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PETITIONER: BARADAKANTA MISHRA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: MR. JUSTICE GATIKRUSHNA MISHRA

DATE OF JUDGMENT21/06/1974

BENCH: BHAGWATI, P.N. BENCH: BHAGWATI, P.N. PALEKAR, D.G. KRISHNAIYER, V.R.

CITATION:  1974 AIR 2255            1975 SCR  (1) 524  1975 SCC  (3) 535  CITATOR INFO :  D          1978 SC1014  (5)

ACT: Contempt  of  Court Act, 1971--Sec. 19(1)  where  the  Court rejects  a motion or a reference and declines to initiate  a proceeding for contempt, can such a decision be regarded  as "a  decision in the exercise of its jurisdiction  to  punish for contempt.

HEADNOTE: The  appellant, a member of the Judicial service  of  Orissa was  promoted as Addl.  District and Sessions Judge on  31st July, 1968. but on 30th March. 1972 he was suspended by  the High  Court  as  a disciplinary enquiry was  decided  to  be started against him. On 29th April, 1972 the appellant was charge-sheeted and was called upon to show cause why disciplinary action should not be  taken  against  him.   In  the  meantime  the  appellant appealed  to the Governor, complaining against the order  of suspension  and  requesting  him  to  cancel  the  order  of suspension  on the ground that it was outside the  authority of  the High Court.  The High Court withheld the  appeal  of the  appellant  and refused to forward it  to  the  Governor since in its opinion, no appeal lay to the Governor  against an order of suspension passed by the High Court. The    appellant,   thereafter.   forwarded    directly    a representation to the Governor with a copy to the High Court and by this representation he moved the Governor to transfer the  disciplinary enquiry against him to the  Administrative Tribunal.   There  were  several submissions  made  in  this representation  which scandalised the High Court and  tended to  lower its prestige etc.  The High Court  therefore,  suo motu, issued a notice dated 3rd July, 1972 calling upon  the appellant  to show cause :why he should not be punished  for contempt of Court.  The notice set out the passages from the representation made by the appellant and the proceeding  for contempt  initiated by this notice was Criminal  Misc.  case No. 8 of 1972. The  appellant appeared in answer to the notice  and  raised several  contentions.   One  of  the  contentions  was  that whatever  he  had said in regard to the Judges of  the  High

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Court  in the representation was in regard to their  conduct in  the  discharge  of  administrative  functions  and   not judicial  functions  and  therefore, it did  not  amount  to contempt  of Court.  The appellant pleaded before  the  Full Bench  that this Contention should be tried  as  preliminary issue,  but  the  Full  Bench  rejected  the  plea  of   the appellant.   The appellant thereupon, preferred  a  petition for  special  leave  to appeal to this  Court  and  in  this petition  the  appellant once again made  submissions  which prima facie appeared to be criminal contempt of court.   The petition  was rejected by this Hon’ble Court, but  the  High Court,  taking  note of the objectionable  submissions  con- tained in the petition, issued a supplementary notice  dated 5th  January.  1973 to the appellant to show  cause  why  he should  not  be punished for having  committed  contempt  of Court by publishing such statements. The  Full  Bench,  thereafter  heard  the  proceedings   for contempt  on the charges contained in both the  notices  and held  the  appellant  guilty of con-,  tempt  of  Court  and sentenced him to two months’ simple imprisonment. In the mean while, the displinary enquiry instituted against the appellant was entrusted to a single judge and he learned Judge  submitted his report finding the appellant guilty  of all  the  charges, except charge No. 4(a).  The  High  Court considered the report at a full Court meeting and thereafter issued show cause notice calling upon the appellant to  show cause  why  he should not be reduced to the  rank  of  Addl. District  Magistrate.  Judicial.  The appellant was  granted personal hearing and after considering the explanation given by  him  the High Court found the appellant  guilty  of  the charges  except charge 4(a) and reduced him to the  rank  of A.D.M., Judicial. 525 The appellant took the view that some of the issues  arising in  the disciplinary enquiry were the same as those  arising in the proceeding for contempt which was pending against him and  the decision of those issues by the High Court  on  the administrative  side  in  the  course  of  the  disciplinary enquiry,   amounted  to  prejudging  these  issues  in   the proceeding for contempt which was a judicial proceeding  and the  Chief  Justice and other Judges of the High  Court  who decided the disciplinary enquiry were, therefore, guilty  of criminal  contempt of their own High Court.  The  appellant, therefore.  as  soon  as the  proceeding  for  contempt  was decided  by  the  High  Court  moved  the  Full  Bench   for initiating  a  proceeding  for contempt  against  the  Chief Justice  and other Judges in their personal  capacity.   The motion  of the appellant was heard by a Full Bench  and  the bench  held  that in its opinion there was  no  contempt  of Court committed by the Chief Justice and other Judges and in any  event by reason of Section 15, (1). the  appellant  was not  entitled  to  move the High  Court  for  taking  action against the Chief justice and other Judges since he had  not obtained the consent in writing of the Advocate General  and the  Bench  accordingly declined to take any action  on  the motion   of  the  appellant.   The   appellant,   thereupon, purporting  to  appeal  under Section  19(1)  preferred  the present appeal to this Hon’ble Court. Before  this Hon’ble Court a preliminary  objection  against the  maintainability  of  the  appeal  was  raised  by   the respondent.   According  to the respondent,  no  appeal  lay under  Section 19,(1) against the refusal of the High  Court to  take  action on the motion made by the  appellant.   The appellant,  on the other hand, contended by relying  on  the words  "Any  order or decision.... in the  exercise  of  its

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jurisdiction  to punish or contempt" and urged that even  if the  decision  was taken by the High Court not to  take  any action  on  the motion made by the Advocate-General  or  any other  person with the consent in writing of  the  Advocate- General, it would still be a decision in the exercise of its jurisdiction  to  punish  for  contempt  and  therefore   be appealable on the plain terms of section 19(1). Dismissing the appeal. HELD (1) it is clear that under the law as it stood prior to the  enactment  f  the contempt of Court Act,  1971  even  a person  punished  for  criminal contempt  had  no  right  of appeal.   This  unsatisfactory position was,  however,  made right  by Parliament by enacting the Contempt of Courts  Act 1971,  which introduced Section 19(1) by which an appeal  as of  right  was introduced "from any order or decision  of  a High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt." [531 D] (2)  From the provision of the Act. of 1971 it is clear that the scheme adopted by the Legislature is that the Court  may initiate  a proceeding for contempt suo motu or On a  motion made  by  the Advocate General or on a reference made  by  a subordinate  Court.  Where the Court initiates a  proceeding for contempt suo motu, it assumes jurisdiction for punishing for contempt and takes the first step in exercise of it; but when  a motion is made by the Advocate-General or any  other person  with the consent in writing of the  Advocate-General or  when  a reference is made by a  Subordinate  Court,  the Court, on a consideration of such motion or reference  would decide, in exercise of its jurisdiction, whether to initiate proceedings  for  contempt. The Court may  decline  to  take cognizance  and to initiate a proceeding for contempt.   The exercise  of contempt jurisdiction being a  matter  entirely between the court and the, condemner the Court though  moved by  motion  or reference, may in its discretion  decline  to exercise its jurisdiction for contempt.  It is only when the Court decides to take action and initiates a proceedings for contempt   that  it  assumes  jurisdiction  to  punish   for contempt.  The  exercise of the jurisdiction to  punish  for contempt  commences with the initiation of a proceeding  for contempt.  whether suo motu or on a motion or a,  reference. That is why the terminus a quo for The period of  limitation provided  in Section 20 is the date when the proceeding  for contempt is initiated by the Court.  Where the court rejects a motion or reference and declines to initiate a  proceeding for contempt, it refuses to assume or exercise  jurisdiction lo  punish  for  contempt. and such  a  decision  cannot  be regarded  as a decision in the exercise of its  jurisdiction to punish for contempt.  Such a decision 526 would  not,  therefore  fall within  the  opening  words  of Section 19(1) and no appeal would lie against it as of right Linder that provision. [532 A-F] (3)  It  does  not.. however mean that there  is  no  remedy available  where  the  High  Court,  on  an  erroneous  view disallows or unreasonably refuses to take action on a motion or a reference.  Though no appeal lies Linder Section 19(1 ) as  of right, the Advocate-General or any other person  with the consent in writing of the Advocate-General who has moved the High Court, can always come to this Court by a  petition for  special leave to appeal and the power of this Court  to interfere with such order or decision in the exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 136 is  unfettered. This Court can always in Suitable cases set right any  order or  decision of the High Court refusing to take  action  for contempt against the alleged condemner, if the interests  of

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the administration of justice so require. [532 F-H]

JUDGMENT: CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 84  of 1973. (Appeal under Section 19 of the Contempt of Court Act,  1971 from the Judgment and Order dated the 13th February, 1973 of the Orissa High Court at Cuttack in original Criminal  Misc. Case No. 3 of 1973). Baradakanta Mishra, in person. F.   S.  Nariman, Addition-,it’ Solicitor-General of  India, and Vinoo Bhagat, for the respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BHAGWATI,  J.,  Since we are disposing of this appeal  on  a preliminary point, it is not necessary to state the facts in detail.  It would be sufficient if we state only so much  of the facts as bear on the preliminary point. The  appellant  was at all material times a  member  of  the Judicial Service of the State of Orissa.  He was promoted as an Additional District and Sessions Judge on 31st July, 1968 but  by  an order dated 30th March, 1972 made  by  the  High Court of Orissa, he was suspended as a disciplinary  inquiry was  decided to be instituted against him.  On  29th  April, 1972, a charge-sheet containing eight charges was served  on him  and he was called upon to show cause  why  disciplinary action should not be taken against him.  In the meantime, on 10th  April, 1972, the appellant addressed an appeal to  the Government  complaining  against  the  order  of  suspension passed  by  the High Court and requesting  the  Governor  to cancel  the  order of suspension on the ground that  it  was outside  the  authority of the High Court.  The  High  Court withheld the appeal of the appellant and refused to  forward it to the Governor since in its opinion no appeal lay to the Governor, against an order of suspension passed by the  High Court.   The appellant thereupon forwarded directly  to  the Governor  a representation dated 14th May, 1972 with a  copy to   the   Registrar  of  the  High  Court   and   by   this representation the appellant moved the Governor to  transfer the  disciplinary inquiry against him to the  Administrative Tribunal.   There  were  several  statements  made  in  this representation  which scandalized the High Court and  tended to  lower  its  prestige, dignity  and  authority  and  thus constituted criminal contempt of court within the meaning of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.  The High Court, 527 therefore,  suo  motu issued a notice dated 3rd  July,  1972 calling  upon the appellant to show cause why he should  not be  punished for contempt of court.  The notice set out  the passages  from the representation made by the  appellant  to the  Governor which, in the prima facie opinion of the  High Court,  amounted to contempt of court.  The  proceeding  for contempt  initiated by this notice was numbered as  Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 8 of 1972.  The appellant appeared in answer  to the notice and raised several contentions with  a view  to  exonerating himself from the charge  of  contempt. One  of  the contentions was that whatever he  had  said  in regard to the judges of the High Court in the representation made  by him to the Governor was in regard to their  conduct in  the  discharge,  of  administrative  functions  and  not judicial  functions,  and therefore, it did  not  amount  to contempt  of court.  The appellant pleaded before  the  Full Bench of five judges, which was constituted to hear the pro- ceeding  for contempt, that this contention should be  tried

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as a preliminary issue, but the Full Bench rejected the plea of  the  appellant.   The appellant  thereupon  preferred  a petition  for special leave to appeal to this Court  and  in this  petition,  the appellant once  again  made  statements which  prima facie appeared to constitute criminal  contempt of  court.  The petition was rejected by this Court but  the High  Court  taking  note of  the  objectionable  statements contained  in  the petition issued  a  supplementary  notice dated  5th January, 1973 to the appellant to show cause  why he  should not be punished for having committed contempt  of court by publishing such statements.  The Full Bench  there- after  heard  the  proceeding for contempt  on  the  charges contained  in  both the notices and by an  order  dated  5th February,  1973  held the appellant guilty  of  contempt  of court  and  sentenced  him to simple  imprisonment  for  two months. Meanwhile  the  disciplinary inquiry  instituted  under  the charge-sheet  dated 29th April, 1972 was entrusted to K.  B. Panda,  J.,  and the learned Judge, after holding  a  proper inquiry  in  accordance  with  the  principles  of   natural justice,  submitted a report dated 2nd August  1972  finding the appellant guilty of all the eight charges set out in the charge-sheet,  except  charge  No.  4(a).   The  High  Court considered  the  report at a Full Court meeting of  all  the judges and finding itself in agreement with the report,  the High  Court  issued  a show cause notice  calling  upon  the appellant to show cause why he should not be reduced to  the rank  of  Additional District  Magistrate  (Judicial).   The appellant was granted personal hearing and after considering the explanation given by him, the High Court again at a Full Court meeting of all the’ judges held on 8th December, 1972, found  the appellant guilty of the charges levelled  against him  except charge No. 4(a) and reduced him to the  rank  of Additional  District Magistrate (Judicial).   The  appellant took  the  view  that  same of the  issues  arising  in  the disciplinary  inquiry were the same as those arising in  the proceeding  for contempt which was pending against  him  and the  decision  of  those issues by the  High  Court  on  the Administrative  side  in  the  course  of  the  disciplinary inquiry   amounted  to  pre-judging  those  issues  in   the proceeding for contempt which was a judicial proceeding  and the Chief Justice and other judges 528 of  the  High Court, who decided  the  disciplinary  inquiry were,  therefore, guilty of criminal contempt of  their  own High  Court.   The  appellant, therefore,  as  soon  as  the proceeding for contempt was decided by the Full Bench on 5th February,   1973,  moved  the  Full  Bench  for   initiating proceeding for contempt against the Chief Justice and  other judges  in  their  personal capacity.   The  motion  of  the appellant  was heard by a Full Bench of three judges and  by an  order dated 13th February, 1973, the Bench held that  in its opinion there was no contempt of court committed by  the Chief  Justice  and the other judges and in  any  event,  by reason of section 15, sub-section (4), the appellant was not entitled  to move the High Court for taking  action  against the Chief Justice and other judges since he had not obtained the consent in writing of the Advocate General and the Bench accordingly declined to take any action on the motion of the appellant.  The appellant thereupon, purporting to avail  of the  right  of appeal granted under section  19,  subsection (1), preferred the present appeal to this Court. When  the  appeal  reached hearing before  us,  the  learned Additional  Solicitor  General, appearing on behalf  of  the respondent,  raised  a  preliminary  objection  against  the

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maintainability  of  the  appeal.   The  learned  Additional Solicitor  General  contended  that  not  appeal  lay  under section 19, sub-section (1) against the refusal of the  High Court  to take action on the motion made by  the  appellant. It  is, only if the High Court suo motu or on a motion  made by the Advocate General or any other person with the consent in  writing  of  the  Advocate  General  takes  action   and initiates  proceeding  for  contempt  against  the   alleged contemner and on arising at a finding of guilt, punishes him for  contempt  that  the alleged contemner has  a  right  of appeal  under  section  19,  sub-section  (1).   Even  if  a proceeding  for  contempt is initiated against  the  alleged contemner but the alleged contemner is found not guilty  and is  exonerated, there is no right of appeal,  contended  the learned  Additional  Solicitor  General,  and  neither   the Advocate General nor the person who has, with the consent in writing  of the Advocate General, moved the High Court,  can appeal as of right.  The appellant, who appeared in  person, combated this contention by relying on the, words "any order or  decision-in the exercise of its jurisdiction  to  punish for contempt" and urged that even if a decision was taken by the High Court not to take action can the motion made by the Advocate  General  or any other person with the  consent  in writing  of  the  Advocate  General, it  would  still  be  a decision  in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish  for contempt  and would, therefore, be appealable on  the  plain terms  of section 19, sub-section (1).  It is  difficult  to imagine,  contended  the  appellant,  that  the  legislature should have conferred a right on the Advocate General,or any other  person  with the consent in writing of  the  Advocate General  to  move  the  High Court  for  taking  action  for contempt, but should have refused to grant a right of appeal to  the  Advocate General or such other person even  if  his motion was wrongly rejected by the High Court.  These  rival contentions  raise an interesting question of law  depending for  its  determination on the true  interpretation  of  the language of section 19, sub-section (1). 529 Now,  while considering this question, we must bear in  mind the  true nature of the contempt jurisdiction  exercised  by the  High  Court and the law in regard to  right  of  appeal which  obtained  immediately prior to the enactment  of  the contempt  of Courts Act, 1971.  It has always been  regarded as  well  settled law that so far as  criminal  contempt  is concerned,  it is a matter entirely :between the  Court  and the alleged condemner.  No one has a statutory or common law right to say that he is entitled as a matter of course to an order for committal because the alleged condemner is  guilty of  contempt.  All that he can do is to move the  Court  and draw  its  attention to the contempt alleged  to  have  been committed and it will then be for the Court, if it so thinks fit,  to take action to vindicate its authority  and  commit the alleged contemner for contempt.  It is for the Court  in the  exercise of its discretion to decide whether or not  to initiate  a proceeding for contempt.  Even if the  Court  is prima  facie satisfied that a contempt has  been  committed, the  Court may yet choose to ignore it and decline  to  take action.  There is no right in any one to compel the Court to initiate a proceeding for contempt even where a prima  facie case  appears  to  have been made out.   The  same  position obtains even after a proceeding for contempt is initiated by the Court on a motion made to it for the purpose.  The Court may   in   the  exercise  of  its   discretion   accept   an unconditional  apology from the alleged contemner  and  drop the  proceeding  for contempt.  Or, even after  the  alleged

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contemner  is found guilty, the Court may, having regard  to the  circumstances,  decline to punish him.  So far  as  the contempt  jurisdiction is concerned, the only actors in  the drama  are the Court and the alleged contemner.  An  outside party  comes in only by way of drawing the attention of  the Court to the contempt which has been committed : he does not become  a party to the proceeding for contempt which may  be initiated  by  the  Court.  It was for this  reason  that  a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court held in Narendrabhai Sarabhai  Hatheesing v. Chinubhai Manibhai, Seth(1) that  an order  made by the High Court refusing to commit a  man  for breach  of  an  undertaking  given to the  Court  is  not  a judgment  within  the meaning of clause 15  of  the  Letters Patent  as  it does not affect the merits  of  any  question between  the parties to the suit.  Beaumont,  C.J.,  pointed out  :  "the  undertaking is given to the Court;  if  it  is broken, and that fact is brought to the Court’s notice,  the Court may take such action as it thinks fit.  If it comes to the conclusion that the order has been deliberately  broken, it will probably commit the defaulter to jail, but the Court is  free to adopt such course as it thinks fit."  Rangnekar, J.,   also  spoke  in  the  same  strain  when  he  said   : "Proceedings  for contempt are matters entirely between  the Court  and  the  person  alleged  to  have  been  guilty  of contempt.   No party has any statutory right to say that  he is entitled as a matter of course to an order for  committal because his opponent is guilty of contempt.  All that he can do  is to come to the Court and complain that the  authority of the Court has been flouted, and if the Court thinks  that it was so, then the Court ill its discretion takes action to vindicate its authority.  It is, therefore, difficult to see how an application ?or contempt raises any question  between the parties, so that any order made (1)  I.L.R. 60 Bom. 894. 530 on such an application by which the Court in its  discretion refuses  to take any action against the party alleged to  be in  the wrong can be said to raise any question between  the parties."  It is, therefore, clear that under the law as  it stood prior to the enactment of the Contempt of Courts  Act, 1971 no appeal lay at he instance of a party moving the High Court  for taking action for contempt, if the High Court  in the exercise of its discretion refused to take action on the motion  of such party.  Even if the High Court  took  action and  initiated  a  proceeding  for  contempt  and  in   such proceeding,  the alleged contemner, being found guilty,  was punished for contempt, the order being one made by the  High Court  in the exercise of its criminal jurisdiction was  not appealable  under  clause  15 of  the  Letters  Patent,  and therefore, no appeal lay against it from a Single Judge to a Division Bench and equally, there was no appeal as of  right from a Division Bench to this Court.  The result was that in cases  of  criminal  contempt, even a  person  punished  for contempt  had  no right of appeal and he  could  impugn  the order  committing  him for contempt only if the  High  Court granted  the appropriate certificate under Art. 134  in  fit cases  or  on the refusal of the High Court to do  so,  this Court  intervened  by granting special leave  under  article 136. This was a highly unsatisfactory state of affairs and it was largely  responsible  for the criticism  against  the  large powers   of  the  Court  to  punish  for   contempt.    This unsatisfactory feature of the law of contempt was  adversely commented upon by Sanyal Committee in its Report dated  28th February,  1963 submitted to the Government of  India.   The

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Sanyal Committee, pointed out in Paragraph 2.1 in Chapter XI of its Report :               "The  present  state of the  law  relating  to               appeal  in cases of criminal contempt  appears               to  be more, the result of accidents of  legal               history than a matter of policy.  That this is               so  is clearly evident from the fact  that  in               those  cases of contempt for  which  specific.               provision is made in the Indian Penal Code and               the  Code-  of Criminal Procedure a  right  of               appeal  is provided for under section  486  of               the  Code of Criminal Procedure.  In the  case               of  contempt  falling within  the  purview  of               inherent   powers  of  the  High  Courts,   no               specific  provision  has  been  made  in   the               Letters Patent of the High Courts and the only               explanation for this seems to be that no  such               provision was made in England in regard to the               English  superior courts.  Further, under  the               provisions of the Letters Patent, no appeal is               ordinarily permissible where the order of  the               court is made in the exercise of the  criminal               jurisdiction.   It  has also  been  held  that               section 411A of the Code of Criminal Procedure               does not afford any remedy by way of appeal in               contempt  cases.   The result  has  been  that               before  the Constitution came into  force,  an               appeal in contempt cases from the decision  of               a  High Court could lie only in special  cases               to  the Judicial Committee.  The  Constitution               did not alter this position very much for  the               effect   of  articles  134  and  136  of   the               Constitution is merely to substitute the               531               Supreme  Court  for  the  Privy  Council.   In               short, there is only a discretionary right  of               appeal  available  at  present  in  cases   of               criminal contempt."               Then  in  Paragraph 3.1 in Chapter XI  of  its               Report the Sanyal Committee proceeded to state               :               "we  accordingly  recommend that  against  ’an               order   of  a  single  Judge,  punishing   for               contempt,  the appeal should lie, in the  High               Court,  to  a Bench of Judges  and  against  a               similar  order of a Bench of Judges of a  High               Court,  the appeal should lie as of  right  to               the Supreme Court."               Chapter  XII  of  the  Report  contained   the               recommendations  of the Sanyal  Committee  and               clause,  25 of the recommendations was in  the               following terms :               "Provision  may  be made for an appeal  as  of               right  from  any order or decision of  a  High               Court in the exercise of its. .jurisdiction to               punish for contempt.  The appeal should lie to               a Bench of Judges of the High Court where  the               order or decision is of a single Judge.  Where               the order or decision is of a Bench the appeal               should lie to the Supreme Court." It  was  in  pursuance of this recommendation  made  by  the Sanyal  Committee  that the Parliament, while  enacting  the Contempt  of Courts Act, 1971, introduced section  19,  sub- section(1)  in  that Act conferring an appeal  as  of  right "from any order or decision of a High Court in the  exercise

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of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt". Before  we examine the language of section  19,  sub-section (1)  in order to arrive at its true interpretation,  we  may first  look at sections 15, 17 and 20.  Sub-section  (1)  of section  15  provides that in a case  of  criminal  contempt other  than contempt in the face of the Court,  the  Supreme Court  or the High Court may take action ’on its own  motion or  on  a motion made by the Advocate General or  any  other person  with the consent in writing of the Advocate  General and  subsection  (2) of that section-says that  in  case  of criminal  contempt of any subordinate court, the High  Court may take action on a reference made to it by the subordinate court  or  on a motion made by the Advocate  General  or  in relation  to Union Territories, by such law officer  as  the Central  Government may specify in this behalf.  Section  17 lays down the procedure to be followed by the, Court when it decides  to  take  action and  initiates  a  proceeding  for contempt under section 15.  Sub-section (1) of that  section provides  that notice of every proceeding under  section  15 shall  be  served  personally  on  the  person  charged  and according   to   subsection  (2),  such  notice   shall   be accompanied, in case of a proceeding commenced, on a motion, by a copy of the motion as also copies of the affidavits, if any,  on  which  such motion is founded, and in  case  of  a proceeding commenced on a reference by a subordinate  court, by a copy of the reference.  Section 20 prescribes a  period of  limitation  by saying that no court shall  initiate  any proceeding  for contempt either on its own motion  or  other wise after the expiry of a period of one year from the  date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.  It will  be seen from these provisions that the scheme  adopted by the legislature is that the 532 Court may initiate a proceeding for Contempt suo motu or  on a  motion made by the Advocate General or any  other  person with the consent in writing of the Advocate General or on  a reference  made  by a subordinate court.   Where  the  Court initiates  a  proceeding for contempt suo motu,  it  assumes jurisdiction to punish for contempt and takes the first step in  exercise of it.  But whit happens when a motion is  made by the Advocate General or any other person with the consent in writing of the Advocate General or a reference is made by a  subordinate  court.   Does  the  Court  enter  upon   the jurisdiction  to punish for contempt and act in exercise  of it  when  it  considers such motion  or  reference  for  the purpose of deciding whether it should initiate a  proceeding for contempt ? We do not think so.  The motion or  reference is  only  for the purpose of drawing the  attention  of  the Court to the contempt alleged to have been committed and  it is  for  the Court’. on a consideration of  such  motion  or reference, to decide, in exercise of its discretion, whether or not to initiate a proceeding for contempt.  The Court may decline to take cognizance and to initiate a proceeding  for contempt  either  because in its opinion no  contempt  Prima facie  appears  to have been committed or because,  even  if there is prima facie contempt, it is not a fit case in which action  should be taken against the alleged contemner.   The exercise  of contempt jurisdiction being a  matter  entirely between  the  Court and the alleged  contemner,  the  Court, though moved by motion or reference, may in its  discretion, decline  to exercise its jurisdiction for contempt.   It  is only  when the Court decides to take action and initiates  a proceeding  for  contempt that it  assumes  jurisdiction  to punish  for contempt.  The exercise of the  jurisdiction  to punish  for  contempt  commence; with the  initiation  of  a

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proceeding for contempt, whether suo motu or on a motion  or a reference.  That is why the terminus a quo for the  period of  limitation  provided in section 20 is the  date  when  a proceeding  for contempt is initiated by the  Court.   Where the  Court rejects a motion or a reference and  declines  to initiate a proceeding for contempt, it refuses to assume  or exercise  jurisdiction  to punish for contempt  and  such  a decision cannot be regarded as a decision in the exercise of its  jurisdiction to punish for contempt.  Such  a  decision would  not,  therefore,  fall within the  opening  words  of section 19, sub-section (1) and no appeal would lie  against it  as of right under that provision.  This of  course  does not  mean that there is no remedy available where  the  High Court  on an erroneous view of the law or  unreasonably  and perversely  refuses to take action for contempt on a  motion or  a  reference.  Though no appeal lies under  section  19, sub-section (1) as of right against such order or  decisions of the High Court, the Advocate General or any other  person who has with the, consent in writing of the Advocate General moved  the  High Court can always come to this  Court  by  a petition  for special leave to appeal and the power of  this Court  to  interfere  with such order  or  decision  in  the exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under article 136 is unfettered.  This Court can always in suitable cases  set right  any order or decision of the High Court  refusing  to take  action for contempt against the alleged contemner,  if the  larger  interests  of  administration  of  justice   so require. It  is,  therefore. clear that the order made  by  the  Full Bench of the Orissa High Court in the present case rejecting the motion made by 533 the  appellant  and refusing to initiate  a  proceeding  for contempt against the Chief Justice and other judges was  not appealable under section 19, sub-section (1).  We may  point out that ’in the present case it is unnecessary to  consider whether  an  appeal  under section  19,  subsection  (1)  is confined  only  to  a  case  where  the  High  Court   after initiating  a  proceeding  for contempt  finds  the  alleged contemner guilty and punishes him for contempt as  contended by  the learned Additional Solicitor General or  it  extends also  to  a  case where after initiating  a  proceeding  for contempt, the High Court finds that the alleged contemner is not guilty of contempt and exonerates him, or even if he  is found  guilty  of  contempt,  declines  to  punish  him.   A question  may  well  arise whether in the  latter  case  the Advocate  General  or  any other person who  has,  with  the consent  in writing of the Advocate General, moved the  High Court  can appeal as of right against the order or  decision of  the  High Court.  That question does not  arise  in  the present  case  and  we need  not,  therefore,  express,  any opinion  upon it, though we may point out that in England  a right  of appeal is given to a disappointed applicant  under section  13, subsections (1) and (2) of the   Administration of Justice Act, 1960. We  are,  therefore,  of  the  view  that  the   preliminary objection raised by the respondent is well founded  and  the appellant  is  not entitled to maintain the  present  appeal under  section-19, sub-section (1).  ’no appeal,  therefore, fails and is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. S.C. Appeal dismissed. 2-M185SUP.CI./75 534

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