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PETITIONER: BANWARI DASS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SUMMER CHAND AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT13/02/1974

BENCH: SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH BENCH: SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH KRISHNAIYER, V.R.

CITATION:  1974 AIR 1032            1974 SCR  (3) 358  1974 SCC  (4) 817

ACT: Delhi  Muncipal Corporation Act, 1957--Ss. 17 and  19--Scope of--Words   and   phrases--Meaning  of  ’have   been’   land being’--Recrimination--Election--Petition     to declare election    void    and   to    declare    the    petitioner elected--Returned candidate if can plead that     petitioner was guilty of corrupt practice.

HEADNOTE: The  appellant  and the respondent contested election  to  a ward  in  the Municipal Corporation of Delhi  in  which  the appellant was declared elected.  Respondent no.  1 filed  an election  petition challenging the appellant’s  election  on the  ground  of  corrupt  practice and  prayed  that  he  be declared  duly elected under s. 19(1)(c) of the  Corporation Act.   The appellant on the other hand contended that  since the  respondent  was  guilty of corrupt  practices  he,  had become  disentitled  to be declared elected.   The  Election Tribunal  held that the appellant was not entitled to  raise such  a  plea.  On appeal the High Court held  that  in  the absence  of  a  specific provision in  the  Corporation  Act corresponding to s. 97 of the Representation of People  Act, 1951 the returned candidate was not entitled to  recriminate on the grounds contained in s. 17 of the Corporation Act. Section 9(1)(d) of the Corporation Act enacts that a  person shall be disqualified for being chosen as, and for being,  a councillor,  or  alderman  if he  has,  in  proceedings  for questioning the validity or regularity of an election,  been found  to  have  been guilty of any corrupt  practice.  .  . Section 17 enacts the grounds on which the election could be declared void.  One of such grounds in s. 17 (1) (a) is that "on  the date of his election a returned candidate  was  not qualified or was disqualified to be chosen as a councillor." On  the question whether in an election petition  under  the Act for getting an election declared void and for a  further declaration  that  the  petitioner  himself  had  been  duly elected,  the  returned candidate is entitled to  plead  and prove that the petitioner was guilty of corrupt practice  in the election in question, and was therefore not entitled  to be declared as duly elected. Dismissing the appeal to this Court, HELD  :  (1) There is no provision in  the  Corporation  Act

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corresponding to s. 97 of the Representation of People,  Act expressly  giving a right of recrimination to  the  returned candidate.   The effect of the word "being" in  the  opening sentence  of s.9(1) appears to have been largely off-set  by the  use of the words "to have been guilty" in  cl.(d).  The meaning of the phrase "have been" is "immediately prior to a specific  time".  If the phrase "found to have been  guilty" in  s.9(1)(d)  is  construed in the  context  of  cl.(a)  of s.17(1), then it will mean "found to have been guilty at the time  of election, and immediately preceding the  election." The right to recriminate cannot be legitimately spelled  out of  s.9(1)(d)  without  doing violence to  its  language  or unduly stretching it. [364 F] (2)  The inquiry of the District Judge, who is the  election tribunal, at the trial of an election petition is limited to the  investigation of those matters only which  will  enable him to make the orders specified in s.19(1). But where in  a composite petition relief is claimed that the petitioner  be declared  elected  in place of the returned  candidate,  the District  Judge  is  to investigate if  either  of  the  two conditions for the grant of a further declaration  specified in  s.19(2)  is made out namely : (a) whether  in  fact  the petitioner  received a majority of the valid votes,  or  (b) whether the petitioner would have but for the votes obtained by the returned candidate, obtained a majority of the  valid votes.   In such a composite position apart  from  rebutting the  allegations made against him in the petition  all  that the returned candidate can further show is that the 359 petitioner  did  not in fact receive the majority  of  valid votes  and  is  therefore,  not  entitled  to  the   further declaration  of  his  due election.  In  the  absence  of  a provision specifically conferring such a right, the returned candidate  cannot allege and prove further that even if  the petitioner had obtained a majority of valid votes,-he  could not  be granted the declaration of his due election  because he  had  committed corrupt practices.  Such plea  and  proof will,  in reality, be in the nature of a counterattack,  not necessary for legitimate defence. [365 C] (3)  In  the light of the  well-established  principles  the court cannot bridge the gap or supply this apparent omission in the Corporation Act with regard to a returned candidate’s claim to recriminate, by importing principles of common  law or  equity,  the  maxim casus  omissus  et  oblivioni  datus disposition communis juris relinqitur being in-applicable to the  construction of election statutes.  A right to file  an election  petition or a recriminatory petition being a  mere creature  of statute, unknown to common law, the  appellant’ in  the  absence  of a clear  statutory  provision,  is  not entitled  to recriminate on any of the grounds mentioned  in s. 17. [366 D] (b) If the failure to comply strictly with the  requirements of  a statutory provision as to recrimination precludes  the returned candidate from recriminating, a    fortiori, in the absence  of such a statutory provision in an  election  law, the returned candidate has no right to recriminate. [367 D] P.  Malai Chami v. M. Andi Ambalas & Ors. A.I.R.  1973  S.C. 2077  and  Jabar  Singh  v. Genda  Lal  [1964]6  S.C.R.  54, followed.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 893 of 1973. From  the judgment and order dated the 18th April,  1973  of

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the  Delhi  High Court in Letters Patent Appeal No.  289  of 1972. L.  M.  Singhvi, S. S. Dhanduja and K. B. Rohatgi,  for  the appellant. O.  P. Malhotra, Sat Pal, K. N. Sehgal and N. S.  Das  Behl, for respondent No. 1.           The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SARKARIA,  J.  The  principal  question  that  falls  to  be determined in this appeal on certificate, is : whether in an election petition under the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957  (for  short,  the Corporation  Act),  for  getting  an election  declared void and for a further  declaration  that the  petitioner himself had been duly elected, the  returned candidate is entitled to plead and prove that the petitioner was guilty of corrupt practice in the election in  question, and  was  therefore  not entitled to  be  declared  as  duly elected ?           The  material facts bearing on this  question  may now be stated The elections to the Delhi Municipal  Corporation were  held on  May  2, 1973. Appellant, Benarsi Dass and  Sumer  Chand, Respondent 1 and others contested the election from Ward No. 51.  The appellant secured 3974 valid votes as against  3882 valid  votes  obtained by Respondent 1.  The  appellant  was declared duly elected. Respondent  1 filed an election petition under S. 15 of  the Corporation  Act  before  the  Election  Tribunal  (District Judge) to challenge the election inter alia on the ground of corrupt practices particularised in para 9 of the  petition. Apart  from getting the election of the  returned  candidate declared void, the election-petitioner prayed that he 360 be declared duly elected to the Municipal Corporation  under S. 19(1) (c)   of the Corporation Act. In his written statement, the Returned Candidate raised some preliminary  objections (which have not been pressed  before us) and traversed the allegations in the election  petition. He further pleaded under the caption "Additional Pleas" that since  the petitioner was guilty of the  corrupt  practices, particularised  in  the  written  statement  he  had  become disentitled to be declared elected. The District Judge held that the appellant was not  entitled to  plead and prove in reply to the election  petition  that the  petitioner  was also guilty of corrupt  practices.   To impugn  those  orders of the District Judge,  the  appellant moved the High Court by a writ application under Article 226 of the Constitution.  The learned Single Judge who tried the application  negatived the contention of the  appellant  and dismissed the writ application with these observations :-               "The  petitioner may show that the  Respondent               No.  1  did  not obtain a  majority  of  valid               votes.   This is the legitimate defence.   But               he cannot go further and show that even if the               Respondent  No. 1 has obtained a  majority  of               votes, the Respondent No. 1 is not entitled to               be  declared  to  be  duly  elected  candidate               because  he committed corrupt  practices.   An               election petition to declare the election of a               returned  candidate  void lies only  when  the               election is notified and published under S. 14               of  the Act.  Since the election of  the  Res-               pondent No. 1 has not been so published  under               section 14 of the Act, the petitioner does not               have  the  right to challenge, it  by  proving               corrupt practices against Respondent No. 1".

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Aggrieved,. the appellant carried an appeal under cl. 10  of the Letters Patent to the Division Bench of the High  Court. The  Bench dismissed the appeal holding that in the  absence of a specific provision in the Corporation Act corresponding to s. 97 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951,  the Returned  Candidate  is not entitled to recriminate  on  the grounds  contained in s. 17 of the Corporation Act.  It  was noticed that if at all there was a conscious omission in the Corporation  Act,  about the Returned Candidate’s  right  to recriminate,  the  Court was not empowered  to  supply  that omission.  The High Court, however, granted the  certificate under  Article  133(1)  of  the  Constitution.   Hence  this appeal. According to the relevant statutory provisions in Chapter 11 of the Corporation Act, the Councillors are chosen by direct election  on the basis of adult suffrage from various  wards into  which  Delhi  has been divided.  The  normal  term  of office  of  a  Councillor is four years  from  the  date  of publication  of  the result of his  election.   The  persons entitled to vote at election of Councillors are the  persons registered, by virtue of the provisions of the  Constitution and the Representation of the People Act, 1950 as voters  at elections to the House of the People for the area  comprised in a ward. 361                     According to section 8 :               "a person shall not be qualified to be  chosen               as a Councillor unless his name is  registered               as  an  elector in the electoral  roll  for  a               ward".               Section  9  lays  down  disqualifications  for               membership of Corporation.  Its material  part               reads :               "9(1) A person shall be disqualified for being               chosen  as,  and for being, a  councillor,  or               alderman--               (a)  to  (c)                 x               x               x               (d)   if   he   has,   in   proceedings    for               questioning  the validity or regularity of  an               election, been found to have been guilty of--               (i)   any corrupt practice, or               (ii)  any  offence  punishable  under  section               171E or section 171F of the Indian Penal  Code               or any offence punishable under section 29  or               clause (a) of sub-section (2) of section 30 of               this  Act, unless a period of five  years  has               elapsed  since the date of the finding or  the               disqualification   has  been  removed   either               retrospectively   or  prospectively   by   the               Central Government.               (e)  to (1)                  x               x               x"                     Section 14 enjoins that the names of all               persons  elected  as councillors  or  aldermen               shall, as soon as may be, after such election,               be  published  by  the  Commissioner  in   the               Official Gazette.  Sections 15 to 21 relate to               disputes regarding elections.  The mandate  of               s.  15(1) is that no election of a  councillor               or alderman shall be called in question except               by an election petition presented to the court               of  District Judge, Delhi within 15 days  from               the  date of the publication of the result  of               the election under s. 14.  Sub-s. (2) provides

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                           :               "An election petition calling in question  any               such election may be presented on one or  more               of the grounds specified in section 17--               (a)   by any candidate at such election               (b)  (i)  in  the case of  an  election  of  a               Councillor,   by  an  elector  of   the   ward               concerned;               (ii)  in  the  case  of  an  election  of   an               alderman, by any councillor."               Its sub-section (4) requires that               "An election petition-               (a)   shall contain a concise statement of the               material facts on which the petitioner relies;               362               (a)   shall, with sufficient particulars,  set               forth  the  ground  or grounds  on  which  the               election is called in question; and               (c)   shall  be signed by the  petitioner  and               verified  in the manner laid down in the  Code               of Civil Procedure 1908, for the  verification               of pleadings."               The   relief  that  may  be  claimed  by   the               petitioner is indicated in s. 16(1) which says               :               "A petitioner may claim-               (a)   a  declaration that the election of  all               or any of the returned candidates is void, and               (b)   in    addition   thereto,   a    further               declaration  that  he  himself  or  any  other               candidate has been duly elected."               Section  17 indicates the grounds on which  an               election  can be declared void.  One  of  such               grounds  vide clause (a) of S. 17(1) is  "that               on  the  date  of  his  election  a   returned               candidate    was   not   qualified   or    was               disqualified, to be chosen as a councillor or,               as the case may be, as an alderman under  this               Act".   Another  ground in clause  (b)  is  of               corrupt  practices  committed  by  a  returned               candidate  or his agent or other  person  with               his  consent.  Section 18 applies the Code  of               Civil   Procedure,  1908  to  the  trial   and               disposal of an election petition "as far as it               can   be   made   applicable".    Section   19               enumerates  the  nature of  orders  which  the                             District  Judge can make at the  concl usion  of               the trial of an election petition.  It reads               "19(1)  At the conclusion of the trial  of  an               election  petition, the court of the  District               Judge shall make an order-               (a)   dismissing the election petition; or               (b)   declaring the election of all or any  of               the returned candidates to be void; or               (c)   declaring the election of all or any  of               the  returned  candidates to be void  and  the               petitioner  and  any other candidate  to  have               been duly elected.               (2)   If any person who has filed an  election               petition  has,  in  addition  to  calling   in               question   the   election  of   the   returned               candidate, claimed declaration that he himself               or  any other candidate has been duly  elected               and  the  court of the district  judge  is  of

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             opinion--               (a)   that  in  fact the  petitioner  or  such               other  candidate  received a majority  of  the               valid votes, or               (b)   that  but for the votes obtained by  the               returned  candidate  the  petitioner  or  such               other candidate would have obtained a majority               of the valid votes, the court shall, after de-               claring the election of the returned candidate               to be void, de-               363               clare the petitioner or such other  candidate,               as  the  case  may  be,  to  have  been   duly               elected."               Section 21 says :               "(1)  An  order of the court of  the  district               judge  on an election petition shall be  final               and conclusive.               (2)   An  election  of  a  councillor  or   an               alderman not called in question in  accordance               with, the foregoing provisions shall be deemed               to be good and valid election." The provisions of ss. 9,15(1), 16(1), 17(1), 19(1), 19(2) of the  Corporation Act are more or less parallel to  those  in Sections  9A, 18, 84, 101, 98 and 100 of the  Representation of the People Act, 1951 (for  Short    the,   People    Act) respectively.    It   will   be  seen   that   a   provision corresponding  to S. 97 of the Representation of the  People Act, 1951 is conspicuous by its absence from the Corporation Act,  though the latter enactment was placed on the  statute book in 1957. Dr.  Singhvi, learned Counsel for the appellant,  vehemently contends that a right to plead and prove that the  election- petitioner  himself was guilty of corrupt practice  and,  as such,  was  disqualified to be declared to  have  been  duly elected has been given by S. 9(1) (b) of the Corporation Act to  the  returned candidate. Section 9,  it  is  maintained, applies  to all stages of an election petition, and,  if  at the  time  of  granting relief in an  election  petition,  a returned   candidate  can  show  that  the  petitioner   had committed  corrupt  practices in the election  in  question, then  the court will not grant him the declaration that  lie has  been  duly elected. Stress has been laid  on  the  word ’being’  in  section  9(1)  (b).  Learned  Counsel   further maintains  that  in  interpreting  the  provisions  of   the Corporation  Act, two principles have to be, kept  in  view. The  first is ubi jus ibi remedium (where there is a  right, there is a remedy). The argument is that once it is conceded that  the returned candidate has a right to plead  that  the petitioner   had  incurred  any  of  the   disqualifications enumerated  in  S.  9, he cannot be  debarred  from  leading evidence to substantiate that plea. It is contended that  if the returned candidate is not permitted to lead evidence  to establish  Such  a  counter-allegation,  in  defence,  to  a composite election petition of this nature, he will be  left without any remedy because S. 21 (1) will make the order  of the  District  Judge in the petition final  and  conclusive, while  sub-s.  (2) of the same section will  bar  any  other procedure  for  impeaching  the election  of  the  election- petitioner  on  the ground that he has committed  a  corrupt practice. It is added the remedy provided in S. 33 will also be not open to the returned candidate after the decision  of the  election petition. In any case, the remedy in S.  33(3) is too circuitous, The  second  principle  relied  on by  the  Counsel  is  the

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Mischief  Rule as enunciated in Heydon’s case(1),  that  the court  should make such construction as shall  suppress  the mischief, and advance the remedy.  The main object of  these statutory provisions, it is urged, is to ensure (1)  (1584) 3 Co. Rep. 364 purity  of the elections, and if the returned  candidate  is not allowed to expose the corrupt practices committed by the election-petitioner, himself, it would defeat that object of the statute. The other grounds of appeal have not been pressed before us. Mr.  O.  P. Malhotra, learned Counsel for  the  respondents, submits  that in clause (d) of s. 9(1), the words  "to  have been"  read  together  with clause (a) of s.  17(1)  put  it beyond doubt that this particular disqualification must have been  incurred  or in existence at the date of the  poll  or election.   The,  plea  sought  to  be  established  by  the returned  candidate, according to the Counsel, is a plea  of recrimination, and the Corporation Act does not contain  any provision  analogous to s. 97 of the People Act, giving  him such  a right.  The only remedy of the  returned  candidate, says the Counsel, is to avail of the machinery of S. 33 (3). In approaching the matter under consideration, we must first appreciate  the  true  nature  of the plea  set  up  by  the returned   candidate.   What  the  appellant  seeks  is   in substance,  a  right  to give evidence  to  prove  that  the election of the election-petitioner would have been void  on account  of  corrupt  practices  committed  by  him  in  the election,  if  he  had been the  returned  candidate  and  a petition   had  been  presented  calling  in  question   his election.   Although Dr. Singhvi is reluctant to style  this plea as one of recrimination, the nature of the plea or  the right  claimed  is  too obvious to  be  concealed.   To  all intents  and purposes, it is a plea of recrimination of  the type  mentioned in S. 97 of the People Act, 1951.  It is  in the  nature of a counter-petition on the ground  of  corrupt practices under clause (b) of S. 17(1) and not on the ground of  the  petition-or being disqualified at the date  of  the election,  which  is a distinct and  separate  ground  under clause (a) of s. 17(1). There  is no provision in the Corporation Act  corresponding to  S.  97 of the People Act, expressly giving  a  right  of recrimination  ’co  the returned  candidate.   The  question therefore, is; Can such a right be legitimately spelled  out of s.9(1) (d)?  The entire argument of Dr. Singhvi has  been built  upon the edifice of the word "being" in  the  opening sentence  of  s.9(1).  But the effect of  the  word  "being" appears to have been largely off-set by the use of the words "to  have  been guilty" in clause  (d).   Stroud’s  Judicial Dictionary  gives the meaning of the phrase "have  been"  as "immediately prior to a specific time".  In Re storie,(1)  a scheme  for the management of the Charity declared that  the boys  should be chosen from those boys "who shall have  been three years at the Free School".  A complaint was made  that an  undue election had been made.  On appeal, Lord  Justices Knight  Bruce and Turner, construing the scheme,  held  that only  those boys were eligible "who had been three years  at the  school  at the time of, and immediately  preceding  the election"- (Emphasis supplied). In the instant case, also, if the phrase "found to have been guilty"  in  s.9(1)  (d)  is construed  in  the  context  of clause(a) of s.17(1), then (1)  (1861) 30, L. J. Ch. 193: 365 on  the  analogy of Re Storie, it will mean "found  to  have

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been  guilty  at the time of the election,  and  immediately preceding the election Thus  a right to recriminate cannot be legitimately  spelled out  of S. 9 (1) (d) without doing violence to its  language or unduly stretching it. The  above interpretation fits better in the general  scheme of  the  Corporation Act.  As will be  apparent  from  s.19, quoted  earlier,  the tribunal i.e. the District  Judge  can pass  only three kinds of final orders indicated in  clauses (a),  (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) of that  section.   The District  Judge’s  inquiry  at  the  trial  of  an  election petition  is,  therefore, limited to  the  investigation  of those matters only which will enable him to make the  orders specified  in s.19(1). But, where in a  composite  petition, like the one in the present case, relief is claimed that the petitioner  be  declared elected in place  of  the  returned candidate,  the’ District Judge is to investigate if  either of   the  two  conditions  for  ’the  grant  of  a   further declaration, specified in s. 19(2) is made out.  That is  to say,  he has to confine his enquiry to the determination  of either  of these two questions namely : (a) whether in  fact the  petitioner received a majority of the valid  votes,  or (b)  whether  the petitioner would have but  for  the  votes obtained  by the returned candidate, obtained a majority  of the  valid votes.  Rule 68(1) of the Rules framed under  the Corporation  Act,  defines ‘ valid vote’  as  "every  ballot paper  which is not rejected under Rule 67 shall be  counted as  one  valid vote".  The concept of validity of  votes  is different from that of corrupt practices defined in s. 22 on the  basis of which an election petition can be  instituted. In  such  a  composite petition, apart  from  rebutting  the allegations  made against him in the petition, all that  the returned  candidate can further show is that the  petitioner did  not in fact receive the majority of valid votes and  is therefore,  not entitled to the further declaration  of  his due  election.  In the absence of a  provision  specifically conferring  such  a  right, the  returned  candidate  cannot allege  and  prove further that even if the  petitioner  had obtained a majority of valid votes, he could not be  granted the declaration of his due election because he had committed corrupt practices.  Such plea and proof will, in reality, be in  the  nature  of  a  counter-attack,  not  necessary  for legitimate defence. Having  seen that there is no provision in  the  Corporation Act which specifically or by inevitable implication gives to a  returned  candidate a right to recriminate,  the  further question  to  be  determined  is  :  Whether  the  court  is competent  to  provide this casus omissus  by  invoking  the maxim  ubi  jus  ibi  remedium or  Mischief  Rule  or  other principles of common law ? It appears to us that the answer to this question must be in the negative. This Court has repeatedly held that ’an election contest  is not  an  action  at law or a suit in  equity  but  a  purely statutory  proceeding  unknown to common law and  the  court possesses  no  common law powers.’ Statutory  provisions  of election   law  are  to  be,  strictly  construed  and   its requirement strictly observed.  In P. Malai Chami v. M. Andi Ambalam   and   ors.,(1)   this   Court   speaking   through Alagiriswami J., again pointed out (1) A. 1. R. 1973 S. C. 2077. -L954Sup.CI/74 366 .lm15 "Courts in general are averse to allow justice to be  defea-

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ted  on  a mere technicality.  But in deciding  an  election petition,  the High Court is merely a tribunal  deciding  an election dispute.  Its powers are wholly the creature of the statute  under  which  it is conferred  the  power  to  hear election-petitions." It must be remembered-to use the oft-quoted words of  Grover j. in Taunton’s case(1)- "that although the object of the statute by which the  elec- tion   tribunals  were  created  was  to   prevent   corrupt practices,  still  the tribunal is a judicial,  and  not  an inquisitorial  one,  it  is a court to  hear  and  determine according to law, and not a commission armed with powers  to enquire into and suppress corruption." In  the  light of these well-established principles,  it  is clear  that the court cannot bridge the gap or  supply  this apparent  omission in the Corporation Act with regard  to  a returned  candidates  claim  to  recriminate,  by  importing principles of common law or equity, the maxim casus  omissus et  oblivioni datus dispositioni communis juris  relinquitur being inapplicable to the construction of election statutes. A  right  to file an election petition  or  a  recriminatory petition   which,  in  substance,  is  a   counter-election- petition,  being  the mere creature of statute,  unknown  to common  law,  the  appellant,  in the  absence  of  a  clear statutory  provision, is not entitled to recriminate on  any of the grounds mentioned in section 17. We  do not think it necessary to notice all the  authorities cited  at  the bar or to dilate on this point  further.   We will  close  the discussion by referring to Jabar  Singh  v. Genda  Lal(2),  wherein Gajendragadkar  C.J.  clarified  the nature of the right of recrimination thus "There  are, however, cases in which the  election  petition makes a double claim; it claims that the election of the re- turned  candidate is void, and also asks for  a  declaration that  the petitioner himself or some other person  has  been duly elected.  It is in regard to such a composite case that S.  100 as well as s. 101 would apply, and it is in  respect of  the additional claim for a declaration that  some  other candidate has been duly elected that s. 97 comes into  play. Section  97  (1’)  thus allows  the  returned  candidate  to recriminate and raise pleas in support of his case that  the other person in whose favour a declaration is claimed by the petition  cannot be said to, be validly elected,  and  these would  be  pleas  of  attack and it would  be  open  to  the returned  candidate  to take these pleas,  because  when  he recriminates,   he  really  becomes   a   counter-petitioner challenging the validity of the election of the  alternative candidate.   The result of s. 97(1), therefore, is  that  in dealing  with  a composite election petition,  the  Tribunal enquires into not only the case made out by the  petitioner, but also the (1)  20 M & H. p. 74. (2)  [1964] 6, S. C. R. 54 367 counter-claim  made by the returned candidate.   That  being the  nature of the proceedings contemplated by S. 97(1),  it is not surprising that the returned candidate is required to make  his recrimination and serve notice in that  behalf  in the  manner  .and  within the time  specified  by  S.  97(1) proviso  and  s.97(2). if the returned  candidate  does  not recriminate  as required by s. 97, then he cannot  make  any attack  against the alternative claim made by the  petition. In such a case, an enquiry would be held under s. 100 so far as  the  validity of the returned  candidate’s  election  is concerned,  and  if  as  a result  of  the  said  enquiry  a

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declaration  is  made  that the  election  of  the  returned candidate  is void, then the Tribunal will proceed  to  deal with  ,alternative  claim,  but in doing  so,  the  returned candidate will .not be allowed to lead any evidence  because he is precluded from raising any pleas against the  validity of  the  claim  of  the  alternative  candidate."  (emphasis supplied) Although  the above observations were made in a  case  under the People Act, but the principle enunciated therein applies with  greater force to the problem in hand.  If the  failure to  comply  strictly with the requirements  of  a  statutory provision  as  to  recrimination,  precludes  the   returned candidate  from  recriminating, a fortiori, in  the  absence of  .such  a  statutory provision in an  election  law,  the returned candidate has no right to recriminate. For the foregoing reasons, we would affirm the view taken by the  Division  Bench  of the High Court  in  regard  to  the returned candidate’s claim to recriminate. Before parting with this judgment, we will like to emphasise the desirability of making a clear provision,  corresponding to  s.  97 of the People Act, 1951 in  the  Corporation  Act specifically  conferring  a right of  recrimination  on  the returned  candidate  in an election-petition  in  which  the petitioner,  in  addition  to getting the  election  of  the returned   candidate   declared  void,   seeks   a   further declaration  that he or some other candidate has  been  duly elected.   One  of the primary objects of  these  provisions relating  to corrupt practices, is to ensure purity  of  the elections.   If corrupt practices committed by the  returned candidate  are abhorrent to that object, so are the  corrupt practices  indulged  in  by  the  petitioner  or  any  other candidate  and  his  agent in favour  of  whom  the  further declaration  of the due election is claimed.  What is  sauce for  the  goose is sauce for the gander.  According  to  the learned  Counsel for the Respondent, the returned  candidate would  be  entitled to get the  petitioner  disqualified  by moving  the  Commissioner  under  s.  33  which  inter  alia provides that "if any question arises as to whether a  coun- cillor  or  an  alderman has become subject to  any  of  the disqualifications mentioned in s. 9, the Commissioner  shall refer  the question to the District Judge of Delhi  for  his decision  and  the decision of the District Judge  shall  be final.    Assuming-not  holding-that  s.  33  provides   for impeaching the election of a candidate declared duly elected under  s.  19 (1) (c) , on the ground of  corrupt  practices committed  by  him,  the  remedy  provided  appears  to   be cumbersome, circuitous and dilatory in- 368 volving  multiplicity  of proceedings.  The  duplication  of judicial proceedings by compelling the aggrieved  petitioner to start a fresh challenge against the respondent after  the formality  of  his being made councillor is  published,  not only defeats the object of an early determination  regarding the  purity of the election but also renders the  proceeding ineffective  for the very reason of the long delay.   Again, the time that may be taken for the reference to the District Judge   under  s.  3  3  and  the  time  consumed  for   the preliminaries  before a trial begins or gains  momentum  can all be eliminated if there is provision, as in the  Peoples’ Representation Act, for recrimination. We express the hope that the Commissioner, in the event of a challenge  being  made to the respondent’s election  on  the ground  of  corruption, will not delay a  reference  to  the District  Judge  who certainly will, go into the  legal  and factual questions involved on which we pronounce no opinion.

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In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. P.B.R. Appeal dismissed. 369