‘NON-REPORTABLE’

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NO.16453 OF 2006

B.Y.Narasimha Prasad … Petitioner

Versus

M.Veerappa & Anr. … Respondent

J U D G M E N T

AFTAB ALAM,J.

This petition for special leave to appeal arises from an eviction

proceeding. The 2nd Additional Small Causes Judge, Bangalore, held

that the eviction petition (HRC No.422/99) filed against respondent

no.  1  was  not  maintainable  under  the  Karnataka  Rent  Act,  1999

because the proceeding was instituted within the period of 15 years

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since  the  suit  house  was  subjected  to  substantial  renovation  and

additional construction as provided under Section 2(3) (f) of the Act.

In revision, the High Court affirmed the view taken by the trial court

vide  order  dated  22  June,  2006  in  House  Rent  Revision  Petition

No.554 of 2005.  The petitioner seeks leave to file appeal against the

High Court order.

 The facts of the case are brief and may be stated thus. The suit

premises belonged to one Shankar Narayan Rao (now deceased). He

inducted respondent No.1 as a tenant in the house in the year 1976. At

that  time  it  was  a  single  storey  house  without  any  garage  as  an

appurtenance.  In the year 1988, on the request of the tenant, another

storey was added and a garage was also constructed on the ground

floor.   Respondent  No.1  then came to  occupy as tenant,  the  entire

premises, that is to say, the ground floor and the newly added first

floor and the garage on a monthly rental of Rs.2500/-.  

In  1999,  Shankar  Narayan  Rao  filed  a  petition  under  the

Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 seeking the eviction of respondent

No.1 on a number of grounds.  Respondent no.1 resisted the eviction

proceeding  and  filed  his  written  statement,  inter  alia,  stating  that

additional construction/renovation of the house in the year 1988 was

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done at his expense and in that connection he had incurred the cost of

Rs.6,50,000/-.  

The  Karnataka  Rent  Control  Act  was  repealed  and  it  was

replaced by the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1999 with effect from

December 2001.   At that time the proceeding was pending before the

trial court.  

In the  same year Shankar Narayan Rao died and the present

petitioner and respondent No.2 got themselves substituted in his place

to prosecute the eviction proceeding.  Respondent No.2 is the widow

of Shankar Narayan Rao and the petitioner claims to be his adopted

son.

In course of the proceeding before it  the trial  court seems to

have noticed the plea taken by respondent No.1 that  the additional

construction/renovation of the house was done in the year 1988 at a

cost of Rs.6,50,000/-.  On the basis of the evidences already on record

he further found that the aforesaid amount was in excess of 75% of

the valuation of the house and hence, the suit premises had undergone

substantial renovation/construction within the meaning of Section 2

(3) (f) of the Act that stipulated that to such a premises no provision

of the Rent Control Act, 1999 would apply for a period of 15 years

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from the date of completion of construction or substantial renovation.

The  eviction  petition  in  question,  was  filed  in  1999,  i.e.,  clearly

within  the  period  of  15  years  from  the  date  of  completion  of

additional construction/substantial renovation of the suit premises and

was, therefore, not maintainable under the Act.

The petitioner challenged the order of the trial court in revision

before the High Court. At this stage, the dispute which was till then

only  bipartite,  being  between  the  tenant  on  the  one  side  and  the

petitioner and the second respondent on the other assumed a tripartite

dimension. The widow of Shankar Narayan Rao who after the death

of her husband had initially joined the petitioner in prosecuting the

eviction proceeding changed her stand. A petition was filed on her

behalf in the trial court stating that she came to know about a will

allegedly created in favour of the petitioner, which according to her

was a fake. She also disputed the petitioner’s claim of adoption by

Shankar  Narayan  Rao  and  prayed  for  dismissing  the  eviction

proceeding. It was in those circumstances that in the revision filed by

the petitioner before the High Court she was impleaded as the second

respondent along with the tenant being the first respondent.  The High

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Court, as noticed above, dismissed the revision and affirmed the order

passed by the trial court.

Learned  counsel  appearing  in  support  of  the  Leave  Petition

submitted that the question of maintainability of the proceeding was

not even raised by respondent No.1, the tenant, and there bring no

such plea the trial court was in error in dismissing the petition as not

maintainable.  He further submitted that the suit house could not be

said to have undergone construction/substantial renovation within the

meaning of the explanation to Section 2(3)(f)  of the Act.   Learned

counsel also submitted that at any rate on 21 November, 2005, the

date on which the trial court dismissed the eviction petition, the 15

years period was already over.  The bar of Section 2(3)(f) was thus

lifted  in  connection  with  the  suit  house  and  there  was  no  legal

impediment before the court to proceed in the matter. In support of

the last submission, he relied upon a decision of this Court in Sudhir

G.Angur & Ors. V. M. Sanjeev & others, 2005 (8) Scale 762.

We are not impressed by any of these submissions.  What was

the cost of construction or the value of the single storey house that

was originally let out to respondent No.1 and what was the cost of

construction of the first floor and the garage and whether or not the

suit  house  had  undergone  substantial  renovation/additional

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construction within the meaning of Section 2(3)(f) of the Act are pure

questions of fact.  On the basis of the evidences led before it, the trial

court  found  and  held  that  the  cost  incurred  in  the  additional

construction/renovation  was  in  excess  of  75% of  the  value  of  the

original single storey house. The finding of the trial court has been

affirmed  by  the  High  Court.   The  finding  is  based  on  evidence

brought  before  the  court  and  it,  therefore,  does  not  warrant  any

interference by us. Further, once it was established that the suit house

had undergone additional construction/substantial  renovation within

the  meaning  of  Section  2(3)(f)  of  the  Act  the  question  of

maintainability of  the proceeding became a jurisdictional  issue and

the court was legally bound to address it regardless of whether or not

any  objection  was  raised  by  the  other  side.   The  trial  court  was,

therefore, perfectly justified in considering whether or not it had the

jurisdiction and the competence to proceed in the matter. The Trial

Court  did  so  and  found  that  the  proceeding  was  not  maintainable

before it.  

We are also unable to accept  the contention that the date on

which  the order  was  passed  the 15  years  period  was over  and the

proceeding had thus became maintainable. We are of the view that the

decision in Sudhir G.Angur has no application to the facts of the case.

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The  maintainability  of  the  proceeding  was  to  be  decided  with

reference to the date on which the Rent Control Act, 1999 came into

force  and not  the  date  on which the  order  was passed  by the trial

court. A proceeding that was incompetent on the date the Act came

into  force  would  not  revive  merely  because  it  remained  pending

before the court.  

Counsel  for  the  petitioner  lastly  submitted  that  the  intent  of

section 3(2)(f) was to give some benefit to the landlord and further

that  the  proceeding  would  not  abate  under  Section  70(2)(c)  of  the

Act.   We find  no  force  in  the  submission.   It  is  indeed  true  that

Section 2(3) (f) is beneficial to the landlord but then it was for the

land  lord,  Narayan  Shankar  Rao  to  withdraw  the  proceeding  on

coming into force on the 1999 Act in terms of Section 2(3)(f) and to

proceed  against  the  tenant  under  the  general  law  governing  the

landlord and tenant relationship. That course having not been adopted

the  proceeding  under  the  Rent  Control  Act  was  clearly  not

maintainable and was rightly dismissed by the trial court.

 We thus find no merit  in this  special leave petition and it  is

dismissed accordingly.

We may note here that the High Court has left it open to the

petitioner or the 2nd respondent (the widow of Narayan Shankar Rao)

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to  file  a  fresh  eviction  petition  on  the  ground  that  by  the  end  of

December 2003 the 15 years period was over.  The direction of the

High Court in that regard would remain undisturbed by the dismissal

of the Special Leave Petition.  

     …………………………..J.

     [Harjit Singh Bedi]

     …………………………..J.

     [Aftab Alam]

New Delhi,

July 21, 2008.         

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