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PETITIONER: U. P. RASHTRIYA CHINI MILLADHIKARI PARISHAD,LUCKNOW

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF U. P. & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT02/07/1995

BENCH: KULDIP SINGH (J) BENCH: KULDIP SINGH (J) VENKATACHALA N. (J)

CITATION:  1995 AIR 2148            1995 SCC  (4) 738  JT 1995 (5)   474        1995 SCALE  (4)265

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                THE 2ND DAY OF JULY, 1995 Present:           Hon’ble Mr. Justice Kuldip Singh           Hon’ble Mr. Justice N.Venkatachala Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi, Addl.Adv. Genl. (State of U.P.), Mr. D.D.Thakur, Mr. Umesh Chandra, and Mr. Satish Chandra, Sr.Advs, Mr. Arun Kathpalia, Mr.R. Ayyam Perumal, Mr. M. Iqbal Butt, Mr. Manoj Pillai, Mr. Sandeep Dixit, Mr.C. P. Pal, M/s.L.O.Naithani, T.D.Singh, Prashant Kumar, Amander Nath Singh and Ms. V. D. Khanna, Advs. (Mr. Ashok K. Srivastava) Adv. for (State of U. P.) with them for appearing parties.                     JUDGMENT The following Judgment of the Court was delivered: U.P. Rashtriya Chini Mill Adhikari Parishad, Lucknow VERSUS The State of U. P & Others JUDGMENT Kuldip Singh,J.      This interlocutory  application has  been filed  by the High Court  of Judicature at Allahabad through its Registrar in the  Special Leave Petition arising from the judgment and order dated  September 23,  1994 of  High Court of Allahabad (Lucknow Bench)  in U.  P.  Rashtriya  Chini  Mill  Adhikari Parishad vs. State of U.P. and other (Writ Petition No.35951 of 1994). The special leave petition was disposed of by this Court on December 2, 1994 with the following order:      "In view  of the  Full Bench judgment of      the Allahabad  High Court  this  special      leave petition  has become  infructuous.      The special  leave petition  is disposed      of as such."

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    The judgment  in Chini  Mill’s case  is  by  the  Bench consisting of  B. M.  Lall and S.R.Singh,JJ. The question of law decided  by the  Bench in Chini Mill’s case was later on reconsidered by a Full Bench of the High Court which came to the conclusion  that the  judgment of  the Division Bench in Chini Mill’s  case was contrary to the law laid down by this Court in  Nasiruddin Vs. STA Tribunal AIR 1976 BC 331 and as such was  not correctly decided. It was in this background - Chini Mill’s case having been overruled by the Full Bench of the same  court - that this Court did not go into the merits of the  special leave  petition and  disposed of the same as having become infructuous.      The jurisprudence  governing court-functioning  in this country makes  a judgment,  delivered by  a judge or a Bench comprising of  more than  one judges,  the judgment  of  the court and not of the person holding the judicial office. The judgment hold  good till  it is set aside or its correctness is doubted  by the  higher Court.  Once the correctness of a judgment is  doubted by  the higher  court the  judgment  no longer remains  the law  of the land and  is treated as non- est. Judicial  propriety demands that the judge/judges whose judgment has  been rendered  non-est  by  the  higher  court should not  bring their  personal ego  into the  matter  and should bow before the law laid down by the higher court. The facts and circumstances highlighted in this application give the impression  that the  Registry of the High Court is in a state of  helplessness and there is a functional - crisis on the issue  of interpretation  of clause 14 of the High Court (Amalgamation) Order,  1948. The  Registry is being asked to comply with  the "General  Directions" given by the Bench in Chini Mill’s  case despite  the fact  that the said case has been overruled  by the  full Bench  of the  same Court.  We, therefore, grant  permission  to  the  High  Court  to  file special leave petition in this Court against the judgment of the Division  Bench in  Chini Mill’s  case.  We  treat  this interlocutory application  as special  leave petition and we grant special leave in the matter.      The question before the Lucknow Bench of the High Court was whether  the Bench  at Lucknow  or  the  High  Court  at Allahabad had  the territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition  under Article  226  of  the  Constitution  of India. The  answer to  the said question further depended on the interpretation  of the  expression "in  respect of cases arising in such areas in Oudh" occurring in first proviso to Article 14  of the  High Court  (Amalgamation)  Order,  1948 (hereinafter called Amalgamation Order).      The High Court came to the conclusion that in the facts of  the   Chini  Mill’s   case  the  Lucknow  Bench  had  no jurisdiction to  entertain the  writ petition.  According to the Division Bench of the High Court the writ petition could only be filed in the High Court at Allahabad.      Historically, the  territories  with  12  districts  of Lucknow,  Faizabad,  Sultanpur,  Rai  Bareli,  Pratap  Garh, Barabanki, Gonda,  Baharaich,  Sitapur,  Kheri,  Hardoi  and Unnao were  brought under  the then British Crown within the jurisdiction of  the Court of the Judicial Commissioner Oudh at Lucknow.  This was  done under the Government Order dated February 4,  1856 read with the Oudh Civil Courts Act, 1879. In 1925  Oudh Courts  Act was  passed by  the Utter  Pradesh Legislature. The  Chief Court of Oudh with one Chief Justice and  four   puisne  judges  was  established  replacing  the Judicial Commissioner’s  Court. In 1937 by the Government of India (Adaptation  of  Indian  Laws)  Order,  1937,  it  was provided that the Chief Court of Oudh shall consist of Chief Justice and  such other judges as may be appointed under the

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Government of  India Act,  1935. It  was in  this background that the  Governor General  made the Amalgamation Order. The said order came into force on July 19, 1948.      Clause 3  of the  Amalgamation Order  provided that  as from the  appointed day,  namely, July  26, 1948,  the  High Court in  Allahabad and  the Chief  Court in  Oudh would  be amalgamated and  would constitute one High Court by the name of the  High Court of Judicature at Allahabad. The judges of the existing  High Courts,  namely, the Allahabad High Court and the  Oudh Chief  Court became  Judges of  the  new  High Court. The  Chief Justice  of the existing High Court became the Chief  Justice of  the new  High Court. Clause 14 of the Amalgamation order is as under:-      "The new  High Court  and the judges and      division courts  thereof, shall  sit  at      Allahabad or at such other places in the      United Provinces  as the  Chief  Justice      may with the approval of the Governor of      the United Provinces,appoint:           Provided that  unless the  Governor      of  the   United  Provinces   with   the      concurrence   of   the   Chief   Justice      otherwise directs such judges of the new      High Court, not less than two in number,      as the  Chief Courts  may from  time  to      time nominate,  shall sit  at Lucknow in      order to  exercise in  respect of  cases      arising in  such areas  in Oudh,  as the      Chief   Justice    may    direct,    the      jurisdiction  and  power  for  the  time      being vested in the new High Court:           Provided  further  that  the  Chief      Justice may in his discretion order that      any case  or class  of cases  arising in      the  said   areas  shall   be  heard  at      Allahabad."      It would  be useful  to mention  at this stage that the precise question which was before B.M. Lall and S. R. Singh, JJ. in  Chini Mill’s  case was also pending consideration in S.A. 86  of 1994  before a Bench of the Allahabad High Court consisting of  S. R.  Sharma and Shobha Dixit, JJ. The Bench by its  order dated  September 5, 1994 referred the question to a  Full Bench of three judges. It is thus obvious that on September 23,  1994 when  B.M. Lall  and S.  R.  Singh,  JJ. delivered the  judgment in  Chini Mill’s case the matter was pending consideration before a Full Bench of the High Court. Needless to say that the appropriate course for the Division Bench would  have been  to await  the decision  of the  Full Bench which  finally delivered  its judgment on November 15, 1994 over-ruling the Division Bench in Chini Mill’s case.      Before the  High Court  a notification/Order  issued by the Utter  Pradesh Government  at Lucknow, whereunder it was decided to  sell six  sugar factories, was challenged by way of a  writ petition.One  of the  sugar  mills  was  situated within the  Oudh area  whereas the remaining five mills were situated outside the Oudh area. The contention raised before the Lucknow  Bench  was  that  the  sale  in  terms  of  the notification, if  finalised, would  be given  effect at  the places where  the mills  are situated  and since five out of the six  mills were  situated outside  Oudh area the Lucknow Bench had  no jurisdiction to take cognizance, entertain and decide the  writ petition  in respect  of the  five mills in terms of  clause 14  of the Amalgamation Order. The Division Bench of  the  High  Court  accepted  the  contention.  B.M. Lall,J. who  primarily spoke  for the  Bench interpreted the

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relevant expression  in clause  14 of the Amalgamation Order in the following words:      "Thus  in   this   context   if   entire      provision of Clause 14 is read together,      the  true   intent  ingrained   in   the      expression appears to be that the Judges      shall  sit   at  Lucknow   in  order  to      exercise power  and jurisdiction  vested      in the  High Court  in respect  of cases      "pertaining to" Oudh area alone and; not      pertaining to  the area outside the Oudh      area. By  no stretch  of imagination, it      can be  assumed that  the  Judges  while      sitting at  Lucknow can  exercise  power      and jurisdiction  in respect of any area      outside the Oudh area." The learned  Judge supported  the conclusions reached by the Bench on the following reasoning:      "The  theory   of  ’cause   of   action’      originates  from   the  code   of  Civil      Procedure which  is of general character      and is, therefore, a general law. In the      present case, the theory of ’exercise of      jurisdiction revolving  on the  place of      sitting’     originates     from     the      amalgamation  Order  1948  which  is  of      special character  and is  therefore  in      the shape  of special law. It applies to      a limited  contingency  i.e.  where  the      case  falls   within   the   territorial      jurisdiction of  the High  Court and the      Judges sit  at two  places in  order  to      exercise jurisdiction of the High Court.           Thus where the controversy pertains      to the  territorial jurisdiction  of two      different  High  Courts,  certainly  the      theory of ’cause of action’ in the shape      of sub-clause  (2) of Article 226 of the      Constitution of  India comes  into  play      with   full    force   but   where   the      controversy pertains  to the exercise of      jurisdiction of  one High Court as is in      the  present   case,   the   theory   of      ’exercise of  jurisdiction revolving  on      the place of sitting comes into play.           Both   the    theories   have   got      different fields  to operate  but at the      appropriate occasion,  the theory having      characteristic of  special law will have      overriding effect  in preference  to the      theory having  characteristic of general      law, is  the well  settled  position  of      law... as  far as the theory of cause of      action   attracting    jurisdiction   of      Lucknow  Bench   even   in   the   cases      pertaining to  those districts which are      situated  outside   the  oudh   area  is      concerned, Nasiruddin’s  case (supra) is      of no  avail to  the petitioners in view      of the  change in  law with  effect from      1.2.1977 (adding  Explanation to Section      141 C.P.C.)  and in  view of  the dictum      laid down  by  the  Apex  Court  in  the      recent pronouncements in Oil and Natural      Gas  Commission’s   case   (supra)   and

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    Navodaya   Vidayalaya    Samiti’s   case      (supra)."      The Division Bench of the High Court declined to follow the interpretation given to the very same expression by this Court in Nasiruddin’s case on the following reasoning:      "As stated  above, with the commencement      of  Explanation  added  to  Section  141      C.P.C. with  effect from 1.2.1977, since      the application  of  the  provisions  of      C.P.C.  including   Sections  15  to  20      C.P.C. have  been excluded  in the  writ      proceedings hence  assuming partly cause      of action  arose at Lucknow by virtue of      revisional  or  appellate  forums  being      located at  Lucknow, such cases will not      be deemed  to have  arisen in  Oudh area      rather will  be deemed to have arisen in      the districts  where the lis originated.      Thus the  submissions made  by Sri Umesh      Chandra in  this regard  have no legs to      stand after  1.2.1977 and  the aid taken      by Sri  Chandra from  Nasiruddin’s  case      (supra) is  otiose and is of no avail to      the petitioners."      We are  of the view that the Division Bench of the High Court  fell   into  patent   error  in   holding  that   the interpretation placed  by this  Court on  Clause 14  of  the Amalgamation Order  had ceased  to be  operative  after  the incorporation of  the Explanation to Section 141 of the Code of Civil  Procedure. This Court in Nasiruddin’s case did not rely on  the provisions  of the  Code of Civil Procedure. In fact this Court did not even notice any of the provisions of the Code  of Civil Procedure. The Division Bench of the High Court took  shelter behind the Explanation to Section 141 of the code  of Civil  Procedure without  any justification. It created an argument when none existed. We have no hesitation in holding  that the  reasoning of  the High  Court  in  not following the  law laid  down by  this Court in Nasiruddin’s case was wholly perverse.      This Court  in Nasiruddin’s  case speaking through A.N. Ray, CJ dealt with the relevant expression used in Clause 14 of the Amalgamation Order in the following words:      "The  meaning   of  the  expression  "in      respect of  cases arising  in such areas      Oudh" in  the first proviso to paragraph      14 of the order was answered by the High      Court that  with regard  to applications      under Article  226 the  same will be " a      case arising  within the areas in Oudh "      only if  the right  of the petitioner in      such an  application arose  first  at  a      place within  an area  in Oudh"  only if      the right  of the  petitioner in such an      application  arose   first  at  a  place      within an  area in Oudh. The implication      according to  the High  Court is that if      the right  of the petitioner arose first      at any  place outside  any area  in Oudh      and if  the subsequent  orders either in      the revisional  or appellate  stage were      passed by an authority within an area in      Oudh than  in  such  cases  the  Lucknow      Bench would  not have  any jurisdiction.      The factor  which weighed  heavily  with      the High  Court is  that in  most  cases

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    where an appeal or revision would lie to      the State Government, the impugned order      would be  made at  Lucknow and  on  that      view  practically   all  writ  petitions      would arise at Lucknow.           The  conclusion   as  well  as  the      reasoning   of   the   High   Court   is      incorrect. It  is  unsound  because  the      expression  "cause   of  action"  in  an      application under  Article 226  would be      as the  expression is  understood and if      the cause of action arose because of the      appellate order  or the revisional order      which came  to be passed at Lucknow than      Lucknow would  have jurisdiction  though      the original order was passed at a place      outside the  areas in  Oudh. It  may  be      that the original order was in favour of      the person  applying for a writ. In such      case an adverse appellate order might be      the  cause  of  action.  The  expression      "cause of action " is well-known. If the      cause of action arises wholly or in part      at a  place within  the  specified  Oudh      areas,  the   Lucknow  Bench  will  have      jurisdiction. If  the  cause  of  action      arises wholly  within the specified Oudh      areas,  it   is  indisputable  that  the      Lucknow  Bench   would  have   exclusive      jurisdiction in  such a  matter. If  the      cause of  action arises  in part  within      the specified  areas in  part within the      specified areas in Oudh it would be open      to the litigant who is the dominus litis      to  have   his  forum   conveniens.  The      litigant has  the right to go to a Court      where  part   of  his  cause  of  action      arises. In  such cases,  it is incorrect      to say  that the  litigant  chooses  any      particular  Court.   The  choice  is  by      reason of  the jurisdiction of the Court      being attracted  by  part  of  cause  of      action arising  within the  jurisdiction      of the Court. Similarly, if the cause of      action can be said to have arisen partly      within  specified   areas  in  Oudh  and      partly outside the specified Oudh areas,      the litigant  will have  the  choice  to      institute    proceedings    either    at      Allahabad or  Lucknow.  The  Court  will      find  out   in  each  case  whether  the      jurisdiction of  the  Court  is  rightly      attracted  by   the  alleged   cause  of      action."      While reaching  the above conclusion this Court kept in view the  plain language  of clause  14 of  the Amalgamation Order. No  provision of  the Code  of  Civil  Procedure  was noticed, referred to or taken into consideration directly or indirectly. The  territorial jurisdiction of a Court and the "cause of action" are interlinked. To decide the question of territorial jurisdiction  it is  necessary to  find out  the place where  the "cause  of action" arose. We, with respect, reiterate that  the law  laid down  by a Four-Judge Bench of this Court  in  Nasiruddin’s  case  holds  good  even  today despite the  incorporation of  an Explanation to Section 141

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to the Code of Civil Procedure.      There is  no dispute  that the  Amalgamation Order is a special law  which must  prevail over  the general  was This Court interpreted  the relevant  expression in Clause 14 and did  not   take  any  support  from  any  general  law.  The discussion by  the Division  Bench  of  the  High  Court  by evolving the  so called  theory of "exercise of jurisdiction revolving on the place of sitting" as compared to the theory of "cause of action" is wholly misconceived and has no legal basis whatsoever.  This part  of the  High Court judgment is mentioned to be rejected.      Mr. Satish  Chandra, learned  senior advocate appearing for the  appellant has  contended that even on the reasoning of  the  Division  Bench  judgment  itself  the  conclusions reached by  the Bench  are erroneous.  We see  force in  the contention. The Division Bench of the High Court in Ram Rakh Vyas vs. Union of India AIR 1977 Rajasthan 243 (the judgment delivered by  A.P. Sen  , J. as the learned Judge then was), came to  the conclusion  that the words "arising in " in the context, mean  "pertaining to  the districts of" or "arising from". It  is not  disputed that  in the  present  case  the order/notification and  the advertisement were issued by the State  Government   at  Lucknow.   Without  there  being  an order/notification by the Government there could be no cause of action at all. The petitioner got aggrieved only from the order/notification     which  "arose"   from  Lucknow.   The grievance of  the petitioner  "arose" at  Lucknow  which  is within the Oudh area and as such on the plain reading of the relevant provisions  of clause 14 of the Amalgamation Order, the Bench  at Lucknow  had the jurisdiction to deal with the matter.      We have  been  informed  that  review  petition  136/94 against the  impugned judgment  is also  pending before  the High Court.  Apart from that an application to withdraw writ petition No.  35951 of  1994 is also pending before the High Court. We  are informed  that the withdrawal application was initially allowed  by a  Bench at  Lucknow but  later on the arguments were  heard in  the said application once again at Allahabad by the Bench consisting of B.M.Lall and S.R.Singh, JJ. and  the judgment  is reserved.  We  have  further  been informed that  writ petition No. 4158 of 1994 (Satish Mishra vs.  Registrar  High  Court)  -  axising  out  of  the  same proceedings -  is also  pending before the High Court. Since we are setting aside the impugned judgment delivered by B.M. Lall and  S.R. Singh,  JJ. in Chini Mill’s case in toto, all these proceedings  which are  pending before  the High Court would be rendered infructuous.      We allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court dated September 23, 1994 in writ petition No. 35951 of 1994. The  writ petition  before the  High Court shall stand dismissed. No costs.