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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  6686-6689 of 2003

PETITIONER: B. Bharat Kumar & Ors

RESPONDENT: Osmania University & Ors

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 07/05/2007

BENCH: H.K. Sema & V.S. Sirpurkar

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T

WITH CIVIL APPEAL NOs.6668-6671 OF 2003 Putla Chandra Paul, etc. etc.                                   \005. Appellants Versus The Human Resources Dept. Government of New Delhi & Ors.                                                        \005. Respondents WITH CIVIL APPEAL NOs.6672 OF 2003 Dr.Mrs. G. Shashikala                                           \005. Appellant         Versus The Govt. of A.P. & Ors.                                        \005. Respondents

WITH CIVIL APPEAL NOs.6673-6678 OF 2003

S. Kishan Rao & Ors.                                            \005. Appellants

       Versus

Osmania University & Ors.                                       \005. Respondents

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NOs.6679-6683 OF 2003

G. Sreedhara Reddy & etc.                                       \005. Appellants

       Versus

Osmania University & Ors.                                       \005. Respondents

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO.6684 OF 2003

K. Narsing Rao                                                  \005. Appellant

       Versus

Govt. of A.P. Education Dept. & Ors.                    \005. Respondents

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO.6685 OF 2003

A. Haranadha                                                    \005. Appellant

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       Versus

The Secretary Higher Education Dept. Govt. of A.P. & Ors.                                            \005. Respondents

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO.6690 OF 2003

V. Rami Reddy                                                   \005. Appellant

       Versus

Sri Venkateshwara University & Ors.                     \005. Respondents

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO.6691 OF 2003

A. Venkateswara Rao                                             \005. Appellant

       Versus

The Human Resources Dept.,  Govt. of India & Ors.                                           \005. Respondents

V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.

1.      Several writ petitions came to be filed in the High Court raising  a common issue regarding the superannuation age.  All the  petitioners were serving in different private colleges which were  enjoying the grant-in-aid by the Government.  They were serving in  the capacity as Lecturers, Professors, Readers, Librarians, Physical  Education Teachers, etc.  Their common prayer in the writ petitions  was that their age of superannuation which was hitherto 58 or 60  years, as  the case may, should be raised to 62 years.  For this they  all commonly relied on a communication No.F.1.22/97-U.I dated  27.7.1998.  The claim made by the petitioners was that firstly the  decision of the Government of India was mandatory and binding vis- ‘-vis the colleges/universities.  This was all the more reiterated in the  backdrop that the Central Government was providing financial  assistance to the State Government in implementing the scheme of  revision of pay scales.  It will be better for us to quote the whole letter  dated 27.7.1998 since the same happens to be the main and by far  the only basis for the prayers made in the writ petitions (unfortunately,  the copies of the writ petitions have not been filed before us though  there are several appeals): "Sub:   Revision of pay scales of teachers in Universities  and colleges following the revision of pay scales of  Central Government employees on the recommendations  of Fifth Central Pay Commission:

Madam/Sir,

       I am directed to say that in fulfillment of the  constitutional responsibility for consideration,  determination and maintenance of standards in higher  education, the Central Government and the University  Grants Commission (UGC) have taken, from time to time,  several measures.  As a part of these efforts, the Central  Government has revised the pay scales of teachers in  Central Universities and Colleges thereunder in order to

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attract and retain talent in the teaching profession.  A  copy of the letter addressed to the UGC giving details of  the revised scales of pay and other provisions of the  scheme of revision of pay scales is enclosed.

2.      In discharging its constitutional responsibility, the  Central Government has decided to continue to provide  financial assistance to the State Governments who wish  to adopt and implement the Scheme of revision of pay  scales subject to the following terms and conditions:

(a)     The Central Government will provide financial  assistance to the State Governments which have  opted for these revised pay scales to the extent of  80% of the additional expenditure involved in the  implementation of the revision.

(b)     The State Government will meet the remaining 20%  of the expenditure from their own sources.

(d)     The financial assistance, indicated above, would be  provided for the period from 1.1.1996 to 31.3.2000.

(e)     The entire liability on account of revision of pay  scales, etc., of university and college teachers  would be taken over by the State Governments  w.e.f. 1.4.2000.

(f)     The Central assistance would be restricted to  revision of pay scales in respect of only those posts  which were in existence and filled up on 1.1.1996.

3.      The State Governments, after taking local  conditions into consideration, may also decide in their  discretion, to introduce scales of pay different from those  mentioned in the scheme, and may give effect to the  revised scales of pay from January 1, 1996, or a later  date.  In such cases, the details of the modifications  proposed either to the scales of pay or the date from  which the scheme is to be implemented, should be  furnished to the Government of India for its approval and,  subject to the approval being accorded to the  modifications, Central assistance on the same terms and  conditions as indicated above will be available to the  State Governments for implementation of the scheme  with such modifications, provided that the modified scales  of pay are not higher than those approved under the  scheme.

4.      The payment of Central assistance for  implementation of the Scheme is also subject to the  condition that the entire scheme of revision of pay scales,  together with all the conditions to be laid down in this  regard by the UGC by way of Regulations, is  implemented by the State Governments as a composite  scheme without any modification except to the date of  implementation and scales of pay as indicated above.

5.      It shall be necessary for the Universities and  Managements of colleges to make necessary changes in  their statutes, ordinances, rules, regulations, etc., to  incorporate the provisions of this scheme.

6.      The detailed proposal for implementation of the  scheme on the lines indicated above, may kindly be

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formulated immediately and sent to the Department of  Education in the Ministry of Human Resources  Development for examination so that Central assistance  to the extent indicated above can be sanctioned for the  implementation of revised scales of pay.

7.      Anomalies, if any, in the implementation of the  scheme may be brought to the notice of the Department  of Education in the Ministry of Human Resource  Development for clarification.

8.      The scheme applies to teachers in all Universities  (excluding Agricultural Universities) and colleges  (excluding Agricultural, Medical and Veterinary Science  Colleges) admitted to the privileges of the Universities."

2.      The petitioners also relied on a UGC notification on revision of  pay scales bearing No.1-3-1494(PS) dated 24.12.1998.  This was a  communication from the Secretary, University Grants Commission  along with the whole scheme.  Few other letters like Letters dated  22.9.1998 and 6th November, 1998 were also relied upon and lastly a  consolidated statement sent by the Ministry based upon the above  mentioned three letters was also heavily relied upon.  From that  consolidated statement our attention was invited to the following para  No.(vi): "(vi)   Age of superannuation (Annexure I)         The age of superannuation of university and college  teachers, Registrar, Librarians, Physical Education  personnel, Controller of examination, Finance Officers  and such other university employees who are being  treated at par with the teachers and whose age of  superannuation was 60 years, would be 62 years and  thereafter no extension in service should be given.   However, it will be open to a university or college to re- employ a superannuated teacher according to the existing  guidelines framed by the UGC upto the age of 65 years  (Annexure I & III)."

3.      In short initially the claim of some of the writ petitioners was  entirely based on this material for the extended age of  superannuation upto 62 years.  The things did not stop here. 4.      On 29.6.1999 the State of Andhra Pradesh passed the GOMS  208.  This was mainly for implementation of the UGC pay scales to  the teachers and others covered in the aforementioned consolidated  statement and the letters mentioned above.  The State of Andra  Pradesh agreed to implement the said scheme in so far as the  salaries were concerned. This position obviously was taken after  formation of a committee of five experts which is clear from para (iv)  of the GOMS 208.  The committee submitted the report to the State  Government after making an indepth study of the issues relating to  implementation and had made a report to the Government on  30.4.1999. It is on the basis of this report that the aforementioned  GOMS 208 came to be issued.  Para 5 of the GOMS is as under: "5.     After careful consideration of the Revised UGC  scales and the suggestions of Government of India, and  the recommendations of the five member committee, as  mentioned in para 4 above, the State Government of A.P.  have decided to extend the Revised UGC Scales of pay,  to the Teachers, Librarians and Physical Education  Personnel in the Universities and Colleges in the State,  as shown in the Schedule to this order."

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The rest of GOMS is not material as it pertains to the other conditions  subject to which the revised pay-scales were awarded.  However,  para 14 of the GOMS suggests that the service conditions like  recruitment and qualifications, selection procedure career  advancement, teaching days, work load, code of professional ethics,  accountability, etc., shall be as indicated in the Appendix to the order.   The Appendix however, to the chagrin of the petitioners, suggested  the age of superannuation also.  The relevant para is as under: "15. Superannuation and Re-employment of Teachers: (1)     The University Grants Commission has  recommended superannuation age as 62 years uniformly  for the teachers in Universities and colleges.  At present,  in the State of Andhra Pradesh, the age of  superannuation is 58 for the college teachers and 60 for  university teachers.  After considering the issue at great  length and keeping in view that if this issue to enhance  the age of superannuation to 62 years is agreed to, it will  have repercussions and adverse implications regarding  announcement of the age of retirement of the State  employees also, the Government have decided that there  should be no change in the age of superannuation as  existing now and it shall be retained at 58 years to the  college teachers and 60 years for the university teachers.

(2)     It is open to a university or a college to re-employ a  superannuated teacher according to the existing  guidelines framed by the UGC upto the age of 65 years.

(3)     Age of retirement of Registrars, Librarians, Physical  Education Personnel, Controllers of Examinations,  Finance Officers and such other university employees  who are being treated at par with the teachers and whose  age of superannuation was 60 years, would also continue  to be 60 years.  No re-employment facility is provided for  the Registrars, Librarians and Directors of Physical  Education."

It is this para which infuriated the petitioners. Though some of the  petitioners had rushed to the court prior to the passing of the GOMS,   other batch of writ petitions came to be filed where they also  challenged the GOMS 208 and more particularly para 15 of the  Appendix which has been quoted above.  The writ petitioners who  had filed the writ petitions earlier to this date did not even bother to  amend the writ petitions and introduce a challenge to this GOMS in  their writ petitions.  Strangely enough, however, while filing the  Special Leave Petitions challenging the impugned judgments, we find  a challenge having been made to the GOMs in the body of the SLPs.   However, at the High Court stage it was treated as if all the writ  petitions had challenged GOMS 208 because the same was an  outcome of the aforementioned three letters to which we have  already referred to earlier. 5.      The High Court took the view that this matter was squarely  covered by the judgment of this Court in T.P. George & Ors. Vs.  State of Kerala [(1992) Suppl. 3 SCC 191] against the petitioners.   The High Court, more particularly relied on one paragraph in that  judgment which is as follows: "However, the court viewed that age of retirement fixed at  55 years in the case of teachers of affiliated colleges is  too low.  It is only after a teacher acquires several years  of teaching experience that he really becomes adept at  his job and it is unfortunate if the students have to lose  the benefits of his experience by reason of any unduly  early age of retirement.  However, it is not for the court to  prescribe the correct age of retirement but that is a policy

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function requiring considerable expertise which can  properly be done by the State Government or the State  Legislature of the Universities concerned.  It is hoped that  some time in near future, the State Government will be  able to consider the question and determine the age of  retirement as it best thinks fit."

In that judgment this Court had sealed a mark of approval on the  aforementioned observations of the impugned judgment of the  Division Bench of the Kerala High Court: "Though clause 26 of the scheme provides that the age of  superannuation for teachers should be 60 years, and the  scheme contemplates certain improvements in providing  for assistance in that behalf, it is not a scheme which is  statutorily binding either on the State Government or the  different universities functioning under the relevant  statutes in the State of Kerala.  What the State  Government has done by its order dated March 13, 1990  is to implement the UGC scheme including revision of  scales of pay in relation to teachers in Universities  including Kerala-Agricultural University, affiliated colleges,  Law Colleges, Engineering Colleges, and qualified  Librarians and qualified physical Education Teachers with  effect from January 1, 1986, subject however to the  express condition that in so far as the age of retirement is  concerned, the present fixation of 55 years shall continue.   The contention of the appellant is that the State  Government having accepted the UGC scheme, and as  the scheme provides for a  higher age of 60 years, once  the State Government accepted the scheme, all the  clauses of the scheme become applicable.  It is not  possible to accede to this contention.  Firstly, as already  stated the UGC scheme does not become applicable  because of any statutory mandate making it obligatory for  the Government and the Universities to follow the same.   Therefore, the State Government had the discretion either  to accept or not to accept the scheme.  In its discretion it  has decided to accept the scheme.  Subject to the one  condition, namely, in so far as the age of superannuation  is concerned, they will not accept the fixation of higher  age provided in the scheme.  The State Government  having thus accepted, the scheme in the modified form,  the teachers can only get the benefit which flows from the  scheme to the extent to which it has been accepted by  the State Government and the concerned universities.   The appellant cannot claim that major portion of the  scheme having been accepted by the Government, they  have no right not to accept the clause relating to fixation  of higher age of superannuation.  That is a matter  between the State Government on the one hand and the  University Grants Commission on the other, which was  provided certain benefits by the scheme.  It is for the  University Grants Commission to extend the benefit of the  scheme or not to extend the benefit of the scheme  depending upon its satisfaction about the attitude taken  by the State Government in the matter of implementing  the same.  That is a matter entirely between the State  Government on one hand and the University Grants  Commission on the other.  Teachers of the private  institutions concerned are governed by the statutes  framed under the relevant statutory enactment.  As long  as the superannuation remains fixed at 55 years and as  long as the State Government has not accepted the  UGC’s recommendation, to fix the age of superannuation

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at 60 years, teachers cannot claim as a matter of right  that they are entitled to retire on attaining the age of 60  years."

In view of this all the writ petitions came to be dismissed by two  separate judgments.  These judgments have now fallen for  consideration in these appeals.   6.      Shri Gururaja Rao, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf  of the appellants contends firstly that the High Court erred in relying  upon the judgment of this Court in T.P. George’s case (supra).   According to the learned counsel, the judgment has ceased to apply  in view of the subsequent developments.  Learned counsel secondly  urged that the language of the letter dated 27.7.1998 itself suggested  that it was not open for the State Government or as the case may, the  other educational institutions like Universities and Colleges to ignore  the letter, especially the suggestion therein that the retiring age  should be 62 years.  In this the learned counsel laid a great stress on  the term "wish" used in that letter and suggested that the term should  not be interpreted to suggest any discretion being left with the State  Government regarding the scheme to be implemented.  Learned  counsel also claimed that the scheme, if at all chosen to be  implemented, had to be implemented as a composite scheme since  the whole scheme is contained in a single document which was plain  and unambiguous.  Relying on the decision of O.P. Singla vs. Union  of India [(1984) 4 SCC 450] it was urged that when a rule or section  is a part of an integral scheme, it should not be considered or  construed in isolation because doing so would result in some inter- related provisions becoming otiose or devoid of meaning.  Relying on  Maniklal Majumdar vs. Gouranga Chandra Dey [(2005) 2 SCC  400], the learned counsel suggested that in order to ascertain the  meaning of a clause, the court must look at the whole statute as what  precedes and what succeeds and not merely the clause itself.  There  are number of other authorities referred to by the learned counsel like  Chandrika Prasad Yadav vs. State of Bihar [(2004) 6 SCC 331],  Dove Investments (P) Ltd. vs. Gujarat Industrial Investment  Corporation [(2006) 2 SCC 619] which suggest that whether the  statute would be directory or mandatory would depend upon the  scheme thereof.   7.      Referring to the letter itself, the learned counsel further  suggested  that considering the language therein, it was clear that it  did not leave any discretion with the State Government with in  respect to the scheme as a whole.  Referring to paragraphs 4 and 5  of the letter, the learned counsel suggested that there was a clear  suggestion to the Universities and Managements of Colleges to make  necessary changes in their statutes, rules, regulations, etc., to  incorporate the provisions of the scheme and these directions in para  5 were mandatory in nature and, therefore, the Universities and the  State Government had no other option but to give effect to the  scheme as a composite scheme.  Learned counsel laid a great stress  on the terminology "shall be necessary" and "to make necessary  changes".  Learned counsel took us through the whole letter  paragraph by paragraph and insisted that the scheme suggested by  the University Grants Commission (UGC) was not only mandatory but  was also binding vis-‘-vis the Universities and the States and,  therefore, it was essential that the retirement age was bound to be  increased to 62 or as the case may be 60 years. 8.      We were also taken through Entry No.66 of the Union List and it  was tried to suggest that the letter or the as case may be, the scheme  was in the nature of a legislation, a Central legislation that would be  binding against the States and the statutes of the State contrary to it  to that extent would have to be read as otiose.  Learned counsel also  made a reference to the subsequent letter dated 6.11.1998 and more  particularly the subsequent developments and wanted to read  therefrom that the superannuation age was bound to be 62 years or

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as the case may be 60 years.  9.      In so far as the decision in T.P. George’s case (supra) is  concerned, the counsel very heavily relied on the judgment of this  Court in Prof. Yashpal and Anr. Vs. State of Chattisgarh & Others  [(2005) 5 SCC 420] and for that purpose also argued the scope of  Entry 66 from List I as against Entry 25 of List III.  It was the  contention of the learned counsel that Yashpal’s case expressly  overrules the law laid down in T.P. George’s case (supra).  For  impressing upon us the importance of Entry 66 of List I which was  required to be harmonized with Entry 25 of List III, the learned  counsel took up through the celebrated judgment of this Court in The  Gujarat University, Ahmedabad vs. Krishna Ranganath  Mudholkar & Ors. [(1963 Supp. 1 SCR 112].  In that the learned  counsel further urged that the whole gamut of University which  include teaching, etc., will not come within the purview of the State  Legislation on account of the specific nature of determination of  standards in institutions for higher education being in the Union List  for which Parliament alone is competent to legislate.  Learned  counsel, therefore, taking the analogy further suggests that the  scheme which was being handed down by the Central Government  was binding as a Central legislation.  Learned counsel also took us  through another celebrated decision of this Court in State of T.N. vs.  Abhiyaman Educational and Research Institute [(1995) 4 SCC  104].  Even the other celebrated decision in Dr.Preeti Srivastava vs.  State of M.P. [(1999) 7 SCC 120] which was referred to in Yashpal’s  case was heavily relied upon by the counsel.  In short the main stay  of the argument was that the University Education which was higher  education and shall be covered by Entry 66 of List I, and therefore,  the recommendations made by the UGC were binding as against the  State Government and the Universities and the conflicting States  statutes to that extent stood overruled.  It was tried to be suggested  that the Government of India’s letter calling upon the State  Governments in implementing the scheme is the result of the  exercise of the executive powers under Article 73 of the Constitution  of India with respect to Entry 66 of List I and, therefore, such a  decision of the Central Government was binding on the State  Government and the Universities as the subject pertains to the Union  List.  It was also suggested that the State Government in GOMS 208  dated 26.6.1999 had accepted the partial implementation of the  scheme and such partial implementation was not permissible in view  of the categorical directions contained in paragraph 4 of the letter  dated 27.7.1998.  To the same effect, more or less are the written  submissions by other appellants in other appeals. 10.     The State of Andhra Pradesh, however, took a clear stand that  a mandamus cannot be issued to the State Government on the basis  of current letter written by the Director of UGC.  It is pointed out that  the language of the letter was clear enough to suggest that the  scheme was voluntary in nature.  It was pointed out that it was  nowhere suggested in the letter that the State Governments were  required to implement the contents of the letter.  Learned counsel  heavily relied on the decision in T.P. George’s case (supra) and  pointed out that that case clinched the issue against the appellants.  It  was also pointed out by the learned counsel for the other  respondents that the language of the letter or for that matter  subsequent letters and the scheme was clearly suggesting that it  would be voluntary on the part of the State Government to accept or  not to accept the scheme.  There was no question of the scheme  being in the nature of a legislation or order or a policy decision.   Learned counsel further argued that even if it was a policy decision,  the scheme itself suggested that it was voluntary and dependent  upon the "wish" of the State Government to implement the scheme or  not.  It was, therefore, impermissible to attribute different meanings  and to read something in the scheme which is not there.  The other  counsel also pointed out that the appellant had utterly failed to show  as to how the judgment in T.P. George’s case was not applicable to

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the present case or for that matter stood overruled by Yashpal’s  case.  It is in this background that we have to consider the matter. 11.     The judgments of the High Court in appeal undoubtedly turn  firstly on the plain and simple language of the scheme and secondly  on the reported decision in T.P. George’s case. 12.     We would, therefore, first examine as to whether the two  Division Benches have rightly relied upon the said judgment held  against the appellants.  We have examined the judgment in extenso.   This is also a case where the UGC had floated a scheme in 1986  which was framed by the Central Government pursuant to the  Mehrotra Committee Report.  In that scheme there was a Circular  dated 17.6.1987 addressed by the Ministry of Human Resource  Development, Department of Education to the Education Secretaries  of all the States, UTs and it was clearly mentioned therein that the  adoption of the scheme was voluntary and the only result follow from  the State Government not adopting the scheme might be that the  State Government may not get the benefit of the offer of  reimbursement from the Central Government to the extent of 80% of  the additional expenditure involved in giving effect to the revision of  pay-scales as recommended by the scheme.  Therefore, the factual  situation was almost identical as in the present case.  This Court  approved specifically a paragraph in the Kerala High Court judgment  which we have already quoted earlier in this judgment in para 5.  In  that the Kerala High Court had specifically rejected the contention  that the State Government having accepted the UGC scheme and as  the scheme provided for the higher age of 60 years, the clause of the  scheme regarding age of retirement also would become applicable.   The Kerala High Court had specifically further observed that the UGC  scheme did not become applicable as it was not obligatory for the  Government and the Universities to follow the same.  The Kerala  High Court read a discretion in the State Government to accept or not  to accept the scheme.   13.     The situation is no different in the present case also.  The very  language of the letter dated 27.7.1998 suggests that the scheme is  voluntary and not binding at all.  Further it is specified in the judgment  of the Kerala High Court that the teachers had no right to claim a  specific age because it suggested in the scheme which scheme was  itself voluntary and not binding.  The Court clearly observed that "the  appellant cannot claim that major portion of the scheme having been  accepted by the Government, they have no right not to accept the  clause relating to fixation of higher age of superannuation".  The  Court therein observed that it is a matter between the State  Government on the one hand and the University Grants Commission  on the other and it would be for the University Grants Commission to  extend the benefit of the scheme or not to extend the same  depending upon its satisfaction about the attitude taken by the State  Government in the matter of implementing the scheme.  It was lastly  clearly observed that as long as the State Government has not  accepted the UGC’s recommendations to fix the age of  superannuation at 60 years, teachers cannot claim as a matter of  right that they were entitled to retire on attaining the age of 60 years. 14.     Inspite of our best efforts, we have not been able to follow as to  how the judgment of the Kerala High Court, which has been approved  by this Court is, in any manner, different from the factual situation that  prevails here in this case.  It is for that reason that we have  extensively quoted not only the aforementioned letter dated  27.7.1998 but also the subsequent letters and the further policy  statement.  Plain reading of all these is clear enough to suggest that  the scheme was voluntary and it was upto the State Governments to  accept or not to accept the scheme.  Again even if the State  Government accepted a part of the scheme, it was not necessary that  all the scheme as it was, had to be accepted by the State  Government.  In fact the subsequent developments suggest that the  State Government has not chosen to accept the scheme in full  inasmuch as it has not accepted the suggestions on the part of the

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UGC to increase the age of superannuation. 15.     Once we take this view on the plain reading of the scheme, it  would be necessary for us to take stock of the subsequent arguments  of Mr.Rao regarding Entry 66 in the List I vis-‘-vis Entry 25 in List III.   In our opinion, the communications even if they could be heightened  to the pedestal of a legislation or as the case may be, a policy  decision under Article 73 of the Constitution, they would have to be  read as they appear and a plain reading is good enough to show that  the Central Government or as the case may be UGC also did not  introduce the element of compulsion vis-‘-vis the State Government  and the Universities.  We, therefore, do not find any justification in  going to the Entries and in examining as to whether the scheme was  binding, particularly when the specific words of the scheme did not  suggest it to be binding and specifically suggest it to be voluntary. 16.     Much debate was centered around the interpretation of the  words "wish" and "gamut".  In our opinion it is wholly unnecessary  and we have merely mentioned the arguments for being rejected.   Once the scheme suggested that it was left to the "wish" of the State  Government, there will be no point in trying to assign the unnatural  meaning to the word "wish".  Similarly, there would be no point in  going into the interpretation of the word "gamut" and to hold that once  the State Government accepted a part of the scheme, the whole  scheme had to be accepted by the same as such would, in our  opinion, be an unnecessary exercise. 17.     In view of the plain and ambiguous language of the scheme,  there would be no necessity on our part to attempt any interpretation.   For the same reasons we need not consider the argumets based on  the decisions in O.P. Singla, Maniklal Majudar, Chandrika Prasad  Yadav & Dove Investments as they all pertained to principles of  interpretation which exercise would have been necessary for us only  if the language was ambiguous.  It is also not necessary for us to  extensively consider Dove Investment’s case as from the plain  language of the scheme itself we find that it is not a mandatory  scheme in the sense being binding against the State Governments. 18.     For the similar reasons we do not see as to why the judgment  in T.P. George’s case is not applicable to the present case.  A very  serious argument was raised by the learned counsel that the  judgment stood overruled by Yashpal’s case.  We do not think so.   Yashpal’s case was on entirely different issue.  There the  controversy was relating to a legislation creating number of  universities.  The question there was as to whether the State  Government could create so many universities and whether the  legislation creating such universities was a valid legislation,  particularly in view of the fact that the subject of higher education was  covered under Entry 66 of List I.  Such is not the subject in the  present case.  Here is a case where there is no legislation.  Even if  we take the scheme to the higher pedestal of policy statement under  Article 73 of the Constitution, the scheme itself suggests to be  voluntary and not binding and the scheme itself gives a discretion to  the State Government to accept it or not to accept it.  If such is the  case, we do not see the relevance of the Yashpal’s case in the  present matter.  Once this argument fails, the reference to the other  cases which we have referred to earlier also becomes unnecessary.   In our considered opinion all those cases relate to the legislative  powers on the subject of education on the part of the State  Government and the Central Government.  In the present case we do  not have any such legislation for being considered. Where the  scheme itself gives the discretion to the State Government and where  the State Government uses that discretion to accept a part of the  scheme and not the whole thereof, it would be perfectly within the  powers of the State Government not to accept the suggestion made  by the scheme to increase the age of superannuation.   19.     Learned counsel also argued, to a great extent, the desirability  of the age of superannuation being raised to 60 or 62 as the case  may be.  We again reiterate that it is not for this Court to formulate a

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policy as to what the age of retirement should be as by doing so we  would be trailing into the dangerous area of the wisdom of the  Legislation.   If the State Government in its discretion, which is  permissible to it under the scheme, decides to restrict the age and not  increase it to 60 or as the case may be 62, it was perfectly justified  into doing so.   20.     When we see the writ petitions which were filed before the High  Court, number of them have not even challenged the subsequent  Resolution GOMS 208 dated 26.9.1999.  Therefore, all the  challenges were made in a haphazard manner without even  bothering to put the proper challenge.  Again nobody even challenged  the constitutionality of the said Resolution to suggest that there was a  conflict between the said GOMS and any Central legislation as  covered by Entry 66 of List I.  What was being examined in  Yashpal’s case was regarding the validity of the State Legislation  particularly when it was in conflict with the Central Legislation though  it was purported to have been made in Entry 25 of the Concurrent List  which in effect encroaches upon legislation including the supporting  legislation made by the Centre under Entry 23 of the Concurrent List  to give effect to Entry 66 of the Union List.  This Court had held the  same to be void and inoperative.  Since there is no conflict in the  present case whatsoever either apparent or latent, as such there is  no question of invalidating the said GOMS which has been  challenged only in few of the writ petitions. Even after the said GOMS  came on the anvil, the petitioners who had filed the writ petitions  earlier have never bothered to amend their writ petitions so as to  challenge the said GOMS. However, we leave it at that particularly  when we have taken the view that there has been no conflict between  any of the Central Legislation or for that matter its policy and the said  GOMS or the policy of the State Government displayed from the  same.  A great stress was laid on para 33 in Yashpal’s case.  We  have absolutely no quarrel with the proposition laid therein.  In that  paragraph this Court expressed that the whole gamut of the university  which will include teaching, quality of education being imparted,  curriculum, standard of examination and evaluation and also research  activity being carried on will not come within the purview of the State  Legislature on account of the specific entry on coordination and  determination of standards in institutions for higher education or  research and scientific and technical education being in the Union  List for which Parliament alone is competent.  There can be really no  dispute with this proposition but in the first place there is nothing here  to suggest that the Parliament has legislated over any such subject  and that the State Government’s any legislation is in conflict with any  such legislation made by the Parliament.  Further it is clear from the  letter dated 27.7.1998 that it is expressly left to the discretion of the  State Government to implement or not to implement the policy.  Once  there is no question of any conflict we do not think that would have  the effect of overruling the T.P. George’s case.  Further, merely  because in Yashpal’s case the observation are about the gamut of  the University it does not necessarily mean that the State  Government will not be able to decide the age of retirement  particularly where it has the discretion to do so as also the legislative  powers.  We must hasten to add that no provision of any Act has  been challenged in these writ petitions.  All that the plea of the  appellants in the original writ petitions was that the State Government  must implement the UGC recommendations of the scheme and it was  rightly found to be untenable. 21.     In short we are of the opinion that the appeals have no merit  and must be dismissed.  They are accordingly dismissed.  The  parties to bear their own costs.