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PETITIONER: BIJAYA KUMAR AGARWALA ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF ORISSA

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       01/08/1996

BENCH: AHMADI A.M. (CJ) BENCH: AHMADI A.M. (CJ) MANOHAR SUJATA V. (J)

CITATION:  1996 SCC  (5)   1        JT 1996 (7)    56  1996 SCALE  (5)530

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                 THE 1ST DAY OF AUGUST, 1996 Present:           Hon’ble the Chief Justice           Hon’ble Mrs. Justice Sujata V. Manohar B.K. Mehta, Sr.Adv. Shri Narain, Sandeep Narain, Y. Mathur, Advs. with him for the appellant in Crl. A.No. 770/96 U.R. Lalit, Sr. Adv. L.K. Pandey, Adv. with him for the appellant in Crl. A.No. 771/96 R.K. Mehta, Adv. for the Respondent                       J U D G M E N T The following Judgment of the Court was delivered: Bijaya Kumar Agarwal V. State of Orissa                           W I T H                CRIMINAL APPEAL NO 771 OF 1996         (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 355 of 1990) Jagdish Prasad Agarwal V. State of Orissa                       J U D G M E N T Ahmadi, CJI,      Leave granted.      Section 3(1)  of the  Essential Commodities  Act,  1955 (hereinafter called  ’the Act’) provides that if the Central Government is  of  the  opinion  that  it  is  necessary  of expedient so to do for maintaining or increasing supplies of any essential  commodity or  for  securing  their  equitable distribution and  availability at  fair prices,  it may,  by order provide  for regulating or prohibiting the production, supply and  distribution  thereof  and  trade  and  commerce therein. Section  3(2)(d) further  clarifies that  the order may provide, inter alia, for regulating by licences, permits of otherwise the storage, transport, distribution, disposal, acquisition use  or consumption of, any essential commodity.

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We may  reproduce the  exact words  of the  relevant part of Section 3  which reads as under:      "3. Power  to  control  production,      supply,  distribution,   etc.,   of      essential commodities.-      (1)    xxx      xxx     xxx     xxx      (2)  Without     prejudice  to  the      generality of  the powers conferred      by sub-section  (1), and order made      thereunder may provide -      (a)    xxx      xxx     xxx     xxx      (b)    xxx      xxx     xxx     xxx      (c)    xxx      xxx     xxx     xxx      (d)  for  regulating  by  licences,      permits or  otherwise the  storage,      transport, distribution,  disposal,      acquisition, use or consumption of,      any essential commodity;      (e)    xxx      xxx     xxx     xxx      (f)    xxx      xxx     xxx     xxx Section 7  of the  act makes contravention of any Order made under Section 3 punishable.      On 29th  December, 1965,  the  Orissa  Rice  and  Paddy Control Order, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as ’the Order’) was issued  in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 3 of the  Act, Clause  3 of  the Order  which is  relevant  is reproduced below :      "3. Licensing  of  persons  (1)  No      person shall act as a dealer except      under  and  in  accordance  with  a      licence issued  in that  behalf  by      the licensing authority:           Provided that  the  Government      may, by a special or general order,      exempt, subject  to such conditions      as may  be specified  in the order,      any  class   of  persons  from  the      operation of this sub-clause.      (2) For the purpose of this clause,      any person who stores rice or paddy      or rice and paddy taken together in      quantity  exceeding   ten  quintals      inside   the    State   of   Orissa      excluding  the   border  area   and      exceeding two  quintals contrary is      proved,  be  deemed  to  act  as  a      dealer." The term ’dealer’ is defined in clause 2(b) as under:      "2(b). ’Dealer’  means  any  person      who purchases,  sells or  stores in      wholesale quantity rice or paddy or      rice and paddy taken together:           Provide that, if such a person      happens  to   be  a  cultivator  or      landlord, he shall not be deemed to      be a  dealer in  respect of rice or      paddy being the produce or the land      cultivated or owned by him."      On February  22, 1980,  the Supply Inspector along with C.S.O. and  others, while on duty near Hat Muniguda, stopped the Truck  No. ORR 2511 and found Bijaya Kumar Agarwala, the appellant herein  travelling in  the truck carrying 124 bags of paddy.  He was  charged and  tried under Section 7 of the Act as  he had  no licence issued to him under the order. He was convicted  and sentenced  on the  finding that  his  act

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amounted  to   ’storage’  for  which  a  valid  licence  was necessary. Since he had no such licence, it was held that he had violated the provisions of the Order. The conviction and the sentence  were confirmed in appeal. A revision was filed in the  High court  which was  referred to a Division Bench; the point of reference being whether paddy loaded in a truck in excess  of the  permissible limit while in transit can be deemed to  be ’stored’  within the meaning of the expression ’storage’ used  in  the  Order.  The  Division  Bench  after examining the law on the point held by the impugned Judgment dated December  12, 1988  that under the Order transshipment in a  moving vehicle  or vessel  amounted to  ’storage’. The Criminal Revision  was accordingly  dismissed and  hence the appeal.      The  second   Criminal  appeal  also  raises  the  same question of  law. On  the same  day, the  appellant  Jagdish Prasad was  found moving in Truck No. ORR 2262 with Paddy in excess of  the permissible  quantity in contravention of the Order and  was similarly  charged, convicted  and sentenced. His revision  was also referred to a larger bench. But after the judgment dated December 12, 1988 in the appellant in the first case,  his revision  was dismissed  following the same judgment by  a ingle  Judge by  the impugned  judgment dated November  7,  1989.  Thus,  the  question  that  arises  for determination in  both the appeals is the same viz., whether goods found in a moving vehicle amounted to ’storage’ within the meaning of the Order.      We find  two sets  of judicial opinion on this aspect : one that  follows the  decision of  the Orissa High Court in Balabhadra Raja  Guru Mohapatra  v. State AIR 1954 Orissa 95 in which  goods in  transit in  a  truck  were  held  to  be ’storage’ within  the meaning  of  the  Orissa  Food  Grains Control Order’  1947 and  the other that follows Orissa High Order judgment  in the  case of Prem Bahadur v. The State of Orissa AIR  1978 Crl.L.J.  683 in  which it  was  held  that possession of  stock of  rice in  a moving  vehicle does not amount to  ’storage’ under  the Orissa  Rice & Paddy Control Order, 1965,  The impugned  judgment of December 12, 1988 as well as  the previous  judgment in  the case  of  Balabhadra (supra) relied  on in  the impugned  judgment  are  Division Bench decisions  whereas the one in the case of Prem Bahadur (supra) and  those following  it are all rendered by learned Single Judges.      The decision  in Balabhadra’s  case  is  based  on  the Orissa Food  Grains Control Order, 1947 issued under Section 3(1) of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946. Clause III(1)  of the  said Order  was very  similar to  the Order of 1965 and read as follows :      "III(1) - No person shall engage in      any undertaking  which involves the      purchase, sale or store for sale in      wholesale   quantities    of    any      foodgrains  except   under  and  in      accordance   with a  licence issued      in that  behalf by  the Director of      Food Supplies :      xxx             xxx             xxx      Explanation(2) - For the purpose of      this clause  any person  who stores      Mung and  Biri or their products in      quantities  exceeding  20  standard      Mounds  and   other  foodgrains  in      quantities   exceeding 50  standard      Mounds, shall  unless the  contrary      is proved  be deemed  to store  the

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    foodgrains for purposes of sale."      The case  involved similar facts in which possession of goods in  transit in  a truck were held to be ’storage’. The High Court  observed that  "there may be a case in which the seller may  be carrying  goods for  purposes of  sale  in  a vessel and  may be  selling all  along the  route". The High Court held  that keeping  such goods in a truck would amount to ’storing’.      For the  same reasons, the impugned judgment also holds that transhipment  in a moving vehicle or vessel will amount to ’storage’ within the meaning of the Order.      As against  this, the  judgment in Prem Bahadur’s case, without reference  to  the  decision  in  Balabhadra’s  case adopts the common parlance-meaning of the word ’storage’ and holds that  it envisages  continued possession  spread  over some time and did not include goods in transit.      Before we  proceed further,  it will  be worthwhile  to examine the  dictionary meaning  of  the  word  ’store’.  In Black’s Law Dictionary ’store’ as a verb means :      "To  keep   merchandise  for   safe      custody, to  be delivered  in   the      same condition  as  when  received,      where  the   safe-keeping  is   the      principal object  of  deposit,  and      not the consumption or sale."           In   Webster’s   Comprehensive      Dictionary (International  Edition)      ’store’ as a verb transitive means:      "(1) To put away for future use; to      accumulate  (2)   to   furnish   or      supply; provide  (3) To  place in a      warehouse or other place of deposit      for safe-keeping."      As per Concise Oxford Dictionary ’store’ as a verb transitive means as under:      "Store  8.v.t..  stock  or  furnish      adequately with,  or with something      useful (usually  with knowledge  or      the  like:  store  your  mind  with      facts; a  well-stored  memory).  9.      put in  store, lay up or up or away      for future  use; deposit (furniture      etc.) in  a warehouse for temporary      keeping. 10.  (Of receptacle) hold,      keep,   contain,    have   storage-      accommodation for  (a  single  cell      can  store  enough  energy  for  12      months’ operation)."      The dictionary  meanings suggest  that ’storing’ has an element  of  continuity  as  the  purpose  is  to  keep  the commodity in store and retrieve it at some future date, even within a  few days.  If goods  are  kept  or  stocked  in  a warehouse, it  can be  immediately described  as an  act  of ’storage’. A vehicle can also be used as a store house. But, whether in  a particular  case, a  vehicle  was  used  as  a ’store’ or  whether a person had stored his merchandise in a vehicle would  be a  matter of  fact in  each case. Carrying goods in  a vehicle  cannot per  se be ’storing’ although it may be  quite possible  that a  vehicle is  used as a store. Transporting is  not storing.  Section 3(2)(d)  of  the  Act extracted earlier  in  the  judgment  uses  the  expressions ’storage’ and  ’transport’ as  two separate acts which could be regulated  by licences,  permits or  otherwise. The Order could as  well prohibit  transporting of large quantities of rice or  paddy within the section of 3 the 3 of the Act. Was

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it the  intention of  the framers  of the  Order to prohibit ’transport’ Per  se? Unless  the facts in a  particular case reveal  that   the  vehicle   was  used   not    merely  for transporting the  goods but  also for ’storing’as understood in the  English language  or even  in common parlance, it is difficult to hold in the affirmative.      Now let  us examine  the Judgment  in Balabhadra’s case (supra). The  impugned  judgment  has  quoted  the  relevant portion of the judgment thus:      " There  may be  a case  in which a      seller may  be carrying  goods  for      purpose of sale in a vessel and may      be selling  all along the route. It      cannot be  said that the goods kept      by him  are not  stored by  him.  I      would, therefore,  agree  With  the      Sessions Judge that the find of the      goods in  the truck  was a  storage      within the  meaning of  the Control      Order..............................      Both the Courts have held as a fact      that     the     petitioner     was      transporting goods  for sale within      the Madras area."      The hypothetical  fact-situation of  a seller  carrying goods for  sale from station to station, halting at stations en route  may indicate  that the  vehicle or vessel was used for ’storage’  as well as ’transport’.  The decision in such a case  would turn  on the facts of the case. That is why in the Balabhadra’s case (supra) the Courts below had held that the accused was transporting goods for sale.      Strict  construction  is  the  general  rule  of  penal statutes, Justice  Mahajan in Tolaram v. State of Bombay AIR 1954 SC  496 at  498-499 stated  the rule  in the  following words:      (I)f two  possible  and  reasonable      constructions can  be  put  upon  a      penal’provision,  the   court  must      lean  towards   that   construction      which  exempts   the  subject  from      penalty rather  than the  one which      imposes   penalty.    It   is   not      competent to  the court  to stretch      the meaning  of an  expression used      by  the  Legislature  in  order  to      carry  out  the  intention  of  the      Legislature."      The same  principle was  echoed in  the judgment of the five Judge  Bench in  the case  of Sanjay  Dutt v. The State through C.B.I.,  Bombay JT 1994 (5) SC 225 which approved an earlier expression of the rule by us in Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi  v. Jitendra  Bhinraj Bijjaya  and Others 1990 (4) SCC 76 at 86.      "Therefore, when  a  law  visits  a      person    with     serious    penal      consequences  extra  care  must  he      taken to ensure that those whom the      legislature did  not intend  to  be      covered by  the express language of      the statute  are not  roped  in  by      stretching  the   language  of  the      law." Keeping in  view the  rules of  interpretation  of  criminal statute and  the language  and intent  of the  Order and the Act, we  find ourselves in agreement with the view expressed

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by Ranganath Misra,J. as he then was, in Prem Bahadur’s case (supra):      "The Orissa  Order  does  not  make      possession  without  a  licence  an      offence. Storage, however, has been      made    an     offence.     Between      "possession"  and   "storage"  some      elements   may   be   common   and,      therefore, it  would be appropriate      to say  that in  all  instances  of      storage there  would be possession.      Yet, all  possession may not amount      to storage. "Storage" in the common      parlance   meaning   connotes   the      concept  of  continued  possession.      There is  an element  of continuity      of possession spread over some time      and the  concept is  connected with      the idea  of  a  regular  place  of      storage. Transshipment  in a moving      vehicle would not amount to storage      within the  meaning of  the  Orissa      Order."                                  (p.683)      There is  no doubt  that, in a given situation, a truck could be used as a store, hut we cannot agree with  the view that the  mere fact that goods were found in a  moving truck could prove that the goods were ’stored’ in violation of the Order which  makes such  an act (when goods stored were rice or paddy in excess of the limit).      It will  be proper  at  this  stage  to  refer  to  two judgments of  this Court  in the  case of  S. K. Amir v. The State of  Maharashtra 1974  (3) SCR  84 and  in the  case of Swantraj &  Others v. State of Maharashtra 1974 (3) SCR 287. In S.K.  Amir’s case  the appellant  was  apprehended  by  a railway constable immediately after he had obtained delivery of  a  parcel  from  the  railway  authorities.  The  parcel contained 95,000  capsules of a sedative agent commonly used for intoxication  called "Lal Pari". The court confirmed the finding of  the High  Court that  the  appellant  (i.e.  the accused) was  guilty  of  "stocking"  the  drug  "for  sale" without licensee,  which was  an offence  under the  Drugs & Cosmetics Act, 1940. Apart from the fact that the contextual setting in  which the expression ’stocking for sale’ is used in the  Drugs and  Cosmetics Act  is different  from that in which the   expression ’storing’ is used in the Act, we find that on facts both the Trial Court and the High Court relied upon various  circumstances, particularly  the  circumstance that the  appellant was  found in  possession of  as many as 95,000  capsules   to  support  their  conclusion  that  the appellant had  stocked the drug for sale. Before this Court, the appellant took a new argument that the drug was found on his person  and,  therefore,  the  act  did  not  amount  to ’stocking for  sale’. This Court did not accept the argument and cited  the example of hawkers who display their wares on their person and thus stock them for sale. S.K. Amir’s case does not  deal with the problem involved in the present case and is  not in  conflict with  the view  that we  propose to take.      The other  decision, Swantraj  & Others  (supra), which finds mention  in the  impugned judgment,  merely rules that temporary storing  of drugs  was also  covered by  the  term "stocking for  sale" within the meaning of Drugs & Cosmetics Act. This judgment has no application to the present facts.      Both the  appellants before us were merely found moving

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in trucks  with paddy in excess of the quantity permitted to be ’stored’.  Nothing more was proved. That by itself cannot amount to  ’storing’ of  goods and hence they cannot be said to have  contravened any  of the  provisions of  the  Order. Therefore, they  are not liable to be convicted or sentenced under Section 7 of the Act. The appeals are allowed.      The convictions  of the  appellants are  therefore  set aside, and  they are acquitted. Their bail bonds shall stand discharged.