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PETITIONER: BIBHUTI BHUSAN DAS GUPTA AND ANR.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF WEST BENGAL

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 16/09/1968

BENCH: BACHAWAT, R.S. BENCH: BACHAWAT, R.S. SIKRI, S.M. HEGDE, K.S.

CITATION:  1969 AIR  381            1969 SCR  (2) 104  CITATOR INFO :  F          1974 SC 460  (6)  R          1980 SC1170  (3)

ACT: Code  of Criminal procedure-Section 342-Pleader  if can   be examined  on  behalf  of  accused-Mere  non-examination   of accused if vitiates trial.

HEADNOTE: In  a  defamation case, at the instance of the  accused  his personal  appearance. was dispensed .with by the  Magistrate under  s. 540-A Cr. P.C. His advocate was examined under  s. 342 at the close of the trial and the accused was convicted.     On the questions: (i) whether the pleader can  represent the  accused  for  purposes  of  s.  342  and  whether   the examination  of  the  pleader in place  of  the  accused  is sufficient  compliance with the section in a case where  the Magistrate has dispensed with the personal attendance of the accused ’and permitted him to appear by a pleader; and  (ii) whether  mere  non-examination of the accused  or  defective examination under s. 342 vitiates the trial,     HELD: (i) The privilege of making a  statement under  s. 342  is personal to the accused and the scheme, purpose  and language of  the section lead to the  conclusion that   only he  and  no  body else can be examined  under  it.   If  the statute  gives the accused a personal privilege  or  imposes upon him a personal duty only he can exercise the  privilege or perform the duty.  The second part of s. 342 is mandatory and imposes upon the court a duty to examine the accused  at the  close of the prosecution case in order to give him  ’an opportunity  to explain any circumstances appearing  against him in the evidence and to say in his defence what he  wants to  say in his own words.  The answers of the accused  under s. 342 is intended to be a substitute for the evidence which he  can  give under s. 342-A and the privilege and  duty  of ’answering  questions under s. 342 cannot be delegated to  a pleader.    Though  ss.  205  and  540-A  which  empower   a Magistrate  to dispense with the personal appearance of  the accused do not expressly mention that the pleader cannot  be examined  under  s. 342, it does not lead to  the  inference that the pleader can be so examined. [109 F, 110 G-H, 109 B;

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110 C-D, 109 E; 110 F-H] Dorabshah v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1926 Bom. 218, disapproved.      (ii)  Under s. 537 the conviction and sentence are  not reversible on account of any error, omission or irregularity in  ’any  proceedings  during the trial  unless  the  error, omission or irregularity has in fact occasioned a failure of justice.  Therefore the mere non-examination of the  accused in  the  present  case, under s. 342 was not  a  ground  for interference since no prejudice was established. [111 F] Tilakeshwar  Singh  v. The State of Bihar, [1955]  2  S.C.R. 105, K.C. Mathew  v. The State of Travancore-Cochin, [1955]  2  S.C.R. 1057 and Ram Shankar Singh v. State of West  Bengal,  [1962] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 49, 64, referred to.

JUDGMENT: CRIMINAL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 73  of 1966. 105      Appeal from the judgment and order dated March 31, 1965 of  the Calcutta High Court in Criminal Revision No. 921  of 1963. P.K. Chatterjee, for the appellants.      B.K.  Bhattacharya, G.S. Chatterjee for P.K. Bose,  for the respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      Bachawat, J.  The complainant Sarajit Kumar Bose was  a forest ranger having his headquarters at Bara Bazar range in the  district of Purulia.  Bibhuti Bhusan Dasgupta  was  the editor  and  Ram  Chandra  Adhikari  was  the  printer   and publisher of "Mukti" a local Bengali weekly journal with its registered  office  at  Purulia town.  At  the  instance  of Sripati  Gope, a resident of Bhuni, P.S.  Patanda,  district Singhbhum  they  published a letter in the weekly  issue  of Mukti  dated the 4th Asar, 1388 B.S. corresponding  to  June 19,  1965.  The letter which bore the caption "Wild  law  in the  land  of  the  Nags  (barbarians)",  contained  several defamatory  statements  concerning---Sarajit Bose.   On  his complaint,  Sripati Gope and Bibhuti Dasgupta  were  charged with  an  offence punishable under sec. 500  of  the  Indian Penal  Code  and Ram Adhikari was charged  with  an  offence punishable under sec. 501 I.P.C.  They were tried jointly by Shri S.M. Chatterjee, Magistrate, First Class, Purulia.  The Magistrate convicted all of them of the offences with  which they  were  respectively charged,  and  passed   appropriate sentences. The appeals filed by them against the order  were dismissed  by  the  Sessions  Judge,  Purulia.   The   order concerning  the conviction and sentence of Sripati Gope  has now  become  final.  The two courts rejected his  claim  for protection  under the first exception   to s. 499 I.P.C.   A revision petition filed by Bibhuti Dasgupta and Ram Adhikari was  dismissed  by  the High Court.   They  have  filed  the present  appeal after obtaining a certificate under  Article 134(1 ) (c) of the Constitution.     All  the courts concurrently found that the  publication was  not made by the appellant in good faith for the  public good  and that they were not entitled to the  protection  of the  ninth  exception  to sec. 499 as claimed  by  them  Mr. Chatterjee attacked this finding. The ninth exception to  s. 499  provides  that  "it  is  not  defamation  to  make   an imputation  on  the character of another provided  that  the imputation  be made in good faith for the protection of  the interests  of the person making it, or any other person,  or

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for the public good."  Section 52 provides that "nothing  is said to be done or believed in "good faith" which is done or believed  without due care and attention."  The  appellants’ case is that on their L2Sup C[169--8] 106 behalf  one Dol Gobinda Chakravarty made enquiries  and  was satisfied about the truth of the defamatory statements.   It appears  that  Dol Govinda did not make any  report  to  the appellants  in writing.  The enquiries made by him  did  not reveal   that   all  the  defamatory  imputations   in   the publication were true.  On the materials on the record it is impossible   to  say  that  the  appellants  published   the statements in good faith or with due care and attention.  In Harbhajan  Singh v. State of Punjab (1) the Court held  that the  accused  person was entitled to the protection  of  the ninth  exception to sec. 499 if he. succeeded in  proving  a preponderance  of probability that the case was  within  the exception.  We do not find that the courts below placed upon the appellant any heavier burden of proof. Mr.  Chatterjee  next contended that the  trial  of  Bibhuti Dasgupta was illegal as he was not personally examined under sec. ’342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.  To  appreciate this  argument  it is necessary to refer  to  the  following facts.   On September 27, 1961 the Magistrate  examined  the complainant  and issued summons to. the three  accused.   On the application of Bibhuti Dasgupta the Magistrate passed an order  o.n  December 12, 1961 dispensing with  his  personal appearance and permitting him to appear by his pleader.   On September 17, 1962 the examination of prosecution  witnesses was  concluded.  On the same day Ram Adhikari  was  examined under   sec.   342.   On  December  21,  1962   the   lawyer representing Bibhuti Dasgupta flied a petition stating  that he  was  undergoing an operation in Calcutta  and  that  the lawyer  may be examined on his. behalf under  sec. 342.   On the  same  date the Magistrate allowed the  application  and examined  his  lawyer.   On April 17,  1963  the  Magistrate delivered  judgment.   The plea that the  trial  of  Bibhuti Dasgupta  was  vitiated on account  of  his  non-examination under  s.  342 was not taken before the  Magistrate  or  the Sessions Judge or at the hearing of the revision petition in the  High  Court.  It was taken for the first  time  in  the petition  for grant of the certificate under article 134(  1 )(c).  In this background let us examine the contention.     As  a general rule save where the  magistrate  dispenses with the personal attendance of the accused person the first step  in  a criminal proceeding is to bring him  before  the magistrate.   The  attendance of the accused is  secured  if necessary  by summons or by warrant of  arrest.   Thereafter the inquiry or trial proceeds in his presence.  Section  205 of  the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers  the  Magistrate whenever  he issues a summons to dispense with the  personal attendance  of  the accused and permit him to  appear  by  a pleader.  The section runs as follows :-- (1)  [1965] 3 S.C.R. 235. 107                     "205. (1) Whenever a Magistrate issues a               summons,  he may, if he sees reason to do  so,               dispense  with the personal attendance of  the               accused  and  permit  him  to  appear  by  his               pleader.                     (2) But the Magistrate inquiring into or               trying the case may, in his discretion at  any               stage of the proceedings, direct the  personal               attendance of the accused, and, if  necessary,

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             enforce   such   attendance  in   the   manner               hereinabove provided."                The  form  of summons issued to  the  accused               runs as follows               "Whereas  your  attendance  is  necessary   to               answer  to  a  charge of  (state  shortly  the               offence  charged) you are hereby  required  to               appear in person (o.r by pleader, as the  case               may be) before the (Magistrate) of.. on the ..               day .. of .. Herein fail not." Section  540A  empowers the magistrate at any  stage  of  an inquiry or trial to dispense with the personal attendance of the accused if he is represented by a pleader.  The  section is as follows :--                     "540A (1) At any stage of an inquiry  or               trial  under  this  Code,  if  the  Judge   or               Magistrate  is  satisfied, for reasons  to  be               recorded, that the personal attendance of               the accused before the Court is not  necessary               in  the  interests of justice,  the  Judge  or               Magistrate may, if the accused is  represented               by a pleader, dispense with his attendance and               proceed  with  such inquiry or  trial  in  his               absence, and may, at .any subsequent stage  of               the    proceedings,   direct   the    personal               attendance of such accused.                      (2) If the accused in any such case  is               not represented by a pleader, or if the  Judge               or    Magistrate   considers   his    personal               attendance necessary, he may if he minks  fit,               and for reasons to be recorded by him,  either               adjourn  such inquiry or trial, or order  that               the case of such accused be taken up or  tried               separately." The point in issue is whether the pleader can represent  the accused for purposes of sec. 342 and whether the examination of  the  pleader  in  place of  the  accused  is  sufficient compliance  with the section in a case where the  magistrate has  dispensed with the personal attendance of  the  accused and permitted him to appear by a pleader.  On this  question there is a sharp conflict of judicial opinion.  Most of  the decisions  upto 1962 are referred to in Prova Devi  v.  Mrs. Fernandes(1).   In that case a Full Bench of  Calcutta  High Court by a majority decision held that the magistrate may in his discretion examine the pleader on behalf of the (1) A.I.R. 1962 Cal. 203. 108 accused under sec. 342. This view is supported  by  numerous decisions  of other High Courts, but from time to time  many judges expressed vigorous dissents and came to the  opposite conclusion. The two sides of the question are ably discussed in the majority and minority judgments of the Calcutta case. After  a  full examination of all the decided cases  on  the subject,  we  are  inclined  to  -agree  with  the  minority opinion.     The  main  arguments  in favour of  the  view  that  the examination of the pleader is sufficient compliance with the provisions  of  s. 342 may be summarized  as  follows.   The pleader  authorised     to appear on behalf of  the  accused can   do   all  acts  which  the  accused   can   do.    The representation  of the pleader extends throughout the  trial except  as provided in s. 366(2).  The form .of the  summons shows that the pleader may answer to charge on behalf of the accused  at  every stage of the proceedings.   He  may  even plead guilty under secs. 242, 243, 251A, 255 and 271.  There

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is  no reason why he cannot be examined under s. 342.  ’That section  is  subject  to and controlled  by.  s.  205.   The accused  can refuse to answer questions under sec.  342  and there is no point in insisting on his personal attendance if he  has no intention to answer them.  Accused  persons  will suffer harassment and inconvenience if the magistrates  have no  discretion to dispense with their  personal  examination under s. 342.  Having considered all these arguments we  are not  convinced that pleader can be examined in place of  the accused under s. 342. Section 342 reads as follows :--                      "342. ( 1 ) For the purpose of enabling               the  accused  to  explain  any   circumstances               appearing  in  the evidence against  him,  the               Court  may, at any stage of any  inquiring  or               trial without previously warning the  accused,               put  such  questions  to  him  as  the   Court               considers   necessary,  and  shall,  for   the               purpose  aforesaid, question him generally  on               the   case   after  the  witnesses   for   the               prosecution  have been examined and before  he               is called on for his defence.                      (2)   The  accused  shall  not   render               himself  liable to punishment by  refusing  to               answer  such  questions, or  by  giving  false               answers  to them; but the Court and  the  jury               (if  any)  may draw such inference  from  such               refusal or answers as it thinks just.                      (3)  The answers given by  the  accused               may  be  taken  into  consideration  in   such               inquiry. or trial, and put in evidence for  or               against him in any other inquiry into or trial               for, any other offence which such answers  may               tend to show he has committed.                      (4)  No oath shall be  administered  to               the  accused  when he is examined  under  sub-               section (1 )." 109 Sub-section  (1  ) of sec. 342 consists of two  parts.   The first  part gives a discretion to the Court to question  the accused  at  any  stage  of  an  inquiry  or  trial  without previously  warning  him. Under the second part the Court is required  to  question him generally on the case  after  the witnesses for the prosecution have been examined and  before he is called for his defence.  The second part is  mandatory and imposes upon the Court a duty to examine the accused  at the  close of the prosecution case in order to give  him  an opportunity  to explain any circumstances appearing  against him in the evidence and to say in his defence what he  wants to  say in his own words.  He is not bound to.  answer  the. questions  but  if  he  refuses to  answer  or  gives  false answers,  the consequences may be serious, for  under   sub- section   (2)   the Court may draw such inference  from  the refusal  or the false answers as it thinks fit.  Under  sub- sec. (3) the answers given by the accused may be taken  into consideration  in  the inquiry or trial.  His  statement  is material  upon which the Court may act, and which may  prove his   innocence,  (see  State  of  Maharashtra   v.   Laxman Jairam(1).   Under sub-sec. (4) no oath is  administered  to him.  The reason is that when he is examined under sec. 342, he  is not a witness.  Before sec. 342A was enacted, he  was not  a  competent witness for the  defence.   His  statement under  sec.  342 was intended to take the place of  what  he could  say  in his own way in the witness  box.   (see  Hate Singh v. State of Madhya Bharat(2).  Under sec. 342A, he  is

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now  a competent witness.  But the provisions of  sec.  342A does not affect the value of his examination under sec. 342. Under  sub-section (3) of s. 342 his answers may be  put  in evidence for or against him in other inquiries or trials for other  offences.  For instance, if in a trial for murder  he says  that he concealed the dead body and did not  kill  the victim his statement may be used as evidence against him  in a subsequent trial for an offence under sec. 201.     The  privilege of making a statement under sec.  342  is personal to the accused.  The clear intention of the section is  that only he and nobody else can be examined  under  it. This  conclusion is reinforced if we look at sec. 364.   The whole of his examination including every question put to him and  every answer given by him must be recorded in full  and interpreted  to him in a language which he understands,  and he is at liberty to explain or add to his answers; and  when the  whole  is made conformable to what he declares  is  the truth the record has to be signed by him and the Magistrate. The  idea that the pleader can be examined on his behalf  is foreign  to the language of secs. 342 and 364. It  was  well observed by Rankin J. in Promotha Nath v. Emperor(3) that:  (1)  [1962]  Supp. 3 S.C.R. 230.          (2)  A.I.R.  1953 S.C. 468, 470.                      (3) A.I.R. 1923 Cal. 470, 481. 110                     "...  the  intention of the  statute  iS               that at a certain stage in the case, the Court               itself  shall  put  aside  all  Counsel,   all               ’pleaders, all witnesses, all representatives,               and shall call upon an individual accused with               the  authority  of the Court’s own  voice,  to               take  advantage of the opportunity which  then               arises to. state in his own way anything which               he  may  be desirous. of  stating...  what  is               necessary  is.  that  the  accused  shall   be               brought   face  to  face  solemnly   with   an               opportunity  given to him to make a  statement               from  his place in the dock in order that  the               Court  may have the advantage of  hearing  his               defence if he is willing to make one with  his               own lips?’     The  proposition that a pleader authorised to appear  on behalf  of  the accused can do all acts  which  the  accused himself  can  do at the trial is too wide.  If  the  statute gives the accused a personal privilege or imposes upon him a personal  duty,    only  he  can exercise the  privilege  or perform the duty.  Thus  under  sec. 366(2) the accused must hear  the judgment in person unless the sentence is  one  of fine only or unless, he is acquitted.  Under sec. 342A  only the  accused can give evidence in person and  his  pleader’s evidence  cannot  be  treated as his.  The  answers  of  the accused under s. 342 is intended to be a substitute for  the evidence  which  he can give as a witness under  sec.  342A. The  privilege  and the. duty of answering  questions  under sec.  342  cannot be delegated to a pleader.  No  doubt  the form  of  the summons show that the pleader may  answer  the charges  against  the  accused,  but  in  so  answering  the charges,  he  cannot  do.  what  only  the  accused  can  do personally.   The pleader may be permitted to represent  the accused while the prosecution evidence is being taken.   But at the close of the prosecution evidence the accused must be questioned and his pleader cannot be examined in his place.     Sections 205 and 540A do not expressly mention that  the pleader cannot be examined under sec. 342, but this does not lead  to the inference that the pleader can be so  examined.

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On  the  other hand, secs. 353, 360, 361 and  366  expressly provide  that  the  pleader may represent  the  accused  for certain purposes, but from this fact alone no inference  can be  drawn that the pleader cannot represent the accused  for purposes  of  s.  342 or other sections.  It  is  from,  the scheme, purpose and language of sec. 342 that we are  driven to  the  conclusion that the examination under  the  section must be of the accused person and not his pleader.     In  Dorabshah v. Emperor(1) the Bombay High  Court  held that  where  the  accused is permitted  to   appear  by  his pleader (1) A.I.R. 1926 Bom. 218. 111 under sec. 205 the pleader may on his behalf be examined and may plead guilty under secs. 242 and 243.  Whether the Court can  act  upon an admission of guilt by the  pleader   under secs. 242, 243, 251A, 255 and 271 does not directly arise in this case and we express no opinion on it.  It is sufficient to say that the language of those sections and the effect of admissions under them are entirely different.     We  are not impressed with the argument that an  accused person will suffer inconvenience and harassment if the Court cannot  dispense  with his attendance for purposes  of  sec. 342.   The examination under the section  becomes  necessary when at the close of the prosecution evidence the magistrate finds. that there are incriminating circumstances  requiring an  explanation  by the accused.  If there is.  no  evidence implicating   the  accused,  no  explanation  from  him   is necessary  and  he need not be examined under  s.  342.   If there  is  evidence implicating him, it is in  his  interest that he should be examined personally.     There  are exceptional cases when an examination of  the accused  personally  under  sec. 342  is  not  necessary  or possible. Where the accused is a company or other  juridical person it cannot be examined personally.  It may be that the Court may then examine a director or some other agent on its behalf   [see   Express  Diary  Ltd.   v.   Corporation   of Calcutta(1)].  Exceptional cases apart, only the accused  in person can be examined under s. 342.  We therefore hold that the   Magistrate  should  have  examined  Bibhuti   Dasgupta personally  and  the  examination of  his  pleader  was  not sufficient compliance with sec. 342.     This  conclusion does not dispose of Bibhuti  Dasgupta’s appeal.  Under sec. 537 the conviction and sentence are. not reversable on account of any error, omission or irregularity in  any  proceedings  during the  trial  unless  the  error, omission  or irregularity has’ in fact occasioned a  failure of  justice.  Mere non-examination or defective  examination under  sec.  342  is not a ground  for  interference  unless prejudice  is  established.  [see Tilakeshwar Singh  v.  The State of Bihar(2) K.C.  Mathew  v. The State of  Travancore- Cochin(3), Ram Shankar Singh v. State     West Bengal  (4)]. Looking  at the facts of this case we do not find  that  any prejudice  was  caused  to  Bibhuti  Dasgupta  by  his  non- examination  under sec. 342.  The prosecution  evidence  was closed  on  September 17,  1962.  Ram Adhikari  appeared  in Court and was examined personally.  Bibhuti Dasgupta did not appear  in Court on that date.  After 3 months o.n  December 21,  1962  his  pleader was examined on his  behalf  at  his express request.  The Magistrate delivered judgment on April 17,  1963. (1)  I.L.R.  [1959] 2 Cat. 622.               (2)  [1955]  2 S.C.R. 105. (3) [1955] 2 S.C.R. 1057, 1061-2.          (4) [1962]  Supp. 1. S.C.R. 49, 64

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112 On  that  date Bibhuti Dasgupta was. present in  Court.   He made  no complaint at any time before the Magistrate or  the Sessions  Judge or the High Court that he had  suffered  any prejudice. Even in this Court Mr. Chatterjee could not point out  what  further  explanation could  have  been  given  by Bibhuti Dasgupta if he had been examined personally.  We are satisfied  that the omission to examine him under  sec.  342 did  not  cause  him  any prejudice  and  has  not  in  fact occasioned  a  failure of justice.  We are,  therefore,  not inclined to interfere with his conviction and sentence. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. Y.P.                                       Appeal dismissed. 113