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PETITIONER: BOMBAY UNION OF JOURNALISTS & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF BOMBAY & ANR,

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 19/12/1963

BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. WANCHOO, K.N. GUPTA, K.C. DAS

CITATION:  1964 AIR 1617            1964 SCR  (6)  22  CITATOR INFO :  F          1967 SC1206  (9)  E          1975 SC1735  (4)  R          1975 SC2226  (9)  RF         1975 SC2238  (14)  R          1976 SC1474  (9)  E&D        1985 SC 860  (3,5)  R          1985 SC 915  (6)  F          1987 SC 695  (5,6)  R          1990 SC 255  (2,4,5)

ACT: Industrial  Dispute-Reference  by  Government-Discretion  of Government-Industrial  Disputes Act (XIV of 1947),  s.  25F- Scope of-Duty of Government to make a reference.

HEADNOTE: The  appellants  2 and 3 were working journalists  and  they were retrenched on payment of three months salary in lieu of notice.  The first appellant took up their case and  alleged that  the  retrenchment was not bona fide and they  were  in fact victimised.  On the failure of conciliation proceedings a  report was submitted to the State Government  (respondent No. 1).  After hearing the parties concerned the  Government passed an order refusing to refer the dispute.  The  reasons given 23 for  the  refusal were that the termination of  service  was retrenchment and the management did not appear to have acted mala fide.  Thereupon the appellants filed a petition  under Art.  226  of the Constitution praying -for the issue  of  a writ  of mandamus directing the Government to  consider  the matter  afresh.   The single Judge who  heard  the  petition dismissed it and after appealing to a Division Bench without success  the  present  -appeal was filed  by  special  leave granted by this Court. It  was  contended  on behalf of  the  appellants  that  the Government while deciding whether a reference should be made has in fact decided the merits of the case and therefore the order of refusal to refer was illegal.  The other contention was  that the service of notice as required under s.  25F(c) of  the  Act  was mandatory and the  management  not  having

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served such a notice the Government ought to have taken this failure  into  consideration which the  Government  has  not done. Held:     When  the  appropriate  Government  considers  the question  as  to whether any industrial  dispute  should  be referred  for  adjudication or not, it may  consider,  prima facie, the merits of the dispute and take into account other relevant  considerations  which  would help  it  to  ’decide whether  making a reference would be expedient or  not.   If the  dispute  in  question  raises a  question  of  law,  or disputed questions of fact the Government should not purport to  reach final conclusions because these are matters  which would normally be within the jurisdiction of the  Industrial Tribunal.   If  the claim made is patently frivolous  or  is clearly belated or if the impact of the claim on the general relations  between  the employers and the employees  in  the region is likely to be adverse the Government may refuse  to make a reference. The State of Bombay v. K. P. Krishnan, [1961] 1 S.C.R. 227. (ii) Clause (c) of s. 25F of the Act cannot be said to cons- titute  a  condition  precedent which has  to  be  fulfilled before retrenchment can be validly effected even though that clause  has been included under s. 25F along with  cls.  (a) and   (b)   which  prescribe  conditions   precedent.    The observations  in the following cases to the effect  that  s. 25F  (c) is mandatory are clearly in the nature  of  orbiter dicta. State  of  Bombay v. The Hospital Mazdoor  Sabha,  [1960]  2 S.C.R. 866, The District Labour Association, Calcutta v. Ex- Employees  of  Tea Districts Labour  Association,  [1960]  3 S.C.R. 206 and Workmen of Subhong Tea Estate v. The outgoing Management of Subhong Tea Estate, [1964] Y L.L.J. 333 (iii)     Even  if  s. 25F(c) was  constituted  a  condition precedent  it  would not necessarily follow that a  writ  of mandamus  should  be  issued against  the  Government.   The breach  of s. 25F(c) by the Management is a  serious  matter and  the Government normally would refer such a dispute  for adjudication.   But the provision of s. 10(1) read  with  s. 12(5) clearly shows that even where there is a breach of  s. 25F(c) the Government may have to consider the expediency of making a reference.  But 24 if the Government refuses to make a reference for irrelevant considerations, or on extraneous grounds or acts mala fide a party would be entitled to move the High Court for a writ of mandamus.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 497 of 1963. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated September  10, 1960, of the Bombay High Court in Appeal  No. 10 of 1959. Bishan Narain and 1. N. Shroff, for the appellant. H.   N.  Sanyal, Solicitor General of India, V.  S.  Sawhney and R.  H. Dhebar, for respondent.No. 1. S.   V. Gupte, Additional Solicitor-General of India, J.  B. Dadachanji, O. C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for respondent No. 2. December  19, 1963.-The Judgment of the Court was  delivered by GAJENDRAGADKAR  J.-  The principal point of law  which  this appeal  raises for our decision relates to the  construction of section 25F(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947  (No.

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14 of 1947) (hereinafter called the Act).  The Bombay  Union of Journalists which is the Trade Union registered under the Trade  Unions Act, 1926, Mrs. Aruna Mukherji, and Mr. M.  T. Thomas  are appellants 1 to 3; and the State of Bombay,  and the  Indian National Press, Bombay, which is a Private  Ltd. Co.  are  respondents 1 and 2 respectively  in  the  present appeal.   Appellant No. 2 was appointed on the staff of  the second  respondent on a salary of Rs. 500 p.m.  with  effect from 1st January, 1955.  On the 30th November, 1957, she was served  with -- notice of termination of her  services  with effect from 1st December, 1957.  The notice recited the fact that  the  management in Consultation with  the  Editor  had decided  to  retrench  her services.  Appellant  No.  3  Mr. Thomas  who was employed as a Sub-Editor in the ’Free  Press Journal’ some time in 25 1953,  was  similarly served with a notice  of  retrenchment dated  the  30th November, 1957 by which his  services  were terminated  as  from the 1st December, 1957.   In  both  the notices the two appellants respectively were told that their services  had  been  retrenched under section  3(2)  of  the Working  Journalists  (Conditions of  Service)  and  Miscel- laneous  Provisions  Act, 1955, and that in lieu  of  notice they  would be paid their salaries for three  months.   Both the  appellants  collected their salaries for the  month  of November and ceased to work for respondent No. 2 as from the 1st December, 1957. It  appears that appellant No. 1 took up their cause on  the 3rd  December, 1957 and wrote to the  Director-in-charge  of the  second respondent complaining that the action taken  by the   2nd  respondent  smacked  of  vindictiveness   against appellants  2  and 3, and demanded that the  notices  issued should be withdrawn forthwith and they should be  reinstated in  their original posts.  Respondent No. 2 did not  concede the said demand; thereupon, appellant No. 1 moved the Labour Commissioner  of respondent No. 1 for taking further  action in  the  matter.  At that stage,  the  Conciliation  Officer intervened  and called the parties before him.  As a  result of  the discussion held before the Conciliation Officer,  it was discovered that no settlement was possible, and so,  the Conciliation  Officer  submitted a failure report  under  s. 12(4)  of the Act on the 15th April, 1958.  In this  report, the Conciliation Officer expressed his opinion that in  view of the stand taken by the parties, there was no  possibility of  any  settlement, and so, he was compelled  to  record  a failure. After  the matter was thus reported to respondent No.  1  by its Conciliation Officer, both the parties filed their  res- pective statements before respondent No. 1. Respondent No. 1 considered  the said statements and the report submitted  by the Conciliation Officer and came to the conclusion that  it was  not necessary to refer the dispute to a Tribunal  under s. 12(5) of the Act.  This decision was communicated to  the appellants by the Dy.  Secretary, Labour and Social  Welfare Department of respondent No. 1 by his letter dated 1st July, 1958.  It is necessary to set out the reasons given 26 in  this  letter  for  not  referring  the  dispute  to  the Tribunal. These reasons were set out in the letter in  these terms               "(1)  The termination of services of  Shrimati                             Aruna Mukherji and Shri M. T. Thomas a ppears to               be  an act of retrenchment on the part of  the               management for which the management is willing

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             to  pay all the legal dues to  the  retrenched               persons; and               (2)   in  effecting the said  termination  the               management does not appear to have acted  mala               fide    or    vindictively    nor    practised               victimisation for trade union activities." The  appellants then moved the Bombay High Court under  Art. 226  of  the  Constitution for a writ  of  mandamus  against respondent  No.  1. It was urged on their  behalf  that  the refusal  of  respondent No. 1 to refer the  dispute  to  the Industrial  Tribunal under s. 12(5) of the Act was  illegal, and so, they prayed that the High Court should issue a  writ directing respondent No. 1 to consider the matter afresh and decide whether a reference should be made or not.  This writ petition was heard by a single Judge of the said High  Court and was ultimately dismissed.  The appellants challenged the correctness of the said decision by a Letters Patent  Appeal before  a  Division Bench of the High Court.   The  Division Bench  agreed  with  the view taken by  the  learned  single Judge, and so, the appeal was dismissed.  It is against this decision  that  the appellants have come to  this  Court  by special leave. The first contention which has been raised before us by  Mr. Bishan  Narain  on  behalf of the  appellants  is  that  the reasons  given  by respondent No. 1 in refusing  to  make  a reference  show that respondent No. 1 considered the  merits of the dispute and came to the conclusion that the reference would not be justified; and Mr. Bishan Narain contends  that in  dealing with the merits of the dispute,  while  deciding the question as to whether a reference should be made or not under  s.,12(5)  of  the  Act respondent  No.  1  has  acted illegally and improperly.  The relevant scheme of the Act as disclosed  by s. 12 is clear.  When any  industrial  dispute exists or 27 is   apprehended,   the  Conciliation   Officer   may   hold conciliation proceedings in the manner prescribed by s.  12. If  the  Conciliation  Officer’s  efforts  to  bring  out  a settlement  of  the dispute fail, then he  makes  a  failure report  under s. 12(4); -and s. 12(5) provides, inter  alia, that  if  on a consideration ,of the report referred  to  in sub-section (4) the appropriate Government is satisfied that there  is a case for reference to the Tribunal, it may  make such   reference.    It,  however,  adds  that   where   the appropriate  Government does not make such -a reference,  it shall  record and communicate to the parties ,concerned  its reasons  therefor. The argument is that s. 12(5) imposes  an obligation  on  respondent  No.  1  to  record  reasons  for refusing  to  make  a reference; and the  reasons  given  by respondent   No.  1  in  the  present  case  indicate   that respondent No. 1 acted beyond its jurisdiction in proceeding to consider the merits of the dispute while deciding whether the reference should be made or not. This argument must be rejected, because when the appropriate Government considers the question as to whether ,a reference should be made under s. 12(5), it has to act under s.  10(1) of  the  Act,  and  s.  10(1)  confers  discretion  on   the appropriate  Government either to refer the dispute, or  not to refer it, for industrial adjudication according as it  is of  the  opinion that it is expedient to do so or  not.   In other  words,  in  dealing with  an  industrial  dispute  in respect  of which a failure report has been submitted  under s. 12(4) the appropriate Government ultimately exercises its power  under s 10(1), subject to this that s. 12(5)  imposes an  obligation  on it to record reasons for not  making  the

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reference when the dispute has gone through conciliation and a  failure  report  has  been made  under  s.  12(4).   This question  has been considered by this Court in the  case  of the  State  of Bombay v. K. P. Krishnan & Others  (1).   The decision   in  that  case  clearly  shows  that   when   the appropriate Government considers the question as to  whether any industrial dispute should be referred for  adjudication- or  not,  it may consider, prima facie, the  merits  of  the dispute and take into account other relevant  considerations which  would  help it to decide whether making  a  reference would  be expedient or not.  It is true that if the  dispute in question raise questions of law, (1)  [1961] 1 S.C.R. 227. 28 the  appropriate  Government should not purport to  reach  a final  decision on the said questions of law,  because  that would normally lie within the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal.  Similarly, on disputed questions of fact, the ap- propriate  Government  cannot purport to  reach  final  con- clusions, for that again would be the province of the Indus- trial Tribunal.  But it would not be possible to accept  the plea  that  the  appropriate Government  is  precluded  from considering even prima facie the merits of the dispute  when it  decides the question as to whether its power to  make  a reference  should  be  exercised under s.  10(1)  read  with s.12(5), or not. if the claim made is patently frivolous, or is   clearly belated, the appropriate Government may  refuse to   make a reference.  Likewise, if the impact of the claim on   the general relations between the employer and the  em- ploys in the region is likely to be adverse, the appropriate Government may take that into account in deciding whether  a reference should be made or not.  It must, therefore be held that a prima facie examination of the merits cannot be  said to   be  foreign  to  the  enquiry  which  the   appropriate Government  is  entitled to make in dealing with  a  dispute under  s. 10(1), and so, the argument that  the  appropriate Government exceeded its jurisdiction in expressing its prima facie  view on the nature of the termination of services  of appellants 2 and 3, cannot be accepted. Mr.  Bishan  Narain has then urged that the  main  point  of controversy between the parties was in regard to the failure of  respondent  No. 2 to comply with the  provisions  of  S. 25F(c)  of  the  Act and that has  not  been  considered  by respondent  No. 1 while refusing to make a reference in  the present  case.  Section 25F(c) provides that no  workman  to which the said provision applies shall be retrenched by  the employer  until notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government.  It is common ground that notice had not been served by respondent No. 2 on respondent No.  1 as  required  by  s.  25F(c) prior  to  the  termination  of services  of appellants 2 & 3; and the argument is that  the reasons  mentioned by respondent No. 1 in its  communication to  appellant  No.  1  indicating  its  refusal  to  make  a reference, show that this aspect of the matter has not been 29 considered  by respondent No. 1 and that, it is  urged,  in- troduces  a serious infirmity in the said reasons and  calls for  ,a  writ  of mandamus requiring  respondent  No.  1  to rectify  the said omission.  There is no substance  in  this argument.   It appears that the Rules framed  by  respondent No.  1  under  the Act indicate that respondent  No.  1  has construed the provision of s. 25F(c) as being directory  and not  as constituting a condition precedent for the  validity of  retrenchment  under s. 25F.  Rule 80 of the  said  Rules clearly  Shows  that where the employer has  retrenched  the

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employee  by  offering to pay him the  requisite  amount  of remuneration in lieu of notice prescribed by s. 25F(a),  the employer  is  required  to serve the  notice  of  the  -,aid retrenchment within seven days of the date of  retrenchment, and that means that in such a case, the notice has not to be served  on the Government before retrenchment  is  effected. In  other  words, R. 80, it is conceded, treats  the  notice prescribed by s. s 25F(c) as condition subsequent and not  a condition  precedent.  In view of the Rule framed by  itself respondent No. 1 must not have thought it necessary to  make any reference to -the argument urged by the appellants  that respondent  No. 2’s failure to serve a notice on  respondent No.  1  before  retrenchment  was  effected  introduced   an infirmity in the order ;of retrenchment.  Rule 80 framed  by respondent No. 1 was itself an answer to the said plea,  and so,  respondent  No. 1 -may well have thought  that  it  was unnecessary to give that reason in its communication to  the appellants. Besides, in dealing with this contention, it is necessary to remember  that in entertaining an application for a writ  of mandamus against an order made by the appropriate Government under s. 10(1) read with s. 12(5), the Court is not  sitting in  appeal over the order and is not entitled  to  ,consider the  propriety or the satisfactory character of the  reasons given  by the said Government.  It would be idle to  suggest that  in  giving reasons to a party for refusing to  make  a reference under s. 12(5), the appropriate Government has  to write  an elaborate order indicating exhaustively  -all  the reasons  that  weighed in its mind in refusing  to  make  -a reference.  It is no doubt desirable that the party concern- ed  should be told clearly and precisely the reasons why  no reference is made, because the object of s. 12(5) appears 30 to  be to require the appropriate Government to  state,  its reasons  for  refusing  to make a  reference,  so  that  the reasons.  should  stand public scrutiny; but that  does  not mean   that  a  party  challenging  the  validity   of   the Government’s  decision not to make a reference  can  require the  Court in writ proceedings to examine the  propriety  or correctness  of  the said reasons.  If it appears  that  the reasons given show that the appropriate Government took into account  a  consideration which was irrelevant  or  foreign, that no doubt, may justify the claim for a writ of mandamus. But the argument that of the pleas raised by the  appellants two  have  been  considered and not  the  third,  would  not necessarily  entitle  the party to claim a writ  under  Art. 226. That  takes us to the main point which has been  strenuously argued  before  us by Mr. Bishan Narain with regard  to  the construction  of s. 25F(c).  His contention is that just  as s.  25F(a)  and  (b)  are  both  mandatory  and   constitute conditions precedent for valid retrenchment, so is s. 25F(c) mandatory  and  a  condition  precedent.   The   prohibition contained  in s. 25F is put in the negative form and  it  is coupled  with  the  condition that no  retrenchment  can  be effected  until  the three conditions specified  by  clauses (a),. (b) and (c) are satisfied.  The negative form  adopted by  the provision coupled with the use of the  word  "until" which  introduces the three conditions, indicates  that  the conditions  must be first satisfied before retrenchment  can be validly effected.  In this connection, Mr. Bishan  Narain has  referred to the decision of this Court in the State  of Bombay  &  Others v. The Hospital Mazdoor Sabha &  Ors.  (1) where it has been held that the requirement prescribed by s. 25F(b)  is mandatory and has to be complied with  before  an

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industrial  employee  can be retrenched.   Dealing  with  s. 25F(b),  it was observed in that judgment that  clauses  (a) and  (c) of the said section prescribed similar  conditions, though  it was expressly added that the Court was  then  not concerned  to  construe them.  Mr. Bishan  Narain  has  also invited  our  attention to the fact that  in  Tea  Districts Labour   Association,  Calcutta  v.  Ex-Employees   of   Tea Districts (1) [1960] 2 S.C.R. 866. 31 Labour  Association  and Anr.(1), it was conceded  that  the requirement  as  to  notice  prescribed  by  s.  25F(c)  was mandatory and amounted to a condition precedent.   Likewise, it  appears  that in the case of The Workmen of  Subong  Tea Estate  v.  The Outgoing Management of Subong Tea  Estate  & Anr.  (2)  recently  decided  by this  Court,  it  has  been incidentally stated that the three conditions prescribed  by clauses  (a),  (b) and (c) of s. 25F appear prima  facie  to constitute conditions precedent before an industrial workman can be validly retrenched.  In that case, no question  arose about  the construction and effect of the provisions  of  s. 25F and the observations are clearly in the nature of obiter observations  and  even then they indicate  that  the  Court thought  that  prima  facie  the  three  conditions  may  be similar.  No decision of this Court has been cited before us where  this  question has been directly considered  and  de- cided. Mr. Bishan Narain, however, urges, and with some force, that the nomal rule of construction requires that if clauses  (a) and  (b) of s. 25F constitute conditions  precedent,  clause (c) in the context must also receive the same  construction. Prima  facie,  this argument is no doubt attractive;  but  a closer examination of the section shows that clause(c) of s. 25F cannot receive the same construction as clauses (a) and (b) of s. 25F.  Section 25F(a) requires that the workman has to  be given one month’s notice in writing.  indicating  the reasons  for retrenchment, and the period of notice  has  to expire  before  the  retrenchment  takes  place.   It   also provides that the workman can be paid in lieu of such notice wages  for the said period.  It is the latter  provision  of clause  (a) which requires careful consideration in  dealing with  the  character  of the requirement  prescribed  by  s. 25F(c).   This latter provision allows the employer  to  re- trench the workman on paying him his wages in lieu of notice for one month prescribed by the earlier part of clause  (a), and  that means that if the employer decides to  retrench  a workman, he need not give one month’s notice in writing  and wait for the expiration of the said period before he (1)  [1960] 3 S.C.R. 207. (2)  (1964 1 L.L.J. 333). 32 retrenches him; he can proceed to retrench him  straightaway on paying him his wages in lieu of the said notice.  Take  a case  where  retrenchment  is  effected  under  this  latter provision of clause (a); how would the requirement of clause (c)  operate in such a case?  If it is held that the  notice in the prescribed manner has to be served by the employer on the  appropriate Government before retrenching the  employee in  such  a case, it would mean that even in  a  case  where retrenchment  is  effected on payment of wages  in  lieu  of notice  it  cannot be valid unless the requisite  notice  is served  on  the appropriate Government; and  that  does  not appear to be logical or reasonable.  Reading the latter part of  clause (a) and clause (c) together, it seems  to  follow that  in cases falling under the latter part of cl. (a)  the

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notice  prescribed  by cl. (c) has to be  given  not  before retrenchment,  but after retrenchment; otherwise the  option given to the employer to bring about immediate  retrenchment of  the workman on paying him wages in lieu of notice  would be  rendered nugatory.  Therefore, it seems that clause  (c) cannot  be held to be a condition precedent even  though  it has  been  included  under s. 25F  along  with  clauses  (a) and’(b)   which prescribe conditions precedent.The  argument based on the negative form in which the provision is enacted and  the use, of the word "until" no doubt are in favour  of the appellant’s contention, but the context seems to require a  different treatment to the provision contained in  clause (c).  Besides, the requirement introduced by the use of  the word  "until"  is  complied with even on  the  view  we  are inclined   to  take  about  the  nature  of  the   condition prescribed by clause (c), because after the retrenchment  is effected,  the employer has to comply with the condition  of giving notice about the said retrenchment to the appropriate Government,  and that is where the provision in  clause  (c) that  the notice has to be served in +,he prescribed  manner assumes significance.  Rules have been framed by the Central Government  and  the State Governments in  respect  of  this notice and, stated broadly, it does appear that these  Rules do  not require a notice to be served in every  case  before retrenchment   is  effected.   In  regard  to   retrenchment effected on paying the workman his wages in lieu of  notice, the Rules seem to provide that the notice in 33 that  behalf  should be served within the  specified  period prescribed by them; that is to say, under the Rules,  notice in such a case has to be served not before the retrenchment, but after the retrenchment within the specified period.  Mr. Bishan Narain no doubt contends that if his construction  of s. 25F(c) is correct, the Rules would be invalid and that is true;  but  on the view we are inclined to take,  the  Rules framed  by the Government appear to be consistent  with  the policy underlying the provision prescribed by s. 25F(c).  We are,  therefore, satisfied that s. 25F(c) cannot be said  to constitute  a condition precedent which has to be  fulfilled before retrenchment can be validly effected. In this connection, there is one more consideration which is relevant.   We  have  already seen  the  requirement  of  s. 25F(a).   There  is a proviso to s: 25F(a) which  lays  down that  no such notice shall be necessary if the  retrenchment is  under  an  agreement  which specifies  a  date  for  the termination  of services.  Clause (a) of s. 25F,  therefore, affords  a safeguard in the interests of the retrenched  em- ployee;  it  requires the employer either to  give  him  one month’s  notice or to pay him wages in lieu  thereof  before ,he is retrenched.  Similarly, clause (b) provides that  the workman  has  to be paid at the time of  retrenchment,  com- pensation which shall be equivalent to 15 days’ average  pay for every completed year of service, or any part thereof  in excess of six months.  It would be noticed that this payment has  to  be  made  at the time  of  retrenchment,  and  this requirement  again provides a safeguard in the interests  of the workman; he must be given one month’s notice or wages in lieu  thereof and he must get retrenchment  compensation  as prescribed by clause (b).  The object which the  Legislature had in mind in making these two conditions obligatory and in constituting  them  into conditions  precedent  is  obvious. These  provisions have to be satisfied before a workman  can be retrenched.  The hardship resulting from retrenchment has been partially redressed by these two clauses, and so, there is every justification for making them conditions precedent.

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The  same cannot be said about the requirement as to  clause (c).  Clause (c) is not intended to protect the interests of the workman as such.  It is only intended to give intimation to the appropriate Government about the retrenchment, and 134-159 S.C.-3. 34 that only helps the Government to keep itself informed about the  conditions  of employment in the  different  industries within its region.  There does not appear to be present  any compelling  consideration which would justify the making  of the  provision  prescribed  by  clause  (c  )  a   condition precedent  as in the case of clauses (a) & (b).   Therefore, having regard to the object which is intended to be achieved by clauses (a) & (b) as distinguished from the object  which clause (c) has in mind, it would not be unreasonable to hold that  clause  (c),  unlike  clauses (a)  &  (b),  is  not  a condition precedent. There  is one more point which ought to be mentioned  before we  part  with  this appeal.  Even if we had  held  that  s. 25F(c) constitutes a condition precedent, it would not  have been  easy to accept Mr. Bishan Narain’s contention  that  a writ of mandamus should be issued against respondent No.  1. A writ of mandamus could be validly issued in such a case if it  was established that it was the duty and the  obligation of respondent No. 1 to refer for adjudication an  industrial dispute  where the employee contends that  the  retrenchment effected  by the employer contravenes the provisions  of  s. 25F(c).   Can it be said that the appropriate Government  is bound to refer an industrial dispute even though one of  the points   raised  in  the  dispute  is  in  regard   to   the contravention  of a mandatory provision of the Act?  In  our opinion,  the  answer  to this question  cannot  be  in  the affirmative.   Even if the employer retrenches  the  workman contrary to the provisions of s. 25F(c), it does not  follow that a dispute resulting from such retrenchment must  neces- sarily  be  referred for  industrialist  adjudication.   The breach  of  section  25F is no doubt a  serious  matter  and normally the appropriate Government would refer a dispute of this  kind  for industrial adjudication; but  the  provision contained in s. 10(1) read with s. 12(5) clearly shows  that even  where a breach of s. 25F is alleged,  the  appropriate Government  may have to consider the expediency of making  a reference and if after considering all the relevant fact the appropriate Government comes to the conclusion that it would be inexpedient to make the reference, it would ’be competent to  it to refuse to make such a reference.  We ought to  add that  when  we are discussing this legal  position,  we  are necessarily 35 assuming  that the appropriate Government acts honestly  and bona fide.  If the appropriate Government refuses to make  a reference  for irrelevant considerations, or  on  extraneous grounds,  or  acts  mala fide, that,  of  course,  would  be another matter; in such a case a party would be entitled  to move the High Court for a writ of mandamus. The  result  is, the appeal fails and is  dismissed.   There would be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.