REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.  952       OF 2009             (@  SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO. 5981 OF 2007)  

Bharat Prasad & Ors. .....Appellant(s)

- Versus -

The State of Bihar & Ors. ....Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T

GANGULY, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. The order of the High Court dated 23.5.2007,  

passed  under  Section  482  of  the  Code  of  

Criminal  Procedure  is  impugned  before  this  

Court.

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3. By that order, the High Court refused to quash  

the  order  dated  10.2.2005  passed  by  3rd  

Additional  Sessions  Judge,  Motihari  in  

Cr.Revision No. 326 of 1992 whereby the order  

dated  27.7.1992  passed  by  the  Executive  

Magistrate, Raxaul in case No.548(M) of 1991  

was confirmed.

4. By  the  said  order  dated  27.7.1992,  the  

Executive  Magistrate  declared  possession  in  

favour of the opposite parties in a proceeding  

under Section 145 of the Code.  The relevant  

portion of the order is:-

“I  declare  the  possession  of  the  first  side on the said land until and unless  they  are  dispossessed  by  the  competent  Court  and  the  opposite  side  is  ordered  that  they  shall  not  interfere  in  the  peaceful possession of the first side”.

5. The material facts of the case are as under:

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6. The land in question is 1 Katha 8 dhura out of  

plot No. 1853 under Khata No. 289 in village  

Gambharia Kala, P.S. Darpa, District Motihari.  

The land originally belonged to one Ram Lagan  

Tiwari of village Amnaur of District Chapra.

7. The case of the appellants is that one Ram  

Lagan Tiwari mortgaged the said land to one  

Jagdish  Prasad  Singh  son  of  Tapasi  Rai  of  

village  Bhopatpur  Bajhia,  P.S.  Keshariya,  

District  East  Champaran  on  21.7.1920  for  a  

period of 60 years.

8. It is further contended that some time on or  

about  9.11.1943,  Ram  Lagan  Tiwari  sold  the  

land to one Jamadar Rai @ Jamadar Bhagat of  

Village-  Lahadia,  P.S.  Darpa,  District  East  

Champaran by a registered sale deed. Neither  

Jamadar  Rai  @  Jamadar  Bhagat  nor  Ram  Lagan  

Tiwari redeemed the mortgage and as a result  

whereof Jagdish Prasad Singh continued in the  

possession over the disputed land.  The said  3

Jagdish Prasad Singh, the mortgagee gave the  

said agricultural land to the appellants and  

his brothers to cultivate as Bataidars.

9. The appellant contends that he along with Jai  

Bihar  Sah  took  possession  of  the  said  and  

cultivated it as Bataidar.

10. It is further contended that on 18.8.1977, the  

said Jagdish Prasad Singh tried to dispossess  

the  appellants  and  Jai  Bihar  Sah  from  the  

Batai  Land  whereupon  the  appellant  No.2  –

Lakshman Prasad filed Sikmi Batai Case No. 480  

of 1975 and Jai Bihar Sah  filed Sikmi Batai  

Case No.257 of 1976 before the L.R.D.C. Both  

the  Sikmi  Batai  Cases  were  decided  against  

Jagdish  Prasad  Singh  and  in  favour  of  the  

appellants.

11. The concluding portion of the said order as  

follows:  

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“  ....From  the  statements  of  different  persons and inquiry report it has become  undisputed that Sri Lakshman Prasad Sah,  Batayidaar along with his family members  had  been  cultivating  this  land  for  more  than 30 years as batayidaar and distribute  the  share  of  the  crops  to  Sri  Jagdish  Prasad Sah the remaining 1 bigha of land  but till today 2 bighas and 2 katthas of  land  are  in  his  peaceful  possession  and  legally  Sri  Lakshman  Prasad  Sah  has  got  Sikri right over the 2 bigha and 2 katthas  of land which is equivalent to acre and  decimel…”.

12. Against  the  said  order  no  appeal  was  

preferred. The said order has become final.

13. It  is  also  the  appellants’  case  that  then  

Lakshman Prasad and his two brothers, namely,  

Ram Chandra Prasad and Bharat Prasad separated  

from  each  other  and  partitioned  the  entire  

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land  including  the  land  in  question  among  

themselves.

14. It is alleged that then on 26.6.1979, Vendee  

of  the  original  landlord  Ram  Lagan  Tiwari,  

i.e.  Jamadar  Rai  @  Jamadar  Bhagat  sold  the  

entire land in favour of Dharaman Prasad and  

his  three  sons,  namely,  Shesh  Nath  Prasad,  

Pramod Kumar and Binay Kumar by a registered  

sale deed on 26.6.1979.

15. It  is  alleged  that  on  26.12.1981,  Laxman  

Prasad executed one “Ezabnama” for Sikmi Batai  

in favour of Dharaman Prasad and his sons.

16. Thereafter, a proceeding under Section 144 of  

the  Code  was  initiated  and  the  Sarpanch  of  

Gamhari Kala Panchyat recommended  initiation  

of  such  proceeding  only  on  2  Bigha,2  Katha  

land against the appellants out of total land  

of 3 bigha,22 Katha,5 Dhurs.

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17. However, the said proceeding was dropped by an  

order  dated  9.1.1984  passed  by  the  learned  

Sub-Divisional  Magistrate  in  regard  to  some  

portion of the land and it was directed that  

the  proceeding  will  be  continued  only  on  1  

Bigha, 8 Katha land and the proceeding under  

Section  144  of  the  Code  was  converted  into  

Section 145 of the Code.

18. In the said proceeding, the appellants claim  

to  have  filed  their  show  cause  stating  the  

history starting from 1920.  

On  the  basis  of  police  report,  a  separate  

proceeding under Section 144 of Cr.P.C was initiated  

which was converted into a proceeding under Section 145  

of Cr.P.C and in the said proceeding the respondents  

herein filed Criminal Revision No.333 of 1984 before  

the  Patna  High  Court  and  the  Hon’ble  High  Court  

rejected the same.

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19. It  appears  that  various  proceedings  under  

Section 144 of Cr.P.C were initiated between  

the parties.  Ultimately appellants claim to  

have filed Bataidari (Tenant) Case No.10 of  

1995-96,  11  of  1995-96  and  12  of  1995-96  

before  the  appropriate  authority.   All  the  

cases were heard together and after hearing  

the parties Circle Officer came to a finding  

that appellants are the tenant in respect of  

the disputed land and directed them to deposit  

money for creating Zamabandi in their name and  

which they did.  In support of this assertion,  

the appellants were referring to two orders  

dated  13.06.1995  and  15.10.1995,  issued  in  

Bataidari Case No.10 of 1995-96. In view of  

such proceeding, the respondents herein filed  

Criminal Miscellaneous Case for quashing those  

proceedings  and  various  criminal  proceedings  

were  initiated  between  the  parties.  

Ultimately  before  the  Court  of  Third  

Additional Sessions Judge (E.C.) Motihari, the  

criminal revision was filed by the appellants  

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challenging the order dated 27.07.1992 passed  

by Executive Magistrate and the said criminal  

revision  was  dismissed.   Challenging  that  

order,  the  petition  under  Section  482  of  

Cr.P.C was filed before the High Court.  The  

order of the High Court which was passed on  

that 482 petition has been challenged before  

this Court.

20. It appears from the impugned order that the  

High Court did not consider the effect of the  

relevant  provisions  of  Bihar  Tenancy  Act  

(hereinafter referred “to the said Act”) and  

the  ambit  of  Section  145  of  the  Criminal  

Procedure Code.  It has been held in  Badri  Yadav Vs.  Sat Narain Das and others     – 1993  Supp. (2) SCC 347 that whether a person is  

Bataidar  or  not  rests  on  a  “pure  factual  

investigation and the record of the case”.

21. In  the  instant  case  clear  finding  has  been  

arrived at that the appellants are Bataidars.  

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Such a finding has been arrived at under the  

provision of the said Act which is a special  

law.  The provisions of Section 48E of the  

said Act provides for a complete machinery for  

enquiry into the rights of a Bataidar and also  

provides  for  some  protection.   Section  49C  

also imposes some restriction on the transfer  

of such rights which is created in favour of  

the tenants.  So provisions of Section 48E and  

those of Section 49C supplement each other.

22. The  legislative  purpose  in  enacting  the  

provisions of Section 48E of the said Act is  

to ensure that the disputes between  raiyats  

and under-raiyats are settled as amicably as  

possible and for that, detailed machinery has  

been provided under Section 48E of the said  

Act.  In  continuation  of  such  legislative  

scheme  Section  48E  (13)  has  provided  as  

follows:  

“Save  as  expressly  provided  in  this  Act, no Civil or Criminal Court shall have  any jurisdiction over the subject matter  

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of  a  dispute  after  a  proceeding  is  initiated  under  sub-section  (1)  by  the  Collector:  

Provided  that  nothing  in  this  sub- section  shall  be  deemed  to  affect  the  power  of  a  Criminal  Court  to  take  such  action as may be necessary for preventing  breach  of  the  peace  pending  the  final  disposal  of  the  proceeding  by  the  Collector.”

23. In  this  context  Section  5  of  the  Code  of  

Criminal  Procedure  may  also  be  noticed  and  

which provides as follows:  

“Nothing contained in the Code shall, in  the absence of a specific provision to the  contrary, affect any special or local law  for  the  time  being  in  force,  or  any  special  jurisdiction  or  power  conferred,  or  any  special  form  of  procedure  prescribed, by any other law for the time  being in force.”  

24. It  cannot  be  doubted  that  said  Act  is  a  

special  and  local  law  in  the  sense  it  is  

confined within the State of Bihar.  If we  

read  the  provisions  of  Section  48E  (13)  of  

said  Act  as  against  Section  5  of  the  said  

Code,  it  will  be  clear  that  the  effect  of  

Section 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is  

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to  render  the  provisions  of  the  Code  of  

Criminal Procedure inapplicable in respect of  

all matters covered by such special law.  [See  

Ajmer Singh and Others Vs. Union of India and  Others - 1987 (3) SCC 340 (para 7 page 343)].

25. Similarly, construing Section 5 of the Code,  

the Constitution Bench of this Court held in  

Maru Ram Vs. Union of India and others [(1981)  1 SCC 107]:

“If a special or local law exists covering  the  same  area,  this  latter  law  will  be  saved and will prevail.”  

26. Sub-section 13 of Section 48E of the said Act  

makes it clear that no Civil or Criminal Court  

shall have any jurisdiction over the subject  

matter  of  a  dispute  after  a  proceeding  is  

initiated  under  sub-section  (1)  of  the  

Collector.

27. In the instant case, admittedly a proceeding  

under  Section  48E  was  initiated  and  it  

terminated in favour of the appellants holding  

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their  rights  as  Bataidar.   The  said  

adjudication has become final.

28. However, sub-section 48E (13) has a proviso to  

the effect that nothing in this sub-section  

shall  be  deemed  to  affect  the  power  of  a  

Criminal Court to take such action as may be  

necessary for preventing breach of the peace  

pending the final disposal of the proceeding  

by the Collector.

As in this case the proceeding under Section 48E  

has  been  finally  decided,  this  proviso  cannot  be  

pressed into service.

29. Here, after the proceeding has become final  

and  the  rights  of  the  appellants  have  been  

declared, repeatedly provision of Sections 144  

and 145 of the Cr.P.C have been invoked to  

disturb the rights which the appellants have  

acquired in the Bataidari proceedings. But the  

main provisions of Section 48 (13) have been  

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enacted to protect the Bataidari rights of the  

parties and that is why it provides for an  

exclusion  of  the  power  of  the  Civil  and  

Criminal  Court  over  such  rights.  This  is  

keeping  in  tune  with  the  principle  of  

distributive  justice.    Similar  provisions  

have been made in various land reforms laws of  

different States.  The Courts while construing  

the  provisions  of  such  socio  economic  

legislation must interpret them in a manner  

which  furthers  its  purpose  rather  than  

frustrates it.   

30. The only argument of the respondents is that  

some of the appellants by Ezabnama gave away  

the rights in favour of the respondents.  It  

may be noted that under Section 49C of the  

said Act restrictions are imposed on transfer  

of  rights  by  under  raiyat  and  if  such  a  

transfer is made, that is void.  Apart from  

insisting on such transfer, which apparently  

is violation of the statute, no other argument  14

was  made  by  the  learned  counsel  for  the  

respondents.

31. In this case, proceeding of Bataidari under  

Section 48(1) (E) was over and there was no  

pending  proceeding.   Therefore,  proviso  of  

Section 48E (13) is not attracted.  In view of  

the main provision         in Section 48(13)  

of the said Act jurisdiction of Criminal Court  

cannot  be  exercised  in  view  of  the  express  

ouster.   

32. In  the  case  of  Kunjbihari Vs.  Balram  and  another –  (2006)  11  SCC  66,  a  three-Judge  Bench of this Court has held where rights of  

the parties have already been adjudicated upon  

by a different forum, the parties must respect  

that finding.  In such a situation proceeding  

under Section 145 is not to be initiated to  

disturb the finding.  In that case the High  

Court  in  a  proceeding  under  Section  482  of  

Cr.P.C refused to quash the 145 proceeding.  

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The same thing has been done here.  However,  

this Court allowed appeal by setting aside the  

High  Court’s  order  as  also  directing  that  

Section 145 proceeding be dropped.   

33. In this case, this Court is of the opinion  

that if the respondents are aggrieved by the  

findings reached in the Bataidari proceeding  

they have the statutory right of the appeal to  

be exercised according to law.  Without doing  

that the affect of Bataidari proceeding cannot  

be scuttled with the subterfuge and juggle of  

144/145  proceedings.   In  the  facts  of  this  

case, such a proceeding is an abuse.  

34. For the reasons discussed above, we find that  

the High Court has not approached the legal  

issues involved in this case in their correct  

perspective  nor  considered  the  affect  of  

Section 48E or sub-section (13) of the said  

Act on a 145 proceeding.   

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35. Therefore, we quash the High Court’s order and  

also  the  145  proceeding.   The  appeal  is  

allowed.  There shall be no order as to costs.

.......................J.

(Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT)

.......................J. New Delhi (ASOK KUMAR GANGULY) May 06, 2009

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