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PETITIONER: BINDESI-IWARI PRASAD SINGH

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: KALI SINGH

DATE OF JUDGMENT05/08/1976

BENCH: FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA BENCH: FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA BHAGWATI, P.N.

CITATION:  1977 AIR 2432            1977 SCR  (1) 125  1977 SCC  (1)  57  CITATOR INFO :  F          1986 SC1440  (5,11,14)

ACT:         Code  of  Criminal Procedure  1908--Whether  Magistrate  has         jurisdiction  to recall dismissal order made u/s 203--Appli-         cation  for  recalling dismissal order  whether  amounts  to         fresh complaint.

HEADNOTE:         The respondent’s complaint against the appellant regarding a         trivial  matter was tossed for three years  between  various         magistrates  for inquiry and report without  conclusive  re-         sults,  and  was ultimately dismissed  under  section    203         Cr.P.C.  Thereafter on an application by the respondent  for         recalling his dismissal order, the Magistrate again sent/the         case  for  inquiry  ultimately  issued process  against  the         accused.         The  appellant contended before this Court that  the  Magis-         trate had no jurisdiction to recall his order of  dismissal.         According  to the respondent, his application for  recalling         the dismissal-order, would amount to a fresh complaint.         Allowing the appeal, this Court,         HELD:  (1 ) There is absolutely no provision in the Code  of         Criminal  Procedure  of 1908 (which applies  to  this  case)         empowering a Magistrate to review or recall an order  passed         by him.  Unlike section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code, the         subordinate criminal courts have no  inherent  powers. After         having  passed  the  order,  the  Sub-Divisional  Magistrate         became functus officio and had no power to review or  recall         that order on any ground whatsoever.  [126 G-H; 127 A]         (2) There was no fresh complaint and it is now well  settled         that  a second complaint can be only on fresh facts or  even         on  the previous facts only if a special case is  made  out.         [127 C-D]         Pramatha  Nath Taluqdar v. Saroj Ranjan Sarkar,  [1962]  (2)         S.C.R. Supp.    297, followed.

JUDGMENT:                      CRIMINAL   APPELLATE   JURISDICTION:   Criminal                  Appeal No. 74

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                of 1976.                  Appeal  by  Special  Leave from  the  Judgment  and                  ’Order dated                  28-7-75  of the Patna High Court in Criminal  Revi-                  sion No. 1046 of 1972.                     A.K. Sen and A.K. Nag for the Appellant.                     D. Gobrudhan, for the respondent.                     The Judgment of the Court was delivered by            FAZAL  ALI, J. This appeal by special leave exhibits  the         careless  and  cavalior manner in which  the  Sub-Divisional         Magistrate  appears to have dealt with the  complaint  filed         before  him  as far back as 21st February, 1966.   The  com-         plaint  itself contains allegations of a very petty  nature,         of  which  hardly any cognizance could have been  taken  and         which  would  be  a trivial act under  Sec.  95   of  Indian         Penal Code for which no criminal proceedings could be taken.         There were proceedings under Section 107 between the parties         and both         126         parties applied for copies of .these proceedings on the 20th         December,  1965.   It is alleged in the complaint  that  the         appellant got the copy which was meant for the  complainant,         by  signing  his  name. The complainant also got his copy  a         few  days after eventually.  Such a small matter could  have         been  resolved by the Magistrate himself if he  had  persued         the  complaint carefully and was certainly not a  ,   matter         for  which a detailed inquiry under section 202,   Code   of         Criminal Procedure, 1908 was called for.  It appears, howev-         er, that the Magistrate tossed the complaint from one Magis-         trate to another for inquiry and report, without  conclusive         results,  starting from 21st February 1966 to 23rd  November         1968,  that is, for a period of more than two years.   Ulti-         mately,  on the 23rd November, 1968 the complaint  was  dis-         missed under section 203 of the Criminal Procedure   Code on         the  ground  that the complainant was  absent  and  did  not         show any interest in the inquiry ordered by the Court.              On  the 7th of December, 1968 the  respondent  appeared         before the Magistrate and filed an application for recalling         his order.  The Magistrate passed no orders on this applica-         tion  but he sent the case’ for inquiry to Mr.  K.P.  Sinha,         another Magistrate.  Thereafter, the matter was sent to  Mr.         S.N. Dube on 30th of October, 1969.  Mr, Dube reported  that         the  inquiry  had been completed and hence he  returned  the         papers. of inquiry to  the  Magistrate.  On  9th  of  Decem-         ber, 1970, the Magistrate recalled the inquiry from Mr. K.P.         Sinha and transferred to Mr. A.R. Ansari and on the basis of         his  report, the learned Magistrate passed the order  taking         cognizance of the case and summoned the accused by his order         dated 3-5-1972, and issued processes against the appellants.         It would thus appear that a very petty matter was allowed to         have  a  long and chequered career  because  the  Magistrate         refused to apply his mind either to the’ allegations made in         the complaint or to control the proceedings before him.               In support of the appeal Mr, Nag has submitted a short         point. He has contended that the Magistrate had no jurisdic-         tion  to recall the order dated 23-11-1968, by which he  had         dismissed  the  complaint under Section 203 of the  Code  of         Criminal   Procedure.  In  fact, there was no express  order         recalling  the  order  dismissing the complaint,  but  by  a         process  of deeming fiction the Magistrate thought that  the         order dismissing the complaint stood recalled.               We  might mention that the order dated 23rd  November,         1968 was a judicial order by which the Magistrate had  given         full  reasons  for  dismissing  the  complaint.    Even   if         the  Magistrate  had any jurisdiction to recall this  order,

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       it  could have  been  done  by another judicial order  after         giving  reasons that he was satisfied that a case  was  made         out  for recalling the order.  We, however, need not  dilate         on  this point because there is absolutely no  provision  in         the  Code  of Criminal Procedure of 1908 (which  applies  to         this  case) empowering a Magistrate to. review or recall  an         order passed by him. Code of Criminal Procedure does contain         a  provision  for  inherent powers,  namely,  Section  561-A         which,  however, confers these powers on the High Court  and         the High Court alone.  Unlike Section 151         127         of  Civil  Procedure Code, the subordinate  criminal  courts         have  no inherent powers.  In these  circumstances,   there-         fore,   the  learned Magistrate had absolutely no  jurisdic-         tion  to  recall the order dismissing  the  complaint.   The         remedy  of the respondent was to move the Sessions Judge  or         the High Court in revision.  In fact after having passed the         order dated 23-11-1968, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate became         functus  officio  and had no power to review or recall  that         order  on  any ground whatsoever.  In  these  circumstances,         therefore,  the order even if there be one, recalling  order         dismissing the complaint, was entirely without jurisdiction.         This being the position, all subsequent proceedings  follow-         ing upon recalling the  said  order,would fall to the ground         including  order dated 3-5-1972 summoning the accused  which         must  also be treated to be a nullity and destitute  of  any         legal effect.  The High Court has not at all considered this         important aspect of the matter which alone was sufficient to         put an end to these proceedings.  It was suggested by Mr. D.         Goburdhan  that the application given by him  for  recalling         the  order of dismissal of the complaint would amount  to  a         fresh complaint. We are, however, unable to agree with  this         contention  because there was no fresh complaint and  it  is         now  well  settled that a second complaint can lie  only  on         fresh facts or even on the previous facts only if a  special         case  is  made  out.  This has been held by  this  Court  in         Pramatha Nath Taluqdar v. Saroj Ranjan Sarkar(1).  For these         reasons therefore, the appeal is allowed.  The Order of  the         High  Court  maintaining the order of the  Magistrate  dated         3-5-1972 is set aside and the order of the Magistrate  dated         3-5-1972 summoning the  appellant is hereby quashed.         M.R.         Appeal allowed.         (1)  [1962] 2 Supp. S.C.R. 297.         128