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PETITIONER: BHAVNAGAR MUNICIPALITY

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: ALIBHAI KARIMBHAI & OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT08/02/1977

BENCH: GOSWAMI, P.K. BENCH: GOSWAMI, P.K. SHINGAL, P.N.

CITATION:  1977 AIR 1229            1977 SCR  (2) 932  1977 SCC  (2) 350

ACT:             Industrial Dispute Act, S. 33(1)(a), whether contravened         by  retrenchment  of workers directly  involved  in  dispute         pending  before  Tribunal--Contravention of s.  33,  whether         automatically leads to reinstatement of retrenched workers.

HEADNOTE:             An  industrial  dispute between the  appellant  and  its         workmen  including  the respondents, was pending before  the         Industrial  Tribunal.  The dispute, inter alia,  related  to         the demand for permanent status of the respondents who were         rated  workers of the water works  section  of the   Munici-         pality.   Meanwhile, without obtaining the Tribunal’s  prior         permission, the appellant retrenched the respondents.  On  a         complaint  by the respondents  u/s. 33-A of the   Industrial         Disputes  Act, the Tribunal made an award holding  that  the         appellant  had contravened s. 33(1)(a) of the Act,  and  di-         rected  reinstatement of the respondents. The complaint  was         not  adjudicated  on  merits.  The appellant  filed  a  writ         petition which was dismissed in limine by the High Court.             Allowing the appeal, but agreeing that the appellant had         contravened  s. 33 ( I ) (a) and that the respondents’  com-         plaint  u/s. 3 3 ( 1 ) (a) was maintainable, the  Court  re-         stored the respondents’ complaint for  disposal on merits by         the Tribunal.             HELD: (1) The character of the temporary  employment  of         the  respondents being a direct issue before  the  Tribunal,         that  condition must subsist and cannot be altered to  their         prejudice  by  putting an end to that  temporary  condition.         This  could be done only with the express permission of  the         Tribunal.                                             [933-G-H]         The Court further observed:             To  permit rupture in employment, in this case,  without         the prior sanction of the Tribunal will be to. set at naught         the avowed object of section 33 which is principally direct-         ed to preserve the status quo under specified  circumstances         in the interest of industrial peace during the adjudication.         [936 A-B]             (2)  In a complaint under s. 33-A, even if the  employer         is  found to have Contravened the provisions of section  33,         the Tribunal has to pronounce upon the merits of the dispute

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       between  the  parties.   For the purposes of  the  Act,  the         complaint  under s. 33A takes the form of a reference of  an         industrial dispute by the appropriate authority and the same         has to be  disposed  of  in a like manner. [936 C-D]             (3) The Tribunal has committed an error of  jurisdiction         in  ordering-reinstatement of the respondents and  declining         to adjudicate the matter and to make its award on the merits         as required under the law. [936 D]

JUDGMENT:         CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 900 of 1976.             Appeal  by Special Leave from the Judgment   and   Order         dated  8-3-1976  of  the Gujarat High Court  in  Spl.  Civil         Appln. No. 263 of 1976.         P.H. Parekh and (Miss) Manju jetley for the Appellant.         S.C.  Agarwal, V.J. Francis and A.P. Gupta for the  Respond-         ents.         933         The Judgment of the Court was delivered by             GOSWAMI,  J.   This appeal by special leave at  the  in-         stance of the Bhavnagar Municipality is directed against the         order  of the  Gujarat High Court dismissing in  limine  its         writ  application challenging  the award of  the  Industrial         Tribunal, Gujarat, made under section 33A of the  Industrial         Disputes Act (briefly the Act).             There  was  an industrial dispute  pending  between  the         Bhavnagar  Municipality  (briefly  the  appellant)  and  its         workmen before the Industrial Tribunal ’in Reference No.  37         of 1974 referred to it under section 10(1) (d) of the Act on         March  5,  1974.   The said industrial  dispute  related  to         several demands including the demand for permanent status of         the  daily rated workers of the Water Works Section  of  the         Municipality who had completed 90 days’ service.  While  the         aforesaid industrial dispute was pending before the   Tribu-         nal,  the  appellant,  on September 30, 1974, passed  orders         retrenching 22 daily rated workmen (briefly the respondents)         attached to the Water Works Section of the Municipality.  It         is  not disputed that the appellant had  complied with  sec-         tion  25F of the Act and due retrenchment compensation   had         been paid to those workers.  On June 20, 1975, the  respond-         ents filed a complaint to the Tribunal under section 33A  of         the  Act for contravention of section 33 of the Act  by  the         appellant.             Neither  party  adduced  any oral  evidence  before  the         Tribunal but relied only upon documents produced before  it.         On  October  30, 1975, the Tribunal made its  award  holding         that the appellant  contravened section 33(1)(a) of the  Act         and,  therefore, directed reinstatement of the  respondents.         The  appellant preferred a writ application before the  High         Court which was dismissed in limine, as stated above.  Hence         this appeal by special leave.             Two questions arise for decision in this appeal.  First,         whether  the appellant contravened section 33 (1)(e) of  the         Act  by ordering retrenchment of the respondents who,  along         with other workers, were directly involved in the industrial         dispute pending before the Tribunal. Second, whether contra-         vention of section 33 will automatically lead to an order of         reinstatement  of the respondents, as has been held by  the,         Tribunal.             It  is common ground that the appellant did  not  obtain         prior  permission  of the Tribunal  before  retrenching  the         respondents.             It is well settled that a complaint under section 33A is

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       maintainable only if the employer contravenes section 33  of         the  Act.  It  is submitted by Mr. Agarwal, on behalf of the         respondents,  that  the object of section 33 should be borne         in  mind  in considering the question  about  alteration  of         conditions of service under section 33(1)(a) of the Act.  He         submits  that  since  the  respondents  were   directly  in-         volved  in the dispute and the question of their   permanent         status from a casual or temporary status formed the  subject         matter  of  the dispute, the reference. has been made  nuga-         tory  by the action  of  the appellant in retrenching  them.         ’Mr. Parekh, on the other hand, submits that retrenchment of         the  respondents does not’ involve alteration of  conditions         of service and hence there is no contravention of section 33         of the Act.         934             There is no complaint by Mr. Agarwal that there  is  any         noncompliance by the appellant with section 28F of the .Act.         Mr.  Agarwal further rightly concedes that he  cannot  bring         his case under  section 33(1) (b) or under section  33(2)(b)         since it is not a case of discharge or dismissal for miscon-         duct.    His entire submission is based on section  33(1)(a)         of the Act.                       Section  33 of the Act so far as material  for                       us may be set out:                        "33(1)  During  the  pendency  of  any   ....                       proceeding      before          a       ......                       Tribunal   ....  in respect of  an  industrial                       dispute, no employer shall--                          (a) in regard to any matter connected  with                       the  dispute, alter, to the prejudice  of  the                       workmen concerned in such dispute, the  condi-                       tions of service applicable to them immediate-                       ly before the commencement of such proceeding;                        X                 X                X                        save with the express permission in   writing                       of  the authority before which the  proceeding                       is pending".             There  is  a  clear  prohibition  in  section   33(1)(a)         against   altering  conditions of service  by  the  employer         under  the circumstances specified except with  the  written         permission  of the Tribunal or other authority  therein  de-         scribed.             In  order  to attract section  33(1)(a),  the  following         features must be present:             (1)  There is a proceeding in respect of  an  industrial         dispute pending before the Tribunal.         (2) Conditions of service of the workmen applicable immedi-         ately before the commencement of the Tribunal proceeding are         altered.             (3)  The alteration of the conditions of service  is  in         regard  to  a matter connected with the  pending  industrial         dispute.             (4) The workmen whose conditions of service are  altered         are concerned in the pending industrial dispute.             (5)  The alteration of the conditions of service  is  to         the prejudice of the workmen.             The  first  feature is admittedly present in  this  case         since action has been taken by the appellant in  retrenching         the respondents during the pendency of the proceeding before         the  Tribunal.   The point that  requires  consideration  is         whether  the other features are also present in the  instant         case.             Before we proceed further we should direct our attention         to  the  subject matter of the  industrial  dispute  pending         before  the Tribunal. It is sufficient to take note  of  the

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       principal  item  of the dispute, namely, the demand  of  the         respondents for conversion of the temporary status of  their         employment  into permanent.  To  recapitulate  briefly   the         appellant  employed  daily rated workers to do the  work  of         boring  and  hand pumps in its Water Works  Section.   These         workers  have  been in employment for over  a  year.    They         claimed  permanency in their employment on their putting  in         more  than 90 days’ service.  They  also demanded two  pairs         of  uniform every year, cycle allowance at the rate  of  Rs.         10/- per month, Provident Fund benefit and National Holidays         and other holidays allowed to the other workers. While  this         particular  dispute  was pending before  the  Tribunal,  the         appellant  decided to entrust the work, which had till  then         been performed by these workers in the Water Works  Section,         to a contractor. On the employment of the contractor by  the         Municipality  for  the self-same work, the services  of  the         respondents became unnecessary and the appellant passed  the         orders  of  retrenchment.  It is, therefore, clear  that  by         retrenchment  of  the respondents even the temporary employ-         ment of the  workers  ceased while their dispute before  the         Tribunal was pending in order to improve that temporary  and         insecure status.             Retrenchment  may  not, ordinarily,  under  all  circum-         stances, amount to alteration of the conditions of  service.         For instance, when a wage dispute is pending before a Tribu-         nal and on account of the abolition of a particular  depart-         ment  the workers therein have to be retrenched by  the  em-         ployer,  such a retrenchment cannot amount to alteration  of         the conditions of service.  In this particular case,  howev-         er,  the subject matter: being directly connected  with  the         conversion  of  the  temporary  employment  into  permanent,         tampering  with  the status quo ante of these workers  is  a         clear  alteration of the conditions of their  service.  They         were  entitled during the pendency of the proceeding  before         the Tribunal to continue as temporary employees hoping for a         better dispensation in the pending adjudication. And if  the         appellant  wanted  to  effect a change of  their  system  in         getting  the  work done through a contractor instead  of  by         these temporary workers, it was incumbent upon the appellant         to  obtain  prior permission of the Tribunal to  change  the         conditions  of their employment leading to  retrenchment  of         their services.  The alteration of the method of work culmi-         nating in termination of the services by way of retrenchment         in  this ease has a direct impact on the  adjudication  pro-         ceeding.   The alteration effected in the temporary  employ-         ment of the respondents which was their condition of service         immediately before the commencement of the proceeding before         the  Tribunal, is in regard to a matter connected  with  the         pending industrial dispute.             The  character  of the temporary employment of  the  re-         spondents  being  a direct issue before the  Tribunal,  that         condition  of  employment, however  insecure,  must  subsist         during  the pendency of the dispute before the Tribunal  and         cannot  be altered to their prejudice by putting an  end  to         that  temporary condition.  This could have been  done  only         with the express permission of the Tribunal.  It goes  with-         out saying that the         936         respondents were directly concerned in the pending industri-         al dispute. No one also deny that snapping of the  temporary         employment  of  the respondents is not to  their  prejudice.         All  the five features adverted to above are present in  the         instant  case.   To permit rupture in  employment,  in  this         case, without the prior sanction of the Tribunal will be  to         set  at  naught  the avowed object of section  33  which  is

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       principally directed to preserve the status quo under speci-         fied  circumstances  in the, interest  of  industrial  peace         during  the adjudication.  We  are,  therefore,  clearly  of         opinion that the appellant has contravened the provisions of         section 33(1)(a) of the Act and the complaint under  section         33A,  at the instance of the respondents,  is  maintainable.         The  submission   of Mr. Parekh to the  contrary  cannot  be         accepted.             That, however, does not conclude the matter.  The Tribu-         nal  was clearly in error in not adjudicating the  complaint         on the merits.  It is well settled that in a complaint under         section 32A, event if the employer is found to have  contra-         vened  the  provisions of section 33, the  Tribunal  has  to         pronounce  upon the merits of the dispute between  the  par-         ties.’ The order passed in an application under section  33A         is  an  award  similar to one passed in  a  reference  under         section 10 of the Act.  The award passed has to be submitted         to  the  Government and the same has to be  published  under         section  17  of the Act.  For the purposes of  the  Act  the         complaint under section 33A takes, as it were, the form of a         reference  of an industrial dispute by the  appropriate  au-         thority and the same has to be disposed of in a like manner.         The  Tribunal  has  committed an error  of  jurisdiction  in         declining to adjudicate the matter and to make its award  on         the  merits as required under the law.  The High Court  was,         therefore,  not right in dismissing the writ application  of         the  appellant in limine.  We should also. observe that,  in         the  absence of adjudication on the merits by the  Tribunal,         the  High Court was not right in holding that the  retrench-         ment by the appellant was "a gross act of victimisation".             In the result the order of the High Court is set  aside.         It  follows  that the award of the Tribunal  ordering  rein-         statement  of  the respondents fails and is set  aside.   We         should also add that the. observations of the Tribunal  with         regard  to the question  of  prosecution of   the  appellant         under  sections 31 and 32 of the Act were not at all  perti-         nent  in an enquiry under section 33A and ought not to  have         been  made.  The writ application in the High  Court  stands         allowed to the extent indicated.   The appeal is allowed  as         directed  in  this order. The complaint  under  section  33A         stands restored to the file of the Tribunal for disposal  on         the  merits in accordance with law and in the light of  this         judgment.   The appellant, however, shall pay the  costs  of         the  respondents as ordered at the time of granting  of  the         Special Leave.         M.R.                                                  Appeal         allowed.         937