09 August 2010
Supreme Court
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ATBIR Vs GOVT. OF N.C.T OF DELHI

Bench: P. SATHASIVAM,B.S. CHAUHAN, , ,
Case number: Crl.A. No.-000870-000870 / 2006
Diary number: 8823 / 2006
Advocates: ASHOK KUMAR SINGH Vs ANIL KATIYAR


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REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 870 OF 2006

Atbir                                        .... Appellant(s)

Versus

Govt. of N.C.T. of Delhi               .... Respondent(s)

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 877 OF 2006

J U D G M E N T  

P. Sathasivam, J.

1)  These appeals are directed against the final judgment  

and order dated 13.01.2006 of the High Court of Delhi at  

New Delhi  in Criminal  Appeal  No.  805 of  2004, Murder  

Reference No. 3 of 2004 and Criminal Appeal No. 876 of  

2004  whereby  the  High  Court  dismissed  the  criminal  

appeals filed by the appellants herein and confirmed the  

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sentence  awarded  by  the  learned  Additional  Sessions  

Judge, Delhi in Murder reference.

2) The case of the prosecution is as under:

a) Atbir,  the  appellant  in  Criminal  Appeal  No.  870 of  

2006 is the son of one Jaswant Singh.  Jaswant Singh had  

married  accused  Chandra  @  Chandrawati,  who  is  

absconding  and  from  the  said  wedlock,  three  children,  

namely,  Satbir,  Atbir  and  Anju  were  born  to  them.  

Thereafter,  Jaswant  Singh  married  Sheela  Devi,  the  

deceased and from their wedlock, one daughter Sonu @  

Savita and one son Manish @ Mannu – the deceased, were  

born.  Sheela  Devi  –  the  2nd wife  of  Jaswant  Singh was  

staying  at  Mukherjee  Nagar,  Delhi,  with  her  children.  

They  were  having  dispute  over  the  division  of  their  

properties.   

(b)   On  the  afternoon  of  22.01.1996,  on  receiving  

information of murder of a man and that of one injured at  

N-33, Mukherjee Nagar, Delhi, Inspector Virender Singh,  

Addl. S.H.O., Mukherjee Nagar Police Station along with  

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ASI Kanwar Lal, Ct. Manoj Kumar and Ct. Jogender Singh  

rushed to  the  place  of  occurrence  and found two  dead  

bodies, one of female and other of a boy aged about 16  

years in the adjacent room on the ground floor of N-33,  

Mukherjee  Nagar,  Delhi.   Both  were  later  identified  as  

Smt. Sheela Devi, second wife of Jaswant Singh and her  

son Manish @ Mannu.  It was revealed at the spot that  

one injured, namely, Sonu @ Savita, daughter of Sheela  

Devi was removed to Hindu Rao Hospital in a PCR Gypsy.  

After  leaving  ASI  Kanwar  Lal  at  the  spot,  Inspector  

Virender Singh along with his team rushed to Hindu Rao  

Hospital  and  on  endorsement  given  by  Dr.  Sharat  

Chandra Jai Singh-PW 30 that “patient fit for statement”,  

recorded the statement given by Sonu @ Savita.  In the  

statement,  Sonu  @  Savita  alleged  that  Chandra  @  

Chandrawati  her step-mother, along with her son Atbir,  

one Ashok-appellant herein in Crl. Appeal No. 877 of 2006  

and one person whose name she did not know entered  

their house and demanded money from her mother Sheela  

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Devi but she refused.  Accused persons bolted the doors  

from inside and Atbir took out a knife and stabbed Manish  

@  Mannu,  who  was  held  by  Chandra  @  Chandrawati,  

Ashok and another.  Thereafter, Atbir stabbed Sheela Devi  

and  then  Sonu  @  Savita  with  knife.   On  the  above  

statement,  a  case  under  Sections  307  and  302  of  the  

Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as “I.P.C.”) was  

registered  at  Mukherjee  Nagar  Police  Station  and  

investigation  started.   On  24.01.1996,  Sonu  @  Savita  

succumbed  to  her  injuries  and  died  at  Hindu  Rao  

Hospital.   

(c)  On completion of the formalities, the challan was filed  

in  the  Court  of  Metropolitan  Magistrate  and  after  

completion  of  committal  proceedings,  the  case  was  re-

allocated to the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi.  

On  12.08.1997,  a  charge  under  Section  302  read  with  

Section 34 I.P.C. was framed against accused Atbir, Ashok  

and Chandra @ Chandrawati.   On 24.08.1999, on filing  

the  supplementary  challan  against  accused  Arvind,  the  

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charge  was  re-framed  against  all  the  accused  persons,  

namely, Atbir, Ashok, Arvind and Chandra @ Chandrawati  

by the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, to which they  

pleaded  not  guilty  and  claimed  trial.   Prosecution  

examined as many as 41 witnesses and their statements  

were recorded.  The Additional Sessions Judge, vide order  

dated  27.09.2004,  convicted  Atbir  –  appellant  in  Crl.A.  

No.870/2006 with death penalty and Ashok- appellant in  

Crl. A. No. 877/2006 with life imprisonment and acquitted  

Arvind.  The accused Chandra @ Chandrawati remained  

absconding.   Being  aggrieved  by  the  order  of  the  

Additional  Sessions  Judge,  Delhi,  the  appellants  herein  

filed appeal before the High Court.  The murder reference  

was also sent by the Sessions Court to the High Court.  

The  High  Court,  by  the  impugned  judgment  and  order  

dated 13.01.2006, confirmed the findings recorded by the  

Additional  Sessions Judge and upheld the conviction of  

the  appellants  awarded  by  him.   Against  the  said  

judgment, the appellants have preferred these appeals by  

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way of special leave before this Court.   

3)  Heard Mr. K.B. Sinha, learned senior counsel for the  

appellant  in  Crl.  Appeal  No.  870  of  2006,  Mr.  A.T.M.  

Rangaramanujam,  learned  senior  counsel  for  the  

appellant in Crl. Appeal No. 877 of 2006 and Mr. J.S. Atri,  

learned senior counsel for the respondent-State.         

4)  Mr. K. B. Sinha, learned senior counsel, has raised the  

following contentions:-

(i)  Whether the dying declaration made before the police  

officer  without  there  being  any  corroboration  from  any  

other independent witness in itself is sufficient to convict  

the accused with capital punishment.

(ii)  When there was sufficient time for the Magistrate to be  

called for recording the dying declaration, the statement  

made  before  the  Investigating  Officer  can be  treated  as  

dying declaration and the conviction of the accused with  

capital punishment can be sustained.

(iii)   When  the  Doctor-PW  30,  in  whose  presence  the  

alleged statement “Dying Declaration” was recorded, has  

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stated in his deposition that the trachea of the deceased  

Sonu  @  Savita  was  torn  then  whether  the  dying  

declaration made before the Investigation Officer  inspire  

the  confidence  to  base  the  conviction  on  the  said  sole  

statement.

(iv)   When  all  the  injuries  responsible  for  causing  the  

death, as noted in the statement of doctor C.B. Dabbas-

PW 9, who conducted the post-mortem on the dead body,  

were on the neck then whether the dying declaration made  

before the I.O. can be relied on to base the conviction.

(v)  Whether no corroboration of any kind is required to  

the  dying  declaration  and  the  conviction  can  be  based  

solely on the dying declaration.

(vi)  Whether the High Court is justified in holding that the  

lust for property was the motive of the accused persons for  

committing the murder.  

(vii)   Whether the courts below are justified in awarding  

death sentence in the facts and circumstances of the case  

and principles laid down by this Court.

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5)  Mr. Rangaramanujam, learned senior counsel for one  

of the appellants reiterated very same contentions relating  

to recording of dying declaration by the police officer when  

the Magistrate was very well available.  He also submitted  

that  in  the  absence  of  any  corroborative  evidence,  

conviction solely on the basis of dying declaration cannot  

be  sustained.   He  further  submitted  that  though,  the  

knife,  which  was  said  to  be  used  and  recovered,  

prosecution  has  not  established  the  ownership  of  the  

same.   

6)   Mr.  Atri,  learned  senior  counsel  for  the  State  has  

submitted that  in view of  the  categorical  statements  by  

way of dying declaration by Sonu @ Savita, recorded by  

police officer after certifying that she was in a fit state of  

mind to make a statement by the doctor coupled with the  

admissible  portion  of  Suresh  Chauhan  PW-2,  Arvind  

Monga PW-4, Jaswant Singh PW-5, Ct.  Kulvinder Singh  

PW-8, Dr. C.B. Dabbas PW-9, Dr. Ruma Jain PW-26 and  

Dr. Sharat Chandra Jai Singh PW-30, absolutely there is  

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no ground for interference.   He also highlighted that in  

view of aggravating circumstances, eliminating the entire  

family  and  considering  the  brutality  and  exceptional  

depravity,  the  appellant-Atbir  deserves  capital  

punishment.  The life imprisonment imposed on the other  

accused, namely, Ashok is also justifiable and there is no  

valid ground for interference and prayed for dismissal of  

both the appeals.

7)  We have carefully considered the rival contentions and  

perused the relevant materials.

8)   Among  the  various  contentions  raised  by  both  the  

sides, major part relates to two legal submissions:-

a)   Admissibility  and reliability  of  the  dying declaration  

made by Sonu @ Savita before the Investigating officer.

b)   Whether  death  sentence  insofar  as  Atbir  and  life  

sentence insofar as Ashok is warranted.

(A) “Dying Declaration”.

It is true that in the case on hand, conviction under  

Section  302  was  based  solely  on  the  dying  declaration  

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made  by  Sonu  @  Savita  and  recorded  by  Investigating  

Officer in the presence of a Doctor.  Since we have already  

narrated  the  case  of  prosecution  which  led  to  three  

deaths,  eliminating the second wife  and the children of  

one Jaswant Singh, there is no need to traverse the same  

once  again.   This  Court  in  a  series  of  decisions  

enumerated and analyzed that while recording the dying  

declaration,  factors  such  as  mental  condition  of  the  

maker, alertness of mind and memory, evidentiary value  

etc. have to be taken into account.  

9) In  Munnu  Raja  and  Another  vs.  The  State  of  

Madhya Pradesh, (1976) 3 SCC 104, this Court held:-

“….It  is  well  settled  that  though  a  dying  declaration  must be approached with caution for  the reason that  the maker of the statement cannot be subject to cross- examination, there is neither a rule of law nor a rule of  prudence which has hardened into a rule of law that a  dying  declaration  cannot  be  acted  upon  unless  it  is  corroborated….”

It is true that in the same decision, it was held, since the  

Investigating  Officers  are  naturally  interested  in  the  

success  of  the  investigation  and  the  practice  of  the  

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Investigating Officer himself recording a dying declaration  

during the course of an investigation ought not to have  

been encouraged.

10) In Paras Yadav and Ors. vs. State of Bihar, (1999)  

2 SCC 126, this Court held that lapse on the part of the  

Investigation  Officer  in  not  bringing  the  Magistrate  to  

record the statement of the deceased should not be taken  

in favour of the accused.  This Court further held that a  

statement of the deceased recorded by a police officer in a  

routine  manner  as  a  complaint  and  not  as  a  dying  

declaration can also be treated as dying declaration after  

the death of the injured and relied upon if the evidence of  

the  prosecution  witnesses  clearly  establishes  that  the  

deceased was conscious and was in a fit state of health to  

make the statement.

11) The effect  of  dying declaration not recorded by the  

Magistrate was considered and reiterated in Balbir Singh  

&  Anr.  Vs.  State  of  Punjab,  (2006)  12  SCC  283.  

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Paragraph 23 of the said judgment is relevant which reads  

as under:

“23.  However, in State of Karnataka v. Shariff, (2003)  2 SCC 473, this Court categorically held that there was  no  requirement  of  law  that  a  dying  declaration  must  necessarily  be  made before  a  Magistrate.   This  Court  therein noted its earlier decision in  Ram Bihari Yadav  v. State of Bihar,  (1998) 4 SCC 517, wherein it  was  also held that the dying declaration need not be in the  form of  questions  and answers.  (See  also  Laxman v.  State of Maharashtra, (2002) 6 SCC 710).”

It is clear that merely because the dying declaration was not  

recorded by the Magistrate, by itself  cannot be a ground to  

reject  the whole prosecution case.   It  also clarified that  

where  the  declaration  is  wholly  inconsistent  or  

contradictory statements are made or if  it  appears from  

the records that  the dying declaration is  not  reliable,  a  

question  may  arise  as  to  why  the  Magistrate  was  not  

called for,  but  ordinarily  the  same may not  be  insisted  

upon.  This Court further held that the statement of the  

injured, in event of her death may also be treated as FIR.

12) In State of Rajasthan vs. Wakteng, (2007) 14 SCC  

550,  the  view  in  Balbir  Singh’s  case(supra)  has  been  

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reiterated.  The following conclusions are relevant which  

read as under:

“14. Though conviction can be based solely on the  dying declaration, without any corroboration the same  should not be suffering from any infirmity.

15. While great solemnity and sanctity is attached to  the words of a dying man because a person on the verge  of death is not likely to tell lie or to concoct a case so as  to implicate an innocent person but the court has to be  careful to ensure that the statement was not the result  of  either  tutoring,  prompting  or  a  product  of  the  imagination.  It  is,  therefore,  essential  that  the  court  must be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of  mind  to  make  the  statement,  had  clear  capacity  to  observe  and  identify  the  assailant  and  that  he  was  making the statement without any influence or rancour.  Once the court is satisfied that the dying declaration is  true  and  voluntary  it  is  sufficient  for  the  purpose  of  conviction.”

13) In  Bijoy Das vs. State of West Bengal, (2008) 4 SCC  

511,  this  Court  after  quoting  various  earlier  decisions,  

reiterated the same position.

14) In  Muthu  Kutty  &  Anr.  Vs.  State  By  Inspector  of  

Police, T.N., (2005) 9 SCC 113, the following discussion and  

the ultimate conclusion are relevant which read as under:

“14. This is a case where the basis of conviction of the accused  is the dying declaration. The situation in which a person is on the  deathbed is so solemn and serene when he is dying that the grave  position  in  which  he  is  placed,  is  the  reason  in  law  to  accept  veracity  of  his  statement.  It  is  for  this  reason  that  the  requirements of oath and cross-examination are dispensed with.  

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Besides, should the dying declaration be excluded it will result in  miscarriage of justice because the victim being generally the only  eyewitness  in  a  serious  crime,  the  exclusion  of  the  statement  would leave the court without a scrap of evidence.

15. Though a dying declaration is entitled to great weight, it is  worthwhile  to  note  that  the  accused  has  no  power  of  cross- examination. Such a power is essential for eliciting the truth as an  obligation  of  oath  could  be.  This  is  the  reason  the  court  also  insists that the dying declaration should be of such a nature as to  inspire full confidence of the court in its correctness. The court  has to be on guard that the statement of the deceased was not as  a  result  of  either  tutoring,  or  prompting  or  a  product  of  imagination. The court must be further satisfied that the deceased  was in a fit state of mind after a clear opportunity to observe and  identify  the  assailant.  Once  the  court  is  satisfied  that  the  declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its  conviction  without  any  further  corroboration.  It  cannot  be  laid  down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot  form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule  requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence.”

15) The  same  view  has  been  reiterated  by  a  three  Judge  

Bench decision of this Court in Panneerselvam vs. State of  

Tamil  Nadu,  (2008)  17  SCC  190  and  also  the  principles  

governing the dying declaration as summed up in Paniben vs.  

State of Gujarat , (1992) 2 SCC 474.

16) The analysis of the above decisions clearly shows that,

(i) Dying declaration can be the sole basis of conviction  

if it inspires the full confidence of the Court.

(ii)  The Court should be satisfied that the deceased was  

in  a  fit  state  of  mind  at  the  time  of  making  the  

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statement and that it was not the result of tutoring,  

prompting or imagination.

(iii) Where the Court is satisfied that the declaration is  

true and voluntary, it can base its conviction without  

any further corroboration.  

(iv) It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that  

the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of  

conviction  unless  it  is  corroborated.   The  rule  

requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence.

(v) Where dying declaration is suspicious, it should not  

be acted upon without corroborative evidence.  

(vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity such  

as  the  deceased was unconscious and could never  

make  any  statement  cannot  form  the  basis  of  

conviction.

(vii) Merely because a dying declaration does not contain  

all  the details as to the occurrence, it  is not to be  

rejected.  

(viii)  Even  if  it  is  a  brief  statement,  it  is  not  to  be  

discarded.  

(ix) When the eye-witness affirms that the deceased was  

not in a fit  and conscious state to make the dying  

declaration, medical opinion cannot prevail.

   (x)     If after careful scrutiny, the Court is satisfied that it  

is  true  and  free  from  any  effort  to  induce  the  

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deceased  to  make  a  false  statement  and  if  it  is  

coherent  and  consistent,  there  shall  be  no  legal  

impediment  to  make  it  basis  of  conviction,  even if  

there is no corroboration.

17) In the case on hand,  the  Additional  Sessions Judge  

has found the dying declaration  credit worthy and has held  

the same to have been made by the deceased in a fit mental  

state  to  depose.   The  English  translation  of  the  dying  

declaration,  as  made  by  the  deceased  to  Inspector  V.S.  

Chauhan-PW-41 in the presence of Dr. Sharat Chandra Jai  

Singh, PW-30 and as recorded by him, which was registered  

as FIR reads thus:

Ms  Sonu  @ Savita,  d/o  Shri  Jaswant  Singh,  aged  16  

years,  r/o  –  N-33,  Mukherjee  Nagar,  Delhi  made  the  

following statement:-

“I  reside  at  the  aforesaid  address.   My  father’s  name  is  Jaswant Singh and that of my mother is Sheela.  Today at  about  2:30  p.m.   My mother  Sheela,  brother  Mannu and  myself were present in the house and were doing our work.  At that time, my step mother Chandra, her son Atbir, one  Ashok and one more person,  whose name I  do not  know,  entered our house and demanded money from my mother  whereupon, my mother told that she was not having money.  Thereafter,  Atbir  took  out  a  knife  while  my  step  mother  Chandra, Ashok and the third one caught hold of my brother  Manish @ Mannu.  Atbir, then stabbed upon my brother and  injured him badly.  Then, they caught hold of my mother.  Atbir also injured my mother badly.  Thereafter they caught  hold of me and gave several knife blows upon me as a result  

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of  which  I  also  got  badly  injured.   I  have  witnessed  the  incidence.   A.  PCR Van has brought me (to  the hospital).  Legal action may be taken accordingly.”

                                                                                                   Sd/- Sonu                                                                                                  (In English)

Attested

  Sd/- V.S. Chauhan

     (In English)

      Dt. 2.1.1996                                                                                                             S.H.O.

                                                                                    P.S. Mukherjee Nagar,Delhi

‘The statement has been taken in my presence.  The patient  is in composed mentis.’

Sd/- Sarat Chandra

      Jai Singh                                                                                                     (In English)                                                                                                Dt. 22.1.1996

                                                                                                    C.M.O.(5)”

After  making  the  above  declaration  she  herself  signed  the  

same  and  it  also  carries  an  endorsement  by  Dr.  Sharat  

Chandra to the effect that she was in a fit mental state.  After  

careful  analysis,  the  trial  Judge  as  well  as  the  High  Court  

found that there is total clarity in its contents and it is not a  

case where the deceased was either rambling, unsure or had  

contradicted herself.  We have already adverted to the several  

decisions of  this Court  holding that there is  no compulsion  

that  all  dying  declarations  have  to  be  made  before  the  

Magistrate.   In the  case on hand,  the incident  occurred on  

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22.01.1996  at  2.30  p.m.,   the  injured  Sonu  @ Savita  was  

admitted  in  the  hospital  at  3.30  p.m.  and  she  made  

declaration at 4.05 p.m. on the same day.  It is also relevant to  

note  that  immediately  after  recording  her  statement,  doctor  

referred her to Emergency Ward to save her life.  However, she  

died on 24.01.1996 at 12.30 p.m.  The Inspector who recorded  

the  statement  was  cross-examined  and  the  details  and  his  

evidence was not shattered by the defence, in fact, not even a  

suggestion to the Investigation Officer about the availability of  

Magistrate at the relevant point of time.  Since the statement  

of Sonu @ Savita was very brief as to the circumstances and  

persons involved who caused brutal injuries on her body as  

well as her mother and brother, in addition to the same, Dr.  

Sharat Chandra has also certified that at the relevant time she  

was in a fit mental state and endorsed the same by putting his  

signatures near the signature of the deponent Sonu @ Savita.  

In such circumstances,  there is  no reason to disbelieve the  

statement  of  Sonu  @  Savita  implicating  the  three  accused  

persons i.e. Atbir, Ashok (appellants herein) and Chandra @  

Chandrawati (absconding accused).

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18) Learned counsel appearing for the appellants, by pointing  

out the nature of injuries on the neck of Sonu @ Savita and  

her  medical  report,  contended  that  it  would  be  highly  

improbable to make such a statement after sustaining such  

injuries.   In  order  to  meet  the  above  contention,  the  

prosecution has heavily relied on the statements of   Dr. C.B.  

Dabas-PW-9,  Dr.  (Mrs.)  Ruma  Jain-PW-26  and  Dr.  Sharat  

Chandra-PW30.

19) Dr.  C.B.  Dabas-PW-9,  on  25.01.1995,  conducted  

postmortem examination on the body of the deceased Savita.  

He noticed 21 external injuries.  After internal examination, he  

found the following injuries on the neck:  

“Neck:  Wounds of the neck were further explode and it was  observed  that  muscles  of  neck  on  both  sides  were  cut.  Under injury No. 2, 4, 5 and 6.  With evidence of surgical  devridement and repair.  There was infusion of blood in neck  tissues and blood rest and blood was still  oozing out from  neck vessel of rt. Side.  Both external jugular veins and left  facial artery were cut under injury No. 2 and 4 with surgical  cultures  present  in  situ.   Right  carotid  was  partially  cut  under  injury  No.  6  alongwith  the  muscles  and  smaller  vessels of blood was still oozing out of the severed vessels.  There was a stitched wound on tracheal thyroid.  Traches  was patent.  Other neck structure were intact.”

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Since emphasis was about damage to carotid cartridge, there  

is no need to refer his examination about chest, abdomen and  

head.   It  is  also relevant  to note  question  and answer  and  

cross-examination about damage to carotid artery.

“Que: Kindly name the blood vessel which had been severed  in injury No. 6?

Ans. Mainly it was right common carotid cartridge and other  small vessels.

It  is  correct  that  injuries  no.  2,  4  and  5  external  jugular veins and left facial arteries were cut.  It is correct  that  jugular  and  carotid  artery  are  major  blood  vessels.  Carotid artery supplies blood to the brain.  Carotid artery  was partially cut. It is correct that with this partial cut in the  carotid artery the blood supply to the brain will be reduced.

Que:  Whether  this  reduced blood supply to the brain will  adversely affect the functioning of the brain and will induce  coma?

Ans. It will depend upon the amount of blood oozing out of  cut in common carotid artery.

I  have  not  given  the  dimension  of  the  cut  in  the  common carotid artery as described.  The bigger the size of  the cut in the artery it will speed up the process of affecting  the brain function.”

It is clear that according to PW-9, right carotid was partially  

cut.   Trachea  was  patent  and  other  neck  structures  were  

intact.  He has reiterated the same in cross-examination also.  

Inasmuch as  the  injury  on the  carotid  was  partial  coupled  

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with  opinion  of  Dr.  Sharat  Chandra  PW-30,  it  cannot  be  

claimed  that  she  was  fully  disabled  from  making  any  

statement.        

20) Dr.  (Mrs.)  Ruma Jain,  PW-26,  attached  to  Hindu  Rao  

Hospital  as  CMO,  on  the  date  of  the  incident  i.e.  on  

22.01.1996, in her evidence deposed that on that day at about  

3.30 PM Savita was brought by ASI  Shanti.   She medically  

examined her.  Though she found her general condition was  

not satisfactory she had stated that she was conscious and  

responding  to  verbal  command.   She  also  noted  various  

injuries  including  the  injury  on  the  neck.   Though  during  

cross-examination,  she  has  stated  that  the  drowsiness  was  

excessive but in respect of a specific question by the Public  

Prosecutor, she answered that “I did not indicate the extent of  

drowsiness in the MLC Ex.PW26/A.  What was mentioned by  

me was drowsiness and responding to verbal command.”  She  

also  clarified  that  before  signing  her  statement  before  re-

examination she had stated that the word excessive appearing  

in the cross-examination should not have been there.  If we  

analyze the evidence of PW-26, which also makes it clear that  

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at the time when Sonu @ Savita was admitted in the hospital  

at 3.30 PM though there was indication of drowsiness, the fact  

remains that she was responding to verbal command and able  

to make a statement.  

21) The  other  doctor  examined  by  the  prosecution  is  Dr.  

Sarat Chandra Jai Singh PW-30.  In his evidence, he deposed  

that on 22.01.1996, he was posted in Hindu Rao Hospital as  

Superintendent  of  Surgery.   On that day injured Sonu was  

brought to the hospital and she was medically examined by  

Dr.  Tomar,  Casualty  Medical  Officer  and  he  had  opined  

injured to be fit for statement on the MLC Ex.PW-26/A.  His  

further statement and assertion are as follows:-

“On that day Insp. V.S. Chauhan had met me at MLC Ward  and  he  had  told  me  that  a  dying  declaration  was  to  be  recorded  by  him (by  the  Insp.).   On  the  request  of  Insp.  Chauhan I medically examined injured Ms. Sonu.  She was  mentally  fit  to  maker  her  statement  i.e.  she  could  understand the questions and could answer the questions  put to her.  After I certified the injured to be medically fit for  statement Insp. V.S. Chauhan had recorded the statement of  injured Ms. Sonu Ex. PW4/A in my presence and I made my  endorsement Ex. PW-30/A to the erect  that the statement  had been taken in presence and the patient was in composed  mentis and the endorsement bears my signatures at point P.  Insp. Chauhan had read over statement Ex. PW 4/A to the  injured Ms. Sonu and she signed statement at point Q in  token of correctness of her statement.”

In the cross-examination, he deposed that:

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“When Insp. Chauhan was recording the statement of Ms.  Sonu I heard her statement and then after the recording of  this  statement  was  over,  Insp.  Chauhan  read  over  the  statement to me and at that time Ms. Sonu was also there  and then I signed this statement by giving my endorsement.  It is correct that I did not mention in my endorsement Ex.  PQ 30/A that Insp. Chauhan read over this statement.  To  me  and  Ms.  Sonu.   During  this  time,  Ms.  Sonu  was  in  surgical emergency ward.  Patient had stab injuries and the  injuries were pleading profusely.”

PW-30  also  asserted  that  immediately  after  her  statement,  

Sonu was taken to surgical  emergency ward, since she had  

stab injuries and was bleeding profusely.  It was in evidence  

that  she  was  continuously  in  the  emergency  ward  and  

ultimately  died  on 24.01.1996 at  12.30  PM.   This  was  the  

reason that  because  of  her  critical  position  after  admission  

and  making  her  statement,  the  Magistrate  could  not  be  

secured to record her statement.  

22) The  evidence  of  PW-26  and  PW-30,  who  had  treated  

Sonu,  indicate  that  immediately  after  admission  in  the  

hospital at 3.30 PM on 22.01.1996 and at the time of making  

statement at 4.05 PM she was in a fit  condition.  It  is also  

clear  that  immediately  after  her  statement  because  of  the  

injuries she was taken to emergency ward and she was kept  

therein till her death on 24.01.1996.  It is also clear that in  

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respect of injury on the carotid in view of the fact that it was  

only  partially  cut  and  able  to  speak  and  inform  what  had  

happened at 2.30 PM, her statement to Inspector P.S.Chauhan  

PW-41 in the presence of Dr. Sarat Chandra Jai Singh PW-30  

is legally permissible and admissible in evidence.  The learned  

trial Judge has rightly relied on those materials and the High  

Court  correctly  approved  the  same.   We  accept  the  said  

conclusion and reject the contentions raised by Mr. Sinha and  

Mr. Rangaramanujam.

(B) “Motive”

The prosecution has also proved motive.  It is abundantly  

clear  from the  evidence  of  Jaswant  Singh,  PW-5 that  when  

Satbir  and  his  brother  Atbir  demanded  25-26  Bighas  of  

agricultural  land  in  Bulandshahar,  U.P.  though  agreed  but  

executed a Will (Ex. PW-5/D) bequeathing those lands in their  

favour  but  the  same  was  not  acceptable  by  his  sons,  

particularly  Atbir  and  he  apprehended  that  because  of  the  

presence of his step-mother and her children, he may not get  

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properties of his father, both movable and immovable, at once.  

Since  this  was  in  his  mind  and  in  consultation  with  his  

mother Chandra @ Chandawati, he planned to eliminate the  

entire  family  of  Sheela.   These  aspects  have  been  amply  

projected by the prosecution and rightly accepted by the trial  

Court and the High Court.  

(C) Death sentence   

24)   When  the  constitutional  validity  of  death  penalty  for  

murder  provided  in  Section  302  of  the  Penal  Code  and  

sentencing procedure embodied in sub-section (3) of Section  

354 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, was questioned,  

the  Constitution  Bench of  this  Court  in  Bachan Singh v.  

State  of  Punjab,  (1980)  2  SCC  684,  after  thorough  

discussion,  rejected the  challenge  to the  constitutionality  of  

the said provisions and ruled that “life imprisonment is the  

rule and death sentence an exception”. It has also noted that  

“Aggravating  as  well  as  “Mitigating  Circumstances”  to  be  

considered for imposition of sentence of death.

“Aggravating Circumstances

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(a) If  the  murder  has  been  committed  after  previous  

planning and involves extreme brutality; or

(b) If the murder involves exceptional depravity; or

(c) If the murder is of a member of any of the armed forces  

of the Union or of a member of any police force or of any  

public servant and was committed:-

(i) While  such  member  or  public  servant  was  on  

duty; or

(ii) In consequence of anything done or attempted to  

be done by such member or public servant in the  

lawful discharge of his duty as such member or  

public servant whether at the time of murder he  

was such member or public servant, as the case  

may  be,  or  had  ceased  to  be  such  member  or  

public servant; or

(d) If the murder is of a person who had acted in the lawful  

discharge of his duty under Section 43 of the Code of  

Criminal  Procedure,  1973,  or  who  had  rendered  

assistance  to  a  Magistrate  or  a  police  officer  after  

demanding  his  aid  or  requiring  his  assistance  under  

Section 37 and Section 129 of the said Code.”

“Mitigating Circumstances”

(1) That the offence was committed under the influence of  

extreme mental or emotional disturbance.

(2) The age of the accused.  If the accused is young or old,  

he shall not be sentenced to death.

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(3) The  probability  that  the  accused  would  not  commit  

criminal  acts  of  violence  as  would  constitute  a  

continuing threat to society.

(4) The probability that the accused can be reformed and  

rehabilitated.

The State shall by evidence prove that the accused  

does not satisfy the conditions (3) and (4) above.

(5) That  in  the  facts  and  circumstances  of  the  case  the  

accused  believed  that  he  was  morally  justified  in  

committing the offence.

(6) That the accused acted under the duress or domination  

of another person.

(7) That the condition of the accused showed that he was  

mentally defective and that the said defect impaired his  

capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct.”  

25)   A three-Judge Bench in  Machhi Singh vs.  State  of  

Punjab,  (1983)  3  SCC 470 after  analyzing  the  Constitution  

Bench decision in  Bachan Singh (supra), held the following  

propositions for determination of rarest of rare cases:-  

“Death Sentence

32.  The reasons why the community as a whole does not  endorse  the  humanistic  approach  reflected  in  ‘death  sentence-in-no-case’ doctrine are not far to seek. In the first  place,  the  very  humanistic  edifice  is  constructed  on  the  foundation of ‘reverence for life’ principle. When a member of  the community violates this very principle by killing another  member,  the  society  may  not  feel  itself  bound  by  the  shackles of this doctrine. Secondly, it has to be realised that  every member of the community is able to live with safety  

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without his or her own life being endangered because of the  protective arm of the community and on account of the rule  of law enforced by it. The very existence of the rule of law  and the fear of being brought to book operates as a deterrent  for those who have no scruples in killing others if  it suits  their ends. Every member of the community owes a debt to  the  community  for  this  protection.  When  ingratitude  is  shown  instead  of  gratitude  by  ‘killing’  a  member  of  the  community which protects the murderer himself from being  killed, or when the community feels that for the sake of self- preservation the killer has to be killed, the community may  well  withdraw  the  protection  by  sanctioning  the  death  penalty. But the community will not do so in every case. It  may  do  so  ‘in  rarest  of  rare  cases’  when  its  collective  conscience is so shocked that it will expect the holders of the  judicial power centre to inflict death penalty irrespective of  their personal opinion as regards desirability or otherwise of  retaining death penalty. The community may entertain such  a sentiment when the crime is viewed from the platform of  the motive for, or the manner of commission of the crime, or  the anti-social or abhorrent nature of the crime, such as for  instance: I. Manner of commission of murder 33. When the murder is committed in an extremely brutal,  grotesque, diabolical, revolting or dastardly manner so as to  arouse intense and extreme indignation of the community.  For instance,

(i) when the house of the victim is set aflame with the end  in view to roast him alive in the house;

(ii)  when  the  victim  is  subjected  to  inhuman  acts  of  torture or cruelty in order to bring about his or her death; (iii) when the body of the victim is cut into pieces or his  

body is dismembered in a fiendish manner; II. Motive for commission of murder

34.  When  the  murder  is  committed  for  a  motive  which  evinces total depravity and meanness. For instance when (a)  a hired assassin commits murder for the sake of money or  reward  (b)  a  cold-blooded  murder  is  committed  with  a  deliberate  design  in  order  to  inherit  property  or  to  gain  control over property of a ward or a person under the control  of  the  murderer  or  vis-à-vis  whom  the  murderer  is  in  a  dominating position or in a position of trust, or (c) a murder  is committed in the course of betrayal of the motherland.

III. Anti-social or socially abhorrent nature of the crime 35. (a) When murder of a member of a Scheduled Caste or  minority  community,  etc.  is  committed  not  for  personal  reasons but in circumstances which arouse social wrath. For  instance  when  such  a  crime  is  committed  in  order  to  terrorise such persons and frighten them into fleeing from a  place  or  in  order  to  deprive  them  of,  or  make  them  surrender, lands or benefits conferred on them with a view to  

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reverse  past  injustices  and  in  order  to  restore  the  social  balance. (b) In cases of ‘bride burning’ and what are known as ‘dowry  deaths’ or when murder is committed in order to remarry for  the sake of extracting dowry once again or to marry another  woman on account of infatuation.

IV. Magnitude of crime 36. When the crime is enormous in proportion. For instance  when multiple murders say of all or almost all the members  of a family or a large number of persons of a particular caste,  community, or locality, are committed.

V. Personality of victim of murder 37. When the victim of murder is (a) an innocent child who  could not have or has not provided even an excuse, much  less  a  provocation,  for  murder  (b)  a  helpless  woman or  a  person rendered helpless by old age or infirmity (c) when the  victim  is  a  person  vis-à-vis  whom  the  murderer  is  in  a  position  of  domination  or  trust  (d)  when  the  victim  is  a  public  figure  generally  loved  and  respected  by  the  community for the services rendered by him and the murder  is  committed  for  political  or  similar  reasons  other  than  personal reasons.”

26)  In this background, the guidelines indicated in  Bachan  

Singh’s case (supra) have to be culled out and applied to the  

facts of each individual case where the question of imposing of  

death sentence arises. The following propositions emerge from  

Bachan Singh’s case:

“(i)  The  extreme penalty  of  death  need  not  be  inflicted  except in gravest cases of extreme culpability.

(ii) Before opting for the death penalty the circumstances  of the ‘offender’ also require to be taken into consideration  along with the circumstances of the ‘crime’.

(iii) Life imprisonment is the rule and death sentence is  an  exception.  In  other  words  death  sentence  must  be  imposed  only  when  life  imprisonment  appears  to  be  an  

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altogether  inadequate  punishment  having  regard  to  the  relevant circumstances of the crime, and provided, and only  provided, the option to impose sentence of imprisonment for  life cannot be conscientiously exercised having regard to the  nature and circumstances of the crime and all the relevant  circumstances.

(iv)  A  balance  sheet  of  aggravating  and  mitigating  circumstances  has  to  be  drawn  up  and  in  doing  so  the  mitigating circumstances have to be accorded full weightage  and a just balance has to be struck between the aggravating  and  the  mitigating  circumstances  before  the  option  is  exercised.”

In order to apply these guidelines, inter alia, the following  

questions may be asked and answered:

“(a) Is there something uncommon about the crime which  renders  sentence  of  imprisonment  for  life  inadequate  and  calls for a death sentence?

(b) Are the circumstances of the crime such that there is  no  alternative  but  to  impose  death  sentence  even  after  according  maximum  weightage  to  the  mitigating  circumstances which speak in favour of the offender?”

If upon taking an overall global view of all the circumstances  

in  the  light  of  the  aforesaid  proposition  and  taking  into  

account the answers to the questions posed hereinabove, the  

circumstances  of  the  case  are  such that  death  sentence  is  

warranted, the Court would proceed to do so.

27) In  view  of  the  principles  culled  out  from  the  earlier  

decisions, let us find out whether the present case would fall  

in  the  category  of  rarest  of  the  rare  case  warranting  death  

sentence.    

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28) It is seen from the evidence of Jaswant Singh, PW-5 that  

he had married one Chandra @ Chandrawati in the year 1963.  

Three children, namely, Satbir, Atbir and Anju were born to  

them.  However, in 1971 Jawant Singh had deserted his wife  

Chandra and in 1973 he married Sheela Devi, the deceased,  

as his second wife.  Two children, namely, Sonu @ Savita and  

Manish @ Manu were born from the second wife.  It is further  

seen from the evidence of Jaswant Singh that his first wife’s  

son Satbir visited him and demanded transfer of agricultural  

land  of  25-26  bighas  in  Bulandshahar,  U.P.  in  favour  of  

himself  and  Atbir.   Though  Jaswant  Singh  agreed  to  the  

request but executed a Will (Ex. PW-5/D) in 1995 bequeathing  

those lands in favour of Satbir and Atbir.  It is further seen  

that these two sons, namely, Satbir and Atbir were insisting  

on immediate transfer by way of a registered document.  In  

addition to the same, they also demanded a house in Mathura  

or share in House No. N-33 Mukherjee Nagar, Delhi.  It is the  

categorical  stand  of  Jaswant  Singh  that  Atbir,  Satbir  and  

Chandra used to demand money.  They also threatened that if  

he fails to pay the money as demanded, they would kill him.  

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The fact that Atbir was not in a position to enjoy the lands as  

demanded and his father  refused to pay money made Atbir  

and her mother to take some drastic steps.  It  is also their  

grievance and in their mind that because his father wants to  

part with major properties in favour of Sheela,  second wife,  

and their children Sonu @ Savita and Manish @ Mannu, it is  

in their mind that so long as the second wife and her children  

were  alive,  he  and  his  brother  may  not  get  any  thing  and  

decided to do away with the family of Sheela.  In other words,  

all  the accused persons including Atbir felt that they would  

not get their legitimate share in the property as long as Sheela  

and her children are alive and, therefore, they should do away  

with.   As  rightly  observed  by  the  trial  Court  and the  High  

Court,  this  could  provide  a  strong  motive  to  the  accused  

persons for committing the crime.   

29) As argued before the Courts below, learned counsel for  

the appellant has raised a similar contention stating that Atbir  

was a young man of 25 years and already spent ten years in  

jail, that itself is a sufficient punishment for the crime.  He  

also highlighted that he had no past history of any crime and  

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it cannot be claimed that it is impossible to change his state of  

mind in the future. He also pointed out that Atbir’s main aim  

was to grab the property of  his father immediately  that too  

without  giving  a  share  to  anyone.   By  pointing  out  these  

mitigating  circumstances  and  the  legal  principles  as  

formulated  in  Bachan Singh’s  case  and Machhi  Singh’s  

case,  prayed for leniency and according to him, punishment  

of death sentence is not warranted.

30) It  is relevant to mention that Jaswant Singh, father of  

Atbir deserted his first wife and their children in 1971.  Atbir  

and his brother Satbir had some grievance about their father  

for deserting their mother and living with Sheela Devi – second  

wife and her children.  Apart from the same, Atbir demanded  

land and house property and money immediately, though his  

father Jaswant Singh agreed and executed a Will.  Since the  

properties would come to his hands only after the demise of  

his father, Atbir along with other accused persons committed  

this ghastly crime.  As rightly observed by the courts below,  

among the three accused, Atbir planned for the crime which  

was executed in a brutal manner and decided to wipe out the  

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entire family so that his father would leave all the properties  

and money in their favour.

31) The  manner  in  which  three  persons  were  brutally  

murdered shocks  the  conscience.   The  aggravated  accused,  

under  the  leadership  of  Atbir,  reached the  house  of  Sheela  

Devi and initially demanded money and bolted the door from  

inside  and,  thereafter,  inflicted  11  cut  injuries  on  Manish  

@Mannu by Atbir when the others caught hold of him. After  

finishing him, Atbir inflicted 5 grievous injuries on deceased  

Sheela mercilessly.  He also inflicted another 21 injuries on  

the  deceased  Sonu @ Savita  ignoring  her  tender  age.   The  

manner in which Atbir first stabbed Manish @ Mannu followed  

by Sheela and then Sonu @ Savita showed that there was a  

determination to finish the entire family so that he and his  

brother enjoy the entire property and money immediately.

32) Another aggravating circumstance is that the crime had  

been committed and executed after closing the doors with all  

the three deceased being left helpless and unarmed.  Closing  

of  the  door  and  bolting  it  from  inside  clearly  shows  the  

determination to complete the crime and take away the life of  

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all the three.  Among them, two of them were in the young age  

and they could not be provoked and instigated in any manner.

33) It is seen from the evidence of the Doctors particularly,  

Post-mortem Doctor, that the accused Atbir inflicted as many  

as 37 knife injuries on the body of three innocent persons.  A  

perusal  of  the  post-mortem  reports  of  the  three  deceased  

clearly shows the nature of the injuries inflicted on all the vital  

parts and the accused Atbir continued his action mercilessly  

till  all  the  three  lost  their  breath.   Fortunately,  before  the  

death of Sonu @ Savita, she was taken to the hospital where  

she made a statement to the effect that how they were killed  

by  the  accused  particularly,  by  Atbir.   She  categorically  

mentioned  that  it  was  Atbir  who  took  out  the  knife  and  

inflicted  stab  blows  on  all  the  three  deceased.   We  have  

already mentioned the fact that Atbir inflicted 37 knife blows  

which resulted in the death of three persons.

34) After  analyzing all  the  relevant  materials  let  in  by the  

prosecution and in the light of the well established principles  

including  aggravating and mitigating circumstances as laid by  

the Constitution Bench in Bachan Singh’s case (supra) and  

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explained in  Machhi Singh’s case (supra),  we conclude the  

murders committed by Atbir is extremely brutal and diabolical  

one.  The cold blooded murder is committed with deliberate  

design in order to inherit the entire property of Jaswant Singh  

without waiting for his death.  The magnitude of the crime is  

also enormous in proportion since Atbir, with the assistance of  

his mother and brother, committed multiple murders of all the  

members of the family.  Apart from this, the victims are none  

else than his step-mother, brother and sister.  The victims are  

innocent  who could  not  have  or  has  not  provided  even an  

excuse  much  less  a  provocation  for  murder.   Further,  the  

victims were unaware of the sudden entry of Atbir and others  

and after bolting the door from inside, they have no other way  

to go out or resist except subjecting themselves to the wishes  

of Atbir.  Though the accused Atbir was also at the age of 25 at  

the relevant point of time considering his hunger and lust for  

property killing his  own family members when they had no  

occasion to provoke or resist and causing 37 knife blows on  

vital parts of all the three persons, we conclude that it is a  

gravest case of extreme culpability and rarest of rare case and  

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death sentence alone would be proper and adequate.  We have  

already noted that the accused had no justifiable ground for  

his action.  We are also satisfied that the victims were helpless  

and undefended.  Taking into consideration of all the facts and  

materials,  it  is  crystal  clear  that  the  entire  act  of  Atbir  

amounts to a barbaric and inhuman behaviour of the highest  

order. The manner in which the murder was carried out in the  

present  case  is  extremely  brutal,  gruesome,  diabolical,  and  

revolting  as  to  shock  the  collective  conscience  of  the  

community.  

35) In  the  light  of  the  above  discussion,  we  confirm  the  

conviction and sentence of  death imposed on Atbir  and the  

same  shall  be  executed  in  accordance  with  law.   We  also  

confirm  the  conviction  and  sentence  of  life  imprisonment  

imposed on Ashok.  

36) Consequently, both the appeals are dismissed.     

...…………………………………J.                   (P. SATHASIVAM)  

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...…………………………………J.           (DR. B.S. CHAUHAN)  

NEW DELHI; AUGUST 9, 2010.                                     

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