IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.                   OF 2008 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.7932 OF 2007)

Baldev Singh          … Appellant          

                      Vs.

State of Punjab                          …Respondent

J U D G M E N T

Dr. Arijit Pasayat, J.

     1. Leave granted.

2. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a learned

Single  Judge  of  the  Punjab  and  Haryana  High  Court

dismissing the appeal  filed by the appellant,  while  directing

acquittal of the co-accused Narinder Kaur. Learned Sessions

Judge,  Amritsar,  had  convicted  both,  the  present  appellant

and Surjit Kaur for the offence punishable under Section 304-

1

B of  the  Indian Penal  Code,  1860 (in short  “IPC”)  and had

sentenced each of them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for

10 years and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/- in default of payment

of  fine  to  further  undergo  rigorous  imprisonment  for  three

months.  It is to be noted that Narinder Kaur had faced trial

along with the appellant Baldev Singh and Surjit Kaur but was

acquitted of the charges by the trial court.   

3. The case of the prosecution is as under:-

Satwant Kaur @ Bholi was the sister of Rachhpal Singh

(PW-4)  and  was  married  with  Baldev  Singh  accused  on

8.6.1991. Within about a month of their marriage, differences

cropped  up between  the deceased  and her  husband as  the

mother-in-law  and  husband  of  the  deceased  started

demanding  a  fridge  and  a  T.V.   Within  three  days  of  the

marriage, the mother of Bholi had died, at the anniversary of

their mother's death, Rachhpal Singh (PW-4) had collected a

sum of  Rs.12,000/-  from the sale  of  paddy and Rs.8,000/-

after encashing the National Saving Certificates and had given

2

an amount of Rs.20,000/- to Baldev Singh.  According to the

complainant, for two months, after the payment there was no

quarrel,  but  thereafter  accused  Baldev  Singh,  his  mother

Surjit Kaur and sister Narinder Kaur again started saying that

at the time of the marriage adequate jewellery had not been

given.  The result was that the witness had again collected a

sum of Rs.20,000/- by encashing the Fixed Deposit  Receipt

and  paid  the  amount  to  Baldev  Singh.  In  the  month  of

October, 1992, accused Baldev Singh had fixed a date for the

marriage of his younger brother and as the father of Rachhpal

Singh  (PW-4)  and  Satwant  Kaur  had  died,  Baldev  Singh

accused started asking for his share in the estate of his father-

in-law.  In  view  of  this,  Rachhpal  Singh  and  his  brothers

Nirmal  Singh  and  Avtar  Singh  had  gone  to  the  house  of

Satwant Kaur and there they tried to persuade the accused

and other members of the family not to harass Satwant Kaur

@ Bholi and assured them that in due course they would meet

whatever was demanded by him. At this time Baldev  Singh

and the members of  his family had told that they were not

demanding any specific piece of land and that they would be

3

satisfied  in  case  an  amount  of  Rs.1,00,000/-  was  given.

Rachhpal Singh (PW-4) had then told accused Baldev Singh

that they had decided to hold the anniversary of his father's

death  on  13th September,  1992  and  they  would  pay  the

accused the amount of Rs.1,00,000/- on that day. The details

regarding the  harassment  that  was being  faced  by Satwant

Kaur  were  communicated  by  her  to  her  brother  Rachhpal

Singh from time to time in various letters that were written by

her.  In these letters, (Ex. PW-4/A to Ex. PW-4/D) Satwant

Kaur had given the details of the demands by her husband

and in-laws and she had also been apprising her brothers of

the treatment given to her by her mother-in-law, sister-in-law

and  the  husband  whenever  she  met  them.  On  2.9.1992

Rachhpal Singh had received a letter written by Satwant Kaur.

This letter had been brought from Amritsar to Chandigarh by

the wife of Amrik Singh, who in turn, had taken it to Pinjore to

deliver the same to Rachhpal Singh.  After going through the

letter Rachhpal Singh had become very upset and had left for

Amritsar and reached there about 7-8 P.M. During the night,

he had stayed at the house of his second sister  and in the

4

morning  of  3.9.1992  he  had  gone  to  the  house  of  Satwant

Kaur  along  with  his  brother-in-law  Narinder  Singh.   On

reaching the house, he found that Satwant Kaur was lying on

a cot while her husband, sister-in-law and mother-in-law were

standing  nearby.  On  seeing  him,  Satwant  Kaur  had  again

indicated  that  the  accused  had  harassed  and  beaten  her

regarding her inability  to bring more money.  She had also

told  Rachhpal  Singh  (PW-4)  that  she  had  consumed  some

poisonous substance as a result of which, she would die and

requested him to ensure that the accused did not escape the

rigours of law.  At this point of time, Rachhpal Singh found

the attitude of the accused very hostile and had told Narinder

Singh that they should try to move out of the house and come

back with some more relatives. Thereafter Rachhpal Singh and

Narinder Singh had gone away from the house of the accused

and with  some  relatives  returned  there  at  about  9.30  A.M.

When they reached the house,  they found that none of  the

accused was present in the house and even Satwant Kaur was

not  present  there.   On  enquiry,  it  transpired  that  Satwant

Kaur had been removed by the accused but the neighbourers

5

were  not  certain  whether  Satwant  Kaur  was  dead  or  alive.

Fearing that the accused may try to burn the dead body, the

witness first went to the cremation ground and thereafter to

various  doctors.  At  about  6/6.15  P.M.  they  reached  Guru

Nanak Dev Hospital and found ASI Amrik Singh going inside

and before him Rachhpal Singh made statement Ex. PW-4/A,

which was reduced into writing and signed by the witness.  He

then accompanied the police to the mortuary, where he saw

the dead body of Satwant Kaur.

Assistant Sub Inspector Amrik Singh (PW-7) had gone to

Guru  Nanak  Dev  Hospital,  Amritsar  after  receipt  of

information  regarding  the  death  of  Satwant  Kaur  and  on

reaching  the  hospital,  had met  Rachhpal  Singh (PW-4)  and

recorded his statement.  He thereafter made his endorsement

thereon and sent the same to the police station for recording

the formal FIR, Ex. PW-7/B.  He had gone to the mortuary,

prepared inquest report Ex. PW-1/B and got done the post-

mortem on the dead body.  Dr. R.K. Gorea (Pw-1) conducted

the post mortem examination on 4.9.1992 at 5.00 P.M., who

6

gave his opinion that the cause of death in this case was due

to  poisoning  with  organo  phosphorus  group  of  insecticide,

which was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of

nature.  The Investigating Officer recorded the statements of

the witnesses and prepared rough site plan.  On completion of

necessary investigation, accused were sent up for trial.  

After the charge sheet was filed under Section 304-B IPC,

trial was held as the accused persons pleaded innocence.  In

order to prove its case, the prosecution examined 7 witnesses.

In the statements recorded under Section 313 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short ‘Cr.P.C.’), accused persons

took the stand that they were falsely implicated in this case.  

The  trial  court  relied  upon  the  evidence  of  PW.4  and

PW.5 and found that their evidence was clear and cogent to

the  effect  that  the  deceased  was  being  harassed  for  not

bringing  adequate  dowry and though some of  the  demands

were  satisfied  by  the  relatives,  the  demands  persisted.  On

account  of  such  persistent  demands,  the  deceased  felt

7

harassed and consumed poison and had ultimately died as a

result  thereof.   With  reference  to  the  evidence  of  Dr.  R.K.

Gorea, PW.1, it was noted that the death of the deceased was

as  a  result  of  consuming  organo  phosphorus  group  of

insecticide and the death was unnatural and had taken place

within  7  years  of  the  date  of  marriage.   The  trial  court,

accordingly, found the appellant and Surjit Kaur guilty while

directing acquittal of Narinder Kaur.   

In appeal, the stand taken by the appellant was that with

a view to falsely implicate the accused persons, the case was

lodged.  It  was submitted that the deceased was deprived of

her legitimate share in the ancestral property and because of

this she was in mental depression leading to her committing

suicide.  It was pointed out that if the appellant on behalf of

the  deceased  had  asked  for  her  legitimate  share  in  the

ancestral  property that  does  not  amount  to dowry demand.

The prosecution, on the other hand, relied on the evidence of

PW.4 and PW.5 to show that the demand was not restricted

only to the share in the ancestral properties but also to the

8

other demands which were nothing but dowry demands.  The

High  Court  found substance  in the  plea  of  the  prosecution

and upheld the conviction.

4. In  support  of  the  appeal,  learned  counsel  for  the

appellant  submitted  that  the  evidence  of  PW.4  and  PW.5

should not have been relied upon.  The stand taken before the

High  Court  that  the  demand  related  to  the  share  in  the

ancestral  property  and cannot  be termed as dowry demand

was reiterated.  Additionally, it was submitted that custodial

sentence of 10 years as imposed is harsh.  

5. Learned counsel for the Respondent-State, on the other

hand, supported the judgment of the trial court as upheld by

the High Court qua the appellant.  

6. In  order  to  attract  Section  304B  IPC,  the  following

ingredients are to be satisfied.  

9

i) The death of a woman must have been caused by

burns or bodily injury or otherwise than under normal

circumstances.

ii) Such death must have occurred within 7 years of

the marriage.

iii) Soon  before  her  death,  the  woman  must  have

been  subjected  to  cruelty  or  harassment  by  her

husband or any relative of her husband; and

iv) Such  cruelty  or  harassment  must  be  in

connection with the demand of dowry.  

7. In the instant case the marriage took place on 8.6.1991

and the death took place on 3.9.1992 other than in normal

circumstances within 7 years of the marriage.  The evidence of

PW.4 and PW.5 were to the effect that the demand of dowry

was made just before the deceased committed suicide.   

8. Sections 304B and Section 498A read as follows:

“304-B. Dowry Death- (1) Where the death of a woman  is  caused  by  any  burns  or  bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal

10

circumstances  within  seven  years  of  her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death  she  was  subjected  to  cruelty  or harassment by her husband or any relative of her  husband for,  or  in  connection  with  any demand for dowry, such death shall be called “dowry death”  and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death.

Explanation –  For  the  purpose  of  this  sub- section ‘dowry’ shall have same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961).

(2) Whoever  commits  dowry death  shall  be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life.”

“498-A:  Husband or relative of husband of a woman  subjecting  her  to  cruelty-  Whoever, being  the  husband  or  the  relative  of  the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for  a term which may extend to  three  years and shall also be liable to fine.  

Explanation – For the purpose of this section ’cruelty’ means –

(a) any  wilful  conduct  which  is  of  such  a nature  as  is  likely  to  drive  the  woman  to commit  suicide  or  to  cause  grave  injury  or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or

(b) harassment  of  the  woman  where  such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any  person  related  to  her  to  meet  any

11

unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any  person  related  to  her  to  meet  such demand.”

9. The term “dowry” has been defined in Section 2 of the

Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (in short ‘Dowry Act’) as under:-

“  Section 2. Definition of ‘dowry’   – In this Act, ‘dowry’  means  any  property  or  valuable security  given  or  agreed  to  be  given  either directly or indirectly –

(a)  by  one  party  to  a  marriage  to  the other party to the marriage; or

(b) by the parents of either party to a marriage  or  by  any  other  person,  to either  party  to  the  marriage  or  to  any other person,  

at or before or any time after the marriage in connection  with  the  marriage  of  the  said parties, but does not include dower or mehr in the  case  of  persons  to  whom  the  Muslim personal law (Shariat) applies.

Explanation I- For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that any presents made at the time  of  a  marriage  to  either  party  to  the marriage  in  the  form  of  cash,  ornaments, clothes or other articles, shall not be deemed to  be  dowry  within  the  meaning  of  this section,  unless  they  are  made  as

12

consideration  for  the  marriage  of  the  said parties.

Explanation  II-  The  expression  ‘valuable security’ has the same meaning in Section 30 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).”

10. Explanation to Section 304-B refers to dowry "as having

the same meaning as in Section 2 of the Act", the question is :

what is the periphery of the dowry as defined therein ? The

argument is, there has to be an agreement at the time of the

marriage in view of the words "agreed to be given" occurring

therein, and in the absence of any such evidence it would not

constitute to be a dowry. It is noticeable, as this definition by

amendment  includes  not  only  the  period  before  and at  the

marriage but also the period subsequent to the marriage. This

position was highlighted in Pawan Kumar and Ors. v. State of

Haryana (1998 (3) SCC 309).

11. The  offence  alleged  against  the  respondents  is  under

Section  304-B  IPC  which  makes  "demand  of  dowry"  itself

punishable. Demand neither conceives nor would conceive of

13

any agreement. If  for convicting any offender, agreement for

dowry is to be proved, hardly any offenders would come under

the clutches of law. When Section 304-B refers to "demand of

dowry", it refers to the demand of property or valuable security

as referred to in the definition of "dowry" under the Act. The

argument that there is no demand of dowry, in the present

case,  has  no  force.  In  cases  of  dowry deaths  and suicides,

circumstantial  evidence  plays  an  important  role  and

inferences can be drawn on the basis of such evidence. That

could be either direct or indirect. It is significant that Section

4 of the Act, was also amended by means of Act 63 of 1984,

under  which  it  is  an  offence  to  demand  dowry  directly  or

indirectly from the parents or other relatives or guardian of a

bride. The word "agreement" referred to in Section 2 has to be

inferred  on  the  facts  and  circumstances  of  each  case.  The

interpretation that the respondents seek, that conviction can

only be if there is agreement for dowry, is misconceived. This

would  be  contrary  to  the  mandate  and  object  of  the  Act.

"Dowry"  definition  is  to  be  interpreted  with  the  other

provisions  of  the  Act  including  Section  3,  which  refers  to

14

giving  or  taking  dowry  and  Section  4  which  deals  with  a

penalty for demanding dowry, under the Act and the IPC. This

makes it clear that even demand of dowry on other ingredients

being satisfied is punishable. It is not always necessary that

there be any agreement for dowry.

12. Section 113-B of the Evidence Act is also relevant for the

case at hand.  Both Section 304-B IPC and Section 113-B of

the Evidence Act were inserted as noted earlier by the Dowry

Prohibition (Amendment) Act 43 of 1986 with a view to combat

the increasing menace of dowry deaths. Section 113-B reads

as follows:-

“113-B:  Presumption  as  to  dowry  death- When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is  shown  that  soon  before  her  death  such woman has been subjected by such person to cruelty  or  harassment  for,  or  in  connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume  that  such  person  had  caused  the dowry death. Explanation – For the purposes of this section ‘dowry death’ shall have the same meaning as in Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).”

15

The  necessity  for  insertion  of  the  two  provisions  has  been

amply analysed by the Law Commission of India in its 21st

Report  dated 10th August,  1988 on ‘Dowry Deaths and Law

Reform’. Keeping in view the impediment in the pre-existing

law  in  securing  evidence  to  prove  dowry  related  deaths,

legislature  thought  it  wise  to  insert  a  provision  relating  to

presumption of dowry death on proof of certain essentials.  It

is  in  this  background  presumptive  Section  113-B  in  the

Evidence  Act  has  been  inserted.   As  per  the  definition  of

‘dowry death’  in Section 304-B IPC and the wording in the

presumptive  Section 113-B of  the Evidence  Act,  one  of  the

essential ingredients, amongst others, in both the provisions

is that the concerned woman must have been “soon before her

death”  subjected  to  cruelty  or  harassment  “for  or  in

connection  with the  demand  of  dowry”.  Presumption  under

Section  113-B  is  a  presumption  of  law.   On  proof  of  the

essentials  mentioned  therein,  it  becomes  obligatory  on  the

Court  to  raise  a  presumption  that  the  accused  caused  the

dowry death.  The presumption shall be raised only on proof

of the following essentials:  

16

(1) The question before the Court must be

whether  the  accused  has  committed  the

dowry  death  of  a  woman.  (This  means  that

the  presumption  can  be  raised  only  if  the

accused is  being tried for the offence under

Section 304-B IPC).

(2) The woman was subjected to cruelty or

harassment by her husband or his relatives.

(3) Such cruelty or harassment was for, or

in connection with any demand for dowry.

(4) Such  cruelty  or  harassment  was  soon

before her death.

13. A conjoint reading of Section 113-B of the Evidence Act

and Section 304-B IPC shows that there must be material to

show that soon before her death the victim was subjected to

cruelty  or  harassment.  Prosecution  has  to  rule  out  the

possibility of a natural or accidental death so as to bring it

within the purview of the ‘death occurring otherwise than in

17

normal circumstances’.   The expression ‘soon before’  is very

relevant where Section 113-B of the Evidence Act and Section

304-B IPC are pressed into service.  Prosecution is obliged to

show that  soon before  the  occurrence  there  was  cruelty  or

harassment  and  only  in  that  case  presumption  operates.

Evidence in that regard has to be led by prosecution.  ‘Soon

before’  is  a  relative  term  and  it  would  depend  upon

circumstances of each case and no strait-jacket formula can

be laid  down as to what would  constitute  a period  of  soon

before the occurrence.  It would be hazardous to indicate any

fixed period, and that brings in the importance of a proximity

test both for the proof of an offence of dowry death as well as

for raising a presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence

Act.  The  expression  ‘soon  before  her  death’  used  in  the

substantive  Section  304-B  IPC  and  Section  113-B  of  the

Evidence Act is present with the idea of proximity test.   No

definite  period has been indicated and the expression ‘soon

before’ is not defined.  A reference to expression ‘soon before’

used  in  Section  114.  Illustration  (a)  of  the  Evidence  Act  is

relevant.  It lays down that a Court may presume that a man

18

who is in the possession of goods ‘soon after the theft, is either

the thief has received the goods knowing them to be stolen,

unless he can account for his possession. The determination

of the period which can come within the term ‘soon before’ is

left to be determined by the Courts, depending upon facts and

circumstances of each case.  Suffice, however, to indicate that

the  expression  ‘soon  before’  would  normally  imply  that  the

interval should not be much between the concerned cruelty or

harassment  and  the  death  in  question.  There  must  be

existence  of  a  proximate  and live-link between  the  effect  of

cruelty based on dowry demand and the concerned death.  If

alleged incident of cruelty is remote in time and has become

stale enough not to disturb mental equilibrium of the woman

concerned, it would be of no consequence.

14. It is true that demanding of her share in the ancestral

property will not amount to a dowry demand, but the evidence

of PW.4 and PW.5 shows that the demands were in addition to

the demand for her share in the ancestral property. Certain

letters  which  were  brought  on  record  clearly  establish  the

19

demand for dowry.   The conviction as recorded by the trial

court  and upheld  by  the  High Court  does  not  warrant any

interference.  However, the custodial sentence appears to be

on  the  higher  side.  The  same  is  reduced  to  the  minimum

prescribed  i.e.  7  years.  In  the  ultimate  result,  with  the

modification of sentence, the appeal stands disposed of.

................................J. (Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT)

................................J. (HARJIT SINGH BEDI)

New Delhi; August 4, 2008

20