IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.   8452       OF 2009 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 1982 of 2007)

Bhuwalka Steel Indus. Ltd. …. Appellant

Versus

Bombay Iron & Steel Labour  Bd. & Anr. …. Respondents

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO.    8453      OF 2009 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 3624 of 2007)

Century Textiles & Industries Ltd. …. Appellant

Versus

Grocery Markets & Ors. …. Respondents

WITH

SLP (C)…. CC No. 4065 of 2007

Steel Re-Rollers Association  of Maharashtra …. Appellant

Versus

The Bombay Iron & Steel  Labour Board …. Respondent

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WITH

SLP (C)…. CC No. 4046 of 2007

Kamgar Utkarsha Sabha …. Appellant

Versus

Bhuwalka Steel Industries  Ltd. & Ors. …. Respondents

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NOS.  8454-8455       OF 2009 (Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 13462-13463 of 2007)

Raymond Limited …. Appellant

Versus

Cloth Market and Shops  Board & Ors. …. Respondents

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO.   8457       OF 2009 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 20206 of 2007)

Kalyan Ambernath Manufacturing Association & Ors. …. Appellants

Versus

The State of Maharashtra & Ors. …. Respondents

2

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO.    8458     OF 2009 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 9600 of 2008)

Valiant Glass Works Pvt. Ltd. …. Appellant

Versus

State of Maharashtra & Anr. …. Respondents

J U D G M E N T

V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.

1. This judgment will  dispose of  SLP (Civil)  No.  1982 of  2007,  SLP  

(Civil)  No.  3624  of  2007,  SLP  (Civil)….  CC  No.  4065  of  2007,  SLP  

(Civil)…. CC No. 4046 of 2007, SLP (Civil)  Nos. 13462-13463 of 2007,  

SLP (Civil) No. 20206 of 2007, and SLP (Civil) No. 9600 of 2008.

2. Leave granted in SLP (Civil) No. 1982 of 2007, SLP (Civil) No. 3624  

of 2007, SLP (Civil) Nos. 13462-13463 of 2007, SLP (Civil) No. 20206 of  

2007, and SLP (Civil) No. 9600 of 2008

3. Two concurrent judgments of the Full  Bench of the Bombay High  

Court, one written by Hon’ble J.N. Patel and Hon’ble Roshan Dalvi, JJ. and  

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a separate but  concurrent judgment authored by Hon’ble Deshmukh,  J.  

have fallen for consideration.  The reference to Full Bench was occasioned  

on  account  of  the  two  Learned  Judges  of  the  Bombay  High  Court,  

principally not agreeing with another Division Bench Judgment reported in  

the case of Century Textiles & Industries Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra   

[2000 II  CLR 279]  in its  interpretation of  the term “unprotected worker”  

provided by Section 2(11) of the Maharashtra Mathadi, Hamal and other  

Manual  Workers  (Regulation  of  Employment  and  Welfare)  Act,  1969  

(hereinafter  referred to as ‘Mathadi  Act’)  and term “worker”  provided by  

Section 2(12) of the Mathadi Act.  The referring Bench was of the opinion  

that the interpretation given to those two terms in the decision in Century  

Textiles & Industries Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra (cited supra) was  

in conflict with the statutory provisions enacted by the Legislature in the  

said Mathadi Act.  The question referred to the Full Bench was as under:-

“In  view  of  the  statutory  definition  of  the  expression  “unprotected  worker”  in  Section  2(11)  of  the  Maharashtra  Mathadi,  Hamal  and  other  Manual  Workers  (Regulation  of  Employment  and  Welfare)  Act,  1969  is  the  interpretation  placed by the Division Bench in Century Textiles & Industries  Ltd.  Vs.  State  of  Maharashtra,  2000  II  CLR  279  on  the  aforesaid expression that it is only casually engaged workers  who come within the purview of the Act, correct and proper?”

In the two aforementioned judgments of the Bombay High Court, the  

Learned Judges, writing the majority judgment, recorded as under:-

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“For  the  aforesaid  reasons,  we  find  that  the  interpretation  placed by the Division Bench in Century Textile and Industries  Ltd. & Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors., 2000 II CLR 270  on  the  definition  of  the  words  “unprotected  worker”  and  “worker” for the purpose of applicability to Mathadi Act, 1969  that  it  is  only  the  casual  workmen  who  come  within  the  purview  of  the  Act,  is  not  correct  and  proper  and  it  is  erroneous which deserves to be ignored and is overruled.”

The Learned Single  Judge (Hon’ble Deshmukh,  J.)  gave his  final  

verdict in the following words:-

“To conclude, therefore, to my mind it is clear that within the  meaning  of  Section  2(11)  of  the  Act  “unprotected  worker”  means every manual worker who is engaged or to be engaged  in any scheduled employment,  irrespective of whether he is  protected by other labour legislations or not and “unprotected  workers” within the meaning of the Act are definitely not only  those manual workers who are casually engaged.”

4. The above two judgments are challenged basically on the contention  

that the judgment in the case of Century Textiles & Industries Ltd. Vs.   

State  of  Maharashtra  (cited supra)  is  essentially  a  correct  judgment,  

while the view taken by the Full Bench and the interpretation put forth by  

the same of the Sections 2(11) and 2(12) of the Mathadi Act, is erroneous  

inasmuch as the impugned judgments have ignored to take into account  

the context in which these provisions have been enacted and they also  

ignored  the  intention  of  the  Legislature,  which  is  reflected  from  the  

Preamble and the other provisions of this Act.

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5. Lengthy arguments were advanced before us.  While arguments on  

the  side  of  appellants  were  led  by  Shri  J.P.  Cama,  Learned  Senior  

Counsel, the arguments on behalf of respondents were led by Shri K.K.  

Singhvi and Ms. Indira Jaising, Learned Senior Counsel.

6. Before taking up the issue, the short history of the legislation is a  

must.  

7. A Bill was introduced in the Maharashtra Legislature, being Bill No.  

XCIX  of  1968  for  regulating  the  employment  of  unprotected  manual  

workers employed in certain employments in the State of Maharashtra to  

make provision for their adequate supply and proper and full utilization in  

such employments and for matters connected therewith.  This Bill was first  

introduced in the Winter Sessions of Maharasthra Legislature at Nagpur.  It  

was then referred to the Joint Committee for its report.  The basic idea  

behind bringing this legislation, as it is reflected in Statement of Objects  

and  Reasons,  was  that  persons  engaged  in  occupations  like  mathadi,  

hamals,  fishermen,  salt  pan  workers,  casual  labour,  jatha  workers  and  

those  engaged  in  similar  manual  work  elsewhere,  were  not  receiving  

adequate  protection  and  benefits  within  the  ambit  of  existing  labour  

legislation.  Therefore, with a view to studying the conditions of the work of  

the persons engaged in these occupations, the Government had appointed  

a Committee on 15.7.1965 to examine whether relief  could be given to  

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these workers within the ambit of the existing labour legislation and make  

recommendation as to how such relief could be given.  The Statement of  

Objects and Reasons mentions that report was made by the Committee to  

the Government on 17.11.1967.  In that report, it was mentioned that the  

persons  engaged  in  vocations  like  mathadi,  hamals,  casual  workers  

employed in docks,  lokhandi  jatha workers,  salt  pan workers  and other  

manual workers mostly work outside fixed premises in the open and are  

mostly engaged on piece-rate system in a number of cases.  They are not  

employed directly, but are either engaged through Mukadum or Toliwalas  

or  gangs  as  and  when  there  is  work  and  they  also  work  for  different  

employers on one and the same day.  The volume of work is not always  

constant.  In view of the peculiar nature of work, its variety, the precarious  

means  of  employment  and  the  system  of  payment  and  the  particular  

vulnerability to exploitation of this class of labour, the Committee had come  

to the conclusion that the application of the various labour laws to such  

workers  was  impracticable  and  regulation  of  their  working  and  other  

conditions by introducing amendments to the existing labour laws was not  

possible.  Therefore, the Committee recommended that the working and  

the  employment  conditions  of  such  unprotected  workers  should  be  

regulated by a special enactment.   

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8. The Statement of Objects and Reasons further mentions that after  

holding series of meetings with the representatives of the interests affected  

by the proposed legislation and after considering all these suggestions and  

examining  the  recommendations  of  the  Committee,  Government  had  

decided  to  bring  the  Bill  which  seeks  to  regulate  the  employment  of  

mathadis,  hamals  and  other  manual  workers  employed  in  certain  

employments,  to make better provision for their terms and conditions of  

employment, to provide for their welfare, for health and safety measures,  

where such employments require those measures, to make provision for  

ensuring an adequate supply  to,  and full  and proper utilization of  such  

workers in such employments, to prevent avoidable unemployment and for  

such purposes to provide for  the establishment of  Boards in respect of  

these employments and (where necessary)  in the different  areas of the  

State and to provide for purposes connected with the matters aforesaid.  

Ultimately, the Act came on the legal anvil vide Act No. XXX of 1969 after it  

received assent of the Vice President, acting on behalf of the President on  

5.6.1969.   It  was  extended to the whole  State of  Maharashtra.   It  was  

clarified in Section 1 that it  applies to the employments specified in the  

Schedule  and  that  it  shall  come into  force  on  such  date  as  the  State  

Government  may,  by  notification  in  the  Official  Gazette,  appoint  and  

different  dates  may  be  appointed  for  different  areas,  and  for  different  

provisions  of  the  Act.   The  Act  was  amended  from  time  to  time  by  

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Maharashtra Act Nos. 27 of 1972, 40 of 1974, 27 of 1977, 62 of 1981, 28  

of 1987 and 27 of 1990.  To begin with, it came into force in Thane District  

in various areas.  (Emphasis supplied)

9. It will be better to see a few provisions of the Act.  Section 2, which  

is  the  definition  clause,  defines  “Board”  in  sub-Section  (1),  to  mean  a  

Board established under Section 6.  Some other sub-Sections of Section 2  

runs as under:-

2(2) “contractor”, in relation to an unprotected worker, means  a person who undertakes to execute any work for an  establishment  by  engaging  such  workers  on  hire  or  otherwise, or who supplies such worker either in groups,  gangs  (tollis),  or  as  individuals;  and  includes  a  sub- contractor, an agent, a mukadum or a tolliwala;

2(3) “employer”,  in  relation  to  any  unprotected  worker  engaged by or through contractor, means the principal  employer  and  in  relation  to  any  other  unprotected  worker,  the person who has ultimate control  over the  affairs  of  the  establishment,  and  includes  any  other  person to whom the affairs of such establishment are  entrusted,  whether  such  person  is  called  an  agent,  manager or is called by any other name prevailing in the  scheduled employment;

2(4) “establishment” means any place or premises, including  the precincts thereof, in which or in any part of which  any  scheduled  employment  is  being  or  is  ordinarily  carried on;

2(7) “principal employer” means an employer who engages  unprotected workers by or through a contractor in any  scheduled employment;

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2(11) “unprotected  worker”  means a manual  worker  who  is  engaged  or  to  be  engaged  in  any  scheduled  employment;

2(12) “worker”  means  a  person  who  is  engaged  or  to  be  engaged  directly  or  through  any  agency,  whether  for  wages  or  not,  to  do  manual  work  in  any  scheduled  employment, and includes any person not employed by  any  employer  or  a  contractor,  but  working  with  the  permission of, or under agreement with the employer or  contractor;  but  does  not  include  the  members  of  an  employer’s family;

2(13) “wages” means all remunerations expressed in terms of  money or capable of being so expressed which would, if  the terms of contract of employment, express or implied  were, fulfilled, be payable to an unprotected worker in  respect of work done in any scheduled employment, but  does not include-

(i) the value of any house accommodation, supply of  light,  water,  medical  attendance;  or  any  other  amenity  or  any  service  excluded  from  the  computation of wages by general or special order  of the State Government;

(ii) any  contribution  paid  by  the  employer  to  any  pension  fund  or  provident  fund  or  under  any  scheme of social insurance and the interest which  may have accrued thereon;

(iii) any  travelling  allowance  or  the  value  of  any  travelling concession;

(iv) any  sum  paid  to  the  worker  to  defray  special  expenses  entailed  on  him by  the  nature  of  his  employment; or

(v) any gratuity payable on discharge.”

Some  other  Sections  of  the  Act,  which  were  referred  to  by  the  Learned Senior Counsel during the arguments are as under:-

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3(1) For the purpose of ensuring an adequate supply and full  and  proper  utilization  of  unprotected  workers  in  scheduled  employments,  and  generally  for  making  better  provision  for  the  terms  and  condition  of  employment  of  such  workers,  the  State  Government  may by means of a scheme provide for the registration  of employers and unprotected workers in any scheduled  employment or employments and provide for the terms  and  conditions  of  work  of  registered  unprotected  workers and make provision for the general welfare in  such employments.

3(2) In particular, a scheme may provide for all or any of the  following matters that is to say:-

(a)-(c) x x x x x x

(d) for  regulating  the  employment  of  registered  unprotected  workers,  and  the  terms  and  conditions of such employment, including rates of  wages, hours of work, maternity benefit, overtime  payment, leave with wages, provision for gratuity  and conditions as to weekly  and other holidays  and pay in respect thereof;

(e) for  securing  that,  in  respect  of  periods  during  which  employment  or  full  employment  is  not  available  to  registered  unprotected  workers  though  they  are  available  for  work,  such  unprotected workers will, subject to the conditions  of the scheme, receive a minimum wage;

(f) for prohibiting, restricting or otherwise controlling  the employment of unprotected workers to whom  the scheme does not apply, and the employment  of unprotected workers by employers to whom the  scheme does not apply;

(g) for the welfare of registered unprotected workers  covered  by  the  scheme  insofar  as  satisfactory  provision therefor, does not exist, apart from the  scheme;

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(h) for health and safety measures in place where the  registered  unprotected  workers  are  engaged,  insofar  as  satisfactory  provision  therefor,  is  required  but  does  not  exist,  apart  from  the  scheme;

5. If any question arises whether any scheme applies to  any  class  of  unprotected  workers  or  employers,  the  matter shall  be referred to the State Government and  the decision of the State Government on the question,  which  shall  be  taken  after  consulting  the  Advisory  Committee constituted under Section 14, shall be final.

7(1) The  Board  shall  be  responsible  for  administering  a  scheme, and shall  exercise such powers and perform  such  functions  as  may  be  conferred  on  it  by  the  scheme.

7(2) The Board may take such measures as it may deem fit  for administering the scheme.

7(3) The  Board  shall  submit  to  the  State  Government,  as  soon as may be, after the 1st of April every year, and not  later than the 31st day of October, an annual report on  the working of  the scheme during the preceding year  ending on the 31st day of  March of  that  year.   Every  report so received shall be laid as soon as may be after  it  is  received  before  each  House  of  the  State  Legislature,  if  it  is  in  session,  or  in  the  session  immediately following the date of receipt of the report.

7(4) In exercise of the powers and discharge of its functions,  the  Board  shall  be  bound by  such directions,  as  the  State  Government  may,  for  reason  to  be  stated  in  writing, give to it from time to time.

15(1) The Board may appoint such persons as it thinks fit to  be Inspectors possessing the prescribed qualifications  for the purpose of this Act or of any scheme and may  define the limits of their jurisdiction.

15(2) Subject to any rules made by the State Government in  this behalf, an Inspector may-

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(a) enter  and  search  at  all  reasonable  hours,  with  such assistants as he thinks fit, any premises or  place, where unprotected workers are employed,  or work is given out to unprotected workers in any  scheduled  employment,  for  the  purpose  of  examining  any  register,  record  of  wages  or  notices required to be kept or exhibited under any  scheme,  and require  the production  thereof,  for  inspection;

(b) examine any person whom he finds in any such  premises or place and who,  he has reasonable  cause  to  believe,  is  an  unprotected  worker  employed  therein  or  an  unprotected  worker  to  whom work is given out therein;

(c) require  any  person  giving  any  work  to  an  unprotected worker or to a group of unprotected  workers to give any information,  which is in his  power  to  give,  in  respect  of  the  names  and  addresses  of  the persons to  whom the work  is  given, and in respect of payments made, or to be  made, for the said work;

(d) seize or take copies of such registers, records of  wages or notices or portions thereof, as he may  consider relevant, in respect of an offence under  this  Act  or  scheme,  which  he  has  reason  to  believe has been committed by an employer; and

(e) exercise  such  other  powers  as  may  be  prescribed:

Provided that, no one shall be required under the  provisions  of  this  section  to  answer  any  question  or  make any statement tending to incriminate himself.

15(3) Every Inspector  appointed under this section shall  be  deemed  to  be  public  servant  within  the  meaning  of  section 21 of the Indian Penal Code.

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21. Nothing contained in this Act shall affect any rights or  privileges,  which  any  registered  unprotected  worker  employed in any scheduled employment is entitled to,  on the date on which this Act comes into force, under  any other law, contract, custom or usage applicable to  such  worker,  if  such  rights  or  privileges  are  more  favourable  to  him  than  those  to  which  he  would  be  entitled under this Act and the scheme:

Provided that such worker will  not be entitled to  receive any corresponding benefit under the provisions  of this Act and the scheme.

22. The  State  Government  may,  after  consulting  the  Advisory  Committee,  by  notification  in  the  Official  Gazette,  and subject  to such conditions and for  such  period as may be specified in the notification, exempt  from the operation of all or any of the provisions of this  Act or any scheme made thereunder, all or any class or  classes  of  unprotected  workers  employed  in  any  scheduled employment, or in any establishment or part  of any establishment of any scheduled employment, if in  the  opinion  of  the  State  Government  all  such  unprotected  workers  or  such  class  or  classes  of  workers, are in the enjoyment of benefits which are on  the  whole  not  less  favourable  to  such  unprotected  workers than the benefits provided by or under this Act  or any scheme framed thereunder:

Provided  that  before  any  such  notification  is  issued, the State Government shall publish a notice of  its  intention  to  issue  such  notification,  and  invite  objections and suggestions in respect thereto, and no  such notification shall be issued until the objections and  suggestions have been considered and a period of one  month has expired from the date of first publication of  the notice in the Official Gazette:

Provided further that the State Government may,  by notification in  the Official  Gazette,  at  any time, for  reasons  to  be  specified,  rescind  the  aforesaid  notification.

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10. It is in the backdrop of these provisions generally that it has to be  

seen as to whether the interpretation put forward by the Full Bench in two  

separate but concurrent judgments, is correct or not.  Though the question  

referred  to  the  Full  Bench  was  restricted  to  the  correctness  of  the  

interpretation  of  the  term  ‘unprotected  worker’  in  Section  2(11)  of  the  

Mathadi Act as given in the case of  Century Textiles & Industries Ltd.  

Vs. State of Maharashtra (cited supra), in our opinion, the scope of the  

question has to be properly understood.  In that case, it was held by the  

Division Bench of that  Court  that  the workers  who were working in the  

factory of the petitioner could not be termed as ‘unprotected workers’.  It  

was held specifically that the Mathadi Act did not deal with the employees  

engaged  on monthly  basis,  as  such workers  were  protected under  the  

Shops and Establishments Act and other enactments.  It was further held  

that it was only the casually engaged workmen, who would come within the  

purview of the Mathadi Act.  The High Court further said that where the  

material produced on record clearly show that the workmen are protected  

workmen,  more  particularly,  with  reference  to  the  Agreement  under  

Section 2(p) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the Act in question would  

not  apply.   Therefore,  the  referred  question  was  whether  it  was  only  

casually engaged workers, who came within the purview of the Act.  The  

majority judgment gave a straight answer to this question that the meaning  

of the term ‘unprotected worker’  was only the casual workman, was not  

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correct, while the Learned Single Judge did not stop at that and gave a  

broader answer interpreting Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act and held that  

every  manual  worker  engaged  or  to  be  engaged  in  any  scheduled  

employment,  irrespective  of  whether  he  is  protected  by  other  labour  

legislations or not, would be termed as ‘unprotected worker’, and further  

that  the definition  was  not  restricted to those manual  workers  who  are  

casually engaged.  Though the judgment of the Learned Single Judge was  

criticized by      Shri J.P. Cama, Learned Senior Counsel for the appellants  

that it went beyond the reference made, we feel that the Learned Single  

Judge has not travelled beyond the reference.  The reference has to be  

read as requiring the correct interpretation of Section 2(11) of the Mathadi  

Act  and the  term ‘unprotected worker’  and,  therefore,  in  our  opinion,  it  

would have to be explained as to what is the true scope and meaning of  

the  term  ‘unprotected  worker’  as  envisaged  by  Section  2(11)  of  the  

Mathadi  Act.   In  that,  the  debate  cannot  be  restricted  to  the  narrower  

question as to whether the term means only the casually engaged workers.  

In our opinion, the true impact of the term ‘unprotected worker’ has to be  

considered and it will have also to be pointed out as to who can be said to  

be  ‘unprotected  worker’.   The  objection  in  that  behalf  raised  by  the  

appellant to the Full  Bench judgment is not correct.   When we see the  

judgment  in  Kay  Kay  Embroideries  Pvt.  Ltd.  Vs.  Cloth  Market  and  

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Shops Board, Mumbai & Ors. [2006 III LLJ 824 Bom], it is clear that the  

Court had posed two questions:-

(i) Whether the expression ‘unprotected worker’ means a worker  

not protected by labour legislation or whether the expression  

means a manual worker who is engaged or to be engaged in  

any scheduled employment as defined in Section 2(11) of the  

Mathadi Act?

(ii) Whether a Mathadi worker, who has been engaged directly by  

an employer,  would  fall  outside the purview of  the Mathadi  

Act?

The Division Bench in this case did not agree with the judgment in  

the case of Century Textiles & Industries Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra   

(cited supra).  The referring judgment clearly goes on to show that it did  

not agree with the narrower judgment in the case of  Century Textiles &  

Industries Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra (cited supra), but it cannot be  

forgotten  that  the  two  questions  framed  by  it  clearly  show  that  the  

consideration  could  not  be  restricted  to  the  narrower  question  as  to  

whether the view taken in the case of Century Textiles & Industries Ltd.   

Vs. State of Maharashtra (cited supra)  was correct or not, instead the  

question which arose for consideration on account of the two Benches not  

agreeing  was  as  to  what  was  the  true  scope  of  the  definition  of  the  

expression  ‘unprotected  worker’  in  Section  2(11)  of  the  Mathadi  Act.  

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Considering  the  clear  language  and  the  questions  considered  in  the  

referring judgment by Hon’ble F.K. Rebello and Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, JJ.,  

we feel that the Learned Single Judge did not exceed the question referred  

in considering the full scope of the Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act and  

the term ‘unprotected worker’.   We will,  therefore, proceed on the basis  

that the Full Bench had to decide the true scope of the term ‘unprotected  

worker’ as defined in Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act and to point out as  

to who could be covered under that definition.

11. Basically, the contentions raised by the parties are as follows:

Legal Submissions on behalf of the Appellants

A. Section  2(11)  of  the  Mathadi  Act  cannot  be  interpreted  

independently of Section 2(12) of the Mathadi Act, which is the  

definition  of  ‘worker’  and  conjoined  reading  of  these  two  

Sections in the light of other provisions of the Act would clearly  

bring out that those workers who are regularly employed and  

who have the protection of other labour legislations, cannot be  

termed as ‘unprotected workers’.   For that purpose, the two  

Sections cannot be interpreted merely on the basis of  plain  

meaning  of  the  language  of  the  Sections,  instead  the  

interpretation  has  to  be  done  taking  into  consideration  the  

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context  of  the  Mathadi  Act,  the  Statement  of  Objects  and  

Reasons and legislative history of the Act.  Shri J.P. Cama,  

Learned Senior Counsel for the appellants further contended  

that the Full Bench had erred in interpreting the said definition  

in isolation and not in the context of the Act.  According to the  

Learned  Senior  Counsel,  the  Mathadi  Act  was  intended  to  

cover only itinerant workers doing manual works for short time  

periods.

B. The Learned Senior Counsel further argued that if the literal  

interpretation  is  accepted,  as  has  been  done  by  the  Full  

Bench,  number  of  other  provisions  in  the  Act  like  Section  

15(2)(b)  would  be  rendered  otiose  and  redundant,  so  also  

other anomalies would creep in.  The Learned Senior Counsel  

also  urged  that  the  Full  Bench  had  erred  in  ignoring  the  

doctrine  of  stare  decisis,  inasmuch  as  the  provision  had  

received  consistent  interpretation  for  a  considerable  period  

and  hence,  that  interpretation  was  liable  to  be  respected,  

particularly because the rights and obligations of the parties  

covered by this Act had remained settled for a long period of  

time.  Therefore, even if the earlier interpretation might not be  

strictly correct or where two views were possible, the settled  

1

principle of law could not be unsettled.  The Learned Senior  

Counsel contended that the law was settled by two judgments  

of the Bombay High Court by Hon’ble Rege, J. in  C. Jairam  

Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra [Misc. Petition No. 150  

of 1973] pronounced on 19.4.1974 and S.B. More & Ors. Vs.  

State  of  Maharashtra  & Ors.  [Misc.  Petition  No.  414  of  

1973] pronounced on 24.4.1974 and four other Division Bench  

Judgments in  Lallubhai Kevaldas & Anr. Vs. The State of  

Maharashtra  &  Ors.  [Writ  Petition  No.  119  of  1979]   

pronounced on 16.1.1980, Irkar Sahu’s & Anr. Vs. Bombay  

Port Trust [1994 I CLR 187], Century Textiles & Industries  

Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra (cited supra) including this  

Court  judgment  in  Maharashtra  Rajya  Mathadi  Transport   

and  Central  Kamgar  Union  Vs.  State  of  Maharashtra  &  

Ors. [1995 Supp. 3 SCC 28].

C. The  Learned  Senior  Counsel  further  relied  on  the  Rule  of  

Contemporanea Expositio Est Optima Et Fortissima In Lege.  

According  to  the  Learned  Senior  Counsel,  the  Full  Bench  

should  have  considered  how  the  authorities  themselves  

construed and understood the law.  In that behalf, the ruling in  

Godawat Pan Masala Products I.P. Ltd. & Anr. Vs. Union  

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of India & Ors. [2004(7) SCC 68]  was relied upon heavily.  

Reference was made by the Learned Senior Counsel to few  

letters  to  show  as  to  how  the  authorities  themselves  

understood the term ‘unprotected worker’.  In this behalf the  

judgment  in  Irkar  Sahu’s  & Anr.  Vs.  Bombay Port  Trust  

[1994 I CLR 187] was heavily relied.

D. Reference was also made to Article 254 of the Constitution of  

India and it  was suggested that in the matters falling in the  

Concurrent  List,  the  Central  Legislation  will  supersede  the  

State  Legislation  if  both  cover  the  same  field.   It  was  

suggested that there was no need for direct conflict between  

the  two  enactments  and  the  repugnancy  arises  even  if  

obedience  to  both  laws  is  possible.   Further,  the  Learned  

Senior  Counsel  suggested  that  specific  contradictions  

between the two Statutes is not the only criteria.  It is enough  

if  Parliament  had  evinced  the  intention  to  cover  the  whole  

field.  It was also suggested that the Presidential assent given  

to this Act was irrelevant to those Central  Acts, which were  

enacted  after  the  assent,  for  example,  the Contract  Labour  

(Regulation  and  Abolition)  Act,  1970.   Therefore,  it  was  

pointed out that  State Act  cannot survive if  the Central  Act  

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covers  the  same  category  of  workers.   It  was  tried  to  be  

pointed out that there was nothing on record to indicate as to  

what  extent  the  Presidential  assent  was  obtained.   It  was,  

therefore,  contended that  Central  labour  enactments,  which  

firstly create and regulate the employer-employee relationship  

and those which confer the benefits to such employees, would  

exclude the operation of Mathadi Act and as a result, those  

workers  who  enjoy  the  benefits  under  the  Central  labour  

legislation  and  whose  rights  are  regulated  by  the  Central  

legislation  would  not  be  covered  by  the  present  State  

legislation.  Reliance was also placed on various reports like  

1963  Committee  Report,  the  Report  of  the  Lokhandi  Jatha  

Kamgar Enquiry Committee to harp upon the real object of the  

enactment and it was suggested that the definition read in the  

light of these reports would clearly bring out the interpretation  

suggested by the appellant.  Various Sections were referred  

like Section 4(a),  Sections 15,  21 and 22 to show that  the  

interpretation given by the Full Bench would lead to absurdity.

12. As against this, Shri K.K. Singhvi and Smt. Indira Jaising, Learned  

Senior Counsel assisted by Shri Vimal Chandra S. Dave, Learned Counsel  

appearing on behalf of the respondents raised various contentions.

2

Legal Submissions on behalf of the respondents

A. Learned Senior Counsel for the respondents contended that in  

the absence of any ambiguity, no harm can be caused to the  

plain language of the Statute.  According to all  the Learned  

Counsel,  impugned  judgments  of  the  Full  Bench  of  the  

Bombay  High  Court  were  in  accordance  with  the  plain  

language of the Sections 2(11) and 2(12) of the Mathadi Act.  

Numbers of authorities for this proposition were relied upon.  

Reliance  was  also  placed  on  Sections  21  and  22  of  the  

Mathadi Act and Clauses 4(c), 11(3), 16(3), 16(4), 16(5), 33,  

35(6) and 36 of the Scheme framed under the Mathadi Act.  In  

short, it was contended that under Section 21, the workmen  

could retain the privileges and benefits under any Act, Award  

or  Contract,  if  such  privileges  were  better  than  the  ones  

offered  by  the  Act  and  in  that  sense,  even  if  the  manual  

worker was protected under the various labour laws, he could  

still be governed by the Mathadi Act.  Same argument was in  

respect  of  Section  22  of  the  Mathadi  Act,  providing  that  a  

manual worker,  who is in receipt of  better benefits from his  

employer either on the date of commencement of this Act or at  

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any time thereafter, he could seek exemption from all or any of  

the provisions of the Mathadi Act.   Reference was made to  

Clauses 4(c), 11(3), 16(3), 16(4), 16(5), 33, 35(6) and 36 of  

the Scheme framed under the Mathadi Act.   

B. It was further contended that the argument on behalf of the  

appellant  that  the  intention  of  the  Legislature  should  be  

ascertained  with  reference  to  the  history  of  legislation,  the  

reports of the Committee, notes on the Clauses of the Bill and  

debates in Assembly, was erroneous as the plain meaning of  

the Section was not susceptible to any other meaning.  It was,  

however, further contended that the language of the Section  

was clear and unequivocal and even if such extraneous aids  

of  the  interpretation  were  to  be  relied  upon,  no  other  

interpretation  could  be  obtained.   It  was  pointed  out  that  

though in the Bill,  as originally introduced, the words “is not  

adequately  protected  by  legislation”  were  to  be  found  and  

though the note on the Clauses also mentioned about such  

non-protection  by the  welfare  Legislature,  the  amended  Bill  

omitted those words, so also the necessary amendments were  

made in Item 5 of the Schedule attached to the Bill. Therefore,  

the Learned Counsel argued that there was a clear, deliberate  

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and  cautious  intendment  to  include  all  manual  workers  

engaged in the scheduled employment, whether protected by  

any labour law or not, in the definition of “protected worker”.  

The Learned Counsel further argued that there could be no  

practical difficulties in such workers being registered with the  

Board and the fear expressed by the Learned Senior Counsel  

on behalf of the appellant was not realistic.  It was pointed out  

that if the service conditions of a workman were better before  

the commencement of the Mathadi Act, he would still continue  

to be benefited by those better conditions and as such, there  

was no anomaly created by giving the plain meaning to the  

Section  depending  upon  its  language.   The  argument  that  

giving  the  plain  meaning  would  deprive  the  workers  of  the  

protection  under  Bombay  Industrial  Relations  Act,  1946  of  

raising  industrial  disputes  before  the  Labour  Court  and  the  

Industrial  Court,  was also termed as incorrect argument,  as  

firstly, there was no vested right for selecting the forum and  

secondly, the Legislature had the competence to enact special  

laws for  a  class  or  section  of  workmen  for  improving  their  

conditions  of  service  and  such  special  law  would  always  

prevail  over any general  law covering the same field.   The  

cases  relied  upon  by  the  appellants  were  distinguished  on  

2

various  grounds.   This  was  especially  done in  the  case of  

Krantikari  Suraksha  Rakshak  Sangathana  Vs.  Bharat   

Sanchar Nigam Limited & Ors. [2008(10) SC 166].  It was  

also  pointed  out  that  the  scheme  of  Security  Guards  was  

different from the scheme of the Act, as in the scheme of the  

Act,  a  directly  recruited  Security  Guard  was  specifically  

excluded from the provisions of the Security Guards Act.   

C. As regards the doctrine of  stare decisis relied upon by the  

appellants,  it  was pointed out that in both the judgments of  

Hon’ble  Rege,  J.  in  C.  Jairam  Pvt.  Ltd.  Vs.  State  of  

Maharashtra (cited supra) and S.B. More & Ors. Vs. State   

of Maharashtra & Ors. (cited supra), the Learned Judge has  

called upon the constitutionality of the certain provisions of the  

Cotton  Merchants  Unprotected  Workers  (Regulation  of  

Employment and Welfare) Scheme, 1972 and in that sense,  

the question of interpretation of Section 2(11) did not fall for  

consideration  in  those  cases.   Similarly  in  the  matter  of  

Lallubhai Kevaldas & Anr. Vs. The State of Maharashtra &  

Ors.  (cited  supra)  decided  by  a  Division  Bench  of  the  

Bombay High Court on 16.1.1980, the Division Bench was not  

called  upon  to  decide  the  interpretation  of  Section  2(11).  

2

Therefore, it could not be said that that case depended upon  

the  interpretation  of  Section  2(11).   Even  as  regards  the  

decision in Century Textiles & Industries Ltd. Vs. State of   

Maharashtra (cited supra),  the question was limited to the  

extent  whether  a  manual  worker  engaged by the petitioner  

therein  through  a  contractor  was  an  unprotected  worker  

although  he  was  covered  by  various  labour  acts.   It  was  

pointed out that the referring judgment itself differed with the  

view  expressed  in  the  decision  in  Century  Textiles  &  

Industries Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra (cited supra).  It  

was, therefore, pointed out that it could not be said that there  

was a breach of doctrine of  stare decisis  in giving a contrary  

meaning  of  Section  2(11)  as  it  was  pointed  out  that  the  

doctrine of stare decisis was not an absolute doctrine and that  

it was for this Court to lay down the correct law under Article  

141 of the Constitution of India.   

D. As regards the Rule of Contemporanea Expositio Est Optima  

Et Fortissima In Lege,  the argument was that there was no  

evidence that  the law makers,  or  as the case may be,  the  

Government understood the scheme in the particular manner.  

Even otherwise, it was pointed out that such interpretation, if it  

2

was palpably correct,  could not be accepted.  To the same  

effect,  was  the  argument  by  Smt.  Indira  Jaising,  Learned  

Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents.

13. It  is  on the basis  of  these conflicting  arguments  that  we have to  

proceed to decide the true interpretations of the Section.  In the referring  

judgment by the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court, consisting of  

Hon’ble F.K. Rebello and Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, JJ. In the case of  Kay  

Kay  Embroideries  Pvt.  Ltd.  Vs.  Cloth  Market  and  Shops  Board,  

Mumbai  &  Ors.  (cited  supra),  the  Division  Bench  made  reference  to  

paras  31  and  41  of  the  judgments.   The Division  Bench  accepted  the  

contentions raised on behalf of the Board that the Division Bench in the  

decision in Century Textiles & Industries Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra  

(cited supra)  adopted a meaning, which could be attributed in common  

parlance to the expression “unprotected worker”, totally ignoring the plain  

meaning of the expression as defined in Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act.  

Relying  on  Section  2(12)  of  the  Mathadi  Act,  wherein  the  expression  

“worker”  was  defined,  the Bench further  held that  when the Legislature  

uses the ‘means and includes’ formula, the intention of the legislature is to  

provide an exhaustive definition, and in such a case, the inclusive part of  

the definition brings within the fold of the expression objects or activities  

which would ordinarily not fall within the purview of the definition.  Carrying  

2

the logic further, the Bench held that by the inclusive part, the definition  

included a person who is not employed by any employer or a contractor,  

but who works with the permission or under agreement with the employer  

or contractor.  On the same logic, the Bench went on to hold that:-

“Once the Act defines the expression ‘unprotected worker’, the  definition in the Act provides a statutory dictionary which the  Court  is  under the bounden duty to apply in construing the  provisions of the Act.  It is not open to the Court to adopt a  meaning of  the expression ‘unprotected worker’  at  variance  with what has been legislated by the competent legislature.”

It  was  pointed out  further  that  if  the legislature  intended that  the  

benefit  of  Act  could  not  be  available  to  workers  who  were  otherwise  

governed by some other industrial legislation, it was open to the legislature  

to legislate accordingly and it was, therefore, that the Division Bench did  

not  agree with  the decision in  Century Textiles & Industries Ltd. Vs.   

State  of  Maharashtra  (cited  supra).   It  was  also  pointed  out  by  the  

Division Bench that  the notes on Clauses appended to the Bill  did not  

override  express  statutory  provisions.   A  reference  was  then  made  to  

Section 22 of the Mathadi Act and the same logic was used as was relied  

and argued by the Learned Counsel for the respondents before us.

14. On these conflicting claims, we have to interpret Section 2(11) of the  

Mathadi Act and also the scope of the definition in the Section.  We have  

already quoted the provisions of Sections 2(11) and 2(12) of the Mathadi  

2

Act in the earlier part of the judgment.  There can be no dispute that the  

term “worker” is used in the definition of “unprotected worker” in Section  

2(11) of the Mathadi Act.  Therefore, while considering the Section 2(11),  

the scope of  the term “worker”,  which  is  separately  defined by Section  

2(12) of the Mathadi Act, would have to be taken into consideration.  The  

definition  of  the  term  “worker”  is  an  inclusive  definition.   It  includes  a  

worker, who is engaged by the employer directly or through any agency  

and it is not necessary that such worker gets the wages or not.  The term  

“wages” is also defined vide Section 2(13) of the Mathadi Act.  Therefore,  

even if such person does not earn the wages, as contemplated in Section  

2(13), such person who is engaged to do manual work in any scheduled  

employment,  would  be  a  worker.   Further,  even  if  such  worker  is  not  

employed in the strict sense of the term by an employer or a contractor,  

but  is  working  with  the  permission  or  under  the  agreement  with  the  

employer or contractor, even then such worker would be a “worker” within  

the meaning of Section 2(12) of the Mathadi Act.  The only exception is  

that such worker should not be a member of employer’s family.  As per the  

plain meaning, when such worker is engaged or is to be engaged in the  

scheduled employment, he becomes the unprotected worker.  It has been  

correctly  held  in  the  judgment  of  the  Learned  Single  Judge  (Hon’ble  

Deshmukh,  J.)  that  these  two  definitions  (“worker”  and  “unprotected  

worker”) given in Sections 2(11) and 2(12) of the Mathadi Act would have  

3

to  be read together  for  realizing the scope of  the Section  2(11)  of  the  

Mathadi  Act.   Therefore,  insofar  as  the  language  of  Section  2(11)  is  

concerned, it is plain, unambiguous and clear.  It means that every worker,  

who  is  doing  manual  work  and  is  engaged  or  to  be  engaged  in  any  

scheduled  employment,  would  be  covered by  that  definition  and would  

become  an  unprotected  worker.   The  question  is  whether  we  should  

accept this plain language.  The appellants take strong exception to this  

approach.   

15. Shri  Cama,  Learned  Senior  Counsel  appearing  on  behalf  of  the  

appellants contended in no uncertain terms that the reliance on the plain  

meaning of the Section, as it appears, would not only be hazardous, but  

would also lead to absurdity.  According to him, while interpreting Section  

2(11) of the Mathadi Act, it  cannot be done bereft  of the context of the  

legislation.   Our  attention  was  invited  to  Statement  of  Objects  and  

Reasons, as also the legislative history of the legislation.  According to the  

Learned  Senior  Counsel,  the  acceptance of  such  plain  meaning  would  

result in rendering some other provisions of the Act, otiose.  Further, such  

interpretation would also hit doctrine of stare decisis, as the interpretation  

of  this  doctrine  prior  to  the  impugned  Full  Bench  Judgment  and  more  

particularly given in various judgments of the Bombay High Court including  

judgment  in  Century  Textiles  &  Industries  Ltd.  Vs.  State  of   

3

Maharashtra (cited supra)  has remained intact for more than 25 years,  

which is a long period.  The further contention is that such interpretation  

would also be violative of the doctrine of  Contemporanea Expositio Est  

Optima  Et  Fortissima  In  Lege,  since  the  relevant  authorities  have  

consistently understood the meaning of that definition in a particular way  

and now, there would be no justification to disturb that understanding.  It  

was also suggested by Shri Cama that the provisions of State Act cannot  

survive if the Central Act covers the same category of workers and in this  

case, such workers who were covered by the other Central Acts could not  

have been brought under the cover of the definition in Section 2(11) of the  

Mathadi Act, it being a State Act.  The Learned Senior Counsel, therefore,  

suggested that those workers, who enjoy the benefits under the Central  

labour  legislation  and  whose  rights  were  regulated  by  the  Central  

legislations, have to be held outside the definition in Section 2(11) of the  

Mathadi Act.   

16. The respondents,  however,  relied on the principle that  where  the  

language of the Statute is clear and unequivocal, there would be no need  

to go to the extraneous aids of the interpretation and the plain meaning of  

the language has to be accepted as the correct  interpretation.   In fact,  

according to Shri Singhvi, Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of  

the respondents, it was not necessary to interpret the provision of Section  

3

2(11) of the Mathadi Act, since the language of that Section was extremely  

clear, which clearly expressed the deliberate and the cautious intention of  

the  legislature  to  include  all  manual  workers  engaged  in  scheduled  

employment, whether protected by any labour law or not, in the definition  

of “unprotected worker”.  Shri Singhvi also dispelled the argument that the  

number  of  other  provisions  in  the  Act  would  be  rendered  otiose  by  

acceptance  of  the  clear  and  unequivocal  meaning  displayed  by  the  

language of Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act.   

17. As  regards  the  argument  on  the  principle  of  stare  decisis,  the  

Learned  Senior  Counsel  pointed  out  that  there  will  be  no  question  of  

allowing a totally wrong interpretation to remain on the legislative scene,  

particularly  in  view of  the  clear  cut  meaning,  which  could  be  attached  

because of the plain and unequivocal  language of Section 2(11) of  the  

Mathadi Act.  At any rate, the Learned Senior Counsel contended that the  

doctrine of stare decisis was not an absolute doctrine.   

18. Even as regards the rule of Contemporanea Expositio Est Optima Et  

Fortissima In Lege, the Learned Senior Counsel argued that there was no  

evidence that the law makers, or as the case may be, the Government,  

understood the scheme in a particular manner.

3

19. We have already pointed out that the plain meaning of the language  

is almost a rule and it is only by way of an exception that the external aids  

of interpretation can be used.  In the case of  Bhaiji Vs. Sub-Divisional  

Officer, Thandla & Ors. [2003(1) SCC 692], this Court has reiterated that  

where the language of the Statue is clear and unambiguous, the external  

aids for interpretation should be avoided.  In Cable Corporation of India  

Vs.  Addl.  Commissioner  of  Labour  [2008  (7)  SCC  680],  this  Court  

observed in Para 16 that when the language is plain and unambiguous and  

admits of only one meaning, no question of construction of a statute arises,  

for the Act speaks for itself.  There can be no dispute that the language of  

Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act is not capable of any other meaning since  

it is clear and unambiguous.  Some debate went on about the use of the  

word  “means”,  which  is  to  be found in  the concerned Section.   It  was  

contended by Shri Singhvi, Learned Senior Counsel for the respondents  

that when a definition of the word begins with “means”, it is indicative of the  

fact that the meaning of the word is restricted, that is to say, it would not  

mean anything else, but what has been indicated in the definition itself.  In  

support of this proposition, he relied on the decision in Feroz N. Dotivala  

Vs. P.M. Wadhwani [2003(1) SCC 433].  The Learned Senior Counsel  

also pointed out that in the decision in P. Kasilingam & Ors. Vs. P.S.G.   

College of Technology & Ors. [AIR 1995 SC 1395], it has been held by  

this Court that the use of the word “means” indicates that the definition is a  

3

hard and fast  definition  and no other  meaning can be assigned to  the  

expression  than  that  is  put  down  in  the  definition.   We have  already  

referred to the decision in Bhaiji Vs. Sub-Divisional Officer, Thandla &  

Ors. (cited supra).  All these three judgments indicate that, firstly, where  

the language of the provision is plain and unambiguous, than that is the  

only avenue available while interpreting the same.  We may also say as we  

have  already  expressed  that  once  the  language  of  the  Section  is  

absolutely clear, there is hardly any scope for interpretation.  This position  

is then further crystallized by the user of the word “means”, which then  

positively rules aside any other meaning than the one which is dependent  

upon the plain and unambiguous language of the provision.  One more  

decision of this Court, which was heavily relied upon by the respondents  

was Baldev Singh Bajwa Vs. Monish Saini [2005(12) SCC 778], wherein  

in para 21, it was observed:-

“The golden rule of construction is that when the words of the  legislation are plain and unambiguous, effect must be given to  them.  The basic principle on which this rule is based is that  since the words must have spoken as clearly to legislatures,  as to judges, it may be safely presumed that the legislature  intended what the words plainly say.  The legislative intent of  the enactment may be gathered from several sources which  are, from the statute itself, from the preamble to the statute,  from  the  Statement  of  Objects  and  Reasons,  from  the  legislative debates,  reports  of  committees and commissions  which preceded the legislation and finally from all legitimate  and  admissible  sources  from  where  they  may  be  allowed.  Reference  may  be  had  to  legislative  history  and  latest  legislation also.  But, the primary rule of construction would be  

3

to ascertain the plain language used in the enactment which  advances the purpose and object of the legislation…………”  

      (Emphasis supplied)

20. However,  Shri  Cama,  Learned  Senior  Counsel  for  the  appellants  

submitted that  in  this  case,  unless the context  is  taken into account,  it  

would lead to absurd and unintended result.  The Learned Senior Counsel  

urged that the definition cannot and should not be mechanically applied.  

He has relied on the decision in Printers (Mysore) Ltd. & Anr. Vs. Asstt.   

Commercial Tax Officer & Ors. [1994 (2) SCC 434].  About the principles  

to  be  borne in  mind while  interpreting  a  definition,  the  Learned Senior  

Counsel has relied on the decision in K.V. Muthu Vs. Angamuthu Ammal  

[1997(2) SCC 53],  wherein in para 11, this Court has observed that the  

interpretation placed on a definition should not only be repugnant to the  

context, but it should also be such as would aid the achievement of the  

purpose, which is sought to be served by the Act.  This Court further held  

that a construction which would defeat or is likely to defeat the purpose of  

the Act, has to be ignored and not accepted.  The Learned Senior Counsel  

also  relied  on  the  decision  in  Gujarat  Steel  Tubes  Ltd.  &  Ors.  Vs.   

Gujarat  Steel  Tubes Mazdoor Sabha & Ors.  [1980(2)  SCC 593] and  

contended that the statutory construction, which fulfills the mandate of the  

statute, must find favour with the judges, except where the words and the  

context rebel against such flexibility.  This Court, in this case observed:-

3

“We would prefer to be liberal rather than lexical when reading  the meaning of industrial legislation which develops from day  to day in the growing economy of India.”

Once it is held that the meaning of the Section is clear on the basis  

of  the  unambiguous  language  used,  it  should  ordinarily  be  end  of  the  

matter.  However, Shri Cama and his other colleagues Shri C.U. Singh,  

Shri  Sudhir  Talsania and Shri  S.S.  Naganand,  Learned Senior  Counsel  

and  Shri  Manish  Kumar,  Shri  Gopal  Singh,  Ms.  Pragya  Baghel,  Shri  

Debmalya Banerjee, Shri  Animesh Sinha,  Smt.  Manik Karanjawala,  Ms.  

Nandini  Gore,  Shri  Raghvendra  S.  Srivatsav,  Shri  T.R.  Venkat  

Subramanium, Shri Abhijit P. Medh, Shri P.V. Dinesh, Ms. Sindhu T.P. and  

Shri P.S. Sudheer, Learned Counsel argued that the legislative history of  

the statute would militate against the language and to accept the meaning  

from the plain language would be completely out of context.  Shri Cama  

and his colleagues also heavily relied upon the history, which led to the  

introduction of the Bill, as also the Statement of Objects and Reasons for  

introducing the Bill in the legislature by the then Hon’ble Labour Minister.  

We were also taken through the debates, as also the Statement of Objects  

and Reasons presented to the State legislature on 19.12.1968 by the then  

Hon’ble Labour Minister.  Our attention was invited to the basic definition of  

the “unprotected worker”, which was as follows:-

“2(11)  ‘Unprotected  worker’  has  been  defined  to  mean  a  manual worker, who but for the provisions of this Act, is not  

3

adequately protected by legislation for welfare and benefits of  the labour force in the State.”

21. Relying  heavily  on  the  Report  of  the  “Mathadi  Labour  Enquiry  

Committee, Greater Bombay, 1963”, Shri Cama, Learned Senior Counsel  

invited our attention to para 2 thereof,  which refers to “such labourers”,  

who  are  deprived  of  regular  wage-scales,  permanency,  earned  leave,  

bonus, provident fund, gratuity, medical benefits, compensation, pension  

etc.  It was argued by Shri C.U. Singh, Learned Senior Counsel appearing  

on behalf of the appellants that in Chapter 6 thereof, under the heading  

“Employer  and  Employee  relationship”,  there  is  expression  “the  real  

difficulty is that there is no ‘employer’ as such”.  It was also pointed out that  

the difficulty, which was felt was that the employment of the worker was  

only through the contractor and technically, there was no direct relationship  

of  employer  and  employee,  as  between  the  Mills  of  Factories  and  the  

Mathadi workers.  Similar was the case with the merchants, traders and  

other concerns as they engage the labour through Mukadam or Toliwala  

and such Mukadam or Toliwala engaged his men or the workers with him  

and paid wages to them and, therefore, technically,  there was no direct  

relationship of the employer and employee, as between the merchants or  

concerns and the workers.  It was also argued that if the direct relationship  

was established, such benefits would flow to the Mathadi workers.  From  

this,  the  Learned  Senior  Counsel  argued  that  where  there  is  a  direct  

3

relationship in case of the monthly workers, there would be no question of  

applying this broad definition to such workers.  It was also pointed out that  

the Committee considered that there was a positive reluctance to appoint  

these  workers  as  the  direct  employees  and  only  a  few  merchants  

expressed  their  willingness  to  accept  the  workers  as  their  direct  

employees, and there was also reluctance on the part of the workers to be  

employed directly.  This was obviously with a view to argue that what was  

contemplated  by  the  Committee  was  not  for  the  direct  workers  and,  

therefore, the directly appointed workers would be outside the definition of  

“unprotected  worker”.   Shri  Singh  also  carried  on  his  argument  further  

relying on the para 13 under the head “Adjudication” and pointed out the  

following observations:-

“13. The  labour  laws  in  force  are  not  applicable  to  the  Mathadi workers and thus they are without any remedy  at law.  To obtain amelioration of the conditions of their  work  and  wages,  they  are  inevitably  led  to  organize  ‘Morchas’ or stage ‘Strikes’.  To avoid such exigencies  as also to enable them to obtain the other benefits, it is  necessary to provide for them a remedy at law.”

22. Our attention was also invited to some portions of the Report of the  

“Lokhandi  Jatha  Kamgar  Enquiry  Committee,  December,  1965”  and  its  

working.  We were also taken through para 13 of Chapter IV thereof titled  

“Application of labour laws”.   

3

23. We  were  also  taken  through  the  Report  of  the  “Committee  for  

Unprotected  Labour,  1967”  and  more  particularly,  through  Chapter  II  

thereof titled “Conditions existing in the Avocations”, as also Chapter IV  

titled “Reasons, Conclusions and Recommendations and draft outline of  

the legislation”.  The contents, which were heavily relied upon are:-

“The  persons  engaged  in  the  avocations  like  hamals,  mathadis, casual workers employed in Docks, Lokhandi Jatha  workers, Salt Pan workers mostly work outside fixed premises  in open space.  Most of the persons are engaged on piece  rate system.  In a number of  cases they are not employed  directly  but  are  either  engaged  through  Mukadams  or  Tolliwalas  as  and  when  there  is  work.   The  persons  in  a  number of cases, work for different persons on one and the  same day.   In  view of  the peculiar  nature of  work  and the  system of payment, the application of the various labour laws  to such workers has become difficult.   The rickshaw pullers  who are not self employed are also pulling the rickshaw taken  on hire.  The question of regulation of the working and other  conditions  of  such  persons,  therefore,  is  not  possible  by  introducing  amendments  to  the  existing  labour  laws.   The  object can be achieved if a special legislation is prepared for  the  purpose  by  incorporating  beneficial  provisions  of  the  important  labour  enactments  applicable  to  similar  workers  employed in regular establishments and factories.”

From this, the argument was tried to be developed by Shri Cama  

and Shri Singh that the objective was very clear and under the same what  

was  contemplated  was  only  the  cases of  those workers  who  were  not  

directly engaged and as such, the term “unprotected worker” should be  

interpreted to exclude all the directly appointed workers employed in the  

factories, even if they are working in the scheduled employments.   

4

24. We  were  also  taken  through  the  Objects  and  Reasons  and  

Preamble and a very strong argument was advanced that if the definition is  

read  in  that  light,  there  would  be  no  question  of  accepting  the  literal  

interpretation.   In  our  opinion,  in  view  of  the  clear  and  settled  law  of  

interpretation, it would really not be necessary to go into these contentions,  

particularly, because the law is very clear that where the language is clear  

and admits of no doubts, it is futile to look for the meaning of the provision  

on the basis of these external aids.  It is possible where the plain meaning  

rungs counter to the objects or creates absurdity or doubts by attributing  

that plain language.  In our considered opinion, it is very difficult to find out  

any such absurdity or  contradiction if  the plain language of the Section  

2(11) is accepted and acted upon for the purposes of interpretation.  It  

must,  at  this  juncture,  be  noted  that  inspite  of  Section  2(11),  which  

included the words “but for the provisions of this Act is not adequately   

protected by legislation for welfare and benefits of the labour force in   

the State”, these precise words were removed by the legislature and the  

definition was made limited as it has been finally legislated upon.  It is to  

be noted that when the Bill came to be passed and received the assent of  

the Vice President  on 5.6.1969 and was  first  published in  Maharashtra  

Government  Gazette  Extraordinary  Part  IV  on  13.6.2009,  the  

aforementioned  words  were  omitted.   Therefore,  this  would  be  a  clear  

pointer to the legislative intent that the legislature being conscious of the  

4

fact and being armed with all the Committee Reports and also being armed  

with  the  factual  data,  deliberately  avoided  those  words.   What  the  

appellants are asking was to read in that definition, these precise words,  

which were consciously and deliberately omitted from the definition.  That  

would amount to supplying the casus omissus and we do not think that it is  

possible, particularly, in this case.  The law of supplying the casus omissus  

by the Courts is extremely clear and settled that though this Court may  

supply the casus omissus, it would be in the rarest of the rare cases and  

thus supplying of this casus omissus would be extremely necessary due to  

the inadvertent omission on the part of the legislature.  But, that is certainly  

not  the case here.  [See Decision in  State  of Jharkhand & Anr. Vs.   

Govind Singh (2005 (10) SCC 437)].  Reliance was also placed on the  

decision in Ramesh Mehta Vs. Sanwal Chand Singhvi & Ors. [2004 (5)  

SCC 409 (Paras 27 and 28)], wherein it was held that the definition is not  

to be read in isolation and it must be read in the context of the phrase  

which  would  define  it.   It  should  not  be  vague  or  ambiguous  and  the  

definition of the words must be given a meaningful application; where the  

context makes the definition given in the interpretation clause inapplicable,  

the same meaning cannot be assigned.  We must point out here that this  

ratio will not apply for the simple reason that the definition given in Section  

2(11) of the Mathadi Act is extremely clear and there is no vagueness or  

ambiguity about it.  We have already pointed out that even if it is read in  

4

the context, we cannot ignore the fact that the legislature had deliberately  

deleted the words “but for the provisions of this Act is not adequately  

protected by legislation for welfare and benefits of the labour force in   

the State”.  The other decision in U.P. State Electricity Board Vs. Shiv  

Mohan  Singh  &  Anr.  [2004(8)  SCC  402  (Para  11)]  would  be  of  no  

consequence in the present controversy.  The omission of the words as  

proposed earlier from the final definition is a deliberate and conscious act  

on the part of the legislature, only with the objective to provide protection to  

all  the  labourers  or  workers,  who  were  the  manual  workers  and  were  

engaged  or  to  be  engaged in  any  scheduled  employment.   Therefore,  

there was a specific act on the part of the legislature to enlarge the scope  

of the definition and once we accept this, all the arguments regarding the  

objects and reasons, the Committee Reports, the legislative history being  

contrary to the expressed language, are relegated to the background and  

are liable to be ignored.

25. Shri  Cama,  Learned  Senior  Counsel  for  the  appellants  relied  on  

decision in Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation Vs. State of  

Maharashtra & Ors. [2003(4) SCC 200],  in which observation in para 16  

was relied upon, which is as follows:-

“16. ………..If  certain  provisions  of  law,  construed  in  one  way,  would make them consistent with the Constitution and  

4

another interpretation would render them unconstitutional, the  Court would lean in favour of the former construction.”

The case is clearly not applicable, since there is no constitutional  

matter  involved.   We  would  comment  regarding  Article  254  of  the  

Constitution of India, in the later part of the judgment.  To the same effect  

is  the  reading  in  the  decision  in  The  State  of  M.P.  &  Ors.  Vs.  M/s.   

Chhotabhai Jethabhai Patel and Co. & Anr. [1972 (1) SCC 209], relied  

upon by the Learned Senior Counsel.  We do not see any such problem  

about two interpretations.  We have already stated that there may not be  

two interpretations.  Therefore, contention of the Learned Senior Counsel  

based upon this decision is also incorrect.  One more decision was relied  

upon by the Learned Senior Counsel in R.D. Goyal & Anr. Vs. Reliance  

Industries Ltd. [2003 (1) SCC 81 (Paras 33 and 34)].  This decision is  

also of no consequence, since the Paras relied upon in this decision deal  

with the words “Notes and Clauses” while interpreting the provision.  That  

is not the case here.

26. We were also taken through the Preamble of the Mathadi Act, which  

is as under:-

“An Act for regulating the employment of unprotected manual  workers  employed  in  certain  employments  in  the  State  of  Maharashtra, to make provision for their adequate supply and  proper  and  full  utilization  in  such  employments,  and  for  matters connected therewith.

4

WHEREAS,  it  is  expedient  to  regulate  the  employment  of  unprotected manual workers,  such as, Mathadi,  Hamal etc.,  engaged in certain employments, to make better provision for  their terms and conditions of employment, to provide for their  welfare,  and  for  health  and  safety  measures  where  such  employments require these measures; to make provision for  ensuring an adequate supply to, and full and proper utilization  of,  such workers  in  such employments  to  protect  avoidable  unemployment; for these and similar purposes, to provide for  the establishment of Boards in respect of these employments  and (where necessary) in the different areas of the State; and  to provide for purposes connected with the matters aforesaid;  It is hereby enacted in the Twentieth Year of the Republic of  India as follows:-…………….”

Great stress was led on the words “such as” and it was tried to be  

suggested that the Preamble carves out a class of the unprotected manual  

workers.  Further, it was stressed that the object of the law is to provide for  

the welfare, health and safety measures, where such employments require  

those measures.  From this, it was suggested that it is only where the other  

legislations are unable to provide for the welfare and the better conditions,  

then alone this Act (Mathadi  Act)  would  be brought into and, therefore,  

necessarily the unprotected workmen would be such workmen, who are  

deprived of the better conditions of service and further,  therefore, if  the  

workers  were  adequately  protected,  there  would  be  no  question  of  

applying the provisions of  the Mathadi Act  to them and they cannot be  

covered under Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act.  The argument is clearly  

incorrect for the reason that the mention of “unprotected manual workers”  

is clearly in the wider sense and even the Preamble of the Mathadi Act  

4

displays the intentions of the State Government to make better provision  

for the unprotected manual workers.  Merely because some workmen are  

manual workers and not casual workers, that by itself, would not make any  

different.   It  is to be noted that in the Preamble, terminology of “casual  

workers” is not to be found.  Therefore, even on this basis, the definition  

cannot be restricted.  The argument is, therefore, rejected.

27. Shri C.U. Singh, Learned Senior Counsel for the appellants referred  

to the Reports of the three Committees in 1963, 1965 and 1967.  We have  

already  referred  to  those  Reports  and  we  find  nothing  contradictory  in  

those Reports in view of our finding on the plain language of the Section.

28. We were also taken through the decision in Printers (Mysore) Ltd.  

& Anr. Vs. Asstt. Commercial Tax Officer & Ors. (cited supra),  more  

particularly,  Para  18  therein  providing  the  principles  for  interpreting  the  

definitions, as also the decision in  Pandey & Co. Builders (P) Ltd. Vs.   

State  of  Bihar  &  Anr.  [2007(1)  SCC  467].   We have  examined  this  

decision.  Para 30 makes a reference to 3 decisions.  They are Mukesh K.  

Tripathi  Vs.  Senior  Divisional  Manager,  LIC  [2004(8)  SCC  387],   

Ramesh Mehta Vs. Sanwal Chand Singhvi (cited supra)  and State of  

Maharashtra Vs. Indian Medical Association [2002 (1) SCC 589].  In the  

first mentioned decision, the word “include” was used, which would make  

all the difference and thereby, it was held that the definition may deserve a  

4

broader  meaning  and,  therefore,  it  was  necessary  to  keep in  view the  

scheme of the object and purport of the statute.  That is not the case here.  

We have  already  referred  to  the  second  mentioned  case  of  Ramesh  

Mehta Vs. Sanwal Chand Singhvi (cited supra).  Expressions in Para 27  

cannot, however, be read in isolation.  Again, it is not that every definition  

has to be read in the context of the phrase, which would define it.  We  

have again pointed out that even the context does not require us to restrict  

the  meaning  of  Section  2(11).   The  third  mentioned  case  of  State  of  

Maharashtra  Vs.  Indian  Medical  Association  (cited  supra) is  of  no  

consequence,  as  the  phraseology  therein  was  entirely  different.   As  

regards decision in Printers (Mysore) Ltd. & Anr. Vs. Asstt. Commercial   

Tax Officer & Ors. (cited supra), we do not think that the case is helpful  

to  the  appellants.  Therein,  the  controversy  was  about  the  definition  of  

“goods” in Section 8(3)(b) of the Central Sales Tax Act and the controversy  

was as to whether the word “goods” could be read in a different manner.  

Such is not the controversy here.

29. We also find no absurdity,  inconsistency or any contradiction with  

the other provisions of the Act.  Shri Singhvi, Learned Senior Counsel for  

the  respondents  alongwith  his  colleagues  Ms.  Indira  Jaising,  Learned  

Senior  Counsel,  Ms.  Lata  Desai,  Ms.  Pallavi  Divekar  and  Shri  Vimal  

Chandra S. Dave, Shri Nitin S. Tambwekar, Shri B.S. Sai, Shri K. Rajeev,  

4

Ms. Bharathi,  Ms.  Mehak G.  Sethi,  Shri  Naveen R.  Nath,  Shri  Arun R.  

Pendekar, Shri Sanjay Kharde, Ms. Asha Gopalan, Shri Vishnu Sharma,  

Shri Shrish Kumar Misra and Shri Rajesh Kumar, Learned Counsel invited  

our attention to Section 21 of the Mathadi Act and pointed out that there  

was  absolutely  no  inconsistency  because  where  a  directly  appointed  

worker was having better rights or privileges, then those rights or privileges  

remains unaffected and in that case, such worker would have the choice  

for  those  more  favourable  rights  and  privileges  under  other  beneficial  

legislations, the only rider being that such worker would not be entitled to  

receive any corresponding benefit under the provisions of the Mathadi Act  

and the scheme.  According to the Learned Senior Counsel, this provision  

was  enough  to  repel  the  arguments  of  the  appellants  that  the  directly  

employed workers were enjoying the better benefits and they would be  

deprived of the same in case they are included in the wider definition under  

Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act.   

30. We were also taken through Section 22 of the Mathadi Act, which  

provides  for  the  exemptions.   The  Section  provides  that  the  State  

Government may exempt from the operation of all or any of the provisions  

of the Act or any scheme, all or any of the classes of unprotected workers  

employed in any scheduled employment or the establishment or part of  

any  establishment,  if  in  the  opinion  of  the  State  Government,  all  such  

4

unprotected workers are in the enjoyment of benefits, which are, on the  

whole, not less favourable to such unprotected workers than the benefits  

provided  by  or  under  the  Mathadi  Act,  of  course,  subject  to  certain  

conditions and after the consultation with Advisory Committee.  If this is the  

position, then there would be no question of accepting the argument that  

by the acceptance of the plain meaning of the wider definition given out in  

Section  2(11)  of  the  Mathadi  Act,  there  would  be  creations  of  

contradictions.  A Statement of Objects and Reasons for introducing the  

Bill is of course an external aid, which should be of no consequence if the  

language is clear.  However, even if we read the Statement of Objects and  

Reasons, it does not further the cause of the appellants.  We have very  

carefully gone through the Statement of  Objects and Reasons and find  

nothing  therein  to  support  the  contention  raised  herein.   Shri  Cama,  

Learned Senior Counsel for the appellants, while relying on the Statement  

of Objects and Reasons, firstly urged that it was because the workers in  

various employments were not receiving adequate protection and benefits  

within the ambit of existing labour legislation that this Bill was introduced  

alongwith Statement of Objects & Reasons.  Our attention was also invited  

to read clause 2.  From this, it was pointed out that the  adequacy of the  

protection was the main issue.  Now, if inspite of this, the legislature went  

on to delete those words, which we have already quoted, the intention of  

the legislature must be loud and clear and we cannot persuade ourselves  

4

to hold that there is anything contradictory to the definition in the Statement  

of Objects and Reasons.  In our opinion, even if that was so, when the  

legislature  consciously  deletes  certain  words,  then  there  will  be  no  

question of relying and insisting upon those words.

31. We were taken through some alleged inconsistencies, for example,  

Section 15 of the Mathadi  Act.   It  was expressed that Section 15(2)(b)  

would become redundant if we accept the interpretation put forward by the  

respondents.  Sub-Section (1) of Section 15 provides for the appointment  

of Inspectors, possessing prescribed qualifications for the purposes of the  

Mathadi Act or of any scheme.  Sub-Section (2) of Section 15 and more  

particularly, clause (a) thereof defines the powers of the Inspector.  Clause  

(b), on which great stress was led by Shri Cama runs as under:-

“15(2)(b) examine  any  person  whom  he  finds  in  any  such  premises or place and who, he has reasonable cause to  believe, is an unprotected worker employed therein or  an  unprotected  worker  to  whom  work  is  given  out  therein.”

According  to  Shri  Cama,  when  all  the  persons  working  in  a  

scheduled industry, doing manual work, become the unprotected workers,  

then there is  no question of  the Inspector  examining any such person,  

because everybody would be an unprotected worker.   The argument is  

clearly wrong.  What is required is that every unprotected worker has to be  

registered with the Board.  If the Inspector suspects that any such worker,  

5

though an unprotected worker, is either not registered or does not get the  

protection  of  the  Board  and is  engaged by the employer,  then  he can  

examine such a person.  We do not think that the Section would become  

unworkable,  as  has  been  argued.   The  argument  is,  therefore,  clearly  

incorrect.

32. Shri  S.S.  Naganand,  Learned  Senior  Counsel  also  referred  to  

Sections 17G, 18, 19 and 20 of the Mathadi Act.  Section 17G provides  

that  the  provisions  of  Bombay  Industrial  Relations  Act,  1946 would  be  

applicable in case of trial of offences under this Act.  Similarly, Section 18  

provides  that  provisions  of  Workmen’s  Compensation  Act,  1923  shall  

mutatis mutandis  apply to registered unprotected workers and they shall  

be deemed to be workmen within the meaning of that Act.   Section 19  

makes the similar provision regarding the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 to  

the workers, while Section 20 provides the application of Maternity Benefit  

Act, 1961. We do not see any relevance of these Sections, particularly, to  

arrive at the correct meaning of Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act.  In all  

these  Sections,  the  words  used  are  “registered  unprotected  workers”.  

There is  a  provision for  creation of  the Boards under  Section  6  of  the  

Mathadi Act and every unprotected worker has to register himself with the  

Board.   Therefore,  the  reliance  on  these  provisions  would  be  no  

consequence.   The  terminology  of  “registered  unprotected  workers”  in  

5

Sections  18,  19  and  20 of  the  Mathadi  Act  was  brought  into  force  by  

Maharashtra  Act  No.  40 of  1974 and under  that,  these words  deemed  

always  to  have  been  substituted  for  the  original  terminology  of  

“unprotected workers”.  We do not, therefore, see any reason to take any  

different view in the light of these Sections.

33. Shri Sudhir Talsania, Learned Senior Counsel arguing on behalf of  

the appellants also argued about the nature of Sections 2(11) and 2(12) of  

the  Mathadi  Act.   He  contended  that  while  Section  2(12)  is  a  general  

provision, Section 2(11) is a specific provision.  We have no quarrel with  

that.   We would  only observe that so long as that  language of Section  

2(11) of the Mathadi Act is clear enough, there will not be any question of  

cutting the scope of the term “unprotected workman”.  He further argued  

that  this  interpretation  would  lead  to  absurd  results,  whereby  Sections  

2(11) and 2(12) would be identical.  We have already explained that such  

is  not  the  possibility.   This  is  true  that  the  Sections  have  to  be  read  

together.   Section  2(12)  specifies  the  worker,  which  in  turn  is  used  in  

Section 2(11) further.  Therefore, they would not be identical under any  

circumstances.

34. It was argued by Shri C.U. Singh, Learned Senior Counsel for the  

appellants that as per Sections 3(13) and 3(14) of the Bombay Industrial  

Relations Act, all the employees are covered and any reduction from those  

5

employees has to be only after the notice of change is given.  Our attention  

was also invited to Section 44 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act.  We  

have no difficulty with the provisions of the Bombay Industrial  Relations  

Act, as that Act operates in different spheres altogether.  We do not think  

that  there  is  any  relevance  of  those  provisions,  particularly,  while  

interpreting the terms of the Mathadi Act and more particularly of Section  

2(11)  of  the  Mathadi  Act.   All  the  Learned  Counsel  for  the  appellants  

expressed  their  apprehension  about  the  working  of  Section  3  of  the  

Mathadi Act and posed a question as to who will decide as to whether an  

industry has or has not adequate employees, whether it would be Board or  

employer  or  employee  union.   In  our  view,  such  argument  is  clearly  

incorrect for the simple reason that such question does not come within the  

scope of the Mathadi Act.  Once a workman is engaged to do the manual  

work, he automatically becomes an unprotected workman and would have  

to be registered with the Board.  In our opinion, such argument has to be  

rejected.  Our attention was invited to the decision in  Chairman, Indore  

Vikas Pradhikaran Vs. Pure Industrial Coke & Chemicals Ltd. & Ors.   

[2007(8) SCC 705], particularly, paras 79, 80 and 81 thereof.  The term “at  

any time”  in  Section  50(1)  of  the  Madhya  Pradesh Nagar  Tatha  Gram  

Nivesh Adhiniyam (No. 23 of 1973) had fallen for consideration.  Hon’ble  

Sinha, J. had held that the term will have to be interpreted in a particular  

manner, otherwise it would lead to manifest injustice and absurdity, which  

5

is not contemplated by the statute.  We have absolutely no quarrel with the  

proposition, however, we have already held that the interpretation that we  

propose to give, does not make any of the provision absurd and does not  

lead to manifest the injustice or the absurdity.   

35. Similarly, reliance was placed by Shri C.U. Singh, Learned Senior  

Counsel for the appellants on the decision in National Insurance Co. Ltd.   

Vs. Laxmi Narain Dhut [2007 (3) SCC 700].   The provisions of  Motor  

Vehicles Act, 1988 and more particularly, Sections 147, 145 (d) and 149  

fell for consideration therein.  There also, the Court held that the golden  

rule of interpretation is that the statutes are to be interpreted according to  

grammatical  and  ordinary  sense  of  the  word  in  grammatical  or  literal  

meaning  unmindful  of  consequence of  such interpretation.   It  was  only  

when  such grammatical  and literal  interpretation  leads to unjust  results  

which the legislature never intended that the said rule has to give place to  

the “rule of legislative intent”.   We have already pointed out that in this  

case,  the  golden  rule  of  interpretation  would  not  lead  to  any  injustice.  

Therefore,  this  ruling  is  more  helpful  to  the  respondents  than  the  

appellants.  Another ruling, which was relied upon was Bombay Dyeing &  

Mfg.  Co.  Ltd.  Vs.  Bombay  Environmental  Action  Group  &  Ors.  

[2006(3) SCC 434].  Reliance was placed on the observations made in  

para 176.  Hon’ble Sinha, J. therein had quoted paras 1392, 1477 and  

5

1480  of  Halsbury’s  Laws  of  England  (4th Edn.),  Vol.  44(1)  (Reissue).  

Those paras are as under:-

“1392. Common-sense construction rule:  It is a rule of the  common law, which may be referred to as the common- sense  construction  rule,  that  when  considering,  in  relation to  the facts of  the instant  case,  which  of  the  opposing  constructions  of  the  enactment  would  give  effect  to  the  legislative  intention,  the  Court  should  presume that the legislator intended common sense to  be used in construing the enactment.

1477. Nature  of  presumption  against  absurdity:  It  is  presumed that Parliament intends that the Court, when  considering, in relation to the facts of the instant case,  which  of  the  opposing  construction  of  an  enactment  corresponds to its legal meaning, should find against a  construction which produces an absurd result, since this  is unlikely to have been intended by Parliament.  Here  ‘absurd’ means contrary to sense and reason, so in this  context  the  term ‘absurd’  is  used  to  include  a  result  which  is  unworkable  or  impracticable,  inconvenient,  anomalous  or  illogical,  futile  or  pointless,  artificial  or  productive of a disproportionate counter-mischief.   

1480. Presumption against anomalous or illogical result:  It  is presumed that Parliament intends that the Court,  when considering, in relation to the facts of the instant  case,  which  opposing  constructions  of  an  enactment  corresponds to its legal meaning, should find against a  construction  that  creates  an  anomaly  or  otherwise  produces  an  irrational  or  illogical  result.   The  presumption  may  be  applicable  where  on  one  construction a benefit is not available in like cases, or a  detriment is not imposed in like cases, or the decision  would turn on an immaterial distinction or an anomaly  would be created in legal doctrine.  Where each of the  constructions  contended  for  involves  some  anomaly  then, insofar as the Court uses anomaly as a test, it has  to balance the effect of each construction and determine  which anomaly is greater.  It may be possible to avoid  

5

the anomaly by the exercise of a discretion.  It may be,  however,  that  the  anomaly  is  clearly  intended,  when  effect must be given to the intention. The Court will pay  little  attention  to  a  proclaimed  anomaly  if  it  is  purely  hypothetical, and unlikely to arise in practice.”

It will be seen that the absurdity which the appellants are referring  

again and again has to be such that it should be contrary to the sense and  

reason  and,  therefore,  should  include  a  result,  which  is  unworkable  or  

impracticable,  inconvenient,  anomalous  or  illogical,  futile  or  pointless,  

artificial or productive of a disproportionate counter-mischief.  We do not  

think that such absurdity could be arrived at if the literal interpretation is  

given to the term.  We, therefore, reject the argument of Shri C.U. Singh in  

this behalf.  Once we accept the literal construction, there will be no further  

question of holding otherwise on the basis of the intent of the legislature.  

We have already pointed out that there would arise no absurdity of any  

kind if the literal interpretation is given.

36. That takes us to the next argument regarding  stare decisis.   Shri  

Cama, Learned Senior Counsel for the appellants urged that under this  

rule, where a particular enactment has received a consistent interpretation  

by Courts of law for a considerable period of time, that interpretation must  

be respected because the rights  and obligations by parties covered by  

such interpretation have remained settled thereby during the long period of  

5

time involved.  It was urged by him that if the settled interpretation is upset,  

then  it  would  do  a  greater  injustice  to  all  the  parties  concerned.   The  

Learned Senior counsel went to the extent of saying that the rule of stare  

decisis  should be honoured even in case where the earlier interpretation,  

though consistently upheld for a long time, may not strictly be correct or  

may  produce  two  possible  views.   Our  attention  was  invited  to  the  

decisions in  Mishri Lal (Dead) by Lrs. Vs. Dhirendera Nath (Dead) by   

Lrs.  &  Ors.  [1999  (4)  SCC 11],  Pradeep  Kumar  Biswas  Vs.  Indian  

Institute  of  Chemical  Biology & Ors.  [2002 (5)  SCC 111],  Union of  

India & Anr. Vs. Azadi Bachao Andolan & Anr. [2004 (10) SCC 1] and  

State of Gujarat Vs. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat & Ors. [2005  

(8) SCC 534].  It was urged by the Learned Senior Counsel that there was  

a  consistent  line  of  judgments  starting  from  year  1974  right  upto  the  

present judgment of the Full Bench in 2006, covering period of 32 years,  

wherein  the  Bombay  High  Court  has  taken  a  consistent  view  in  

interpretation  of  the  term  “unprotected  workers”  to  mean  only  casual  

workers,  or  as  the  case  may  be,  the  workers,  who  did  not  enjoy  the  

protection of the other labour welfare legislations.  It was pointed out that  

firstly, the challenge to the constitutional validity was rejected by Hon’ble  

Rege, J. in his two judgments cited supra, solely on the ground that the  

said  Act  applied  to  a  special  class  of  workmen,  who  needed  special  

protection and classification and, therefore, such persons were entitled to  

5

the special treatment.  The reliance was placed on the judgments passed  

by Hon’ble Rege, J.  in  C. Jairam Pvt.  Ltd.  Vs.  State of Maharashtra  

(cited  supra)  on  19.4.1974  and  in  S.B.  More  &  Ors.  Vs.  State  of  

Maharashtra & Ors. (cited supra) on 24.4.1974 and four other Division  

Bench  Judgments  in  Lallubhai  Kevaldas  &  Anr.  Vs.  The  State  of   

Maharashtra & Ors.  (cited supra),  Irkar Sahu’s & Anr.  Vs. Bombay   

Port Trust (cited supra), Century Textiles & Industries Ltd. Vs. State  

of  Maharashtra  (cited  supra) including  this  Court  judgment  in  

Maharashtra Rajya Mathadi Transport and Central Kamgar Union Vs.   

State of Maharashtra & Ors. (cited supra).   Very heavy reliance was  

placed on the decision in  Irkar Sahu’s & Anr. Vs. Bombay Port Trust   

(cited  supra),  where  the  Division  Bench  has  specifically  rejected  the  

employers’ arguments under Article 254 of the Constitution of India solely  

on  the  ground  that  in  the  docks,  the  expression  “mathadis”  would  be  

limited to only such workers doing loading and unloading operations as  

were not protected by legislation under the Dock Workers’ Act, 1948.   

37. Heavy reliance was placed on paras 34, 35 and 36 of that decision.  

On  the  other  hand,  Shri  Singhvi,  Learned  Senior  Counsel  for  the  

respondents urged that the rule of stare decisis was not and could not be  

viewed as an absolute rule.  Reliance was also placed on the decision in  

Sarva Shramik Sanghatana (KV), Mumbai Vs. State of Maharashtra &  

5

Ors. [2008 (1) SCC 494].   So also Smt. Indira Jaising, Learned Senior  

Counsel  for  the  respondents  repelled  this  argument  relying  on  the  

decisions in Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation Vs. State  

of Maharashtra & Ors. (cited supra) and Danial Latifi & Anr. Vs. Union  

of India [2001 (7) SCC 740].  Our attention was also invited to treatise by  

Justice G.P. Singh, (11th Edition).  It was urged by Shri Singhvi that in the  

aforementioned  judgments  of  the  Bombay  High  Court,  excepting  the  

judgment  in  Century  Textiles  &  Industries  Ltd.  Vs.  State  of   

Maharashtra (cited supra),  this question has not fallen for consideration  

at all.   The Full Bench and more particularly, the Learned Single Judge  

(Hon’ble Deshmukh, J.) has rejected this argument that this question was  

not squarely before Hon’ble Rege, J. in his two judgments in  C. Jairam  

Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra (cited supra) and S.B. More & Ors.  

Vs.  State of Maharashtra & Ors.  (cited supra)  nor  was  it  before the  

Division Benches in Judgments in  Lallubhai Kevaldas & Anr. Vs. The  

State of Maharashtra & Ors.  (cited supra),  Irkar  Sahu’s & Anr.  Vs.   

Bombay Port Trust (cited supra), Century Textiles & Industries Ltd.  

Vs. State of Maharashtra (cited supra) including this Court judgment in  

Maharashtra Rajya Mathadi Transport and Central Kamgar Union Vs.   

State of Maharashtra & Ors. (cited supra).  The Learned Single Judge  

noted the argument that it was expressed in Lallubhai Kevaldas & Anr.   

Vs. The State of Maharashtra & Ors. (cited supra) that the Act did not  

5

apply  to  the  manual  workers  in  the  scheduled  employment,  who  were  

protected  by  the  other  labour  legislations  and  the  said  judgment  was  

followed thereafter in the case of Century Textiles & Industries Ltd. Vs.  

State of Maharashtra (cited supra)  and, therefore, on principle of  stare  

decisis,  the settled position of law should not be disturbed.  The Learned  

Judge has also noted the decision in State of Gujarat Vs. Mirzapur Moti   

Kureshi Kassab Jamat & Ors. (cited supra).  The Learned Single Judge  

then, relying on the judgment of this Court in M/s. Good Year India Ltd.   

Vs. State of Haryana [AIR 1990 SC 781], commented that the precedent  

is  an  authority  only  for  what  it  actually  decides  and  not  for  what  may  

remotely or logically follow from it.  The Learned Single Judge then went  

on to hold that what is binding is the ratio decidendi of the judgment.  The  

Learned Judge noted that this question did not fall for consideration either  

in the two judgments by Hon’ble Rege, J. in C. Jairam Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State  

of  Maharashtra  (cited  supra)  and  S.B.  More  &  Ors.  Vs.  State  of  

Maharashtra & Ors. (cited supra)  or even in the judgment in Lallubhai  

Kevaldas & Anr. Vs. The State of Maharashtra & Ors. (cited supra).  In  

our view, the Learned Judge was absolutely correct in so holding.  Close  

examination  of  judgments  by  Hon’ble  Rege,  J.,  as  also  judgment  in  

Lallubhai Kevaldas & Anr. Vs. The State of Maharashtra & Ors. (cited  

supra)  will  show that  the  question  about  the correct  interpretation  and  

scope of the Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act did not fall for consideration  

6

in those cases.

38. This Court, in Sarva Shramik Sanghatana (KV), Mumbai Vs. State  

of  Maharashtra  & Ors.  (cited supra)  has specifically  quoted from the  

decision in Quinn Vs. Leathem [1901 Appeal Cases 495] as follows:-

“Before discussing Allen Vs. Flood [1898 Appeal Cases 1] and what  was  decided  therein,  there  are  two  observations  of  a  general  character, which I wish to make; and one is to repeat what I have  very  often  said  before  –  that  every  judgment  must  be  read  as  applicable to the particular facts proved or assumed to be proved,  since the generality of the expressions which may be found there  are  not  intended  to  be  expositions  of  the  whole  law,  but  are  governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case  in which  such expressions are to be found.  The other is that a case is only  an authority for what it actually decides. I entirely deny that it can be  quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow logically from it.  Such a mode of reasoning assumes that the law is necessarily a  logical code, whereas every lawyer must acknowledge that the law  is not always logical at all.”        (Emphasis  supplied)

The Court therein again referred to the decision in Ambica Quarry  

Works  Vs.  State  of  Gujarat  [1987  (1)  SCC  213]  and  upheld  the  

observations therein to the effect that:-

“18. The  ratio  of  any  decision  must  be  understood  in  the  background of the facts of that case.  It has been said long  time ago that a case is only an authority for what it actually  decides and not what logically follows from it.”

The  Court  further  relied  upon  the  decisions  in  Bhavnagar  

University Vs. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd. [2003 (2) SCC 111], Bharat   

6

Petroleum Corpn.  Ltd.  Vs.  N.R.  Vairamani  [2004  (8)  SCC 579]  and  

finally, the decision in  British Railways Board Vs. Herrington [All ER  

761] and has quoted the following observations therefrom:-

“There  is  always  peril  in  treating  the  words  of  a  speech  or  a  judgment as though they were words in a legislative enactment, and  it  is  to  be  remembered  that  judicial  utterances  are  made  in  the  setting of the facts of a particular case.

11. Circumstantial  flexibility,  one additional  or different  fact  may  make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases.  Disposal of cases by blindly placing reliance on a decision is  not proper.”

Now, when we examine all the Bombay High Court’s judgments on  

the basis of this ratio, it  is clear that excepting the decision in  Century  

Textiles & Industries Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra (cited supra), such  

position  could  not  be  obtained.   There  can  be  no  dispute  about  the  

importance attached by this Court in the above mentioned cases, as relied  

upon by the appellants, which favour the consistency of law.  Further, it is  

to  be  seen,  particularly,  from  the  decision  in  State  of  Gujarat  Vs.  

Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat & Ors. (cited supra).  In paras  

111 and 112, this Court observed:-

“111. …………….  However,  according to Justice Frankfurter,  the  doctrine of  stare decisis  is  not  ‘an imprisonment  of  reason’  (Advanced Law Lexicon, P. Ramanatha Aiyer, 3rd Edn., 2005,  Vol.  4,  P 4456).   The underlying logic of  the doctrine is to  maintain  consistency  and  avoid  uncertainty.   The  guiding  philosophy is that a view which has held the field for a long  time should  not  be disturbed only  because another  view is  possible.

6

112. The trend of judicial opinion, in our view, is that stare decisis is  not a dogmatic rule allergic to logic and reason; it is a flexible  principle  of  law  operating  in  the  province  of  precedents  providing room to collaborate with the demands of changing  times  dictated  by  social  needs,  State  policy  and  judicial  conscience.”

Again, in para 113, this Court observed:-

“113. According to Professor Lloyd, concepts are good servants but  bad masters.  Rules, which are originally designed to fit social  needs, develop into concepts, which then proceed to take on a  life of their own to the detriment of legal development.  The  resulting ‘jurisprudence of concepts’ produces a slot-machine  approach  to  law,  whereby  new  points  posing  questions  of  social policy are decided, not by reference to the underlying  social situation, but by reference to the meaning and definition  of  the  legal  concepts  involved.   This  formalistic  a  priori   approach  confines  the  law  in  a  straitjacket  instead  of  permitting  it  to  expand  to  meet  the  new  needs  and  requirements of changing society (Salmond on Jurisprudence,  12th Edn.  At  P.  187).   In  such  cases,  the  Courts  should  examine not  only the existing laws and legal  concepts,  but  also the broader underlying issues of policy…………………..”

In para 114, quoting from the Salmond on Jurisprudence, 12th Edn.,  

the Court saw the need of the Judge looking at existing laws, the practical  

social results of any decision he makes and the requirements of fairness  

and justice.  In para 116 again, the Court observed:-

“116. Stare decisis is not an inexorable command of the Constitution  or  jurisprudence.   A  careful  study  of  our  legal  system  will  discern  that  any  deviation  from  the  straight  path  of  stare  decisis in our past history has occurred for articulable reasons,  and only when the Supreme Court has felt obliged to bring its  opinions in line with new ascertained facts, circumstances and  experiences.   (Precedent  in  Indian  Law,  A.  Laxminath,  2nd  Edn. 2005, P. 8)”

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In para 118, this Court observed that:-

“118. The doctrine of  stare decisis  is  generally  to be adhered to,  because well-settled principles of law founded on a series of  authoritative pronouncements ought to be followed.  Yet, the  demands of the changed facts and circumstances, dictated by  forceful factors supported by logic, amply justify the need for a  fresh look.”

Tested on the basis of this logic in the celebrated decision of State  

of  Gujarat  Vs.  Mirzapur  Moti  Kureshi  Kassab  Jamat  &  Ors.  (cited  

supra), we have no hesitation, but to hold that the application of doctrine  

of stare decisis cannot help the appellants in this case.  We must express  

here  that  while  rejecting  the  arguments  of  appellants,  we  have  in  our  

minds,  those  thousands  of  workmen  who  are  otherwise  exploited  by  

Toliwalas, Mukadams and at times, the employers.  The enactment is a  

beneficial enactment, providing the protection to such workers, who do not  

have  the  honest  representation  and  it  is  with  this  lofty  idea  that  a  

progressive  State  like  State  of  Maharashtra  has  brought  about  this  

legislation.   Viewed  from these angles,  it  will  have to  be held that  the  

definition would have to be all the more broad, engulfing maximum area to  

the  advantage  of  a  workman.   It  is  with  this  idea  that  we  reject  the  

argument of the  stare decisis,  though very ably put by Shri Cama, Shri  

C.U.  Singh,  Learned  Senior  Counsel  and  other  Learned  Counsel  

appearing on behalf of the appellants.

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39. The  other  argument  raised  was  on  the  basis  of  maxim  of  

Contemporanea  Expositio  Est  Optima  Et  Fortissima  In  Lege,  shortly  

stated,  Contemporanea  Expositio.   According  to  the  Black’s  Law  

Dictionary,  this  is  the  doctrine  that  the  best  meaning  of  a  statute  or  

document is the one given by those who enacted it or signed it, and that  

the meaning publicly given by contemporary or long professional usage is  

presumed to be the true one, even if the language may have a popular or  

an etymological meaning that is very different.  Shri Cama, Learned Senior  

Counsel for the appellants argued that in the Committee’s Reports, right  

from 1963 clearly only those workers were viewed, who did not have the  

protection of the other labour laws and the Committee had identified only  

those  manual  workers  who  were  engaged  in  loading  and  unloading  

operations.   The  reliance  was  made  on  a  letter  No.  (c)  20206  dated  

7.9.1992, written by one Shri G.K. Walawalkar, Desk Officer, informing that  

in an establishment till the workers doing Mathadi type work are on their  

muster  roll  as  direct  workers  and  they  are  getting  total  protection  and  

benefits under the various labour laws, till  then such establishment shall  

not be included in the Mathadi Act or the schemes thereunder.  Two other  

letters were also referred to by the Learned Senior Counsel.  First Letter  

was  dated  10.5.1990  addressed  to  the  Western  India  Corrugated  Box  

Manufacturers’ Association, authored by one Divisional Officer, informing  

to  the  Chairman,  Western  India  Corrugated  Box  Manufacturers’  

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Association that the provisions of Mathadi Act are not applicable to the  

directly  employed  workers  (employed  no  permanent  basis)  by  the  

company.  Another letter was dated 3.10.1991 addressed to the Secretary,  

Mumbai  Timber  Merchants  Association  Ltd.,  specifying  that  the  direct  

labourers  of  the  employer  doing  loading/unloading  work  would  not  be  

covered by the said Act.  Though these two letters were never procured,  

they were produced before us.  Further, a reference is made to the letter of  

Mathadi Board (Bombay Iron and Steel Labour Board) dated 17.11.1983,  

wherein the Mathadi Board understood and applied the Act only to that  

special  class  of  workers  doing  loading  and  unloading  operations  in  

scheduled  employments,  who  were  in  the  regular  employments  of  an  

employer  and,  therefore,  were  not  protected  by other  applicable  labour  

legislations.  It was also urged that only after the impugned judgment was  

passed, the Mathadi Boards have started asking the employers to register  

them under the Act even if they are engaging regular full time workers.  It  

was urged that in  Irkar Sahu’s & Anr. Vs. Bombay Port Trust (cited  

supra),  the Mathadi Board had taken such a position and they could not  

now turn back from their stance.  From this, the Learned Senior Counsel  

urged that since the State Government itself understood the provision in a  

particular manner, such understanding should be honoured by the Courts.

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40. The argument is clearly erroneous for the simple reason that it is not  

the task of the State Government, more particularly, the Executive Branch  

to  interpret  the  law;  that  is  the  task  of  the  Courts.   Even  if  the  State  

Government understood the Act in a particular manner, that cannot be a  

true  and  correct  interpretation  unless  it  is  so  held  by  the  Courts.  

Therefore, how the State Government officials understood the Act, is really  

irrelevant.   The  Learned  Senior  Counsel,  in  his  address,  relied  on  the  

decision in Godawat Pan Masala Products I.P. Ltd. & Anr. Vs. Union of   

India & Ors.  [2004(7)  SCC 68]  and more particularly,  para 32 therein.  

There,  Hon’ble  Srikrishna,  J.  accepted  the  meaning  of  the  concerned  

provision  as it  was  understood by  the  State  authorities.   However,  the  

Learned Judge was careful enough to say that:-

“While this may not  be really conclusive,  it  certainly indicates the  manner of the State authority viewing its power and the Rules under  which it was exercising the power.  The Court can certainly take into  account this situation on the doctrine of contemporanea expositio.   

      (Emphasis supplied)

Therefore, this cannot be viewed to be an absolute doctrine.  There  

are number of authorities, which speak about the powers of the Court, vis-

à-vis, this doctrine.    It has been held in Clyde Navigation Trustees Vs.  

Laird [1883 (8) Appeal Cases 658], Assheton Smith Vs. Owen [1906   

(1)  Ch  179],  Goldsmiths’  Co.  Vs.  Wyatt  [1907  (1)  KB  95],  Senior   

Electric Inspector Vs. Laxminarayan Chopra [AIR 1962 SC 159], Raja  

Ram  Jaiswal  Vs.  State  of  Bihar  [AIR  1964  SC  828],  J.K.  Cotton  

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Spinning & Weaving Mills Ltd. Vs. Union of India [AIR 1988 SC 191],   

Doypack Systems Ltd. Vs. Union of India [AIR 1988 SC 782] that even  

if the person who dealt with the Act understood it in a particular manner,  

that does not prevent the Court in giving to the Court, its true construction.  

It is pointed out in the decision in  Doypack Systems Ltd. Vs. Union of  

India  (cited supra)  that  the  doctrine  is  confined to  the  construction  of  

ambiguous language used in very old statutes where indeed the language  

itself  have had a rather different  meaning in those days.   The Learned  

author Justice Shri G.P. Singh, in his celebrated treatise quoted that:-

“Subject  to  use  made  of  contemporary  official  statements  and  statutory instruments the principle of contemporanea expositio is not  applicable to a modern statute.”

Same subject has been dealt with in Punjab Traders Vs. State of  

Punjab [1991 (1) SCC 86].  Considering this settled position, we do not  

think we are in a position to accept the contention raised.  Same logic  

applies that even if the Mathadi Board’s stand was somewhat contradictory  

in the case of Irkar Sahu’s & Anr. Vs. Bombay Port Trust (cited supra),   

it did not really create a bar against it from changing its stance for a correct  

interpretation of Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act.

41. The next argument was based on Article 254 of the Constitution of  

India.  It was suggested that the said Article prescribes that in the matters  

falling in the Concurrent List, any Central legislation, whether made before  

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or after a State legislation, supersede such State legislation, if they both  

cover the same field.  An exception to this lies in sub-Article (2), which  

preserves and protects a State enactment to the extent it has received the  

assent of the Vice President.  Needless to say that this challenge is in the  

nature of a challenge to the constitutional validity of the provision of the  

State Act.  Such was not the challenge.  The appellants never urged that  

the Act was constitutionally invalid and in fact, the constitutional validity of  

the Act has already been upheld.  Article 254 does not provide a guide for  

the interpretation of a State statute.  The appellants are also not certain  

about the proposal of the assent of the Vice President, which was received  

on  5.6.1969,  since  the  said  proposal  could  not  be  located  by  them.  

Therefore, all the arguments must fall to the ground once the Presidential  

assent under Article 254(2) is received to the Act.  This is apart from the  

fact that the grounds on the basis of Article 254 cannot be used for the  

interpretation of the Act.  In strict sense, this question was never before the  

Full Bench and in our opinion, the Full Bench rightly rejected this argument  

on the ground that this was not the case of the appellants.   Therefore,  

reliance placed on the decisions in  Kaiser-I-Hind Pvt. Ltd. Vs. National  

Textile Corporation Ltd. [2002 (8) SCC 182]  and Thirumuruga Kirupa  

Nanda  Variyar  Thavathiru  Sundara  Swamigal  Medical  Educational   

and Charitable Trust Vs. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors. [1996 (3) SCC 15]   

is of no consequence.  The argument is thus rejected.

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42. Thus,  in  our  considered  opinion,  the  Full  Bench  was  absolutely  

correct in coming to the conclusions that it did.

43. Before parting with the judgment, we must refer to the fact that this  

legislation,  which came way back in 1969, have in its view,  those poor  

workmen, who were neither organized to be in a position to bargain with  

the employers nor did they have the compelling bargaining power.  They  

were  mostly  dependent  upon the  Toliwalas  and  the  Mukadams.   They  

were not certain that they would get the work everyday.  They were also  

not certain that they would work only for one employer in a day.  Everyday  

was a challenge to these poor workmen.  It was with this idea that the  

Board was created under Section 6 of the Mathadi Act.  Deep thoughts  

have gone into, creating the framework of the Boards, of the schemes etc.  

With these lofty ideas that the Act was brought into existence.  In these  

days  when  Noble  Laureate  Professor  Mohd.  Yunus  of  Bangladesh  is  

advocating the theory of social business as against the business to earn  

maximum profits,  it  would  be better  if  the employers  could realize their  

social obligations, more particularly,  to the have-nots of the society, the  

workers who are all contemplated to be the inflicted workers in the Act.  

Again, before parting, we must appreciate the valuable contributions made  

on behalf of the appellants and the respondents, more particularly,  Shri  

J.P. Cama, Shri C.U. Singh, Shri Sudhir Talsania, Shri K.K. Singhvi and  

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Ms. Indira Jaising, Learned Senior Counsel.  In the result, all the appeals  

are dismissed and under the circumstances, there shall be no orders as to  

the costs.

SLP (C)…. CC No. 4065 of 2007

And

SLP (C)…. CC No. 4046 of 2007

Permission to file Special Leave Petition in these two cases is not granted.  

Dismissed.

………………………………..J. (Tarun Chatterjee)

………………………………..J. (V.S. Sirpurkar)

New Delhi; December 17, 2009

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