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PETITIONER: BHATINDA IMPROVEMENT TRUST

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: BALWANT SINGH AND OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT11/09/1991

BENCH: KANIA, M.H. BENCH: KANIA, M.H. SAWANT, P.B.

CITATION:  JT 1991 (6)   135        1991 SCALE  (2)561

ACT:     Interpretation of Statutes--Reference of Sections 6, 28, 58,  59  of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 in  the  Punjab  Town Improvement Act, 1922  Amendment of those provisions of Land Acquisition Act, after reference--Whether affects the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922.     Punjab Town Improvement Act. 1922--Sections 36, 42  read with  section 6, Land Acquisition Act,  1894---Notice  under Section  36  on 30.5. 1977 and publication  of  Notification sanctioning  development scheme u/s. 42 on 30.6.  1980-First Proviso  of Section 6, Land  Acquisition  Act--Applicability of.

HEADNOTE:     The  appellant--the Improvement Trust-framed a  develop- ment scheme under the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922  and notices  under Section 36 of the Act were published  in  the Daily  Tribune  on May 31, 1977, June 7, 1977 and  June  14, 1977  and in the local Daily Ajit on May 30, 1977,  June  6, 1977 and June 13, 1977 and in the Punjab Government  Gazette on June 17, 1977, June 24, 1977 and July 1977, respectively.     A  notification as required under Section 42 of the  Act was  published on June 30, 1980 sanctioning the  development scheme.     The notification was challenged by the Respondents in  a writ  petition  in  the High Court on the  ground  that  the notification was not issued within the stipulated period  of three years from the first publications of the notice.     The  Single  Judge of the High Court  allowed  the  writ application  and the Division Bench of the High  Court  dis- missed the Letters Patent Appeal, against which the  present petition has been filed by the Improvement Trust, contending that  the  time limit of three years for the  issue  of  the notification under section 42 of the Act was not  prescribed under  the Act; that the first proviso to section 6  of  the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, was not applicable to the scheme in  question, and; that the provisions of Section 6  of  the Land Acquisition Act were 929 incorporated in the Act from the very time of its  enactment and hence, any amendment to the said section after that date would not be applicable to acquisitions under Act. Dismissing the appeal, this Court,

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   HELD: 1. In a case where a statute is incorporated by  a reference into another statute, an amendment of the  statute so  incorporated  after the date of incorporation  does  not affect  the second statute and the provisions of the  latter statute remain the same as they were at the time of incorpo- ration. [934F-G]     2.  Where one statute is referred to in another, it  may be merely by way of reference or by way of incorporation  of the  same. This depends on the language used in  the  latter statute and other relevant circumstances. [934G]     3. In the present case, there is no question of incorpo- ration of any of the provisions of the Land Acquisition  Act into  the Punjab Improvement Act 1922 at all as  the  latter Act does not deal with acquisition of land for the  purposes of  a scheme as contemplated under the Act. The  acquisition of  such land for the purposes of the scheme is left to  the general law of the land in that connection, namely, the Land Acquisition  Act, which has to be resorted to for  the  pur- poses of acquisition of land for the purposes of a scheme as contemplated under the Punjab Town Improvement Act. The only difference is that some of the provisions of the Land Acqui- sition  Act, as referred to in the relevant sections of  the Act, are given effect to as amended by the relevant sections of  the Act. In these circumstances, it cannot be held  that any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act have been  incor- porated into the Act and the provisions of the Land Acquisi- tion  Act  which have to be applied, are the  provisions  as they  stood  at the relevant time, namely, at  the  time  of acquisition, in the absence of a contrary intention.  [934G- C]     4.  The notification under Section 42 should  have  been published  within the period of three years of the  date  of publication  of the notification under Section 4(1)  of  the Land Acquisition Act, as required under the first proviso to Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. Under sub-clause  (1) of  Clause  (2) of the Schedule to the said Act,  the  first publication  of  a notice of any  improvement  scheme  under section 36 of the said Act, is 930 substituted  for and has the same effect as the  publication in  the Government Gazette of a notification under  sub-sec- tion  (1)  of  Section 4 of the Land  Acquisition  Act.  The notice  under section 36 of the said Act is required  to  he published,  inter alia, in a newspaper or newspapers as  set out  in  section 36(2)(a) of the said Act.  In  the  present case, such a notice was first published in the daily  ’Ajit’ on  May 30, 1977, and hence, the notification under  Section 42  of the said Act should have been published on or  before May 30, 1980. In fact, the notification under Section 42  of the said Act, admittedly, was published on June 30, 1980 and hence, was clearly beyond time. [935C-F]     Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. v. Union of India and  Anoth- er,  [1979] 2 SCR 1038 and Secretary of State for  India  in Council  v.  Hindustan Cooperative Insurance  Society  Ltd., [1958] IA 259 at 267, referred to.

JUDGMENT:     CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3574  of 1991.     From the Judgment and Order dated 5.9.1990 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in L.P.A. No. 127 of 1983.     S.K. Mehta, Dhruv Mehta and Aman Vachher for the  Appel- lant.

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   O.P. Sharma, K.R. Gupta, Vivek Sharma, R.C. Gubrele  and Ms. Nanita Sharma for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KANIA, J. Leave granted. Counsel heard.     The  appellant,  Bhatinda Improvement  Trust,  framed  a development  scheme under the Punjab Town  Improvement  Act, 1922  (referred to hereinafter as "the said  Act").  Notices under  Section  36 of the said Act in respect  of  the  said scheme, setting out the particulars referred to in the  said Section,  were  published in the Daily Tribune  on  May  31, 1977, June 7, 1977, and June 14, 1977. The said notices were also published in the local daily Ajit on May 30, 1977, June 6, 1977, and June 13, 1977 and in Punjab Government  Gazette on June 17, 1977, June 24, 1977 and July 1977, respectively. A Notification as required under Section 42 of the said  Act was published on June 30, 1980 sanctioning the said develop- ment scheme. The said Notices and 931 Notifications  were challenged by the respondents  in  Civil Writ No. 2508 of 1982 filed in the High Court of Punjab  and Haryana,  inter  alia, on the ground that  the  Notification under Section 42 was not issued within the stipulated period of  three  years from the first publication  of  the  Notice under Section 36 and on that account it was bad in law. This contention  found  favour with the learned Single  Judge  of Punjab and Haryana High Court who allowed the writ  petition and  set aside the Notification under Section 42  which  was issued  on June 30, 1980. A Letters Patent Appeal  preferred against the said Judgment was dismissed by a Division  Bench of the said High Court and the present petition is  directed against  the aforesaid judgment of the Division Bench,  dis- missing the said Letters Patent Appeal.     It  was submitted by Mr. Mehta, learned Counsel for  the appellant  that the time limit of three years for the  issue of the Notification under Section 42 of the said Act was not prescribed under the said Act and that the first proviso  to Section  6  of the Land Acquisition Act. 1894, was  not  ap- plicable to the scheme in question. It was submitted by  him that the provisions of Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act were,  in effect, incorporated into the said Act  which  was enacted  in  1922 from the very time of  its  enactment  and hence,  any  amendment to the said section after  that  date would not be applicable to acquisitions under the said  Act. It  was pointed out by him that the aforesaid time limit  of three  years  was inserted in the Land  Acquisition  Act  in 1984, long after the said Act was enacted as set out partic- ularly, hereinafter and hence, it could not have any  appli- cation to the acquisitions made for the purposes of the said Act.     In  order to examine the correctness of the  submissions of  Mr. Mehta, it is necessary to take note of the  relevant provisions  of  the said Act and the Land  Acquisition  Act. Section 28 of the said Act sets out the matters which may be provided  for in a scheme. Under sub-section (2) clause  (i) of the said section it is inter alia provided that a  scheme under  said  Act may provide for the acquisition  under  the Land Acquisition Act as modified by the said Act. Section 36 of  the said Act provides that when a scheme under the  said Act  has been framed, the trust shall prepare a notice  set- ting out the particulars contained in the said section.  The relevant part of sub-section (2) of the said Section runs as follows:               (2) The trust shall:               "(a)  notwithstanding  anything  contained  in               Section 78

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             932               cause  the said notice to be published  weekly               for  three consecutive weeks in  the  official               Gazette and in a newspaper or newspapers  with               a statement of the period within which  objec-               tions will be received....  ".     Sub-section  (1) of Section 42 provides that  the  State Government  shall notify the sanction of every scheme  under the  said Act and the trust shall forthwith proceed to  exe- cute  the scheme and so on. Subsection (2) of the said  Sec- tion  provides  that  a Notification  under  subsection  (1) thereof  shall  be conclusive evidence that the  scheme  has been  framed  and sanctioned. Section 58  provides  for  the constitution  of a tribunal for the purposes  of  performing the  functions of a court in a reference to  acquisition  of land  for improvement trust under the Land Acquisition  Act. Section 59 provides for modification of the Land Acquisition Act,  as set out therein for the purposes of  acquiring  the land  under the Land Acquisition Act for the said trust.  We are not concerned with the actual modifications referred  to in Section 59. We need only note that under sub-section  (b) of  Section 59 it is provided that the Land Acquisition  Act may be subject to further modifications as indicated in  the Schedule to the said Act. Sub-clause (1) of Clause 2 of  the Schedule to the said Act, referred to in Section 59, runs as follows:               "(2) Notification under section 4 and declara-               tion under section 6 to be replaced by notifi-               cation under sections 36 and 42 of this Act--               (1)  The first publication of a notice of  any               improvement  scheme under section 36  of  this               Act shall be substituted for and have the same               effect as publication in the Official  Gazette               and  in the locality of a  notification  under               subsection  (1) of section 4 of the said  Act,               except where a declaration under section 4  or               section 6 of the said Act has previously  been               made and is still in force." Sub-section  (1) of Section 4 of the Land  Acquisition  Act, inter alia, provides that whenever it appears to the  appro- priate Government that land in any locality is needed or  is likely  to be needed for any public purpose, a  notification to that effect shall be published in the Official Gazette as prescribed  in  the  said section. Section  5-A  deals  with hearing  of objections. Sub-section (1) of Section 6,  inter alia provides that when the appropriate Government is satis- fied after considering the 933 report,  if  any, made under Section 5-A,  sub-section  (2), that  any particular land is needed for a public purpose,  a declaration  to that effect shall be made as  prescribed  in the said section. The relevant part of the first proviso  to the  said sub-section as substituted by Act 68 of 1984  runs as follows:               "Provided  that no declaration in  respect  of               any particular land covered by a  notification               under Section 4, sub-section (1)               (i)  published after the commencement  of  the               Land  Acquisition (Amendment  and  Validation)               Ordinance,  1967  (1of 1967), but  before  the               commencement  of the Land Acquisition  (Amend-               ment)  Act,  1984,  shall be  made  after  the               expiry  of  three years from the date  of  the               publication of the notification; or".     It  was by this substituted proviso that the said  time-

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limit  of  three years was prescribed.  Sub-section  (2)  of Section  6 provides for the publication of  the  declaration under Section 6 and prescribes the manner in which the  same shall be done.     It  is the submission of learned Counsel for the  appel- lant  that by the aforesaid provisions, and  in  particular, Sections 28, 58 and 59 of the said Act certain provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, and particularly, Section 6 there- of were, in effect, incorporated into the said Act by refer- ence  and  hence,  it is only such provisions  of  the  Land Acquisition  Act as were in existence at the time  when  the said  Act  was  enacted in 1922 which could be  said  to  be incorporated into the said Act. In support of his submission he  placed strong reliance on the decision of a  Bench  com- prising three learned Judges Bench of this Court in the case of  Mahindra  and  Mahindra  Ltd.  v.  Union  of  India  and Another., [1979] 2 SCR 1038. In that case it has been point- ed  out  that Section 55 of the Monopolies  and  Restrictive Trade  Practices Act, 1969 (referred to hereinafter  as  the "MRTP Act") provides that any person aggrieved by the  order made by the Central Government or the Commission (The Monop- olies  and  Restrictive Trade  Practices  Commission)  under Section  13  or  Section 37 of the MRTP Act  may  prefer  an appeal  to the Supreme Court on one or more of  the  grounds specified in Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure.  It was  pointed out in the judgment that on the date  on  which the  MRTP  Act came into force, Section 100 of the  Code  of Civil Procedure specified 3 grounds on which a second appeal could  lie  to the High Court, one of them  being  that  the decision appealed against, was contrary to law. By 934 an  amendment  made  in 1976, Section 100 of  the  Code  was subsituted  by  a new section which provides that  a  second appeal shall lie to the High Court only if the High Court is satisfied  that the case involves a substantial question  of law. The appellant took the stand that under the  provisions of Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code, as it stood when the  MRTP Act was enacted, the appeal was clearly  maintain- able as the impugned order was contrary to law. The respond- ents contended that, although this might be so, no  substan- tial  question of law was involved in the second appeal  and hence, the appeal was not maintainable. It was submitted  by the respondents that the maintainability of the appeal would have  to  be determined on the basis of Section 100  of  the Code  as amended. This Court took the view that  the  appeal was  maintainable. It was held that on a proper  interpreta- tion  of Section 55 it must be held that the grounds  speci- fied  in Section 100 of the Code as it stood when  the  MRTP Act was enacted in 1969, were incorporated in Section 55  of the MRTP Act and the substitution of the new Section 100 did not  affect or restrict the grounds as incorporated in  Sec- tion 55. In the said judgment this Court cited with approval the judgment of the Privy Council in Secretary of State  for India in Council v. Hindustan Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd.,  [1958] I.A. 259 at 267. where the Judicial  Committee observed:               "In  this country it is accepted that where  a               statute  is incorporated by reference  into  a               second statute, the repeal of the first  stat-               ute does not affect the second; (see the  case               collected  in Craies on Statute Law, 3rd  edn.               pp. 349,350)".     We  find ourselves unable to accept the  submissions  of learned  Counsel  for the appellant. As pointed out  by  the Supreme  Court and the Judicial Committee in  the  aforesaid

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decisions,  it is well-settled law that where a  statute  is incorporated  by  a  reference into a  second  statute,  the repeal  of  the first statute does not  affect  the  second. Similarly,  in a case where a statute is incorporated  by  a reference  into another statute an amendment of the  statute so  incorporated  after the date of incorporation  does  not affect  the second statute and the provisions of the  latter statute remain the same as they were at the time of incorpo- ration.  It is again well-settled that where one statute  is referred to in another, it may be merely by way of reference or by way of incorporation of the same. This depends on  the language  used  in  the latter statute  and  other  relevant circumstances.  In the present case, however, we  find  that there  is no question of incorporation of any of the  provi- sions of the Land Acquisition Act into the said Act at  all. The said Act does not deal with acquisition of land for  the purposes of a 935 scheme  as contemplated under the said Act. The  acquisition of  such land for the purposes of the scheme is left to  the general law of the land in that connection, namely, the Land Acquisition  Act, which has to be resorted to for  the  pur- poses of acquisition of land for the purposes of the schemes contemplated under the said Act. The only difference is that some  of  the  provisions of the Land  Acquisition  Act,  as referred  to  in the relevant sections of the said  Act  are given  effect to as amended by the relevant sections of  the said Act. In these circumstances, it cannot be held that any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act have been incorporat- ed into the said Act and the provisions of the Land Acquisi- tion  Act  which have to be applied, are the  provisions  as they  stand  at the relevant time, namely, at  the  time  of acquisition,  in the absence of a contrary intention.  There is  nothing  to indicate that there was  any  such  contrary intention  in the present case. In these circumstances,  the notification  under  Section 42 should have  been  published within the period of three. years of the date of publication of the notification under Section-4(1) of the Land  Acquisi- tion Act, as required under the first proviso to Section  ’6 of the Land Acquisition Act. Under sub-clause (1) of  clause (2) of the Schedule to the said Act, which we have  referred to  earlier,  the first publication of a notice of  any  im- provement  scheme under Section 36 of the said Act, is  sub- stituted  for and has the same effect as the publication  in the  Government Gazette of a notification under  sub-section (1)  of  Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act.  The  notice under  section  36 of the said Act is required  to  be  pub- lished, inter alia, in a newspaper or newspapers as set  out in  section 36(2)(a) of the said Act. In the  present  case, such a notice was first published in the daily ’Ajit’ on May 30,  1977, and hence, the notification under Section  42  of the said Act should have been published on or before May 30, 1980. In fact, the notification under Section 42 of the said Act, admittedly, was published on June 30, 1980, and  hence, was clearly beyond time. In these circumstances, the  notice under  Section  36 of the said Act lapsed on the  expiry  of three years from May 3G, 1977, and no action pursuant to the said  notice  could be taken  thereafter.  The  notification under Section 42 of the said Act was clearly beyond time and bad  in law, as it was not published within the period  pro- vided. The acquisition proceedings lapsed. The submission of learned Counsel for the appellant must be rejected. No other point was canvassed before us. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. V.P.R.                                         Appeal   dis-

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missed. 936