11 February 2009
Supreme Court
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BABU LAL Vs HRYANA STATE AGRICULTURAL MKT. BOARD

Bench: TARUN CHATTERJEE,V.S. SIRPURKAR, , ,
Case number: C.A. No.-000884-000884 / 2009
Diary number: 11214 / 2007
Advocates: Vs B. S. BANTHIA


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REPORTABL E

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 884 OF 2009 (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 15389 of 2007)

Babu Lal         …Appellant

VERSUS

Haryana State Agricultural Mkt. Board    ..Respondent

J U D G M E N T  

TARUN CHATTERJEE,J.

1. Leave granted.  

2. This is a plaintiff’s appeal in a suit for a decree for payment

of salary from 2nd of November,1995 to 30th of March, 2001

and for other incidental reliefs which is directed against the

judgment dated 27th of November, 2006 passed by the High

Court  of  Punjab and Haryana at  Chandigarh in RSA No.

2795 of 2005 (O & M) whereby the High Court had allowed

the second appeal and dismissed the suit of the plaintiff -

appellant.

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3.  The  parties  went  into  trial  and  adduced  evidence  in

support of their respective cases.  After framing issues and

after considering the evidence, documentary and oral, the

trial  Court  dismissed  the  suit.   In  appeal,  the  appellate

court, relying on a judgment of this Court in the case of

Union of India etc. etc. vs. K.V.Jankiraman etc.etc. [AIR

1991 SC 2010] reversed the decision of the trial court and

decreed the suit of the plaintiff - appellant. In the second

appeal, the High Court relied on the aforesaid decision of

this  Court  on  which  reliance  was  also  placed  by  the

appellate court, but after applying the principles laid down

in the said decision and also on consideration of Exhibit P-5

held that the appellant was not entitled to any relief  and

allowed the second appeal and dismissed the suit.  

4. Feeling aggrieved, the plaintiff, who is now appellant before

us, filed a special  leave petition, which on grant of leave,

was heard in the presence of the learned counsel  for the

parties.  

5. We have heard Mr.Mahinder Singh Dahiya, learned counsel

for the plaintiff - appellant and Mr.Ambuj Agarwal for the

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defendant - respondent. We have examined the judgment of

the High Court passed in the second appeal as well as the

judgments  of  the  courts  below  and  other  materials  on

record.  At the risk of repetition, while dismissing the suit

and setting aside the judgment of the appellate court, the

High  Court  relied  on  the  decision  of  this  Court  in

Jankiraman’s  case  (supra)  and  on  a  document  being

Exhibit P-5, which shows that the plaintiff - appellant had

only  worked  as  Executive  Officer  of  the  respondent  from

28th of March, 1997 to 31st of July, 1997.     

6. A reading of the aforesaid decision of this Court would show

that the authorities are vested with power to decide whether

an employee at all deserves any salary for the intervening

period and if he does, the extent to which he deserves it.

This decision also clearly suggests that there is no inflexible

rule  that  in  every  case  when an  employee  is  exonerated

from  disciplinary/criminal  proceedings,  he  should  be

automatically entitled to salary including all benefits for the

intervening period.  This decision of this Court would also

show that where the acquittal of an employee in a criminal

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proceeding  was  on  benefit  of  doubt,  the  employer  has  a

right to decide whether or not such an employee deserves

any  salary  for  the  intervening  period.   Keeping  these

observations  of  this  Court  in  mind,  let  us  now  consider

whether the High Court was justified in holding that in the

admitted facts of this case, the appellant was entitled to the

salary  as  claimed.   The  Office  Memorandum  of  the

respondent  clearly  shows  that  the  appellant  who  was

working as Assistant Secretary, Marketing Board, Hasanpur

was promoted to the post of E.O.-cum-Secretary with effect

from 2nd of November, 1995 in the pay scale of Rs.2000-20-

2300-EB-75-3200 and further revised with effect from 1st of

January,  1996 to Rs.7450-225-11500.   In  the said office

memorandum, it was also made clear that no arrears of pay

would be made for the period for which he had actually not

worked.   

7. The  High Court,  in  its  impugned  judgment,  reversed  the

finding of the Appellate Court on consideration of Exhibit

P5  and  also  applying  the  principles  laid  down  in

Jankiraman’s  case  (supra)  held  that  Exhibit  P-5  would

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show  that  the  plaintiff  -  appellant  had  worked  with  the

respondent as an Executive Officer only from 28th of March,

1997 to 31st of July, 1997.  Relying on this document and

also on the aforesaid decision of this Court, the High Court

dismissed the suit and held that the plaintiff/appellant was

not entitled to salary from 2nd of November, 1995 to 30th of

March, 2001.  Although the findings of the High Court, as

noted  herein  above,  may  not  be  very  clear,  but  on

consideration  of  the  entire  materials  on  record  including

Exhibit P-5 and the principles laid down in Jankiraman’s

case  (supra),  we do not  find any reason to set  aside  the

judgment of the High Court passed in the aforesaid second

appeal.  The Appellate Court, while reversing the finding of

the  trial  Court,  as  noted  herein  earlier,  held  that  the

competent authority had not recorded any legal, valid and

acceptable reasons for denying the arrears of salary to the

plaintiff - appellant to whom promotion was denied due to

criminal  prosecution  and  departmental  proceeding  which

exonerated him ultimately. A bare perusal of Exhibit P-5 on

which reliance was also placed by the High Court in the

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impugned judgment would show that the plaintiff-appellant

had worked as Executive Officer from 28th of March, 1997

to  31st of  July,  1997,  but  this  would  not  mean  that  he

would be entitled to salary from 2nd of November, 1995 to

30th of March, 2001. A further perusal of Exhibit P-5 would

also  show  that  the  plaintiff-appellant  was  only  given

additional charge to look after work of EO-cum-Secretary in

addition to his duties as Assistant Secretary until further

orders.  It  would  also  be  evident  from  Exhibit  P-5  that

additional  charge  was  given  without  any  extra

remuneration. At the risk of repetition, the aforesaid office

memorandum would also make it clear that no arrears of

pay will be made for the period for which he had actually

not  worked.  That  being  the  position,  we  are  not  in  a

position to  upset  the  conclusions  arrived  at  by the  High

Court  in the  aforesaid  second appeal  which is  impugned

before us in this appeal.

8. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the High Court and

restore the judgment of the trial court and dismiss the suit

of the plaintiff –appellant.

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9. For the reasons aforesaid, the appeal is dismissed and the

judgment  and  decree  of  the  High  Court  passed  in  the

aforesaid second appeal is hereby affirmed and that of the

trial court is restored.  There will be no order as to costs.   

…………………………J. [TARUN CHATTERJEE]

NEW DELHI;          .. ….………………….J. FEBRUARY 11, 2008.              [V.S.SIRPURKAR]

  

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