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PETITIONER: BIHAR STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD, PATNA AND ORS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: GREEN RUBBER INDUSTRIES AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT24/11/1989

BENCH: SINGH, K.N. (J) BENCH: SINGH, K.N. (J) FATHIMA BEEVI, M. (J)

CITATION:  1990 AIR  699            1989 SCR  Supl. (2) 275  1990 SCC  (1) 731        JT 1989 (4)   421  1989 SCALE  (2)1196  CITATOR INFO :  F          1990 SC 706  (4,5)

ACT:     Electricity  Supply  Act  1948--Sections  5:7,  23   and 49’Consumer-Liability    to    pay    minimum     guaranteed charges--Agreement-Validity of.

HEADNOTE:     The  Respondent firm made an application to  the  appel- lantElectricity  Board for the supply of 60 KVA  electricity and   the   Board  entered  into  an  agreement   with   the Respondent-firm in that behalf and gave electricity  connec- tion  on 13.4.1981. Thereafter the  Respondent-firm  applied for  reduction  of electricity from 60 KVA to 45 KVA  and  a fresh  agreement was executed on May 2, 1981 and fresh  con- nection of 45 KVA was given on 29.5.1981. It is respondent’s case  that  it  had  requested  the  Electricity  Board   on 19.6.1981  to  cut off the Electricity.  The  firm  received Bills  for minimum guaranteed charges for four  months  i.e. from June to September 1981. The firm refuted its  liability to pay the bill on the ground that it consumed no electrici- ty during the aforesaid period of 4 months. Consequent  upon the  firm’s failure to pay the Bill, the Board  disconnected the electricity connection on 28.9.1981. The firm ultimately received a bill for Rs.22,951.50p for the period  commencing from  June to August 1981. On the firm’s failure to pay  the Bill, the Board sent a requisition to the Certificate  Offi- cer who sent a notice to the firm on 6.7.1981. The  Certifi- cate  Officer rejected the plea of the firm that it was  not liable to pay the Bill and proceeded to attach the  property of  the  firm. Being dissatisfied with the action,  the  re- spondent  firm filed a Writ Petition in the High  Court  for quashing the bills as also the certificate proceedings.     The  High  Court  took the view that  the  Board  itself having  disconnected the connection, it was not entitled  to any  charges for the period after September 1981 and it  was not open to the Board to contend that under clause 9 of  the agreement  it was not open to either party to terminate  the agreement of minimum guaranteed charges before the expiry of two  years  from the date of the agreement. The  High  Court accordingly  quashed, the bills as well as  the  certificate

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proceedings  but  allowed the charges for July,  August  and September 1981 to be adjusted against the security money. 276     The  Electricity Board has therefore filed  this  appeal after obtaining Special Leave. Allowing the appeal, this Court,     HELD:  A supply.agreement to a consumer makes his  rela- tion  with the Board mainly contractual, where the basis  of supply  is held to be statutory rather than contractual.  In cases where such agreements are made, the terms are supposed to have been negotiated between the consumer and the  Board, and  unless  specifically assigned, the  agreement  normally would  have  affected  the consumer with whom  it  is  made. [286D-E]     The  agreement was reasonable and valid and it  was  not determined with the disconnection of supply to the  respond- ent-firm.  The  liability  to  pay  the  minimum  guaranteed charges, therefore, continued till the determination of  the contract.  The  Board was therefore entitled to  submit  the bills  and make the demand on that account and  recover  the same according to law. [285F-G]

JUDGMENT:     CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.  220  of 1987.     From the Judgment and Order dated 22.5.1986 of the Patna High  Court  in Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No.  19  15  of 1986. Soli J. Sorabjee and Ranjit Kumar for the Appellants. B .D. Sharma and S.K. Jain for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     K.N. SAIKIA, J. This appeal by special leave is from the Judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Patna dated  May 22,  1986 in Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 19 15 of  1986 quashig the bills issued by the appellants demanding minimum guaranteed charges from the respondents.     The  appellants  Bihar State Electricity  Board,  Patna, hereinafter  referred  to .as ’the Board’, entered  into  an agreement with the respondent--M/s. Green Rubber Industries, a  partnership firm, hereinafter referred to as ’the  firm’, on  the  latter’s  application dated 26th  July,  1978,  for supplying  the electricity of 60 KVA and on 13.4. 1981  gave electricity connection. The firm later applied that it 277 may  be given 45 KVA instead of 60 KVA and it deposited  the requisite sum of Rs.2700 and a fresh agreement was  executed on  May  2, 1981. On May 29, 1981 the firm was  given  fresh connection of 45KVA. According to the firm it requested  the Board  on  19.6. 1981 to cut off the  connection.  The  firm received  the bills for minimum guaranteed charges  for  the months  of  June, July, August and September,  1981,  though according  to  it no electricity was consumed by  it  during that  period. According to the Board on failure to  pay  the bills, the supply was disconnected on 28th September,  1981. The  firm  ultimately received a demand notice  in  October, 1981 for the minimum guaranteed charges from June,  1981  to August,   1981 amounting to Rs.22,95 1.50p. The firm  having not  paid  the amount, the Board sent a requisition  to  the Certificate Officer who sent a notice to the firm on July 6, 1984.  Rejecting the contention of the firm that it was  not liable to pay, the Certificate Officer proceeded to pass  an order  for attachment of the firm’s property  wherefore  the firm  filed a writ petition in the High Court of  Judicature

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at  Patna under Article 226 and 227 of the  Constitution  of India  for  quashing the bills as well  as  the  certificate proceedings.     Before the High Court the Board contended that the  firm was liable to pay the minimum guaranteed charges in terms of the agreement, the disconnection itself having been in terms thereof.     The  High  Court  took the view that  the  Board  itself having effected the disconnection it was not entitled to any charges for the period after September, 1981 and it was  not open  to  the Board to contend that under clause  9  of  the agreement  it was not open to either party to terminate  the agreement of minimum guaranteed charges before the expiry of two  years from the date of the agreement. In that  view  of the matter, the High Court quashed the bills as well as  the certificate  proceedings,  but allowed the charges  for  the months  of July, August and September, 1981 to  be  adjusted against the security money.     Mr. Soli J. Sorabjee, the learned counsel for the appel- lants,  submits, inter alia, that the firm under the  agree- ment was liable to pay the minimum guaranteed charges  irre- spective  of whether energy was consumed or not  during  the period of the agreement and that disconnection of the supply on  failure  of the firm to pay the energy bills  would  not affect  the  obligation; and that the High Court  fell  into error  in holding that the Board itself having  disconnected the energy supply line it could not claim minimum guaranteed charges thereafter. 278       None appears for the respondents despite notice in the regular as  well as substituted manner of service.     The  question to be decided is whether despite the  fact that the supply line was disconnected on September 28, 1981, the  firm  was still liable to pay  the  minimum  guaranteed charges  under  the  agreement. The answer  depends  on  the agreement  itself  and the relevant provi-   sions  of  law. Clause 4 of the agreement says:                     "The Consumer shall pay to the Board for               the energy so                     supplied and registered or taken to have               been supplied as                     aforesaid   at  the  appropriate   rates               applicable to the Con-                     sumer according to the tariffs framed by               the Board and                     enforced from time to time, the present-               ly enforced tariffs                     being indicated in the Schedule to  this               agreement for easy                     reference. Such reference is subject  to               provisions of       clause 15 appearing  here-               inafter.                        Provided  that  notwithstanding  any-               thing said above but subject to the provisions               of  clause 13 hereinafter, the Consumer  shall               have  to pay minimum charges as  specified  in               the above said tariffs framed by the Board and               enforced  from  time to time  irrespective  of               whether  energy to that extent has  been  con-               sumed  or not. (Such minimum charges  are  re-               ferred to as "the minimum guaranteed  charges"               in other places in this agreement.)                        That   part  of  minimum   guaranteed               charges as is not billed monthly, the  assess-               ment  for the same will be generally  made  at

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             the  end of the year commencing from  the  1st               April,  and ending with the 31st March of  the               following year which is the financial year  of               the  Board. In case any agreement  is  entered               into  in  between this period the  above  said               part of the minimum guaranteed charges will be               proportionate  to  the period  for  which  the               Consumer is connected. Any bill on account  of               the  minimum  guaranteed consumption  for  the               year or part thereof will be submitted by  the               end of June in each year." From  a perusal of the above clause it would be  clear  that the  minimum  guaranteed  charges would be  payable  by  the consumer  irrespective of whether energy to that extent  has been  consumed  or not. Indeed, there would be no  need  for such a provision if the charges were to 279 depend only on the energy actually consumed.               Clause 5 of the agreement is to the  following               effect:               "(a)  Readings of meter shall be taken by  the               Board once in each month or such other  inter-               vals or times as the Board shall deem  expedi-               ent  and the Board’s meter reader  shall  have               access  to  the  consumer’s  premises  at  all               reasonable time for the purpose of taking such               readings.  The Board shall  within  reasonable               time  deliver  to the Consumer  the  bill  for               energy consumed during the month in accordance               with the readings of the meters and subject to               the  minimum guaranteed charges. The  consumer               shall pay the amount under the bill so  deliv-               ered within the due date specified therein  as               per  terms of the tariffs framed by the  Board               and enforced from time to time.               (b) If the consumer fails to pay the amount of               any  bill due under this agreement within  the               due date specified in the bill referred to  in               clause 5(a) above, he shall pay a surcharge at               the  rate given in the tariffs framed  by  the               Board  and enforced from time to time. If  the               amount of such a bill remains unpaid after the               due date specified in the bill, the Board  may               discontinue  the supply after giving the  Con-               sumer not less than 7 clear days’ notice.  The               service will be reconnected only on receipt of               full  payment for all obligations  outstanding               up to the date of reconnection and charges for               the work of disconnection and reconnection  of               service. ’ ’ On  a perusal of this clause there arises no doubt  that  if the  amount  of a bill submitted according  to  law  remains unpaid  after the due date specified in the bill, the  Board may  discontinue  the supply after giving the  consumer  not less  than 7 clear days’ notice. There is no  dispute  about notice in this case.     Clauses 8 and 9 of the agreement deal with its  duration and termination. Clause 8 of the agreement says:               "The  agreement shall be  ordinarily  enforced               for a period of not less than two years in the               first instance (except in exceptional cases in               which written consent of the Board will               280               be  taken)  from the date of  commencement  of               supply, i.e. ..........  and thereafter  shall

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             continue from year to year until the agreement               is determined as hereinafter provided.                    Note: In case where the date of commence-               ment of supply is a date subsequent to that of               the execution of this agreement, the Board  is               given  power to fill in the date in the  blank               space.  provided for the same in  this  clause               with  prior  intimation to the  Consumer.  The               Consumer can produce his copy of the agreement               to have such date filled in by the Board." Clause 9 Provides:               "(a) The consumers shall not be at liberty  to               determine this agreement before the expiration               of two years from the date of commencement  of               supply  of energy. The consumer may  determine               this agreement with effect from any date after               the  said  period of giving to the  Board  not               less than one calendar month’s previous notice               in writing in that behalf and upon the expira-               tion of the period of such notice this  agree-               ment shall cease and determine without  preju-               dice to any right which may then have  accrued               to  the Board hereunder, provided always  that               the consumer may at any time with the previous               consent  of the Board transfer or assign  this               agreement  to any other person and  upon  sub-               scription  of  such  transfer  this  agreement               shall  be  binding on the transferee  and  the               Board  and take effect in all respects  as  if               the  transferee  had originally been  a  party               hereto  in  place of the  consumer  who  shall               henceforth  be discharged from  all  liability               under or in respect thereof.               (b)  In case the consumer’s supply is  discon-               nected by the Board in exercise of its  powers               under this agreement and/ or law and  consumer               does not apply for reconnection in  accordance               with  law within the remainder period  of  the               above given compulsorily availing of supply or               that of notice whichever be longer, he will be               deemed  to have given a notice on the date  of               disconnection in terms of the aforesaid clause               9(a)  for the determination of  the  agreement               and  on  expiry of the  above  said  remainder               period  of compulsorily availing of supply  or               notice  whichever  is longer,  this  agreement               shall  cease and determine in the same way  as               above." 281     Thus  it is seen that the consumer cannot determine  the agreement before expiry of two years and there is nothing to show  in this case that he did so after expiry thereof  with previous notice. In fact the supply was disconnected by  the Board  for default. What would be its effect on  the  agree- ment?     It  is seen that in case of disconnection of the  supply by  the Board in exercise of its powers under the  agreement it would be open for the consumer to apply for  reconnection in  accordance with the law within the remainder  period  of the  above given compulsorily availing of supply or that  of notice whichever is longer, he will be deemed to have  given a notice on the date of disconnection in terms of  aforesaid clause 9(a) for determination of the agreement and on expiry of  the remainder period of compulsorily availing of  supply or  notice, whichever is longer, the agreement  shall  cease

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and  determine.  It is therefore clear that in  the  instant case the disconnection on the default of the cosumer having’ been  effected  on  28.9.1981 and the  consumer  having  not applied for reconnection, it would be deemed to have given a notice on the date of disconnection in terms of clause  9(a) for  the  determination of the agreement and  the  agreement must  be taken to have ceased and determined either  at  the end of the notice or at the end of the period of compulsori- ly availing of supply i.e. two years of the agreement which- ever was longer. The (fresh) agreement having been  executed on  May 4, 1981 it would expire on May 1, 1983. The  discon- nection  having  been  effected on September  28,  1981  the period  of  deemed notice of seven days expired  before  the period  of compulsorily availing of supply under the  agree- ment expired and hence the agreement must be deemed to  have determined  only  on  May 1, 1983. During  this  period  the consumer’s  liability to pay the minimum guaranteed  charges must be held to have continued.     Mr. Soli J. Sorabjee submits, and we think rightly, that the High Court overlooked this important stipulation in  the agreement which was binding on both the parties. However, as the  respondents are not before us, it is necessary to  con- sider  the  reasonability of the stipulation as  to  minimum guaranteed charges as argued by the learned counsel for  the appellant  Board. Was there any power of the Board to  enter into the agreement? If so, to what extent?     The  Indian  Electricity Act, 1910,  hereinafter  called ’the  Act’. provides the law relating to the supply and  use of  electrical  energy. As defined in s. 2(11)  of  the  Act "State Electricity Board" in relation to any State means the State Electricity Board, if any consituted for the 282 State under section 5 of the Electricity (Supply) Act,  1948 (54 of 1948) and includes any Board which functions in  that State  under  sections  6  and  7  of  the  said  Act.   The appellant--the Bihar State Electricity Board is a Board.  As defined in section 2(h) "licensee" means any person licensed under Part II to supply energy. The appellant Board is  such a licensee under this provision. As defined in section  2(c) "consumer" means any person who is supplied with energy by a licensee or the Government or by any other person engaged in the  business of supplying energy to the public  under  this Act  or any other law for the time being in force,  and  in- cludes  any  person whose premises are for  the  time  being connected for the purpose of receiving energy with the works of  a licensee, the Government or such other person, as  the case  may  be.  There is no doubt that  the  respondent  was consumer.     The  Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, hereinafter  called the  ’Supply Act’, is an Act to provide for the  realisation of  the production and supply of electricity, and  generally for taking measures conducive to electrical development  and for all matters incidental thereto.     Under sub-section (1) of section 23 of the Act, a licen- see  shall  not, in making any agreement for the  supply  of energy, show any undue preference to any person. Thus,  this section  envisages  making of an agreement by  the  licensee with  the  consumer for the supply of  energy.  The  instant agreement  has,  therefore, to be held as one  envisaged  by this  provision. Was the stipulation to pay minimum  guaran- teed charges, irrespective of whether energy was consumed or not,  reasonable and valid? What is the  consideration  when less or no energy is consumed?     Section  49  of the Supply Act makes provision  for  the sale  of  electricity  by the Board to  persons  other  than

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licensees.  Under subsection (1), subject to the  provisions of the Supply Act and the Regulations, if any, made in  this behalf,  the Board may supply electricity to any person  not being a licensee upon such terms and conditions as the Board thinks  fit  and may for the purpose of  such  supply  frame uniform  tariff.  Under sub-section (2)  thereof  nothing  m sub-sections  (1) and (2) shall derogate from the  power  of the  Board if it considers it necessary or expedient to  fix different  tariffs  for  the supply of  electricity  to  any person not being a licensee, having regard to the geographi- cal  position  of  any area, the nature of  the  supply  and purpose for which supply is required and any other  relevant factors. Sub-section (2) enumerates the factors to be consi- derd by the Board in fixing the uniform tariffs. 283     It is seen that the rule of charging minimum  guaranteed charges has been in vogue since long. In the London Electric Supply  Corporation  (Limited) v. Priddis, 18  TLR  64,  the agreement between the appellant company and the consumer  to supply  electricity in clause 4 provided that the  "consumer shall  have  the option at or after the expiration  of  five years  from  the  date of installation"  of  purchasing  the installation  at  a price. CI. 7 said: "The  consumer  shall until  purchase  as aforesaid pay quarterly  to  the  supply company  for the use of the installation 3/4d. per Board  of Trade  Unit for every unit of electrical energy supplied  to the said premises and the minimum payment in any year  shall be  Is. for each eight-candle power lamp or  its  equivalent installed." During the period from Mid-summer to Michaelmas, 1900, the defendant did not use any electricity supplied  by the plaintiff, and the question was whether under the agree- ment  the  defendant was bound to pay  the  minimum  payment provided for by cl. 7, even though in fact he had used  none of the plaintiff’s electricity during the quarter. The  Lord Chief  Justice in giving judgment said that "it  was  suffi- ciently clear that the installation was put in on the  terms that  the  customer should have the right  to  purchase  the installation  after five years, and during that  five  years the  customer should be liable to pay minimum  rent  whether the  current was de facto used or not. The minimum rent  had no  reference  to the amount of current used,  and  it  was, therefore,  clear that the mere fact that the defendant  had not taken any current or a small current did not affect  the case." Channel. J. concurring said that the "meaning of  the clause  was that the minimum rent did not merely  cover  the actual  use but the right to use the current.  The  customer had to pay for the right to use the current, although he did not in fact use it."     In  Saila  Bala  v. Darjeeling  Municipality,  AIR  1936 Calcutta 265, it was held by a learned single Judge that the minimum  charge  was not really a charge which had  for  its basis  the  consumption of electric energy.  It  was  really based  on the principle that every  consumer’s  installation involved the licensee in certain amount of capital  expendi- ture in plant and mains on which he was to have a reasonable return.  He could get a return when the energy was  actually consumed, in the shape of payments of energy consumed.  When no such energy was consumed by the consumer, or a very small amount  was  consumed in a longer period, the  licensee  was allowed to charge minimum charges by his licence, but  those minimum  charges were really interest on his capital  outlay incurred for the particular consumer. Natesan, J. in Natesa Chettiar v. The Madras State Electric- ity 284

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Board,  [1969]  1  Madras L.J. 69,  answering  the  question whether  the provision for the minimum guarantee was just  a stipulation by way of penalty or pre-determined damages  for breach  on the part of the consumer or something else,  held the  view that the minimum fixed was only consideration  for keeping the energy available to the consumer at his end;  it was  not  a penalty for not consuming a stated  quantity  of energy  but was a concession shown up to the  amount  fixed, energy at a specified rates could be consumed free, consump- tion beyond only had to be paid for. The statutory basis for the  terms  in the agreement providing  for  minimum  annual charge was found in section 22 of the Act and section 48  of the Supply Act. Section 22 deals with obligation on licensee to supply energy. The proviso to the section says:               "No person shall be entitled to demand, or  to               continue to receive, from a licensee a  supply               of  energy for any premises having a  separate               supply unless he has agreed with the  licensee               to pay to him such minimum annual sum as  will               give  him a reasonable return on  the  capital               expenditure,  and  will cover  other  standing               charges  incurred by him in order to meet  the               possible  maximum demand for  those  premises,               the  sum payable to be determined in  case  of               difference or dispute by arbitration." Section 48 of the Supply Act empowers the licensee to  carry out arrangement under that Act.     In  Watkins  Mayor & Co. v. Jullundhur  Electric  Supply Co.,  AIR  1955 Punj. 133 (136), it was  observed  that  the whole  scheme  of the Act seems to show that  the  provision made  in  any contract for a minimum charge  was  really  to provide for a fair return on the outlay of the licensee, and it was for this reason that the law allowed the contract  of this kind to be entered into. Clause XI A of the schedule to the Act, as it then stood, provided:               "A  licensee may charge a consumer  a  minimum               charge for energy of such amount and determine               in  such  manner as may be  specified  by  his               licence,  and  such minimum  charge  shall  be               payable  notwithstanding  that no  energy  has               been  used by the consumer during  the  period               for which such minimum charge is made." The Court accordingly held that there was nothing illegal in the insertion of the term for payment of a minimum charge in the agreement for 285 supply of energy and held that it had not been made out that it was an unreasonable levy.     A Division Bench of Allahabad High Court, in Hari  Shan- kar & Ors. v. U.P. State Electricity Board & Anr., AIR  1974 Allahabad 70, held that when the electrical supply was being made on the footing that the consumer would pay the  minimum guaranteed  charges  that charge was one of  the  terms  and conditions for supply and fixation of that would be included in  the fixation rates ;or the supply of electricity.  Simi- larly  in M/s. Bhagwan Industries Pvt. Ltd. Lucknow v.  U.P. State Electricity Board, Lucknow, AIR 1979 Allahabad 249,  a Division  Bench held that an agreement for supply  of  elec- tricity with the Board empowered it to revise the rates  and that  imposition  of minimum  consumption  guarantee  charge imposed  by  new  tariff schedule under section  49  of  the Supply Act was valid. A Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Md. Abdul,Gaffar v. Andhra Pradesh Electricity Board, [1975] 1 APLJ 119, also held that fixation of monthly minimum charges based on connected load and revisional rates

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for  electrical  consumption by  non-domestic  consumers  in accordance  with  the factors in section 49(2)  was  neither ultra vires nor arbitrary.     The  High Court in the case at hand relied on  Rajeshwar Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1983 Patna 194, wherein it  was held  that  when the disconnection of  electric  energy  was effected by the Board then it could not ask for the  minimum guaranteed  charges. That decision must be confined  to  the facts of that case only.     It  is true that the agreement is in a standard form  of contract.  The standard clauses of this contract  have  been settled over the years and have been widely adopted  because experience shows that they facilitate the supply of electric energy. Lord Diplock has observed: "If fairness or  reasona- bleness were relevant to their enforceability the fact  that they  are widely used by parties whose bargaining  power  is fairly  matched would raise a strong presumption that  their terms  are fair and reasonable." Schroder Music Co. Ltd.  v. Macaulay,  [1974] 3 All ER 6 16 (624). In such  contracts  a standard  form  enables the supplier to say:  "If  you  want these goods or services at all, these are the only terms  on which they are available. Take it or leave it." It is a type of contract on which the conditions are fixed by one of  the parties in advance and are open to acceptance by anyone. The contract,  which  frequently  contains  many  conditions  is presented  for acceptance and is not open to discussion.  It is settled law that a person who signs a 286 document which contains contractual terms is normally  bound by them even though he has not read them, even though he  is ignorant  of the precise legal effect. In view of  clause  4 having formed one of the stipulations in the contract  along with  others it cannot be said to be nudurn pactum  and  the maxim  nudum pactum ex quo non oritur actio does not  apply. Considered  by the test of reasonableness it cannot be  said to be unreasonable inasmuch as the supply of electricity  to a  consumer  involves  incurring  of  overhead  installation expenses by the Board which do not vary with the quantity of electricity consumed and the installation has to be  contin- ued  irrespective of whether the energy is consumed  or  not until the agreement comes to an end. Every contract is to be considered with reference to its object and the whole of its terms  and accordingly the whole context must be  considered in  endeavouring  to collect the intention of  the  parties, even  though the immediate object of enquiry is the  meaning of  an isolated clause. This agreement with the  stipulation of  minimum  guaranteed charges cannot be held to  be  ultra vires on the ground that it is incompatible with the  statu- tory duty. Differences between this contractual element  and the  statutory duty have to be observed. A supply  agreement to  a  consumer  makes his relation with  the  Board  mainly contractual, where the basis of supply is held to be  statu- tory rather than contractual. In cases where such agreements are  made  the terms are supposed to  have  been  negotiated between the consumer and the Board, and unless  specifically assigned,  the  agreement normally would have  affected  the consumer  with  whom  it is made, as was  held  in  Northern Ontario Power Co. Ltd. v. La Roche Mines Ltd., [1938] 3  All ER 755.     For  the  foregoing  reasons we have  no  hesitation  in holding  that the agreement was reasonable and valid and  it was  not determined with the disconnection of supply to  the respondent  firm  by the Board on 28th September,  1981  but only  accordingly to the stipulations in clause 9(b) of  the agreement  as  discussed  above. The liability  to  pay  the

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minimum  guaranteed charges, therefore, continued  till  the determination  of  the contract. The Board  was,  therefore, entitled  to  submit the bills and make the demand  on  that account, and recover the same according to law.      In  the result, the impugned judgment is set aside  and the appeal is allowed. No order as to costs. Y.  Lal                                          Appeal  al- lowed. 287