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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  4532 of 2006

PETITIONER: Avtar Singh Hit

RESPONDENT: Delhi Sikh Gurdwara Management Committee and others

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 18/10/2006

BENCH: K.G. Balakrishnan, G.P. Mathur & R.V. Raveendran

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T

(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 5188 of 2006) With Civil Appeal No.        4533            of 2006 (Arising out SLP (C) No. 5183 of 2006) With Civil Appeal No.     4534               of 2006 (Arising out SLP (C) No. 5184 of 2006) With Civil Appeal No.       4535             of 2006 (Arising out SLP (C) No. 5190 of 2006)

G.P. Mathur, J.

       Leave granted. 2.      These appeals have been filed challenging the judgment and  order dated 1.3.2006 passed by the Division Bench of Delhi High  Court by which Letters Patent Appeals were allowed and the  judgment and order of the learned single Judge disposing of four writ  petitions was set aside.  The learned single Judge had allowed the writ  petitions and countermanded the election of the members of the  Executive Board of Delhi Sikh Gurdwara Management Committee,  which was held on 19.12.2005 and had issued a further direction that  fresh election be held on 14.2.2006. 3.      The controversy raised in all the four appeals is identical and  for the sake of convenience we will refer to the facts of Civil Appeal  No.   4532        of 2006 (arising out SLP (C) No. 5188 of 2006) (Avtar  Singh Hit vs. Delhi Sikh Gurdwara Management Committee and  others).  The principal issue raised is regarding the validity of the  election held on 19.12.2005 for electing the members of the Executive  Board of Delhi Sikh Gurdwara Management Committee (hereinafter  referred to as ’DSGMC’).  In order to understand the controversy  involved it is necessary to make a brief reference to the relevant  statutory provisions.   

4.      The Parliament enacted The Delhi Sikh Gurdwaras Act, 1971  (hereinafter referred to as ’the Act’) to provide for the proper  management of the Sikh Gurdwaras and Gurdwara property in Delhi  and for matters connected therewith. Section 2(c) of the Act defines  "Committee" and it means the Delhi Sikh Gurdwara Management  Committee established under Section 3 of the Act.  Section 3 provides  for establishment of a committee called the Delhi Sikh Gurdwara  Management Committee for the proper management and control of  the Gurdwaras and Gurdwara property.  The Committee shall be a  body corporate with the name aforesaid having perpetual succession  and a common seal and shall by such name sue and be sued.  Section  4 provides for composition of the Committee.  Sub-section (a) of this

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Section provides that forty six members shall be elected from various  wards into which Delhi is divided in accordance with the provisions  of the Act.  Besides them some members have to be co-opted and  nominated in the manner prescribed in the section.  Section 5 provides  that the term of the office of the members of the Committee shall be  four years.  Section 16 provides for the election of the office bearers  and members of the Executive Board.  Sub-section (5) of Section 16  lays down that the President and the other members of the Executive  Board elected under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) shall hold  office for a term of one year but shall be eligible for re-election for  one more term only.  The proviso to this sub-section says that an  outgoing office bearer or member shall continue in office until  election of his successor is held.  Sub-section (6) of Section 16 lays  down that the election of the President and other office bearers and  members of the Executive Board under sub-section (1) or sub-section  (2) or any subsequent annual election to any of those offices shall be  held in such manner as may be prescribed by Rules.  Section 40 of the  Act provides that the Committee may make regulations not  inconsistent with the provisions of the Act or the rules made  thereunder for carrying out its functions under the Act.  Regulation  4(1), which has been made by the Committee and has some relevance  for the decision of the case reads is as under: - "4.     Meetings of the Committee/Executive Board  etc. (1)     Annual General Meeting (i) Annual General Meetings of the Committee  shall be held in the month of September every year  to hold election of Office-bearers and members of  the Executive Board.  The date of election once  announced by the President/General Secretary  shall not be postponed. (ii)    Among other items, the Annual General  Meetings shall consider and approve: (a)     Annual Report of the Committee; (b)     Annual Budget containing proposals for 1)      Revised estimates of the current year; 2)      Budget estimates for the next year; (c)     Audited statement of accounts of the last  year; (d)     Action taken on report for pending audit  paras; (e)     Format and the manner in which the  accounts shall be maintained in the next  financial year; (f)     Appointment of Auditors for the next year. Note:   Election of New Executive Board and Office- bearers is to be held in accordance with the Rules framed  or to be framed under Clause (r) of Sub-Section (2) of  Section 39 of the Act. (iii)   The agenda papers for the Annual General  Meetings shall be circulated by the General  Secretary with approval of the Executive Board at  least 8 days before the date of meetings."

5.      The issue involved in the present case is regarding the election,  which was held for electing the members of the Executive Board for  the year 2005-06.  In the preceding year 2004-05, Shri Paramjit Singh  Sarna was elected as President and Shri Ravinder Singh Khurana was  elected as Secretary.  According to Shri Paramjit Singh Sarna the  election was held on 19.12.2005 in which the new office bearers of  the Executive Board for the year 2005-06 were elected.  There is no  dispute that at the relevant time the Committee which had to elect the  members of the Executive Board had 50 members and had the right to  elect the members of the Executive Board from amongst themselves. 6.      After constitution of the new Executive Board for the year

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2005-06 had been announced as a result of election held on  19.12.2005 the appellant Shri Avtar Singh Hit filed Writ Petition (C)  No. 370 of 2006 in the Delhi High Court praying that the alleged  minutes of the meeting dated 19.12.2005 be quashed and a writ of  mandamus be issued directing the respondents to the writ petition to  hold fresh election of the Executive Board.  The parties arrayed as  respondents to the writ petition are: -         1.      Delhi Sikh Gurdwara Management Committee         2.      Shri Paramjit Singh Sarna, President         3.      Shri Ravinder Singh Khurana, General Secretary         4.      The Manager, Delhi Sikh Gurdwara Management                 Committee.

       The same persons are arrayed as respondents in the present  appeal.  7.      The main facts pleaded in the writ petition are as follows.  The  last general elections were held on 30.6.2002 and a new Committee,  which is the present Committee in existence, was constituted.  The  Executive Boards, which have life of only one year, were constituted  in the elections held on 24.7.2002, 22.9.2003 and 22.11.2004.  As  respondent No. 2 in the writ petition did not hold a meeting of the  Committee for electing the members of the Executive Board after  expiry of the term of the earlier Board on 21.11.2005, seventeen  members of the Committee made representation to the General  Secretary on 28.11.2005 for holding of fresh election of the Executive  Board for the year 2005-06.  Thereafter the General Secretary sent a  letter on the same day, i.e., on 28.11.2005 intimating that the meeting  of the Committee shall take place on 19.12.2005 to elect the office  bearers of the Executive Board.  The Officiating President S. Baldev  Singh Rani Bagh sent a letter dated 1.12.2005 stating that the letter of  the General Secretary dated 28.11.2005, whereby it was informed that  the election shall be held on 19.12.2005, had been issued without any  authority.  However, the General Secretary by his letter dated  7.12.2005 disputed the authority of the Officiating President and  reiterated that what had been conveyed by his letter dated 28.11.2005  was correct.  Thereafter, Shri Paramjit Singh Sarna, respondent No. 2,  sent a letter to the members of the Committee on 8.12.2005 stating  that there are no records to indicate that the Executive Board had  taken any decision to hold the election.  On 10.12.2005 the General  Secretary gave a reply that the Committee was under a legal  obligation to hold the election and the same would be held on  19.12.2005.  A letter was also sent by him to all the members on the  same day intimating his decision to hold the meeting as scheduled.  In  para 15 of the writ petition it is stated that in a meeting, which had  been called by Paramjit Singh Sarna, respondent No.2, on 15.12.2005,  the members passed a resolution that the election shall be held as  scheduled on 19.12.2005.  This was followed by a communication  sent by respondent No. 3 on 16.12.2005 to all the members that as  intimated earlier vide letter dated 28.11.2005 the meeting shall take  place on 19.12.2005.  Respondent No. 2 then sent a letter to the  members that the meeting for electing the members of the Executive  Board shall be held on 18.1.2006.  In para 28  of the writ petition it is  stated that though respondent No. 3 was taking up a stand that the  order passed by him and communicated vide letter dated 28.11.2005  that the meeting shall be convened on 19.12.2005 was justified but  respondent No. 2 had taken a stand that the meeting shall be held on  18.1.2006.  In para 29 of the writ petition it is averred that the  President in connivance with the General Secretary kept the members  of the Committee in a confused state of affairs and the position was  not clear till 16.12.2005.  In para 32 of the writ petition it is alleged  that on account of aforesaid confusion the writ petitioner did not  attend the meeting on 19.12.2005 though he was very much interested  to contest the election for the office of the President but on account of  the confused state of affairs he was deprived of his valuable right to  participate and contest the election.

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8.      The respondent No. 1 filed a short affidavit stating that  respondent No. 3 had sent a letter to all the members on 28.11.2005  that the meeting shall be held on 19.12.2005.  The respondent No. 2  had also sent a letter dated 17.12.2005 to all the members of the  Committee that the Annual General Meeting of the members of the  DSGMC shall be held at 11.00 A.M. on 19.12.2005 and the said letter  was delivered to all the members of the Committee by ’Dak Rider’.   The elections were held as scheduled on 19.12.2005 wherein 35 out of  50 members participated and the new office bearers had been elected  with more than 2/3rd majority of the total membership of the  Committee.  The new office bearers of the Executive Board had taken  over charge on the same day i.e. on 19.12.2005 but they had not been  impleaded as party to the writ petition.  It was also pleaded that the  election of the office bearers could only be challenged by filing an  election petition in accordance with Section 31 of the Act and the  rules framed thereunder.   9.      Shri Paramjit Singh Sarna, respondent No. 2, in the writ petition  also filed a short affidavit stating that 35 out of 50 members had taken  part in the meeting held on 19.12.2005.  The writ petition was not  maintainable on the ground that the petitioner had an alternative  remedy of filing an election petition as provided in Section 31 of the  Act.  It was further pleaded that the office bearers of the newly elected  Executive Board, who have been functioning since 19.12.2005,  having not been impleaded as party to the writ petition, the writ  petition was liable to be dismissed on ground of non-joinder of  necessary parties.

10.     Shri Ravinder Singh Khurana, respondent No. 3, in the writ  petition filed a counter affidavit stating that after receipt of a  representation from over 1/3rd members of the Committee for holding  a fresh election, he issued a letter dated 28.11.2005 fixing 19.12.2005  as the date for convening the meeting and holding of elections and this  had been done by him in exercise of powers vested in him under the  Regulations. In fact, respondent No. 2, who was holding the office of  President, did not want to hold the election so that he could continue  in office.  In para 7 of the counter affidavit it is stated that a meeting  of the Executive Board was held on 15.12.2005 wherein a decision  was taken to hold the elections on 19.12.2005 and accordingly a  communication was sent to all the members of the Committee.   However, respondent No. 2 held another meeting wherein only 8  members were present and a resolution was passed that the Secretary  had no authority to circulate the letter dated 28.11.2005 and it was  further resolved that the meeting shall be held on 7.1.2006.  In para 9  of the counter affidavit it is averred that respondent No. 2 issued  another communication to the members of the Committee on  16.12.2005 stating that the meeting for electing the office bears of the  Executive Board would be held on 18.1.2006.  Respondent No. 2 also  passed an order whereby he declared 19.12.2005 to be a holiday.   Lastly, it is averred that the respondent No. 2 had never agreed for  holding of elections on 19.12.2005 and had in fact fixed 18.1.2006 for  the said purpose and thus holding of the election on 19.12.2005 by  respondent No. 2 was arbitrary and mala fide exercise of powers. 11.     The learned single Judge held that the writ petitions are replete  with approbation and reprobation of the two warring factions; that the  requirement of Regulation 4 had been met; that the motions of holding  of an election were factually completed on 19.12.2005; that the plea  taken by the petitioners that they did not have notice of the meeting  could not be accepted.  He further held that the action of the General  Secretary in cancelling the election on the penultimate day was not  permissible and the manner in which the election had been concluded,  it had been reduced to a farce.  Finally, it was held that the President’s  decision to go along with the elections scheduled on 19.12.2005 was  given at the eleventh hour and it did not meet with the expectations of  law.  The learned single Judge accordingly passed an order  countermanding and setting aside the election held on 19.12.2005 and

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further directed that the election shall be held on 14.2.2006.

12.     Shri Paramjit Singh Sarna, respondent No. 2 in the writ petition  and Delhi Sikh Gurdwara Management Committee, respondent No.1  in the writ petition, preferred Letters Patent Appeals against the  decision of the learned single Judge.  The Division Bench of the High  Court, after meticulously examining the material on record, held that  there was no confusion regarding the date of meeting as the total  number of members was only 50.  It also held that the allegation that  15 members did not participate in the meeting because of any alleged  confusion could not be believed, more so in the light of the findings of  the learned single Judge that the elections were validly summoned.  It  was further held that as more than 2/3rd members were present and  had elected the office bearers of the Executive Board, the result of the  election had not been materially effected and, therefore, the order  passed by the learned single Judge countermanding and setting aside  the election could not be sustained.  The Division Bench did not go  into the question regarding the effect of non-joinder of the newly  elected members of the Executive Board to the writ petition but  expressed a prima facie view that its effect was not fatal.  It further  held that despite the alternative remedy of election petition being  available, the writ petitions were maintainable. 13.     Learned counsel for the appellants have submitted that there  was utter confusion regarding the date of the meeting in which the  new office bearers of the Executive Board had to be elected.  Initially  Shri Ravinder Singh Khurana, Secretary, sent a communication dated  28.11.2005 stating that the meeting shall be convened on 19.12.2005  but the President Shri Paramjit Singh Sarna sent a letter on 8.12.2005  disputing the authority of the Secretary to convene a meeting.  He  reiterated on 12.12.2005 that no meeting shall be held on 19.12.2005  and thereafter convened a meeting of all members on 15.12.2005 to  discuss the issue and fix a date for holding of the election.  The  President subsequently fixed 7.1.2006 and then 18.1.2006 for the  purpose of holding the meeting. The Secretary, later on took a  different stand and sent telegrams to all the members of the  Committee on 18.12.2005 cancelling the date earlier fixed by him and  confirming the date fixed by the President, i.e., 18.1.2006.  It has thus  been submitted that the contradictory stand taken by the President and  the Secretary and the confusion created thereby, the election held on  19.12.2005 was a farce and the learned single Judge had rightly  countermanded the same.   14.     Learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that there  was no confusion as the Secretary had sent a communication on  28.11.2005 for holding the election on 19.12.2005.  Though initially  the President Shri Paramjit Singh Sarna had challenged the authority  of the Secretary to fix the date for convening the meeting, but  subsequently he had himself intimated that the meeting shall be held  on 19.12.2005, as originally scheduled.  Learned counsel has further  submitted that the fact that 35 out of 50 members participated in the  meeting and unanimously elected office bearers of the Executive  Board by more than 2/3rd majority itself demonstrated that there was  no confusion and the election was properly held.  Learned counsel has  also submitted that at any rate in view of the contradictory stand and  divergent points of view projected by the rival parties, it was not a fit  case for interference by this Court under Article 136 of the  Constitution. 15.     We have given our careful consideration to the submissions  made by learned counsel for the parties.  The pleadings of the parties  and also the material placed in the writ petition clearly show that there  is a factual dispute.  Whether some members of the Committee could  not participate in the meeting on account of the alleged confusing and  contradictory stand taken by the President and the Secretary is a   question of fact.  The writ petitioner Shri Avtar Singh Hit has  specifically averred that he was keen to contest for the office of the  President but on account of the alleged confusion regarding the date

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of the meeting he could not participate in the same.   16.     Part V of the Delhi Sikh Gurdwaras Act deals with Settlement  of Election and Other Disputes.  Sections 31 and 33 of the Act, which  find place in Part V, read as under: - "31.    The provision of section 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22,  23, 24, 25, 27, 28, 29 and 30 of the Delhi Municipal  Corporation Act, 1957, shall mutatis mutandis apply,  subject to such modifications as the Central Government  may by order direct, in relation to settlement of dispute  regarding election, corrupt practices and electoral  offences in respect of election or co-option of members  of the Committee. 33.     (1) Any person aggrieved by an order passed by  the District Judge may, within sixty days of the order,  prefer an appeal to the High Court at Delhi and the orders  of the High Court on such appeal shall be final and  conclusive.

(2)     The provisions of section 5 and 12 of the  Limitation Act, 1963, shall, so far as may be, apply to  appeals under this section."

Sections 15 to 20 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957  (hereinafter referred to as ’the DMC Act’) provide for resolution of  disputes regarding elections by filing an election petition.  Sections 15  and 16 of the DMC Act read as under: - "15.  Election petitions.-- (1) No election of a councilor  shall be called in question except by an election petition  presented to the court of the district judge of Delhi within  fifteen days from the date of the publication of the result  of the election under section 14. (2) An election petition calling in question any such  election may be presented under any of the grounds  specified in section 17 by any candidate at such election,  by any elector of the ward concerned or by any councilor. (3) A petitioner shall join as respondents to his petition  all the candidates at the election. (4) An election petition-- (a)     shall contain a concise statement of the material  facts on which the petitioner relies; (b)     shall, with sufficient particulars, set forth the  ground or grounds on which the election is called  in question; and (c)     shall be signed by the petitioner and verified in the  manner laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure,  1908 (5 of 1908), for the verification of pleadings. 16. Relief that may be claimed by the petitioner.-- (1) A  petitioner may claim-- (a)     a declaration that the election of all or any of the  returned candidates is void, and (b)     in addition thereto, a further declaration that he  himself or any other candidate has been duly  elected. (2) The expression "returned candidate’’ means a candidate  whose name has been published in the Official Gazette under  section 14.

Section 17 of the DMC Act gives grounds for declaring the elections  to be void.  Section 19 of the DMC Act lays down powers of the  District Judge which includes the power to declare the election of all  or any of the returned candidates to be void.  Section 22 of the DMC  Act defines corrupt practices for the purpose of the Act.  Thus a  complete machinery for settlement of election disputes is provided in  the DMC Act which provisions by virtue of Section 31 of the Delhi  Sikh Gurdwaras Act are applicable for settlement of disputes

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regarding elections under the said Act. 17.     It is well settled principle that where elections are conducted in  accordance with the provisions of a statute and the statute also  provides a remedy of settlement of election disputes by filing an  election petition before a tribunal, it is that remedy alone which  should be availed of and recourse cannot be taken to proceedings  under Article 226 of the Constitution.  This view has been taken in  series of decisions rendered by this Court.  The earliest decision was  rendered in N.P. Ponnuswami vs. The Returning Officer AIR 1952 SC  64 by a Bench of six learned Judges.  In this case the nomination  paper of the appellant for election to Madras Legislative Assembly  was rejected by the Returning Officer.  The appellant challenged the  rejection of the nomination paper by filing a writ petition in the High  Court which was dismissed on the ground that it had no jurisdiction to  interfere with the order of the Returning Officer on account of Article  329(b) of the Constitution, which says that no election to either House  of Parliament or to the House or either House of the Legislature of a  State shall be called in question except by an election petition  presented to such authority and in such manner as may be provided  for by or under any law made by the appropriate Legislature.  In  appeal this Court examined the question whether the writ petition  would be maintainable at the initial state against an order rejecting the  nomination paper.  Certain observations made in para 9 of the reports  are relevant and they are being reproduced below: -         "The law of elections in India does not  contemplate that there should be two attacks on matters  connected with election proceedings, one while they are  going on by invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of the  High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution (the  ordinary jurisdiction of the Courts having been expressly  excluded), and another after they have been completed by  means of an election petition.  Any matter which has the  effect of vitiating an election should be brought up only  at the appropriate stage in an appropriate manner before a  special tribunal and should not be brought up at an  intermediate stage before any Court.............................."

In para 12 it was observed: -         "Where a right or liability is created by a statute  which gives a special remedy for enforcing it, the remedy  provided by that statute only must be availed of.         It will be a fair inference from the provisions of the  Representation of the People Act to draw that the Act  provides for only one remedy, that remedy being by an  election petition to be presented after the election is over,  and there is no remedy provided at any intermediate  stage."

       In Mohinder Singh Gill vs. The Chief Election Commissioner,   AIR 1978 SC 851, it was held that if during the process of election, at  any intermediate or final stage, the entire poll has been wrongly  cancelled and a fresh poll has been wrongly ordered, that is a matter  which may be agitated after declaration of the result on the basis of  the fresh poll, by questioning the election in the appropriate forum by  means of an election petition in accordance with law.         The same view has been taken in regard to the elections held in  accordance with some statutory provision where Article 329(b) of the  Constitution is not applicable and they are not governed by  Representation of the People Act.  In K.K. Shrivastava vs. Bhupendra  Kumar Jain AIR 1978 SC 1703, the dispute related to election to Bar  Council of Madhya Pradesh under the Indian Advocates Act and Rule  31 of Election Rules framed by Bar Council of Madhya Pradesh  provided that all disputes arising under the Rule shall be decided by a  tribunal to be known as an election tribunal.  The defeated candidate  approached the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution

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challenging the validity of the election which was allowed by the  High Court.  This Court set aside the judgment of the High Court with  the following observations: -         "Where there is an appropriate or equally  efficacious remedy the Court should keep its hands off.   This is more particularly so where the dispute relates to  an election.  Still more so where there is a statutorily  prescribed remedy which almost reads in mandatory  terms.

       In Gujarat University vs. Shri N.U. Rajguru AIR 1988 SC 66,  the dispute related to election to the Court of Gujarat University.   Some teachers challenged the holding of elections by means of a writ  petition before the High Court which was allowed.  In appeal this  Court set aside the judgment of the High Court with the following  observations: -         "It is well settled that where a statute provides for  election to an office, or an authority or institution and if it  further provides a machinery or forum for determination  of dispute arising out of election, the aggrieved person  should pursue his remedy before the forum provided by  the statute.  While considering an election dispute it must  be kept in mind that the right to vote, contest or dispute  election is neither a fundamental or common law right  instead it is a statutory right regulated by the statutory  provisions.  It is not permissible to invoke the jurisdiction  of the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution by- passing the machinery designated by the Act for  determination of the election dispute.   Ordinarily the  remedy provided by the statute must be followed before  the authority designated therein.  But there may be cases  where exceptional or extraordinary circumstances may  exist to justify by-passing the alternative remedies."

       There are several other decisions where the same view has been  taken.  S.T. Muthusami vs. K. Natarajan AIR 1988 SC 616 is a case  relating to election to the office of Chairman of a panchayat union  under the Tamil Nadu Panchayats Act, 1958 where it was held that the  parties who are aggrieved by the result of the election can question the  validity of an election by an election petition which is an effective  alternative remedy and it is not appropriate for the High Court to  interfere with the election process.         C. Subrahmanyam vs. K. Ramanjaneyullu 1998 (8) SCC 703 is  a case relating to election under the Andhra Pradesh Panchayat Raj  Act and in a short judgment it was observed that the main question for  decision being the non-compliance of a provision of the Act which is  a ground for an election petition in Rule 12 framed under the Act, the  writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution should not have  been entertained for this purpose.         In Ashok Kumar Jain vs. Neetu Kathoria 2004 (12) SCC 73, a  writ petition was filed under Article 226 of the Constitution  challenging the election held under Madhya Pradesh Krishi Upaj  Mandi Adhiniyam, 1972.  This Court observed that Section 66-A of  the said Act provided that an election under the Act could be  challenged only by presenting an election petition and except in some  exceptional extraordinary circumstances normally remedy under  Article 226 of the Constitution, challenging the election by filing a  writ petition would not be available.         Umesh Shivappa Ambi vs. Angadi Shekara Basappa 1998 (4)  SCC 529 is a case relating to election of President, Vice-President and  Chairman, etc., under the Karnataka Cooperative Societies Act,  wherein the High Court in a writ petition under Article 226 of the  Constitution set aside the order by which the nomination of the first  respondent therein was rejected.  This Court reversed the judgment of  the High Court with the following observation :-

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"Once an election is over, the aggrieved candidate  has to pursue his remedy in accordance with the  provisions of law and the High Court will not ordinarily  interfere with the elections under Article 226.  The High  Court will not ordinarily interfere where there is an  appropriate or equally efficacious remedy available,  particularly in relation to election disputes."  

       Similar view has been taken in Harnek Singh vs. Charanjit  Singh 2005 (8) SCC 383 which is a case relating to election of  Chairman of Gram Panchayat and the judgment of the High Court by  which the order of the Returning Officer was set aside in a writ  petition was reversed.   

18.     As discussed earlier the pleadings of the parties show that the  dispute raised was purely factual in nature as to whether some  confusion had been created regarding the date fixed for holding of the  meeting of the Committee for electing the office bearers of the  Executive Board.  The dispute could more appropriately be resolved  by examination of oral evidence to be led by the parties. The writ  petitioner Avtar Singh Hit claimed that on account of the confusion in  dates he could not attend the meeting though he was very keen to  participate in the meeting and contest for the office of the President of  the Executive Board.  In view of the nature of the dispute raised the  proper remedy for the petitioner was to file an election petition as  provided in Section 31 of the Act where parties could have got  opportunity to lead oral evidence.  No exceptional or extraordinary  circumstances were disclosed which could justify recourse to the  extraordinary remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution and for  not availing the remedy provided by the statute.  We are, therefore, of  the opinion that on the facts and circumstances of the present case, the  writ petitions ought not to have been entertained for resolving the  dispute relating to election and on this count alone the writ petitions  were liable to be dismissed. 19.     The respondents in their counter affidavits, which were filed  before the High Court, took a specific plea that the new office bearers  of the Executive Board, who had been elected in the meeting held on  19.12.2005, had taken charge and were functioning.  In all the four  writ petitions,  the office bearers of the newly elected Executive Board  were not made parties.  On the contrary Shri Paramjit Singh Sarna and  Shri Ravinder Singh Khurana, who were the President and the  Secretary respectively of the earlier Executive Board, were arrayed as  respondents to the writ petition.  In the counter affidavit filed on  behalf of respondent No. 2 to the writ petition a specific plea was  taken that the office bearers of the newly elected Executive Board had  not been impleaded as respondents to the writ petition and their rights  would be adversely affected if any relief is granted to the writ  petitioner.  In spite of such clear assertion in the counter affidavit, the  writ petitioner did not choose to implead the newly elected office  bearers of the Executive Board. 20.     In our view no relief could have been granted to the writ  petitioner on account of the fact that the newly elected office bearers  of the Executive Board, who would have been affected by the decision  of the writ petitions, were not impleaded as party to the writ petitions.   In Udit Narain Singh Malpaharia vs. Additional Member, Board of  Revenue, Bihar AIR 1963 SC 786, it was observed that where in a  petition for a writ of certiorari made to the High Court, only the  tribunal whose order was sought to be quashed was made a party but  the persons who were parties before the lower tribunal and in whose  favour the impugned order was passed were not joined as parties; the  writ petition was incompetent and had been rightly rejected by the  High Court.  In Prabodh Verma vs. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1985  SC 167, it was held: -         "A High Court ought not to hear and dispose of a  writ petition under Article 226 without the persons who

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would be vitally affected by its judgment being before it  as respondents or at least some of them being before it as  respondents in a representative capacity if their number is  too large to join them as respondents individually, and, if  the petitioners refuse to so join them, the High Court  ought to dismiss the petition for non-joinder of necessary  parties."

In Ishwar Singh v. Kuldip Singh & Ors. (1995) Supp. (1) SCC  179, it was held that a writ petition challenging selection and  appointment to some posts without impleading the selected candidates  was not maintainable.   This view has been reiterated in Arun Tewari  & Ors. v. Zila Mansavi Shikshak Sangh & Ors. AIR 1998 SC 331. 21.     This being the settled legal position the non-impleadment of the  newly elected office bearers of the Executive Board was fatal and no  relief could have been granted to the writ petitioners. The result of  granting any relief in the writ petitions, as was done by the learned  single Judge, was that the members of the newly elected Executive  Board lost the office which they were holding without affording them  an opportunity to present their case which is clearly impermissible in  law.  The writ petitions were liable to be dismissed on this count as  well. 22.     Mr. Soli J. Sorabjee, learned senior counsel for the appellant  has submitted that absence of notice to even one member may vitiate  the proceedings of the meeting which was convened on 19.12.2005  and in the present case some members were not served with the  statutory notice.  It is not necessary for us to examine this question as  we have held above that the writ petitions filed by the appellants  herein were not maintainable having regard to the controversy raised  which was purely factual in nature and could more appropriately be  decided in an election petition which remedy was provided by the  Delhi Sikh Gurdwaras Act and also on the ground that the writ  petition was not competent as necessary parties were not impleaded as  respondents to the same. 23.     For the reasons discussed above, we find no merit in these  appeals, which are hereby dismissed with costs.