14 March 1962
Supreme Court
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BOKARO AND RAMGUR LTD. Vs THE STATE OF BIHAR AND ANOTHER

Bench: SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.(CJ),GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B.,WANCHOO, K.N.,AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA,AIYYAR, T.L. VENKATARAMA
Case number: Writ Petition (Civil) 19 of 1961


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PETITIONER: BOKARO AND RAMGUR LTD.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF BIHAR AND ANOTHER

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 14/03/1962

BENCH: AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA BENCH: AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA AIYYAR, T.L. VENKATARAMA SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.(CJ) GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. WANCHOO, K.N.

CITATION:  1963 AIR  516            1962 SCR  Supl. (3) 831

ACT: Fundamental right --- Right to hold property -  Adjudication as to title pending -Question of infringement,if could arise before   such   adjudication  --   Constitution   of   India Arts.19(1)(f)  31(1) - Bihar Land Reforms Act 1950 (Bihar  1 of 1950), s. 4(h).

HEADNOTE: The  property regarding which the contention is raised  that the fundamental rights of the petitioners under Arts.  19(1) (f) and 31 ( 1) of the Constitution are alleged to 832 have  been infringed is a plot of land within the  Municipal limits of Hazaribagli with certain buildings and  structures thereon,which  originally belonged to the Raja  of  Ramgarh. On January 16, 1948, the Raja leased this property to N  for a  term  of  99 years and sometime  thereafter  settled  his reversionary  interest of the property for the benefit of  a Trust. The  estate  of Ramgarh was notified under s.  3(1)  of  the Bihar  Land  Reforms  Act  for  being  taken  over  by   the Government  of Bihar and in consequence, the  estate  statu- torily vested in the State of Bihar.  A notice was issued to N to show cause why the lease executed in his favour  should not  be set aside under s.4(h) of the act as the  lease  was executed well within the period specified under s. 4(h).   N submitted objections standing that these properties were not covered by s.  4(h).   During the pendency of the enquiry  N surendered   his   leasehold to the trust.The  trust  leased the property to  one 1, who assigned his household  interest in  the  property to  the petitioner  Company.   The present sought  to quas the said proceedings under s.  4(h)  pending before  the Collector wherein an enquiry was having held  as to  the manner in which the property in, question was  being enjoyed  by tile Raja of Ramgarh prior to the  transfer,  by lease for 99 years.  The question is whether any fundamental rights of the petitioner have been infringed by the  enquiry being held. Held, that before a party could complain of an  infringement

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of his fundamental rights to hold property he must establish that be has title to that property and if that title  itself is  in  dispute  and  is  the  subject  of  adjudication  in proceedings  legally  constituted,the cannot  obviously  put forward  any claim based on such title until as a result  of that  enquiry his title established.  It is only  thereafter that the question whether his rights in or to that  property have been improperly or illegally infringed could arise.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Writ Petition No. 19 of 1961. Petition  under  Art. 32 of the Constitution  of  India  for enforcement of Fundamental Rights. A.   V.  Viswantha  Sastri  and  D.  N.  Mukerjee,  for  the petitioners. Bajrang Sahai and S. P. Yarma, for the respondents.                             833 1962.  March 14.  The Judgment of the Court was delivered by AYYANGAR J.-We consider that this petition under Art. 32  of the  Constitution is entirely devoid of merits and  deserves to  be dismissed as misconceived as it does not involve  any question of the infringement of any fundamental right. The  petition  is substantially for the issue of a  writ  of prohibition  directing the Collector of -Hazaribagh  not  to proceed with an enquiry pending before him under s. 4(h)  of the,  Bihar  Land Act and a writ of cortical  to  quash  the proceedings.   The  property regarding which  a  tension  is raised  that the fundamental rights of the petitioner  under Arts.19(1)(f)  and 31(1) of the constitution are alleged  to have been infringed, is a. plot of land within the municipal limits   of  Hazaribagh  in  Bihar  together  with   certain buildings  and structures thereon.  The property  originally belonged to the Ramgarh Raj.  There is a dispute its to  the manner in which this property was being enjoyed by the  then proprietors  and  so  we shall at this  stage  refrain  from saying  anything about it.  On January 16, 1948 the Raja  of Ramgarh  granted a lease of this property in favour  of  his younger  brother Basant Narain-for a term of 99  years.   On April 7, 1949 the Raja settled his reversionary interest  in the property for the benefit of a, Trust under a  registered deed of settlement The estate, of Ramgarh was notified under s.  3 (1) of the, Bihar Land Reforms Act (Bihar I  of  1950) for  being  taken  over by the Government of  Bihar  and  in consequence  the estate statutorily vested in the  State  on and  from November 3, 1951.  Section 4(h) of the Bihar  Land Reforms Act enacts: "The collector shall have power to make inquiries in respect of  any  transfer including the settlement or lease  of  any land comprised in such estate or the transfer of any kind of 834               interest  in  any building used  primarily  as               office or kutcbery for the collection of  rent               of such estate or tenure or part thereof, made               at  any time after the first (lay  of  January               1946 and if he is satisfied that such transfer               was  made  with the object  of  defeating  any               provisions of this Act or causing loss to  the               State   or   obtaining   higher   compensation               thereunder  the  Collector may,  after  giving               reasonable notice to the parties concerned  to               appear  and  be heard and  with  the  previous               sanction  of the State Government, annul  such               transfer, dispossess the person claiming under

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             it  and take possession of such.  property  on               such terms as may appear to the Collector.  to               be fair and equitable." It  will be noticed that the lease in favour of  the  Raja’s younger brother was dated January 16, 1948 and therefore was well  within the period specified in the provision.  It  was the  contention  of  the State that  the  buildings  on  the property  which were the subject of the lease dated  January 16,  1948 were being used by the Raj primarily as an  office or kutcheri for the collection of rent a fact which  however was disputed and is a subject of contest in the  proceedings now sought to be quashed.  On November 27, 1955 a notice was issued to Basant Narain to show cause why the lease executed in  his  favour on January 16, 1948 should not  beset  aside under  the  power conferred upon the Collector by  s.  4(h). Basant  Narain submitted his objections and stated that  the leased  properties  were  not covered by  s.  4(b).   Before however   this   enquiry  was   completed,   Basant   Narain surrendered  his leasehold interest to the assignee  of  the reversion,  viz.,  the  Trust, by a  registered  deed  dated January  1,  1957.  Subsequently on June 1, 1959  the  Trust which  thus  became entitled to the entire interest  in  the property  in its turn leased the property to  one  Bansidhar and about a month later, on July 3, 1959                             835 Bansidhar assigned his leasehold interest in the property to the  petitioner company and that is how the petitioner  came upon the scene. On November 13,1959 the Collector pawed an order  cancelling the lease.  The petitioner who laid claim to a title to  the property  under the assignment in its favour dated  July  3, 1959,  applied to the Collector to set aside his order  both on  the  merits  and also on the ground that  the  order  of November  13, 1959 had been passed to its prejudice  without giving it an opportunity to make its objections even  though by  that  date  it had obtained title to  the  property  and therefore  a  locus  standi to be heard.   We  are  not  now concerned   with  the  correctness  or  otherwise   of   the contention  raised by the petitioner, because the  State  of Bihar  set aside the order of the Collector and  directed  a re-enquiry  and  in this re-enquiry the petitioner  filed  a petition before the Collector on August 9, 1960 setting  out its case. It  was  during the progress of this last enquiry  that  the petitioner moved this Court by the present petition for  the reliefs  which we have already set out.  Pausing here it  is necessary to add that the constitutional validity of s. 4(h) is  not challenged and the case therefore turns  on  whether the  property satisfies the conditions on which the  section is  attracted.  The relief sought in this petition is  based on two allegations: (1) that the land on which the buildings stand  is  raiyati  land and therefore could  not  be  taken possession of by the State under the Bihar Land Reforms  Act and (2) that the buildings standing thereon were  previously used for the residential purpose of the’ Raja and his family and  not  as a kutcheri.  The enquiry  has  been  proceeding before  the Collector in regard to these two points  and  it may  be mentioned that when the petitioner applied  to  this Court for a stay of proceedings before the Collector,,  this Court  passed an order permitting the enquiry  to  continue’ though it stayed the passing of 836 any  order  by the State Government.  It will thus  be  seen that  if the contention of the State is correct  as  regards the  tenure of the property and as regards the  purpose  for

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which the buildings were used, the title of the State to the property would be made out and the petitioner could have  no legitimate grievance.  If, on the other hand, the petitioner establishes in the enquiry the case that it has put  forward in  the petition it is bound to succeed.  Thus the  question whether  petition  has any right to the  property  which  it claims depends wholly on questions of fact which are plainly within the jurisdiction of the authorities constituted under the Bihar Land Reforms Act.  Before a party can complain  of an infringement of his fundamental right to hold property he must establish that he has title to that property and if his title   itself  is  in  dispute  and  is  the   subject   of adjudication  in proceedings legally constituted, he  cannot obviously put forward any claim based on his title until  as a result of that enquiry he is able to establish his  title. It  is only thereafter that the question whether his  rights in  or  to that property have been improperly  or  illegally infringed could arise. In  the  circumstances we consider that the  petitioner  can complain of no infringement of its fundamental right, as  to justify a petition under Art. 32.  The petition is dismissed with costs. Petition dismissed.  837