IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.  9896   OF 2010 (ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NO. 6511 OF 2009)

Bhagwan Budha Prathmik Technical Training College Nirmali          …Appellant  

           Versus

The State of Bihar & Others                                 …Respondents with

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9897  OF 2010 (ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NO. 9378 OF 2009)

Bhagwan Budha Prathmik Technical Training College Nirmali          …Appellant  

            Versus

Union of India & Others                                 …Respondents

J U D G M E N T

Gokhale J.

Leave Granted.   

2.  These  two  appeals  raise  the  questions  as  to  whether  after  

coming  into  force  of  the  National  Council  for  Teacher  Education  Act  1993  

(hereinafter referred to as ‘the NCTE Act’) the State Governments have the  

power  to  grant  recognition  to  the  colleges  which  train  the  teachers,  and

whether  students  from the  colleges  not  recognized  by  National  Council  for  

Teacher Education (in short NCTE) can be permitted to appear for the requisite  

examination to become teachers.  Since both these appeals are filed by the  

same institution, they are being disposed of by a common judgment.

3. Both these matters have had a chequered history.  There have  

been several rounds of litigation which are being recorded herein below.

4. The appellant claims to be an institution set up by the minority  

Buddhist  religious  community.   The  appellant  has  established  a  Teachers’  

Training College at Nirmali, District Supaul (Bihar), in the year 1987.  It claims  

that  the  Chief  Minister’s  Secretariat  instructed  the  Director,  Research  and  

Training, Primary Education, Patna (vide a letter dated 13.02.1987) to issue a  

permission to the appellant  to establish this minority educational  institution.  

Thereupon,  the  appellant  proceeded  to  admit  students  pending  the  

approval/recognition of its course, by the State Government for training of the  

students to become primary teachers.

5. The appellant waited for the order of recognition for more than  

three years, and thereafter filed a Writ Petition bearing CWJC No. 5084 of 1990  

in the High Court of Patna, seeking a direction to the State Government to  

grant the recognition.   The prayers in the petition were two-fold.  Firstly,  a  

direction to the State Government to consider and finally dispose of the matter  

regarding  recognition,  and  secondly,  a  direction  to  the  Bihar  School  

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Examination  Board  (for  short-Board)  to  allow the  students  of  the appellant  

institution  to appear for  the ensuing primary teachers training examination.  

The appellant claimed that two batches of its students had completed their  

course in the meanwhile, i.e. 1987-89 and 1988-90.  A Division Bench of the  

High Court  issued three-fold directions on that petition vide its  order dated  

3.11.1990 :

(i) to the State Government to decide one way or the other   the question of recognition of the institution and  

(ii) to the Board, if it was so satisfied, as to the bona fides  and genuineness of the claims of the students of the two batches,  to allow them to appear for the examination.   

(iii) to the Secretary of the appellant college also, to submit   full particulars of its students (not exceeding 100 in number for   each session) within 10 days from the date of the order.  The   High Court, however, made it clear that the students appearing in   the examination will be appearing at their own risk and no right   shall enure to them merely on that basis.  Their results will not be   published until the question of recognition of institution is finally   decided by the State Government, and the publication of results   will abide by the final decision in the recognition matter, that is to   say, results will be published only in case recognition is granted.

6. Accordingly, students of the appellant institution appeared for the  

examination conducted by the Board in January 1991.  However, the decision  

of the State Government on the aspect of recognition was not forthcoming, and  

hence the appellant  institution  filed  the second Writ  Petition  bearing CWJC  

No.293 of 1992.  When this Writ Petition was heard, it was pointed out on  

behalf of respondents that the appellant had yet not submitted the application  

for  inspection  and  grant  of  recognition  in  proper  proforma,  and  other  

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requirements were also not fulfiled.  In view of this position, the Division Bench  

declined to pass any direction in this behalf.  It, however, granted liberty to the  

appellants to apply afresh in proper proforma, which shall be considered and  

disposed of by the concerned authorities in accordance with law.  Thus, this  

petition was disposed of by order dated 28.8.1992.

7. It is the case of the appellant that they did furnish the necessary  

particulars with an application on 27.03.1993, followed by a reminder dated  

27.11.1994, with a request to carry out the inspection of the institution for  

necessary approval.

8. It appears that the inspection was accordingly carried out, and a  

report recommending grant of approval was made by the Director, Research  

and Development, Education Department on 28.05.1995.  He recommended  

grant of approval from 1987 till 1995-97.  Another three member committee  

carried out one more inspection and made a similar recommendation to the  

Special Secretary to the Government.

9. Since,  the  recognition  was  still  not  forthcoming,  some  of  the  

students,  namely  one  Vidyanand  Choupal  and  others  filed  a  Writ  Petition  

bearing CWJC No. 517 of 1998 and prayed for a writ of mandamus that their  

results be declared for the examination which was conducted on 24.01.1991  

for the training session of 1987-89.  The Learned Single Judge who heard the  

matter noted that the college was not recognized in spite of the earlier order  

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dated 3.11.1990 in CWJC No.5084 of 1990, which order had also made it clear  

that the results can not be declared until recognition is granted.  The Learned  

Single  Judge,  therefore,  disposed of  this  third  Writ  Petition by order  dated  

28.01.1998 with a direction to the Government to pass a final order on the  

question of recognition.

10. In the meanwhile, the NCTE Act had already come into force on  

1.7.1995,  but  the  appellant  did  not  take  any  steps  to  seek  recognition  

thereunder.  It merely made one more representation on 05.08.2005, that is  

some ten years later to the State Government for grant of recognition.  The  

students who were stated to be waiting for the results filed one more Writ  

Petition at this stage bearing CWJC No.1829 of 2006.  That petition came to be  

dismissed by a Single Judge, and hence those students viz. Ajay Kumar Narala  

and others filed LPA No. 609 of 2006.  The Division Bench disposed of that  

appeal by order dated 13.02.2007 in view of the statement by the counsel on  

behalf of the Government that the recognition will be processed very soon and  

in all probability, the decision shall be taken finally latest by four weeks.

11. The appellants accordingly made another representation on the  

same day  i.e.  13.02.2007  to  the  Education  Commissioner  pointing  out  this  

order in LPA No.609 of 2006.   The Commissioner  for the Human Resource  

Development Department thereupon issued order Memo No. 57 on 16.03.2007.  

He  recorded  in  this  order  that  the  departmental  inspection  committee  had  

requested for the grant of recognition to the college from 1987-89 onwards.  In  

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paragraph  3,  of  his  order  the  Commissioner  in  fact  noted  that  in  the  

meanwhile, the NCTE Act had come into force, but the college had not made  

any application to NCTE for its recognition as required under that Act.  The  

approval/recognition was no longer within the power of the State Government.  

However,  since  the  approval  ought  to  have  been  granted  in  view  of  the  

inspection report,  he recommended that  college can be considered to be a  

recognized one w.e.f. 1987-89.  Para 3 of this order reads as follows: -

“(3) In  this  process,  from  17  August  1995  the  National Council for Education Teachers education bill 93 was  passed.   Under the act,  the right  to grant approval  to the  training  colleges  is  now  given  to  the  National  Council  for   Teachers Education.  Thus in the aforesaid circumstances the  concerned college has to make an application for permission  before the National Council  for Teachers Education (Eastern  Zone,  Bhubneshwar).   The  matter  pertaining  to  approval/recognition  is  not  within  the  power  of  the  State   Govt.  But the college can be considered to be recognized one  with effect from 1987-89 to 1995, because the approval ought   to have been granted in view of the inspection report.”

12. Inasmuch  as,  the  results  were  still  not  being  declared,  the  

appellant filed another Writ Petition bearing CWJC No.7055 of 2007.  A Single  

Judge of the Patna High Court who heard the matter referred to Sections 14  

and 16 of the NCTE Act.   He noted that  under Section 14 of  the Act,  the  

institute which is giving teachers training has to apply for its recognition to  

NCTE within six months of the Act coming into force.  The appellant had not so  

applied after the appointed day.   The students of an institution recognized by  

NCTE alone can appear for the qualifying examination as per Section 16 of the  

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Act.  The Learned Single Judge, therefore, dismissed the petition by his order  

dated 24.08.2007.

13. The appellant filed LPA No.780 of 2007 to challenge the order  

dated  24.08.2007.   The  State  Government,  however,  reviewed  the  

recommendation  for  recognition  dated 16.03.2007  and cancelled  that  order  

memo by its order dated 02.09.2008, which was on the basis of the above  

referred Sections 14 and 16.  Having referred to the facts of the case and the  

two Sections, this order dated 02.09.2008 recorded as follows: -

“Under the aforesaid facts it becomes clear that after the   application of the National teachers training council (N.C.T.E.)   Act 1993, the right to grant recognition to the training colleges   is  the  authority  of  the  regional  council,  National  council  for   Teacher education and not of the State Government or of any   other authority.   It  is also laid down in the order memo 57   dated 16.03.07 that now it is not within the authority of the  State Government to consider matters relating to recognition.

Hence  it  is  clear  that  the  order  memo  57  dated  16.3.2007 is not relevant to the provisions of the N.C.T.E. act   1993.  Henceforth, after reviewing the order memo 57 dated   16.3.07 is being cancelled as per the order of the Government.”

14. Therefore, when LPA No.780 of 2007 reached before the Division  

Bench on 12.11.2008, the Division Bench noted that the order Memo No. 57  

dated  16.03.2007  had  been  withdrawn  by  the  subsequent  order  dated  

02.09.2008.  In view thereof, the Division Bench had no option but to dismiss  

the LPA.  It  is this  order dated 12.11.2008 which is  challenged in the first  

Special Leave Petition No.6511 of 2009.

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15. While dismissing LPA No.780 of 2007, the Division Bench made it  

clear that the order of the Division Bench will not preclude the appellant from  

challenging  the  legality  and  correctness  of  the  order  dated  02.09.2008  by  

means of an independent substantive proceeding.  

16. The  appellant  accordingly  filed  another  Writ  Petition  bearing  

CWJC No.18181 of 2008 to challenge this order dated 02.09.2008.  Two points  

were raised before the Division Bench.  Firstly, with respect to the legality of  

the NCTE Act.  On this aspect the Division Bench noted that the subject of  

education was listed at Entry No. 25 in List No. III (concurrent list in the 7th  

Schedule to the Constitution of India) and, therefore, the enactment was within  

the powers of the Central Government and could not be held to be bad on  

account  of  legislative  competence.   Secondly,  it  was argued that  the State  

Government could not have rescinded the impugned order.  The Division Bench  

noted that after coming into force of the NCTE Act, there is no power to grant  

recognition  retained  with  the  State  Government,  and  therefore  the  order  

rescinding the earlier recommendation for recognition could not be said to be  

illegal.  The Court dismissed the petition by its order dated 9.2.2009 with cost  

quantified  at  Rs.30,000/-  to  be  paid  to  the  State  Government,  the  Union  

Government and NCTE in equal proportion.  It is this order dated 09.02.2009  

which is challenged in the second Special Leave Petition No. 9378 of 2009.

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17. As stated earlier, the only question which is to be considered in  

both these matters is whether the State Government had the authority to issue  

the order dated 16.03.2007 granting recognition for the period 1987-95 when  

the NCTE Act had already come in force way back in July 1995. Consequently,  

whether there was any error on the part of the State Government in rescinding  

the order dated 16.03.2007 by its subsequent order dated 02.09.2008.

18. Mr. K.V. Vishwanathan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the  

appellant assailed the two impugned orders in the two appeals and particularly  

the High Court’s order dated 09.02.2009 on various grounds.  He submitted  

that the High Court has erred in not interfering with the order of the State  

Government  dated 02.09.2008,  withdrawing the earlier  order  of  recognition  

dated 16.03.2007.  He pointed out that during the period when the order of  

recognition dated 16.03.2007 was subsisting, the appellant had filed one more  

Writ Petition CWJC No.6991 of 2007 for the declaration of the results of the  

two batches of 1987-89 and 1988-90, and that direction had been given by a  

Learned Single Judge on 06.05.2008, and the same was left undisturbed by a  

Division Bench by dismissing the appeal filed by the Board being LPA No.550 of  

2008 by its order dated 22.08.2008.  He submitted that, in fact, because of the  

non-implementation of  the order dated 06.05.2008, the appellant has filed a  

contempt petition bearing MJC No. 1747 of 2008, and with a view to avoid the  

action  in  contempt  the  respondents  have  withdrawn  the  recognition  order  

dated 16.03.2007, and the withdrawal was mala fide.

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19. Now, as far as this submission is concerned, a power to issue an  

order includes a power to withdraw the same for valid reasons.  In the instant  

case it is material to note that even the order dated 16.03.2007 recorded that  

after coming into force of the NCTE Act, it was no longer within the authority of  

the State Government to consider the matters relating to recognition.  Yet, it  

was further recorded that because the approval ought to have been granted in  

view of the inspection report, the college can be considered to be recognized  

one with effect from 1987-89 to 1995.   In the subsequent order of withdrawal  

dated 02.09.2008, the above fact has been recorded, and then it is noted that  

after the application of the NCTE Act 1993, the right to grant recognition is no  

longer with the State Government or with any other authority.  It is for this  

reason  that  the  State  Government  has  withdrawn  the  earlier  order  dated  

16.03.2007.   If  an  administrative  order  is  based  under  an  erroneous  

assumption of one’s own power and if it goes to the root of the matter, the  

authority concerned can certainly review it for valid reasons, and if that is so  

done, the withdrawal can not be called to be a mala fide one.  The appellant  

had  challenged  Government’s  order  dated  2.9.2008  withdrawing  its  earlier  

order  dated  16.3.2007,  and  the  order  dated  2.9.2008  having  been  left  

undisturbed by the High Court by its subsequent order dated 9.2.2009, now a  

submission  cannot  be  entertained  on  the  basis  of  previous  orders  in  Writ  

Petition  CWJC  6991/2007  passed  at  a  time  when  the  earlier  order  dated  

16.3.2007 was subsisting.

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20. It was then submitted on behalf of the appellant that prior to the  

coming  into  force  of  NCTE  Act,  it  was  the  State  Government  which  was  

authorized to grant recognition and that the NCTE Act has been held to be a  

prospective legislation in  Sunil Kumar Parimal and Another Vs. State of  

Bihar and Others reported in [2007 (10) SCC 150].  It is contended that  

the appellant is not asking for any recognition for a period subsequent to the  

act coming into force.  In fact thereafter the appellant institution has been  

closed down.  Appellant submits that since the Act is silent about the period  

prior to the NCTE Act coming into force, the State Government continues to be  

the authority to grant recognition for this earlier period.  With respect to this  

submission we must note that in the case of Sunil Kumar Parimal (supra) the  

examination  Board  had  failed  to  discharge  its  function  of  conducting  

examination  of  Tirhut  Physical  Education  College,  Muzaffarpur  in  spite  of  

repeated directions from the State Government.  As seen from para 19 of the  

judgment, the college had already been recognized by the State Government.  

The  students  had completed  their  course  prior  to  the  derecognition  of  the  

college by NCTE.  It  is due to the sheer inefficiency of  the Board that the  

students  were  not  permitted  to  take  their  examination.   In  view  of  these  

peculiar  facts  of  that  case  this  Court  gave  the  direction  to  conduct  their  

examination by specifically invoking Article 142 of the Constitution.  As against  

that,  in  the  instant  case  there  was  no  such  direction  from  the  State  

Government at any point of time to allow the students of the appellant college  

to take their examination, nor was any formal order of recognition issued by  

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the State Government prior to the NCTE Act coming into force.   In the instant  

case, the appellant is asking for a direction for the students of batches from  

1987-89 to 1995-97 to be permitted to appear in the examinations in the year  

1994-97 or thereafter.  This would amount to allowing the students to take  

their examination after the NCTE Act coming into force, when the institution  

conducting the course was never recognized either by the State Government or  

by NCTE.  Obviously that can not be done in the teeth of Section 16 of the Act.  

21. Nor can the State Government be directed now to recognize the  

appellant for the earlier period, since that power vests with the NCTE after the  

appointed day.  The proviso to Section 14 of the Act however permits such an  

existing institution offering a course of training in teacher education, to apply  

within a period of six months from the appointed day for recognition to the  

Regional  Committee  of  the  NCTE.   Appellant  has  not  made  any  such  

application.  Section 16 (b) lays down thereafter that after the appointed day  

no examining body shall hold examination for a course or training conducted by  

an  institution,  unless  it  has  obtained  a  recognition  from  the  Regional  

Committee of NCTE.  Sections 14 (1) and 16 read as follows:-

“14. Recognition of institutions offering course or   training  in  teacher  education  –  (1)  Every  institution  offering or intending to offer a course or training in teacher  education  on or  after  the appointed  day,  may,  for  grant  of  recognition under this Act, make an application to the Regional   Committee concerned in such form and in such manner as may   be determined by regulations:

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Provided that an institution offering a course or training   in  teacher  education immediately  before  the appointed  day,   shall  be  entitled  to  continue  such  course  or  training  for  a   period  of  six  months,  if  it  has  made  an  application  for   recognition within the said period and until the disposal of the   application by the Regional Committee.”

“16.  Affiliating  body  to  grant  affiliation  after   recognition  of  permission  by  the  Council  –  Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the  time being in force, no examining body shall, on or after the  appointed day,-

(a) grant affiliation, whether provisional or otherwise,   to any institution; or  

(b) hold  examination,  whether  provisional  or  otherwise, for a course or training conducted by a recognized  institution,

unless the institution concerned has obtained recognition from  the  Regional  Committee  concerned,  under  section  14  or  permission for a course or training under section 15.”  

 22. ‘Appointed day’ has been defined under Section 2 (a) of the Act  

as  the  date  of  establishment  of  National  Council  for  Teacher  Education.  

Section 3 (1) of the Act lays down that with effect from a date as the Central  

Government may by notification in the official gazette appoint, there shall be  

established a council to be called the National Council for Teacher Education.  

This being the position, after that date the State Government could not have  

conducted the examination and issued the certificate to the students of the  

appellant institution. Prior to 1995, the NCTE had existed since about 1973 as a  

government  advisory  body (and not  as a  separate  institution)  to look after  

development and progress of "teacher education". The NCTE was then only a  

department of the National Council of Educational Research and Training.  The  

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National Council for Teacher Education, in its previous status since 1973, was  

an  advisory  body  for  the  Central  and  State  Governments  on  all  matters  

pertaining  to  teacher  education,  with  its  Secretariat  in  the  Department  of  

Teacher Education of the National Council of Educational Research and Training  

(NCERT).  Despite its commendable work in the academic fields, it could not  

perform essential regulatory functions, to ensure maintenance of standards in  

teacher  education  and  preventing  proliferation  of  substandard  teacher  

education institutions.  The National Policy on Education (NPE) 1986, and the  

Programme of  Action thereunder,  envisaged a National  Council  for  Teacher  

Education with statutory  status  and necessary  resources  as  a  first  step for  

overhauling the system of teacher education.  The NCTE Act came into force  

on 1.7.1995, vide S.O. 620(E), dated 1.7.1995, published in the Gazettee of  

India,  Ext.  Pt.  II,  S.3(ii),  dated  10.7.1995  by  exercising  the  power  under  

Section 1 (3) of the NCTE Act.  The National Council for Teacher Education as a  

statutory body came into existence in pursuance of the NCTE Act, 1993 (No. 73  

of 1993) on 17.8.1995.

23. The  appellant  relied  upon  the  judgment  of  this  Court  in  Civil  

Appeal No. 8239-8240 of 2009 decided on 16.03.2010 in the case of  Zakir  

Hussain Primary Education Vs. State of Bihar.  In that matter also the  

relief sought was with respect to the period from 1979-81 to 1994-96.  What is  

however important to note is that in that matter the Director, Research and  

Training,  Primary  Education,  Bihar  had  granted  recognition  to  the  said  

institution on 26.04.1995 which was prior to the Act coming into force, and the  

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order  dated  4.9.1999  withdrawing  that  recognition  was  challenged  in  that  

petition.  In that matter, it was noted by this Court that the Writ Petition and  

LPA of the institution were dismissed by the High Court only on the ground of  

delay and latches, and since it was dismissed in limini, the Board did not get  

the opportunity to file its counter.  It is for this reason that this Court interfered  

with the orders passed by the Single Judge as well as by Division Bench and  

remanded the matter to the High Court for reconsideration.  That case is quite  

dis-similar to the present case.  In the present matter although the inspection  

was carried out earlier, the order  of recognition was not issued by the State  

Government prior to the NCTE Act coming into force, and after the act came  

into force it no longer had the authority to issue the same.

24. The counsel for the respondent on the other hand pressed into  

service the judgments of this Court in N.M. Nageshwaramma Vs. State of  

Andhra Pradesh reported in [1986 Supl. SCC 166] , St. John’s Teachers  

Training  Institute  (For  Women),  Madurai  and  Others  Vs.  State  of  

Tamil  Nadu  and  Others  reported  in  [1993  (3)  SCC  595]  and  L.  

Muthukumar and Another Vs. State of Tamil Nadu and Others reported  

in [2000 (7) SCC 618].  In Nageshwaramma, this court observed in para 3  

as follows:-

“The Teachers Training Institutes are meant to teach  children of impressionable age and we cannot let loose on   the innocent  and unwary  children,  teachers  who have not   received proper  and adequate  training.   True they will  be   required  to  pass  the  examination  but  that  may  not  be  

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enough.  Training for a certain minimum period in a property   organized  and  equipped  Training  Institute  is  probably  essential before a teacher may be duly launched.”

The observations of this Court in para 12 of State of Maharastra Vs.  

Vikas Sahebrao Roundale reported in [1992 (4) SCC 435] are also quite  

instructive:-

“……..For equipping such trainee students in a school  or a  college, all facilities and equipments are absolutely necessary  and  institutions  bereft  thereof  have  no  place  to  exist  nor  entitled to recognition.  In that behalf compliance with the  statutory  requirement  is  insisted  upon.   Slackening  the  standard and judicial fiat to control the mode of education   and  examining  system  are  detrimental  to  the  efficient  management of the education.”

25. In  L.  Muthukumar’s  case  (supra)  this  Court  held  that  mere  

passing of a public examination is not enough.  It must be coupled with proper  

training in a recognized institution.  Candidates having undergone training in  

institutions  which  do  not  have  recognition  may  at  the  highest  get  the  

declaration of their exam results, but would not be entitled to marks sheets,  

certificates or diplomas in teacher training.  The Court observed in paragraph  

14 that before the teachers are allowed to teach innocent children, they must  

receive  appropriate  and adequate  training  in  a  recognized  training  institute  

satisfying  the  prescribed  norms,  otherwise  the  standard  of  education  and  

careers of children will be jeopardized.

26. In  the  instant  case,  the  prayer  of  the  appellant  is  that  the  

candidates  of  all  these  earlier  years  be  permitted  to  give  the  board  

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examination, and later on, be given the degree of Bachelor of Education and  

Training (BET).   The very first order of the High Court dated 3.11.1990 had  

laid  down two  conditions  for  the  same,  viz.  that  the  students  were  to  be  

allowed for the examination only if the board was satisfied as to the bonafides  

and genuineness  of  the students,  and secondly  the results  were not  to  be  

published until  the question of  recognition was decided finally by the State  

Government.  The order also made it clear that the students were to appear for  

the examination at their own risk and no rights were to enure therefrom.  The  

training to become teachers consists of theoretical as well as practical aspects.  

The performance of the candidates is to be judged on both these aspects and a  

mere  theoretical  examination  does  not  suffice.   The  students  intending  to  

become teachers have to undergo practical training.  The institution is now  

closed down.  The Board cannot ascertain the bonafides and genuineness of  

the  claims  of  the  students  (including  the  entries  concerning  their  practical  

training) after so many years to permit them to appear for the examination.  

What facilities were available in this institution at the relevant time can also not  

be now ascertained by NCTE.  Thus the students of the appellant cannot be  

permitted to take the Board examination since the appellant does not have the  

recognition either from the State Government or from NCTE.  Thus, the two  

requisite conditions are not fulfilled.

27. It was submitted on behalf of the appellant that the students of  

the appellant institution should not be made to suffer and it was pointed out  

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that this Court by an interim order passed in these appeals on 25.05.2009 has  

allowed these students to appear in the examination in view of the decision in  

Sunil Kumar Parimal’s case (supra).  We must however note that this order also  

made it clear that the examination was to be conducted and the results were to  

be declared subject to the decision of the petition.  That apart, as pointed out  

by the counsel  for  the respondents,  in  the event  these candidates get  the  

degrees or diplomas, they will claim seniority in Government Employment over  

teachers properly trained in recognized institutions and that would be certainly  

prejudicial  to  the  public  interest.   As  held  in  the  case  of   

L. Muthukumar (supra), if such candidates are issued mark-sheets, certificates  

or diplomas in teacher training, that will defeat the objective of having teachers  

with proper training as expected under the NCTE Act.  It will  cause serious  

damage to the education of the children who would be studying under these  

teachers.    This Court has observed in para 18 in St. John’s Teachers Training  

Institute (supra), that the teachers appearing for the examination on the basis  

of  interim  orders  cannot  derive  any  benefits  on  the  basis  of  such  interim  

orders.   Whatever  education and training these students have taken in the  

appellant’s institution may help them get employment in some private schools  

as noted in L. Muthukumar’s case (supra), or they may otherwise seek their  

remedy against the appellant.

28. As  the  preamble  of  the  NCTE Act  lays  down it  is  enacted  to  

achieve planned and coordinated development for teacher education system  

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throughout the Country.  The Act is also passed to bring about the regulation  

and proper maintenance of norms and students in teacher education system.  

Sections 14 and 16 of Act are enacted with that purpose, and recognition of  

the teacher training institute vests  with the NCTE after  the appointed day.  

These provisions answer the two questions which are set out at the beginning  

of  this  judgment.   Every institution offering a course of  training in teacher  

education has to obtain a recognition from the Regional Committee of NCTE  

after  the  appointed  date.   That  authority  is  vested  only  in  the  Regional  

Committee  as  per  Section  14  of  the  Act.   The  State  Government  cannot  

exercise that power after the appointed date. Nor can the examining body hold  

examination of the students of a teacher training institute after the appointed  

day unless the institute is recognized by Regional Committee of the NCTE as  

laid down in Section 16 of the Act.  These provisions have to be implemented  

with full  force in the interest  of  the education of  the children whom these  

teachers will be subsequently teaching, the teacher-candidates themselves, and  

for  bringing  about  proper  standard  and  norms  in  the  field  of  teachers’  

education.  In the present case the order granting recognition dated 16.3.2007  

was  outside  the  powers  of  the  State  Government  and  therefore  the  

Government  was quite right  in  rescinding the same by a subsequent  order  

dated 2.9.2008.

29. It was contended by the appellant that its students should not be  

made to suffer on account of the delay on the part of the State Government in  

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taking the decisions.  We quite see the agony of the students who might have  

joined  the  appellant  institute  bona  fide.   We  are  told  that  the  appellant  

institution  is  in  a  backward  area  and  the  students  are  coming  from  

economically  and  socially  backward  classes  of  the  society.   An  institution  

claiming  to  teach  such  students  should  conduct  itself  with  all  the  more  

responsibility and ought to be more careful and diligent.  When the NCTE Act  

came into force in 1995, the institution should have applied to the concerned  

authorities  diligently  within  the  time  stipulated.   Having  not  so  applied  

thereunder, it is the appellant institution which is responsible for the situation  

in which the students have landed.  From what is narrated earlier, it is seen  

that even prior to the NCTE Act coming into force, inspite of High Court’s order  

dated 3.11.1990, the appellant did not submit the application for inspection of  

the institution and the required particulars in the prescribed proforma to the  

State  Government  until  27.3.1993.   The students  also  sought  their  remedy  

belatedly in the year 1998 by filing Writ Petition No. CWJC 517 of 1998 for the  

declaration of the result of the examination of the 1987-1989 batch held on  

24.1.1991  (conducted  pursuant  to  the  order  of  the  High  Court  dated  

3.11.1990).  By the time this petition was filed, the NCTE Act had already come  

into force on 1.7.1995, and hence although the State Government considered  

the case of the appellant in pursuance to the direction dated 28.1.1998 in Writ  

Petition No. CWJC 517 of 1998 and order dated 13.2.2007 in LPA No. 609/2006  

for the period 1987 to 1995, it rescinded the same on realizing that it no longer  

had the power to grant the recognition.  Thus, it is very clear that the appellant  

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and the students were also not diligent in furthering their cause, for reasons  

which are not stated. The State Government alone cannot be blamed for the  

fate of the students for its initial inaction.   

30. Even so, in our view the part of the order in CWJC No.18181 of  

2008 imposing cost of Rs. 30,000/- on the appellant was not called for.  The  

same requires to be deleted.

31. In  the  circumstances,  we  do  not  find  any  error  in  the  two  

impugned orders.  Accordingly, both the appeals are dismissed.  The order in  

CWJC No.18181 of 2008 is however modified to the extent of deleting the cost  

of Rs. 30,000/-.   As far as the present proceedings are concerned, there will  

be no order to costs in both these appeals.  In view of the dismissal of both  

appeals all the interim applications pending therein stand disposed of.

…………..……………………..J.  ( R.V. Raveendran )

  …………………………………..J.  ( H.L. Gokhale  )

New Delhi

Dated: November 23, 2010

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