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PETITIONER: BAREILLY DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ANR.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: AJAI PAL SINGH & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT17/02/1989

BENCH: PANDIAN, S.R. (J) BENCH: PANDIAN, S.R. (J) OZA, G.L. (J)

CITATION:  1989 AIR 1076            1989 SCR  (1) 743  1989 SCC  (2) 116        JT 1989 (1)   368  1989 SCALE  (1)439

ACT:     U.P.  Urban  (Planning and Development) Act,  1973:  S.4 Bareilly  Development  Authority--Construction  of  dwelling units--Whether  entitled to revise cost of houses/flats  and rate  of monthly instalments-Applicants whether entitled  to assail the action of the Authority in writ petition.     Constitution  of  India,  1950: Articles 12,  14,  32  & 226--Bareilly Development Authority--Whether other authority for purpose of Article 12--Construction of flats and  dwell- ing  units--Cost  of  flats/rate of  instalment  revised  on allotment--Whether amenable to writ jurisdiction.

HEADNOTE:     The  appellant-Authority  offered to register  names  of intending applications desirous of purchasing LIG, MIG,  HIG and  EWS type houses/flats. The ’General Information  Table’ given  in the brochure indicated the type of houses,  corre- sponding  income groups, cost, initial payment to  be  made, rate  of interest and approximate monthly instalments.  Note (1) under the said table stated that the cost shown  therein was  only estimated cost and it would increase  or  decrease according  to the rise or fail in the price at the  time  of completion  of  the houses, while Note (2) stated  that  the date  given therein could be amended as felt  necessary.  By clauses  12 and 13 contained in the brochure  the  Authority reserved  its discretion to change, alter or modify  any  of the  terms  and/or conditions of the allotment as  and  when necessary.     All the respondents registered their names for allotment of the flats in accordance with the terms and conditions  in the  brochure  and made the initial  deposit.  Subsequently, they  received  notices from the  Authority  intimating  the revised cost of houses and the amount of monthly  instalment rates which were almost double of those initially stated  in the  ’General Information Table’. The respondents were  fur- ther  informed  that those who intend to buy houses  on  the revised price/instalments must send their written acceptance by  the date specified other-wise their claims would not  be included  in the lots to be drawn. Except a few,  all  other respondents gave their unequivocal and unconditional written consent. Hence their names were included in the

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743  744 draws and on becoming lucky in the draw, they were  allotted their respective houses.     At  this stage. all the respondents approached the  High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging  the revised  terms and conditions on the ground that the  appel- lants were estopped from changing the conditions subject  to which  the  respondents  had applied  for  registration  and deposited the initial payment, that the enhancement of  cost of  the  house amounting to almost double of  the  estimated cost as shown in the brochure and the increase of the month- ly  instalments were much beyond their means and  that  this arbitrary and unilateral stand of the appellants was to  the prejudice of the respondents. These petitions were  resisted by  the appellants by contending that the  respondents  were estopped from challenging the varied terms and conditions of the allotment after having consented.     The  High  Court found the action of  the  Authority  in fixing the revised cost and instalments arbitrary and unrea- sonable and directed the appellant-Authority to re-determine the cost of the flats and instalments payable by them  after hearing the parties.     In  these appeals by special leave it was contended  for the  appellant-Authority that the income of  the  applicants was relevant only to determine the category of the scheme in which they had to be included for eligibility to get a house under the scheme but not for enhancement of the cost of  the house and monthly instalments, that it had fixed the cost of the  houses  and the rate of instalments after  taking  into consideration the escalation in the price of building  mate- rial, labour charges, cost of transport and allied  valuable factors  which  all enter into the price fixation,  that  in price fixation the executive has a wide discretion and it is only answerable provided there is any statutory control over its policy of price fixation, and that after the parties had entered  into  the  field of ordinary contract,  as  in  the instant  case. the relations were no longer covered  by  the constitutional provisions but by the legally valid  contract which  determines the rights and obligations of the  parties inter se Allowing the appeals,     HELD:  1.  Where the contract entered into  between  the State and the persons aggrieved is non-statutory and  purely contractual and the rights are governed only by the terms of the  contract, no writ or order can be issued under  Article 226 of the Constitution of India so as  745 to  compel  the authorities to remedy a breach  of  contract pure and simple. [755C]     Radhakrishna  Agarwal & Ors. v. State of Bihar  &  Ors., [1977]  3 SCR 249; Premji Bhai Parmar & Ors. etc.  v.  Delhi Development  Authority & Ors. [1980] 2 SCR 704 and  D.F.O.v. Biswanath Tea Company Ltd., [1981] 3 SCR 662 referred to.     The  respondents  in the instant  case  had  voluntarily registered themselves as applicants only after fully  under- standing the terms and conditions of the brochure, inclusive of cls. 12 and 13 and Notes 1 and 2 of the General  Informa- tion Table under which the Authority had reserved its  right to  change the terms and conditions as and when felt  neces- sary evidently depending upon the escalation of the  prices. The  Authority  did not compel anyone of the  applicants  to purchase the flat at the rates subsequently fixed by it  and pay  the increased monthly instalments. On the contrary  the option  was left over only to the allottees. All  the  same,

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the  respondents gave their written consent  unconditionally accepting  the  changed  and varied  terms  and  conditions. [753H;754A-C]     The  respondents after accepting the conditions  imposed by  the Authority had thus entered into the realm of a  con- cluded contract pure and simple with the Authority and hence they  could only claim the right conferred upon them by  the said  contract and were bound by the terms of  the  contract unless  some statute stepped in and conferred  some  special statutory  obligations on the part of the Authority  in  the contractual field. The contract between the respondents  and the  Authority  did not contain any statutory  terms  and/or conditions. [754C-E]     Even conceding that the Authority had the trappings of a State or would be comprehended in ’other authority’ for  the purpose of Article 12 of the Constitution, while determining price of the houses flats constructed by it and the rate  of monthly instalments to be paid, the ’authority’ or its agent after entering into the field of ordinary contract had acted purely  in its executive capacity. Thereafter the  relations were  no longer. governed by the  Constitutional  provisions but  by  the  legally valid contract  which  determined  the rights  and  obligations of the parties  inter-se.  In  this sphere, they could only claim rights conferred upon them  by the contract in the absence of any statutory obligations  on the  part  of the Authority in the said  contractual  field. [754G-H; 755A-B] Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. The International Airport Authority  746 of India & Ors., AIR 1979 S.C. 1628.     The  High Court while exercising its jurisdiction  under Article  226 of the Constitution had, therefore, gone  wrong in  its finding that there was arbitrariness and  unreasona- bleness on the part of the appellants in increasing the cost of the houses/flats and the rate of monthly instalments, and giving  directions  in  the writ petitions  as  prayed  for. [755D-E]

JUDGMENT:     CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal  Nos.  2809- 2812A of 1986.     From the Judgment and Order dated 6.2.1986 of the  Alla- habad High Court in Civil Misc. W.P. Nos. 2274, 2983,  3860, 4558 and 3202 of 1984. Rajinder Sachher and Bharat Sanghal for the Appellants.     Harbans  Lal,  Dr. Meera Agarwal, R.C.  Misra  and  Arun Madan for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     S.  RATNAVEL PANDIAN, J. These five appeals  by  Special Leave  under  Article 136 of the Constitution of  India  are preferred  against  the Judgment and Or,  let  dated  6.2.86 passed  by  the  Allahabad High Court in  Civil  Misc.  Writ Petition  No. 2274/84 connected with Civil Misc. Writ  Peti- tion Nos. 2983/84, 3860/84, 4558/84 & 3202/84 directing  the respondents (appellants herein) to re-determine the cost  of the  appellants’ (respondents herein) flats and  instalments payable by them after hearing their grievances.     Since  identical  contentions are urged in all  the  ap- peals, we are rendering a common judgment.     As it is said that Civil Appeal No. 2809/86 arising  out of Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 2274/84 is more  comprehen- sive and the facts alleged therein may be taken as represen- tative  in character, the facts relating to this appeal  are

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briefly stated.     The  Bareilly  Development  Authority  (hereinafter  re- ferred. as ’BDA’), the first appellant was constituted under Section  4 of the U.P. Urban Planning and  Development  Act, 1973 by the State Government 747 for   the  purposes  of  development  in  the  District   of Bareilly.,  With a view to casing the acute housing  problem in the said District, the BDA has undertaken construction of dwelling  units  for people belonging  to  different  income groups  styled  as  ’Lower  Income  Group’,  ’Middle  Income Group’,  ’High  Income Group’ and the  ’Economically  Weaker Sections’  (hereinafter  referred as LIG, MIG, HIG  and  EWS respectively). The BDA issued’ an advertisement offering  to register names of intending applicants desirous of  purchas- ing dwelling houses/flats in any one of the different income groups intended to be constructed by the BDA. In this appeal i.e.  Civil Appeal No. 2809/86, the respondents 1 to 17  and 20  got themselves registered for allotment of flats in  MIG scheme and respondents 18 and 19 in HIG scheme with the  BDA in accordance with the terms and conditions contained in the brochure issued by the Authority. The following table of the brochure shows the necessary details inclusive of the  esti- mated  cost for the different types of flats  under  various categories: Type of Range of   Cost      Initial   Interest  Approx House  Income                payment             monthly                                                  instalment MIG   Rs. 1000 to    Rs.64,000  Rs.5000  12%    Rs.551                                                 p.m. for       Rs. 1500 p.m.                             15 yrs. HIG   Rs. 1500 and  Rs. 1, 15,000 Rs.7000  12%    Rs. 1440       above p.m.                                  p.m. for                                                   10 yrs. LIG   Rs.351 to      Rs.35,000  Rs.2000  11%    Rs.345                                                 p.m. for       Rs. 1000 p.m.                             15 yrs. EWS   Rs.350 p.m.  Rs. 11,000  Rs, 100  7%     Rs.89                                                p.m. for                                                20 yrs.     The note under the ’General Information Table’ given  in the said brochure states that the cost shown therein is only estimated  cost and it would increase or decrease  according to  the rise or fail in the price at the time of  completion of the houses/flats. All the respondents registered.their names’ for MIG, HIG and  748 EWS  flats as the case may be and made the initial  deposit. Thereafter, the respondents in MIG group received indentical notices dated 19/20.1.84 from the Secretary, Bareilly Devel- opment  Authority  (second appellant)  intimating  that  the revised  cost  of houses/flats of MIG group as well  as  the amount of monthly instalment would be as follows:      1. No. of houses available            77      2. Cost of the house                 Rs. 1,27,000       3.  Down payment to be made/       Rs.35,000       paid on allotment      4.  No. of monthly instalment        180          fixed for the payment of          remaining amount      5. Rate of yearly interest              13.5%      6. Amount of monthly instalment      Rs. 1,031.50         with interest.     By  the said notice, the respondents in MIG  group  were informed  that  40%  of the houses/flats  mentioned  in  the

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notice would be given to the allottees who would deposit the entire cost in one cash payment and that the other allottees who  intend  to  buy  houses/flats  on  the  above   revised price/instalments must send by 28.1.84 their written accept- ance on the annexed proforma to the Registration Section  of the  office of the BDA otherwise their claims would  not  be included  in the lots to be drawn on 31.1.1984.  Except  the respondents Nos. 13, 17, 18 and 20, all other respondents in reply  to those notices gave their unequivocal and  uncondi- tional  written consent. Hence their names were included  in the  draw  and on being lucky in the draw,  the  respondents barring  the above 4 were allotted their respective  houses. After  allotment,  they  were asked to  complete  the  other formalities  and make down payments in accordance  with  the notice.  dated  19/20.1.1984,  by  a  further  notice  dated 3.2.1984 (Annexure ’F’). Similar notices were issued to  all the  registered  allottees for all types of houses  and  the respondents  were  also intimated that in case  any  of  the registered persons does not want to purchase the house,  his name would not be included in the draw but he would have his choice later on.  749     At  this  stage, all the respondents  in  these  appeals approached the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitu- tion  of India challenging the revised terms and  conditions of the BDA on the ground that the petitioners were  estopped from  changing the conditions subject to which the  respond- ents-applicants  had applied for registration and  deposited the  initial payment in the year 1980; that the  enhancement of  cost  of the house/flat amounting almost double  of  the estimated  cost as shown in the brochure while inviting  the applications and the increase of the monthly instalments are much  beyond  the  means of the respondents  and  that  this arbitrary and unilateral stand of the petitioners is to  the prejudice of the respondents. On the above contentions,  the respondents  prayed in their respective petitions for  issue of  writ of mandamus directing the petitioners  to  maintain the  allotment of the flats in their favour on the  original terms  and  conditions, to hand over the possession  of  the same and further to restrain the petitioners from cancelling the  original allotment. The above plea was resisted by  the petitioners strongly relying on certain conditions contained in the brochure especially of clauses 12 and 13 as per which the  BDA  has reserved its discretion to  change,  alter  or modify  any of the terms and/or conditions of the  allotment given in the brochure; that its decision would be final with regard to any matter concerning the registration and  allot- ment  and that the BDA has right to relax any  condition  in its discretion. It has been further contended that  respond- ents  barring  13, 17, 18 and 20 have  given  their  written acceptance  to  the changed conditions as mentioned  in  the notice dated 19/20.1.1984 and as such they are not  entitled to  the reliefs claimed in the writ petition.  According  to the  petitioners the increase in the cost and  the  interest demanded  from  the  respondents is  neither  arbitrary  nor unreasonable and the High Court is not the proper forum  for examining  in detail the terms regarding payment of  instal- ments  in the circumstances of the present case, and if  the respondents  were  not agreeable to the  changed  terms  and conditions,  they could as well resile from  their  consent. Finally, it was contended that the respondents are  estopped from  challenging  the varied terms and  conditions  of  the allotment after having consented.     The  High  Court though repelled the contention  of  the respondents (allottees) based on the principle of promissory

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estoppel, made the following observations with regard to the case of the respondents in the MIG category:               "In the circumstances of the present case  the               fixation of monthly instalment to the tune  of               Rs.1031.50 from the               750               petitioners  of  MIG  group  whose  income  is               hardly Rs. 1500 per month appears to us smack-               ing  of arbitrariness and unreasonableness  on               the  part  of the  contesting  opposite  party               (petitioners herein)";               "In the circumstances of the present case,  we               are not satisfied that the contesting opposite               party has succeeded in establishing its demand               of  double  the estimated cost  by  facts  and               figures.  The end of justice demands that  the               authority  should refix the cost of the  peti-               tioner’s flats after hearing their grievance."     The  High  Court answered the objections  taken  by  the petitioners  herein that the respondents have consented  for the  changed terms and conditions observing, "We think  that the  consent  obtained  from the petitioners  was  also  not reasonable  act on the part of the contesting opposite  par- ties (appellants herein)". Finally, the High Court  adopting the  above  reasoning in respect of the cases of  other  re- spondents also falling under various categories directed the appellants herein in all the writ petitions "to re-determine the cost of the petitioners’ (respondents herein) flats  and instalments payable by them after heating their grievances."      Being aggrieved by the impugned judgment the appellants have filed these appeals by special leave.      Shri Rajinder Sachher, St. Adv. after taking us through the relevant documents and the additional affidavit filed by the  second respondent and the reply affidavit assailed  the reasonings given by the High Court contending that the  said Court has erroneously held that the BDA has failed to justi- fy the demand of the enhancement in the cost of houses/flats as  well as the increase of the monthly instalments in  dis- proportionate  to  their income, because the income  of  the applicant was relevant only to determine the category of the scheme in which the applicant had to be included for  eligi- bility  to  get a house/flat under the scheme  but  not  for enhancement  of  the cost of the houses/ flats  and  monthly instalments.  According to him since the declared policy  of the BDA being ’No Profit No Loss’, it had fixed the cost  of the  houses/flats and the rate of instalments  after  taking into consideration of the escalation of the building materi- al,  labour charges, cost of transport and the allied  valu- able factors which all enter into the price fixation, and as such  the High Court is not correct in going into the  ques- tion   of  computation  of  cost  of  the  construction   of houses/flats and  751 the  plea of clerical mistakes exercising  its  jurisdiction under  Article 226 of the Constitution of India. He  further submits that the High Court has gone wrong in importing  the principle laid down in Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. The Interna- tional  Airport Authority of India & Ors., AIR 1979  Supreme Court  1628  to the present facts and circumstances  of  the case  in view of the fact that in price fixation the  execu- tive has a wide discretion and it is only answerable provid- ed  there is any statutory control over its policy of  price fixation and it is not the function of the High Court to sit in  judgment  over such matters of economic policy.  It  has been  vehemently urged that after the parties  have  entered

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into  the field of ordinary contract, the relations  are  no longer  covered by the constitutional provisions but by  the legally  valid  contract  which determines  the  rights  and obligations of the parties inter-se.     The fact that all respondents had applied for  registra- tion only on acceptance of terms and conditions contained in the  brochure  inclusive of Clauses 12 & 13 as well  as  the conditions  mentioned in the Notes 1 and 2 of  the  ’General Information  Table’  of the said brochure, and  further  the respondents  barring respondents Nos. 13, 17, 18 and  20  in MIG  group gave their reply accepting the changed terms  and conditions as per letter dated 19/20.1.1984 cannot be  chal- lenged  in  view of the  unassailable  documentary  evidence namely Annexures ’A’, ’D’, ’E’ and ’F’.     Now, we shall reproduce some of the relevant  conditions of the brochure as well as the changed conditions  contained in  the letter dated 19/20.1.1984. Clauses 12 and 13 of  the brochure  issued  by the BDA and the notes 1 and  2  of  the General Information Table thereto read thus:               Clause 12               For  allotment by lottery all  the  above-men-               tioned  terms and rules given in  the  booklet               would ordinarily be followed but the  Develop-               ment Authority will have the right to  change,               enhance  or  amend  any of  the  terms  and/or               condition as and when it thinks necessary  and               at its discretion.               Clause 13               The  decision of the Development Authority  in               regard to any matter in relation to the regis-               tration  application will be final.  It  would               have the right to relax any of the  conditions               at  its discretion. The fight to sell by  auc-               tion the Middle                752               Income   Group   and   Higher   Income   Group               plots/houses  or any portion thereof,  of  the               various schemes, will also vest in the  Devel-               opment Authority.               General Information Table                     Note: (1) The cost shown in the column 4               is  only estimated cost. It will  increase  or               decrease according to the rise or fall in  the               price  at the time of completion       of  the               property.                     Note:  (2) The data given in  the  above               mentioned table can be amended as felt  neces-               sary.     The  last  paragraph  of  the  letter  dated  19/20.1.84 (Annexure ’D’) reads thus:               "If  you  want to buy the house on  the  above               price/instalment   then  you  must   send   by               28.1.1984  your  written  acceptance  on   the               annexed  proforma to the Registration  Section               of this office."     It  may be mentioned here that in this letter  (Annexure ’D’),  the BDA has informed the allottees of MIG  about  the enhancement  of the cost of the houses/flats as well as  the increase  of the monthly instalment and the rate  of  yearly interest  etc.  and requested the allottees  to  give  their written acceptance so that their names could be included  in the list.     The  respondents except the four above have  sent  their written  acceptance  to  the letter (Annexure  ’D’).  For  a better appreciation of the case of the appellants, we  think

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that  as an example the letter (Annexure ’E’) of  the  first respondent  in this case namely Shri Ajay Pal Singh  may  be reproduced:               "I, Ajay Pal Singh, S/o Shri Sujan Singh  want               to  take  a Middle Income Group house  in  the               Housing Scheme No. 2 situated at Tibrinath  of               the Bareilly Development Authority on  payment               by  instalment. I have seen the house  and  am               satisfied. I accept the rules of the  Bareilly               Development Authority."  753     Only on the basis of the written acceptance, the name of the  first  respondent was included in the draw and  he  has successful  in getting the allotment of House No. 37 in  MIG type which fact if clearly borne out by the letter from  the second respondent (Annexure ’F’). In this connection, it  is worthwhile to note that the first respondent, Shri Ajay  Pal Singh  is  the  Principal of Shri Guru  Govind  Singh  Inter College and his educational qualifications are M.A. (Econ. & Hist.), B.Sc., B.Ed., LL.B. From the above, it is clear that all  the  respondents who have sent their  applications  for registration  with initial payment only after  having  fully understood  the terms and conditions of the brochure  inclu- sive  of  the  Clauses 12 and 13 and Notes 1 and  2  of  the General Information Table as per which the BDA has  reserved its  right  to  change, enhance or amend any  of  the  terms and/or  conditions as and when felt necessary, and also  the right to relax any of the conditions at its discretion,  and that the cost shown in the column 4 of the brochure was only estimated cost subject to increase or decrease according  to the  rise or fail in the price at the time of completion  of the property. This is not only the case of the applicants of MIG  scheme but also of the other applicants  falling  under the other categories i.e. HIG, LIG and EWS. So it cannot  be said that there was a mis-statemennt or incorrect  statement or an fraudulent concealment in the information supplied  in the  brochure published by the BDA on the strength of  which all  the  applicants falling under  the  various  categories applied  and got their names registered. In such  a  circum- stance  the respondents cannot be heard to say that the  BDA has  arbitrarily  and  unreasonably changed  the  terms  and conditions of the brochure to the prejudice of the  respond- ents.     More so, the respondents barring respondent Nos. 13, 17, 18 and 20 after having given their written consent accepting the changed and varied terms and conditions as shown in  the letter dated 19/20.1.84 are not justified in contending that the BDA has gone back on its original terms’ and  conditions and has substituted new conditions to their detriment. It is quite  un-understandable  that the persons  like  the  first respondent who is highly educated, occupying the post of the Principal  of  a College and who has  accepted  the  changed terms  and conditions by his letter is making these  allega- tions against the BDA.     The respondents were under no obligation to seek  allot- ment  of houses/flats even after they had  registered  them- selves.  Notwithstanding, they voluntarily registered  them- selves  as  applicants, only after fully  understanding  the terms and conditions of the brochure inclusive of Clauses 12 and 13 and Notes 1 and 2 of the General Information  754 Table which we have reproduced above, they are now trying to obtain  the houses/flats at the price indicated in the  bro- chure  at the initial stage conveniently ignoring the  other express  conditions by and under which the BDA has  reserved

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its  right  to change the terms and conditions as  and  when felt  necessary, evidently depending upon the escalation  of the prices. One should not loose sight of the fact that  the BDA did not compel anyone of the applicants to purchase  the flat  at  the  rates subsequently fixed by it  and  pay  the increased  monthly instalments. On the contrary, the  option was  left over only to the allottees. In fact, the  respond- ents in Civil Appeal No. 2809 of 1986 except the four  above mentioned  have unconditionally accepted the  changed  terms and conditions.     Thus  the  factual  position in this  case  clearly  and unambiguously reveals that the respondents after voluntarily accepting  the  conditions imposed by the BDA  have  entered into  the realm of concluded contract pure and  simple  with the  BDA and hence the respondents can only claim the  right conferred  upon them by the said contract and are  bound  by the  terms of the contract unless some statute steps in  and confers  some special statutory obligations on the  part  of the BDA in the contractual field. In the case before us, the contract  between the respondents and the BDA does not  con- tain any statutory terms and/or conditions. When the factual position  is  so,  the High Court placing  reliance  on  the decision  in Ramana Dayaram Shetty case (AIR 1979  SC  1628) has erroneously held:               "It has not been disputed that the  contesting               opposite  party  is included within  the  term               ’other  authority’ mentioned under Article  12               of the Constitution. Therefore, the contesting               opposite  parties cannot be permitted  to  act               arbitrarily with the principle which meets the               test of reason and relevance. Where an author-               ity appears acting unreasonably this Court  is               not  powerless and a writ of mandamus  can  be               issued  for  performing  its  duty  free  from               arbitrariness or unreasonableness."      This finding, in our view, is not correct in the  light of  the  facts  and circumstances of this  case  because  in Ramana  Dayaram Shetty case there was no concluded  contract as  in this case. Even conceding that the BDA has the  trap- pings of a State or would be comprehended in ’other authori- ty’ for the purpose of Article 12 of the Constitution, while determining price of the houses/flats constructed by it  and the rate of monthly instalments to be paid, the  ’authority’ or its agent after 755 entering into the field of ordinary contract acts purely  in its  executive  capacity. Thereafter the  relations  are  no longer governed by the constitutional provisions but by  the legally  valid  contract  which determines  the  rights  and obligations  of the parties inter-se. In this  sphere,  they can only claim rights conferred upon them by the contract in the absence of any statutory obligations on the part of  the authority (i.e. B.D.A. in this case) in the said contractual field.     There is a line of decisions where the contract  entered into  between  the State and the persons aggrieved  is  non- statutory and purely contractual and the rights are governed only  by the terms of the contract, no writ or order can  be issued under Article 226 of the Constitution of India so  as to  compel  the authorities to remedy a breach  of  contract pure  and  simple Radhakrishna Agarwal & Ors.  v.  State  of Bihar  & Ors., [1977] 3 SCR 249; Premji Bhai Parmar  &  Ors. etc. v. Delhi Development Authority & Ors, [1980] 2 SCR  704 and D.F.O. v. Biswanath Tea Company Ltd., [1981] 3 SCR 662.     In view of the authoritative judicial pronouncements  of

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this Court in the series of cases dealing with the scope  of interference  of  a  High Court while  exercising  its  writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of  India in  cases of non-statutory concluded contracts like the  one in  hand, we are constrained to hold that the High Court  in the present case has gone wrong in its finding that there is arbitrariness and unreasonableness on the part of the appel- lants herein in increasing the cost of the houses/flats  and the rate of monthly instalments and giving directions in the writ petitions as prayed for.     For  the reasons hereinbefore stated, we set  aside  the judgment  of  the High Court and accordingly allow  all  the appeals. There will be no order as to costs.     Before  parting  with  the judgment, we  would  like  to observe  that it is open to the respondents to approach  the appellants  for correction of any clerical mistakes  in  the calculation,  if  any and they are at liberty  to  move  any proper authority for any remedy if they are otherwise legal- ly entitled to. P.S.S.                                         Appeals   al- lowed. 756