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PETITIONER: BACHCHOO LAL

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 25/04/1963

BENCH:

ACT: District Board-Lease to collect Tah Bazari dues-Obstruction- Complaint-  "Penalty  for obstructing  persons  employed  by Board"-Scope-United Provinces District Board Act, 1922  (Act X of 1922), s. 107.

HEADNOTE: One  Raja  Sahib  took  a lease  from  the  District  Board, Allahabad,.  with  respect to the realisation of  bayai  and bazar  dues  on the sale of commodities in the  bazar.   The appellant was his employee to collect these dues.  A peon of Raja Sahib asked Shyam Lal, P.W. 2, who had sold linseed  to Mewa  Lal, respondent No. 2, to come to the   Munim  and pay the  beyai dues.  Mewa Lal asked Shyam Lal not to pay  those dues.   The  peon  took Shyam Lal  to  the  appellant.   The respondent  No.  2  armed with a lathi, came  there  and  on appellant’s asking him as to why he was creating obstruction in  the  realisation of the dues, filthily  abused  him  and threatened  to  kill  him.  The  appellant,  thereafter,  on obtaining sanction of the District Magistrate, instituted  a complaint  against Respondent No. 2 for prosecuting him  for an  offence  under s. 107 of the United  Provinces  District Board  Act.   The  trial Magistrate  convicted  him  of  the offences under ss. 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code  and also  of  an offence under s. 107 of the  Act.   On  appeal, Sessions  judge acquitted him of all the  charges.   Against acquittal,  the appellant filed an appeal to the High  Court which  was  dismissed.   On  appeal  by  certificates  three contentions were raised by the appellant in this Court:  (i) The  order of the Sessions judge aquitting Mewa Lal was  bad as  no  notice of hearing of the appeal was  issued  to  the appellant, on whose complaint the Magistrate convicted  him, (ii) The High Court was wrong in holding that the Raja could not  collect  the Tah Bazari dues through  his  agents,  and (iii) that the appellant had requisite sanction under s. 182 of the Act, for prosecuting Mewa Lal, respondent No. 2. Held that s. 107 of the Act does not make obstruction or molestation of an employee of the person under contract with  359 the   Board,  an  offence.   The  section  speaks   of   the obstruction  or molestation of two classes of persons.   One class  consists  of persons employed by the  District  Board under the Act.  The Raja or the appellant is not an employee of  the District Board.  The second class consists of  those persons who are under contract with the Board under the Act. Surely, the person under contract with the Board is the Raja and not the appellant.  The appellant is only an employee of the Raja.  In view of these considerations, the acquittal of the respondent No. 2 could not be interfered with merits.

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The appeal, therefore, must be dismissed. The  appeal was not heard on merits.  If was considered  not necessary  to decide the first contention and the Court  did not  express  any opinion on the second  contention  as  the terms of the lease were not known.  The third contention was held to be correct.

JUDGMENT: CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 126  of 1961. Appeal  from the judgment and order dated May3,1961  of  the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 381- of 1960.  O. P. Rana, for the appellant. The respondent did not appear. 1963.  April 25.  The judgment of the Court was delivered by RAGHUBAR  DAYAL J.-Raja Kamlakar Singh of Shankargarh,  U.P. took  a  lease  from the  District  Board,  Allahabad,  with respect  to the realisation of bayai and bazaar dues on  the sale of commodities in the bazaar of Shankargarh.   Bachchoo Lal  was his employee to collect these dues.  On  April  13, 1959, Bahadur Singh , a peon of the Raja Sahib, asked  Shyam Lal Kurmi, P.W. 2, who had sold two bullock load of  linseed to Mewa Lal, respondent 2, in that 360 bazaar,  to accompany him to the Munim in order to  pay  the bayai dues there.  Mewa Lal asked Shyam Lal not to pay those dues.   The peon, however, took Shyam Lal to  Bachchoo  Lal, appellant,  at  the grain godown.  Mewa Lal,  armed  with  a lathi, came there and on Bachchoo Lal’s asking him as to why he was creating obstruction in the realisation of the  dues, filthily  abused  him and threatened to break his  hand  and feet  and kill him.  Bachchoo Lal, thereafter, instituted  a complaint  against  Mewa Lal, on obtaining sanction  of  the District Magistrate for prosecuting Mewa Lal for an  offence under  s.  107 of the United Provinces District  Board  Act, 1922 (U.P. Act No. X of 1922), hereinafter called the Act. The  trial Magistrate, the II Class Tashildar Magistrate  of Karchana,  convicted Mewa Lal of the offences under ss.  504 and 506, I.P.C., and also of an offence under s. 107 of  the Act.   On appeal, the Sessions Judge,  Allahabad,  acquitted Mewa Lal holding that proper authority in favour of Bachchoo Lal  for prosecuting Mewa La] under s. 10 7 of the  Act  had not been proved, that the Magistrate had no jurisdiction  to try  an  offence  under s. 506, Part II,  I.P.C.  which  was triable  by  a  Magistrate  of the I  Class,  and  that  the prosecution  case  under  s.  504  I.P.C.,  was  suspicious. Bachchoo  lal filed an appeal against the acquittal of  Mewa Lal, after obtaining the permission of the High Court  under sub-s.  (3)  of s. 417 of the Code  of  Criminal  Procedure, hereinafter  called the Code.  The High Court dismissed  the appeal  repelling the contentions for the appellant  to  the effect  that  the  appellant,  being  the  complainant   and therefore  a  party to the criminal case against  Mewa  Lal, ought  to  have  been  given notice of  the  appeal  by  the Sessions  judge  and  also  ought  to  have  been  given  an opportunity to be heard and that such notice and opportunity of  hearing  were  necessary on the  principles  of  natural justice and in view of the fact that s. 417 (3) of the  Code conferred a  361 substantive  right of appeal on the complainant.   The  High Court further held that though the Sessions judge was  wrong in  holding that the sanction required by s. 182 of the  Act

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had  not been proved, the sanction was in the name  of  Raja Sahib  of Shankargarh and not of Bachchoo Lal and  therefore the  complaint was not a valid complaint and that  the  Raja Sahib  could not collect Tah Bazari through his agents.   It also  held that the acquittal of the accused of the  offence under s. 506 I.P.C., was justified and that the acquittal of the  offence  under s. 504 I.P.C. could not be  said  to  be erroneous and that in any case the matter was too petty  for interfering with an order of acquittal even if it had  taken a different view of facts from the one taken by the Sessions judge.   The High Court, accordingly, dismissed the  appeal. Bachchoo  La] has preferred this appeal after obtaining  the requisite  certificate  from the High Court under  Art.  134 (I.)  (c)  of the Constitution.  The State of  U.P.  is  the first  respondent and Mewa Lal, the accused,  is  respondent No. 2. Three questions have been raised on behalf of the appellant. One  is  that  the Assistant Sessions judge  ought  to  have issued  a  notice  of  the hearing  of  the  appeal  to  the appellant  on whose complaint Mewa Lal was convicted by  the Magistrate  and  against which order of  conviction  he  had filed  an  appeal.   No such notice was issued  to  him  and therefore   the  order  of  the  Assistant  Sessions   Judge acquitting  Mewa  Lal  was not a  good  order.’  The  second contention is that the High Court was wrong in holding  that the  Raja  of Shankargarh could not collect the  Tah  Bazari dues  through  his  agents.  The third  contention  is  that Bachchoo Lal had requisite sanction under s. 182 of the  Act for prosecuting Mewa La] and, therefore, the finding to  the contrary is wrong. 362 The  third contention is correct.  The  requisite  authority under s. 182 of the Act is in favour of not only the Raja of Shankargarh, but also in favour of several of his  employees including Bachchoo Lal, the appellant. We  need not express an opinion on the second contention  as we  do  not  know the terms of the  lease  executed  by  the District  Board in favour of the Raja of Shankargarh and  as we  are not concerned with the civil rights with respect  to the  manner  of collecting the dues which he  could  collect under  the lease.  We are, however, of opinion that  s.  107 does  not make obstruction or molestation of an employee  of the person under contract with the Board an offence.               Section 107 of the Act reads               "Whoever   obstructs  or  molests   a   person               employed by, or under contract with, the Board               under this Act in the performance of his  duty               or  in  the  fulfilment of  his  contract,  or               removes  a  mark  set up for  the  purpose  of               indicating  any levels or direction  necessary               to  the execution of works authorised by  this               Act,  shall be liable on conviction to a  fine               which may extend to fifty rupees." The section speaks of the obstruction or molestation of  two classes  of  persons.   One class  of  persons  consists  of persons  employed by the District Board under the Act.   The Raja  of Shankargarh or Bachchoo Lal is not an  employee  of the District Board.  The second class of persons consists of those  who are under contract with the Board under the  Act. Surely, the person under contract with the Board is the Raja of  Shankargarh and not Bachchoo Lal.  Bachchoo Lal is  only an employee of the Raja.                             363 We  did  not hear the learned counsel on the merits  of  the case under s. 504 of the Code and accept the finding of  the

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court-. below. In view of the considerations mentioned, no interference  is possible  with  the  acquittal of the respondent  No.  2  on merits.  It is, therefore, not necessary to decide the first question raised for the appellant. We accordingly dismiss the appeal.