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PETITIONER: BABULAL DAS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL

DATE OF JUDGMENT17/01/1975

BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH

CITATION:  1975 AIR  606            1975 SCR  (3) 193  1975 SCC  (1) 311  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1975 SC1165  (13)  RF         1987 SC1383  (9)

ACT: Maintenance  of  Internal Security Act, 1971  (Act  XXVI  of 1971), Section 3(1)(a)(ii)-Detention order, whether  illegal on account of solitary incident.

HEADNOTE: The  petitioner has been detained in pursuance of the  order of detention passed by the District Magistrate under  sub-s. (1)(a)(ii)  of s. 3 of the Maintenance of Internal  Security Act, 1971.  The act imputed to the detenue is as follows :               "That on 16-2-73 between 10-08 and 10-14 hours               you,  along with your other associates,  being               armed  with gun and other weapons committed  a               dacoity in a 3rd class compartment of  running               train  S  110 Dn. between  Habibpur  R.S.  and               Kalinarayanpur  Junction  R.S.  in   Ramaghat-               Santipur  Section and snatched away  cash  Rs.               30,000/-  from Shri Ashutosh Pal  of  Calcutta               causing  bullet  injuries to him  putting  all               passengers to fear of death." It  was  contended for the detenu that a  solitary  incident cannot imperil internal security and therefore, the order is illegal. Rejecting the contention and dismissing the writ petition HELD:One  who  reads the ground of detention,  will  be alarmed   by   the  training  and  planning   and   sinister preparation of skill and spirit which has. made possible the commission of the act imputed organised dacoity in a running railway  train by an armed gang equipped with fire-arms  and putting,   innocent   passengers  to  Peril  to   life   and property...  Such  action  is so  manifestly  suggestive  of desperate daring, organised ganging and habitual  proclivity to.  violence that it cannot be held unreasonable  to  infer therefrom  a  trendy  course  of  criminal  conduct-although intercepted  or  detected but once likely  to  break  public order in a brazen manner and panicking the community by show of  force.  In this view, the petitioner’s detention  cannot be castigated as illegal. [194F-G] Obiter   It  is fair that persons  kept  incarcerated  and

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embittered  without  trial should be given  some  chance  to reform themselves by reasonable recourse to the parole power under s. 15.  Calculated risks. by release for short periods may, perhaps, be a social gain, the beneficent  jurisdiction being wisely exercised, [195F]

JUDGMENT: ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition No. 444 of 1974. Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India. O.   P, Malviya, for the petitioner. M.   M. Kshatriya, and G. C. Chatterjee, for the respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KRISHNA  IYER, J.-A single act of outrageous violence, in  a running  train  on February 16, 1973 by an  armed  gang,  of which  the petitioner was alleged to be a member,  persuaded the  District  Magistrate of Nadia to direct  his  detention under  sub-S.  (1) (a) (ii) of S. 3 of  the  Maintenance  of Internal Security Act, 1971 (Act XXVI of 1971)  (hereinafter called  the  MISA,  for short).   The  subsequent  statutory requirements  have  been fulfilled impeccably and  the  only major sub 14-L379 Sup.C 75 194 mission  of  the  petitioner is that on merits,  he  is  not guilty, that a case charge-sheeted against him has ended  in a  discharge and that a single incident is  insufficient  to constitute  ’a  stream of  tendency’  warranting  preventive detention.   Most  of the submissions urged have  no  force. The  fact that the petitioner was discharged by a court  for the same crime does no bear on the power to detain, nor  are we  impressed  with  the other arguments  urged  before  us. Learned  counsel  Sri  Malviya,  appearing  amicus   curiae, strenuously  contended  that  one swallow does  not  make  a summer  and  likewise  a solitary  incident  cannot  imperil maintenance  of internal security and so the order  is  bad. He relied on certain rulings of this Court and, rightly so. This  Court has been vigilant to see that isolated  offences are not exploited by executive authorities for clamping down preventive  detention  insouciantly to  by-pass  the  normal judicial  processes.  But there is one exceptional  category of  cases  where  an  only  dangerous  deviance  may  itself demonstrate its potentiality for continuing criminality  and indicate  previous practice, experiment and  expertise.   In such  a  narrow  category  of  causes  it  is  difficult  to predicate  abuse of power or absence of application of  mind by the authority if preventive detention is directed  solely on one specialised crime. In the present case the act imputed to the detenu is set out in the detention order thus:               "That on 16-2-73 between 10-08 and 10-14 hours               you,  along with your other associates,  being               armed  with gun and other weapons committed  a               dacoity in a 3rd class compartment of  running               train  S. 1 10 Dn. between Habibpur  R.S.  and               Kalinarayanpur  Junction  R. S.  in  Ramaghat-               Santipur  Section and snatched away  cash  Rs.               30.000/-  from Shri Ashutosh Pal  of  Calcutta               causing  bullet  injuries to him  putting  all               passengers to fear of death.." He  who  runs and reads-if the statement were true  and  its veracity  is  unavailable  for  judicial  scrutiny-will   be alarmed   by   the  training  and  planning   and   sinister preparation of skill and spirit which has made possible  the

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commission of the act imputed-organized dacoity in a running railway  train by an armed gang equipped with  firearms  and putting  innocent passengers to peril to life and  property. Such action is so manifestly suggestive of desperate daring, organized  ganging and habitual proclivity to violence  that it  cannot be held unreasonable to infer therefrom a  trendy course of criminal conduct-although intercepted or  detected but once-likely to break public order in a brazen manner and panicking  the  community  by show of  force.   We  are  not concerned with the merits of the alleged offence, since that is   assigned   by  the  Legislature  to   the_   subjective satisfaction   of   the  authority.   In  this   view,   the petitioner’s  detention  cannot,  in the  present  case,  be castigateD as illegal, since we regard it as exceptional.   While  discharging  the  rule issued  and  dismissing  the petition,  we  wish to emphasize that s. 15  is  often  lost sight of by the Government in 195 such  situations, as long term preventive detentions can  be self-defeating or criminally counter-productive.  Section 15 reads:               "15.  Temporary release of persons detained-               (1)   The  appropriate Government may, at  any               time,  direct  that  any  person  detained  in               pursuance of a detention order may be released               for   any  specified  period  either   without               conditions  or upon such conditions  specified               in  the direction as that person accepts,  and               may, at any time, cancel his release.               (2)   In  directing the release of any  person               under   subsection   (1),   the   appropriate.               Government  may  require him to enter  into  a               bond  with  or without sureties  for  the  due               observance of the conditions specified in  the               direction.               (3)   Any  person released  under  sub-section               (1)  shall surrender himself at the  time  and               place, and to the authority, specified in  the               order directing his release or cancelling  his               release, as the case may be.               (4)   If  any person fails without  sufficient               cause  to  surrender  himself  in  the  manner               specified  in  sub-section (3),  he  shall  be               punishable  with imprisonment for a  term  may               extend to two years, or with fine, or     with               both.               (5)   If any person released under sub-section               (1)           fails  to  fulfil  any  of   the               conditions imposed upon             him  under               the  said sub-section or in the  bond  entered               into by him, the bond shall be declared to  be               forfeited  and any person bound thereby  shall               be liable to pay the penalty thereof." We  consider that it is fair that persons kept  incarcerated and embittered without trial should be given some chance  to reform themselves by reasonable recourse to the parole power under s. 15.  Calculated      risks, by release for short periods may, perhaps, be  a social  gain,  the  beneficent  jurisdiction  being   wisely exercised.  In this context we would recall the observations made by this Court in Anil Dey v. State of West Bengal.() "The   petition,  therefore,  deserves  to   be   dismissed. However,  the fact remains that the petitioner was  arrested in  September 1972, and has been in deterrent  incarceration for nearly a year and half.  Prolonged imprisonment  without

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trial alienates the individual against society and makes him a vengeful enemy when he ultimately emerges from the  prison cell.   Indeed,  it  is a serious  injury  inflicted  on  an individual by the State which can be justified as a  measure of  social  defence only in extreme circumstances.   But  to jail   a   man  on  subjective  satisfaction   of   possible prejudicial  activity  and  to forget about  him  after  the statutory formalities have been perform- (1)  A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 832. 196 .lm15 ed  is  not fair to the constitutional  guarantees.   It  is appropriate  for  a  democratic  government  not  merely  to confine  preventive detention to serious cases but  also  to review,  periodically  the need for the continuance  of  the incarceration.   The rule of law and public conscience  must be respected to the maximum extent risk-taking permits,  and we  dismiss  the present petition with the  hopeful  thought that the petitioner and others like him will not languish in prison cells for a day longer than the administrator  thinks is absolutely necessary for the critical safety of society." The  State  may be reminded, in its own interests,  of  this Court’s anxious admonition in Gama(1) :               "If  the detaining authority takes the  chance               of conviction and, when the court verdict goes               against it, falls back on its detention  power               to  punish  one  whom  the  Court  would   not               convict,   it   is  an   abuse   and   virtual               nullification  of  the judicial  process.   If               honestly  finding a dangerous  person  getting               away  with  it  by  over-awing  witnesses   or               concealing   the   commission   cleverly,   an               authority  thinks. on the material before  him               that  there  is  likelihood  of  and  need  to               interdict  public disorder at his instance  he               may validly direct detention.  The distinction               is fine but real." We  hope the humanist mandate in s. 15 of the MISA will  not rust  in the statute book but will be used by Government  to humanise,  by gradual assimilation into society, those  who, with blood-shot eyes, hate and intimidate their fellow  men. The rare use of this provision suggests that the  compassion and conscience of the law must be actively shared by the men who operate the machine from executive cells. V.M.K.   Petition dismissed. (1) [1974] 4 S.C.C. 530. 534. 197