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PETITIONER: ASSOCIATED CEMENT COMPANIES LTD. ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: T.C.SHRIVASTAVA & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT29/03/1984

BENCH: TULZAPURKAR, V.D. BENCH: TULZAPURKAR, V.D. PATHAK, R.S.

CITATION:  1984 AIR 1227            1984 SCR  (3) 361  1984 SCALE  (1)596  CITATOR INFO :  F          1985 SC1416  (68,96)  RF         1986 SC 555  (6)

ACT:      Industrial  Employment(Standing   Orders)  Act,   1946- Standing  Orders-Certified  Standing  Order  No.17-Providing that all  dismissal orders shall be passed by the Manager or Acting Manager  who shall  do so after giving the accused an opportunity  to  offer  any  explanation-Interpretation  of- Whether contemplates  second opportunity  to  workman  after conclusion of  enquiry and  before inflicting  punishment of dismissal-Whether enquiry  gets vitiated  in absence of such opportunity.

HEADNOTE:      Four workmen  of the  appellant company in Civil Appeal No. 209/73  were  charged  for  mis-conduct  as  defined  in Standing order No. 16. The enquiry officer found them guilty of the charges. On the basis of the Enquiry officer’s report and after  looking into  the previous record of the workmen, the General Manager dismissed them. On a dispute having been raised it  was referred to the arbitrator, first respondent, under section  10A of  the Industrial Disputes Act 1947. The arbitrator held  that the  enquiry which  was otherwise fair and valid  was vitiated  because no  second opportunity  was given to  the workmen  before dismissing them as required by the Standing  order No.  17. The  Arbitrator set  aside  the dismissal of  two workmen  and confirmed  that of  the other two. The  management and the workman challenged the award in the High  Court  by  two  writ  petitions.  The  High  Court confirmed the  award and  dismissed both the writ petitions. Hence these appeals by management and the workmen.      Allowing the  appeal of  the management  and dismissing that of the workmen. ^      HELD: Under Standing order No. 17 no second opportunity of  showing   cause  on   the  question   of  punishment  is contemplated. [367D]      Neither under  the ordinary  law of  the land nor under industrial law  a second  opportunity to  show cause against the proposed  punishment is  necessary. This of course, does not mean  that the standing order may not provide for it but

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unless the Standing order provide for it either expressly or by necessary implication, no enquiry which is otherwise fair and  valid   will  be  vitiated  by  non-affording  of  such opportunity. [369B-D]      Standing Order  No. 17  provides that  a worker  may be suspended, fined or dismissed if found guilty of mis-conduct as defined  in Standing  Order No.  16. Para  3 of  Standing Order No. 17 says that "all dismissal orders shall be passed by the  Manager or  Acting Manager  who shall  do  so  after giving the accused an opportunity to offer any explanation." The question  is whether  para 3  provides for  such  second opportunity being  given to  the delinquent ? The words "all dis- 362 missal orders  shall be  passed by the Manager after giving, the accused an opportunity to any offer explanation" in para 3 of  Standing Order  No. 17  are  wholly  inappropriate  to convey the  idea of  a second  hearing or opportunity on the question of  punishment but  appropriate in  the context  of seeking an explanation’ in regard to the alleged mis-conduct charged against  him. An  ’explanation’ is to be called from the ’accused’  which suggests  that the same is to be called for prior  to the recording of a finding that the delinquent is guilty of mis-conduct; it is the alleged mis-conduct that is to  be explained  by him and not the proposed punishment. On  a   plain  reading  of  the  relevant  words  no  second opportunity of showing cause against the proposed punishment is   contemplated   either   expressly   or   by   necessary implication. In other word, it is clear that the opportunity spoken of  by para  3  of  Standing  Order  No.  17  is  the opportunity to  be given  to  the  delinquent  to  meet  the charges framed  against  him.  Further,  since  the  instant Standing Order was certified prior to the enunciation of the law by  Courts regarding the observance of the principles of natural justice  such as issuance of a charge-sheet, holding of an  inquiry, opportunity to lead evidence, etc. It merely contains  a  bald  provision  for  ’giving  the  accrued  an opportunity to  offer  any  explanation’.  In  other  words. different stages  in domestic  inquiry  were  never  in  the contemplation of  the framers  of the  Standing Order.  That being the  position it  would be  difficult to attribute any intention to  the framers  thereof to  provide for  a second opportunity being  given to  the delinquent of showing cause against the proposed punishment. [368A-E; 369C-H; 370A-B]      The view of the Arbitrator as also the view of the High Court proceed  on an  assumption the  Standing Order  No. 17 deals with  two  different  stages  concerning  disciplinary proceedings  against   a  delinquent,  first  holding  of  a departmental inquiry  into the  charges where  principles of natural justice must be implied and second the infliction of graver punishment  before awarding which opportunity to show cause has  been provided  for; but  the plain reading of the Standing Order  read as  a whole  does not  warrant any such assumption  and,   therefore,  the  construction  placed  on Standing order No. 17 by the Arbitrator or the High Court is not possible much less reasonably possible. [373H; 371A-B]      In the  instant case,  admittedly, opportunity to offer explanation in  regard to  the alleged  mis-conduct was  not only afforded  but was  availed of  by  the  concerned  foul workers by  submitting their  written  explanations  to  the Manager whereafter  the departmental  inquiry was  held.  In other words  Standing Order  No. 17  was fully complied with and what  is more  the Arbitrator  has held that the inquiry was otherwise fair and valid. [371D]

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JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil  Appeal No. 209 of 1973.      (Appeal by  Special leave  from the  Judgment and Order dated the 27th July 1972 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Misc. Petition No. 129 of 1970)                             AND                Civil Appeal No. 1140 of 1974      (From the  Judgment and order dated the 27th July, 1972 of the  Madhya Pradesh  High Court  in Misc. Case No. 365 of 1970.) 363      F.N. Kaku  and D.N. Misra for the Appellants in CA. No. 209 of 1973 & For the Respondent No.2 in CA. 1140/74.      M.K. Ramamurthy, Vineet Kumar and Naresh K. Sharma, for the Respondent Nos.2 & 4 in CA.209/73 & for the Appellant in CA. No.1140 of 1974.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      TULZAPURKAR, J.  The principal  question raised for our determination in  these appeals  is: Whether  on its  proper construction the  certified Standing  Order 17  provides for second opportunity being given to a workman after conclusion of the  inquiry into his misconduct and before inflicting on him the  punishment of  dismissal  and  if  so  whether  the enquiry gets vitiated by not affording him such opportunity?      Facts giving  rise to  the question  may be stated. The Associated Cement Companies Limited (hereinafter called ’the Appellant’) has  quarries worked  by its  department  called Kymore &  Bamangaon Lime-stone  Mines  at  Kymore,  District Jabalpur, M.P.  Workers employed in the said quarries have a union called  Kymore Quarry  Karamchari Sangh  and the  four concerned workmen  Rama Shanker,  Barmapradhan, Emmanual and Mohd. Rauf (hereinafter called the Respondents’) were at the material time the office bearers in the union.      In  connection   with   the   implementation   of   the Recommendations of  Second Central Wage Board for the cement industry, after serving a strike notice on the management of the Appellant  on 13th September, 1968, the Karamchari Sangh and all its Members went on a strike for 24 hours commencing from  the  mid-night  of  19th  September,  1968  which  was accompanied by  acts of  intimidation, threats, ghearoes and unlawful obstruction. According to the management before the commencement of  the strike  two meetings  were organized by the Respondents,  one at  4 P.M. and the other at 11 P.M. on 19th September  at which  fiery speeches  were made  by them wherein they  not only  instigated  the  quarry  workers  to resort to  strike but  intimidated and prevented the willing workers from 364 going to their work and threatened the supervisory staff and officers with  dire consequences  if they  tried to work the quarries and  what  is  more  from  the  mid-night  of  19th September till  4.30  A.M.  on  20th  September  the  quarry Manager and  the supervisory staff were ghearoed and at 4.30 A.M. the  Agent’s  car  stopped  at  the  gate  and  he  was unlawfully obstructed  from visiting  the  querry  premises. Since resorting  to a  strike without  giving 14 days’ prior notice as  also the  aforesaid  acts  on  the  part  of  the Respondents  amounted   to  serious  mis-conduct  under  the certified Standing  Orders applicable  to the  quarries  the Management served  Charge-sheets dated  3rd of October. 1968 on  the  Respondents  in  which  four  common  charges  were levelled against all of them; in addition a fifth charge was

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levelled against  two of  them Emmanual  and Mohd. Rauf; and yet another  6th charge was levelled against Mohd. Rauf. The common charges  were (a)  themselves going on strike without 14 days’  prior notice,  (b) inciting  and instigating other workers to  go on  strike, (c)  gheraoing the Quarry Manager and other  supervisory staff between mid-night and 4.30 A.M. on 20th  September and  inciting others  to gherao  the said staff and (d) forcibly and unauthorisedly occupying the area near the  quarry canteen  between 4 P.M. on 19th Sept. and 1 A.M. on  20th Sept.  and installing  and using loud-speakers for inciting  the workers.  Shri Emmanual and Shri Rauf were further charged  with threatening  the gheraoed  staff  with dire consequences,  if they  moved out;  and Mohd.  Rauf was charged in  addition for  having restrained the Quarry Agent from entering  the quarry  premises.  The  respondents  were called upon  to submit  their explanation  in respect of the charges to  the General  Manager which  they did;  in  their Explanations they  by and  large denied the charges levelled against them.  A departmental  enquiry was held against them by Shri  H.S. Mathur during the course of which at one stage the Respondents  withdrew from  the enquiry on 24th October, 1968 on  the plea  that the  Quarry Agent should be examined first which  was not  being  done,  whereafter  the  enquiry proceeded ex-parte  and on  a consideration  of  the  entire evidence led  before him  the Enquiry  Officer came  to  the conclusion that  the first  three charges  were fully proved and the  fourth charge  was partly  proved against  all  the respondents while  the additional  charges against  Emmanual and Mohd.  Rauf were  also proved.  The Enquiry  Report  was forwarded to  the General  Manager who after considering the same and  after taking  into account  the  previous  service record of  the Respondents by his order dated 31st December, 1968 dismissed  the Respondents from service. That order was served on the Respondents on 30th January, 1969. 365      A dispute  having been  raised  with  regard  to  their dismissal, by  common consent,  the same was referred to the arbitration of  Shri T.C.  Shrivastava, a  retired Judge  of M.P. High  Court, under sec. 10-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947  on 14th  ’April, 1969.  The Arbitrator  gave  his Award  on   9th  February,  1970  whereby  he  came  to  the conclusion that  the enquiry  which was  otherwise fair  and valid was  vitiated because  no second opportunity was given to the  Respondents of  showing cause  against the  proposed punishment before  the issuance  of their dismissal order as required by  the Standing Order No. 17; he further held that though before  him the  Management had  by leading  evidence proved their  mis-conduct by  establishing the  first  three charges against  all, the  fifth charge against Emmanual and Mohd. Rauf  (fourth charge  being  held  not  to  have  been proved) the  punishment of  dismissal in respect of Emmanual and  Mohd.  Rauf  could  be  confirmed  but  set  aside  the dismissal in respect of Rama Shanker and Barmapradhan on the ground that  while  fomenting  the  strike  the  conduct  of Emmanual and Mohd. Rauf was graver than that of Rama Shanker and Barmapradhan and instead ordered their reinstatement but without back  wages. The  Appellant challenged  the Award in the High  Court by  means of a Writ Petition (Misc. Petition No.  129   of  1970)  contending  that  the  Arbitrator  had misconstrued Standing  Order  No.  17  and  that  no  second opportunity was  required to be given to the Respondents and that in the alternative the interference with the punishment of dismissal in respect of Rama Shanker and Barmapradhan was erroneous while  another writ  petition (Misc.  Petition No. 365 of  1970) was  filed  by  the  Respondents  against  the

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punishments that  were awarded  to each one of them the High Court by  its judgment  dated 27th  July, 1972 confirmed the Award  of   the  Arbitrator  by  dismissing  both  the  writ petitions.      The Appellant has come up in appeal (being Civil Appeal No. 209/73)  by special  leave challenging  the interference with the  dismissal of  Rama Shanker and Burma Pradhan while the Respondents  have preferred  their appeal  (being  Civil Appeal No.  1140 of  1974) on  a Certificate  granted by the High Court  challenging the  punishments   operating against each one  of them.  At this  stage it  may be stated that as regards  Emmanual   and  Mohd.  Rauf  the  matter  has  been compromised between  the  parties  which  has  already  been recorded by this Court with the result that Civil Appeal No. 1140 of  1974 in  so far  as their dismissal is concerned no longer survives  and the  same needs  to be dealt with by us only as  regards back  wages that  have  been denied to Rama Shanker and Burmapradhan. 366      In support  of civil Appeal No. 209 of 1973 Counsel for the Appellant  raised three  contentions before  us. In  the first place,  he contended  that the  learned Arbitrator  as well as  the  High  Court  have  erroneously  construed  the certified Standing  order  No.  17  as  requiring  a  second opportunity being  given to  a workman  at the conclusion of the enquiry  into his mis-conduct and before inflicting upon him the  punishment of  dismissal; he urged that the concept of second  opportunity being  given to  a  delinquent  which obtained under  sec. 240(3)  of the Government of India Act, 1935 or  Art. 311 of the Constitution prior to the insertion of the  Proviso to  Article 311  (2) could not be invoked or applied to the instant case nor was  such second opportunity any requirement  of the  ordinary law  of  the  land  or  of Industrial law  and in  this behalf  reliance was  placed on two decisions of this Court in Hamdard Dawakhana case and in Saharanpur Light  Rly, case.  Counsel urged  that on  proper construction of  the Standing order it should have been held that no  second opportunity  was contemplated thereunder and therefore  the  finding    that  the  enquiry  was  vitiated deserved to be set aside and according to him if the enquiry was valid  and was  not vitiated the punishment of dismissal imposed on  Rama  Shanker  and  Barmapradhan  could  not  be interfered with.  In the  alternative counsel contended that assuming that  the  enquiry  was  vitiated  for  the  reason mentioned by  the Arbitrator  even than  once  serious  mis- conduct was  proved by  leading evidence  before the learned Arbitrator it  was not  open to   him  to interfere with the punishment of  dismissal unless  the punishment was so harsh as to  smack of  victimisation. In  the further  alternative counsel contended  that assuming  that  the  Arbitrator  had power to  interfere with  the punishment in the instant case having to  the facts  and circumstances he was not justified in  setting   aside  the   dismissal  of  Rama  Shanker  and Barmapradhan especially  on the  ground on  which he  did so namely, that the conduct of Shri Emmanual and Mohd. Rauf was more grave  than that of Rama Shanker and Barmapradhan while fomenting the  strike; counsel  urged that  passively taking part in the strike was distinguishable from the more serious mis-conduct of  fomenting or inciting the strike and all the respondents were  found guilty  by the learned Arbitrator of such serious  mis-conduct and  as such no distinction on the distinction on  the basis  indicated between the two sets of workmen should  have been  made in the matter of punishment, on the other hand coun- 367

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    sel for  the Respondents  urged that Standing order No. 17 had  been properly  construed by  the Arbitrator  and the High Court and that construction should be upheld and in any case  if  two  constructions  were  reasonably  possible  no interference by  this Court  was called  for and  counsel in that behalf  relied upon  the decision Agani (W.M.) v. Badri Das and  ors. Counsel  further urged  that once the  enquiry got vitiated the entire field of determining the mis-conduct as  also   the  punishment  therefor  became  open  and  the Arbitrator had  jurisdiction and  power to consider both the aspects  and   that  the   Arbitrator  in   the  facts   and circumstances of  the case  had justifiably  interfered with the dismissal  of Rama  Shanker  and  Barmapradhan  and  had directed their reinstatement.      From the  rival contentions  summarised above  it  will appear clear  that the  real question  that arises  in these appeals is, does the certified Standing order No. 17 provide for second  opportunity being  given to  a workman  to  show cause against  the proposed punishment of dismissal, for, it was  not   disputed  before   us  that  if  no  such  second opportunity is  contemplated by  it then  the only ground on which the inquiry has been held to be invalid by the learned Arbitrator and  the  High  Court  would  disappear  and  the Arbitrator could not have entered into merits of the case or interfered with  the punishment  of dismissal inflicted upon Rama  Shanker   and  Barmapradhan.  The  question  obviously depends upon  the proper   construction to be placed on said S.O. 17. It may be stated that the certified S.O. 16 enlists several acts  or omissions that constitute ’mis-conduct’ and striking work  either singly  or with  other workers without giving 14  days previous  notice,  inciting  whilst  on  the premises and  worker to  strike  work  and  indulging  in  a Gherao,  which   would  amount  to  an  ’act  subversive  of discipline or  efficiency’ are  obviously included  therein. S.O. 17  which deals with punishments and procedure therefor runs thus:           "17. A  worker may  be suspended  for a period not      exceeding 4  days  or  fined  in  accordance  with  the      Payment of Wages Act or dismissed without notice or any      compensation in  lieu of  notice  it  found  guilty  of      misconduct defined in Standing order No. 16. 368           All orders  of suspension  and fines  shall be  in      writing  setting  out  the  misconduct  for  which  the      punishment is awarded. No officer below the rank of the      Head of Department shall award the above punishment           All dismissal order shall be passed by the Manager      or Acting  , ’Manager  who shall  do  so  after  giving      accuse an  opportunity to  offer any  explanation.  Due      consideration to  the gravity of the misconduct and the      previous  record  of  the  worker  shall  be  given  in      awarding the maximum punishment.      In the  event of  a discharge  of dismissal, the worker      shall  be  paid  off  within  the  second  working  day      following the discharge or dismissal."      The question  is whether  when paragraph  3 of the S.O. says: "all  dismissal orders  shall be passed by the Manager or Acting   Manager who shall do so after giving the accused an opportunity  to offer  any explanation",  it contemplates giving of  a second  opportunity to  the delinquent  to show cause against  the proposed punishment of dismissal after he has been  found guilty  or the  opportunity spoken of is the opportunity to meet the charges in the domestic inquiry ?      At the  outset the legal position as has been clarified by this  Court in  the Saharanpur  Light Railway  Co.’s case

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(supra)  may   be  stated.   In  the   context  of   certain modification sought  to be  introduced in  a Standing  order requiring a second show cause notice this Court has observed thus: ’           "As regards  the modification  requiring a  second      show cause notice, neither the ordinary law of the land      nor the  industrial law  requires an  employer to  give      such a  notice. In  none of  the decisions given by the      Courts or  the Tribunals  , such  a second  show  cause      notice in  the case  of removal has ever been demand or      considered necessary.  The only  class of  cases  where      such a  notice has  been held to be necessary are those      arising under  Art. 311. Even that has now been removed      by the recent amendment of that Article. To import such      a retirement  from Art.  311 in industrial matters does      not  appear to be either necessary or proper and. would      be equating  industrial employees  with civil servants.      In our view, there is no justification or any principle      for such equation. 369      Besides, such a requirement would unnecessarily prolong      disciplinary  enquiries   which  in   the  interest  of      industrial peace should be disposed of in short time as      possible. In  our view  it is  not possible to consider      this modification  as justifiable  either on the ground      of reasonableness  of fairness  and should therefore be      set aside."      It is  thus clear neither under the ordinary law of the land nor  under industrial  law a second opportunity to show cause against the proposed punishment is necessary. This, of course, does  not mean that a Standing order may not provide for it but unless the Standing order provides for it. either expressly or  by necessary  implication no  inquiry which is otherwise fair  and valid  will be vitiated by non-affording of such  second opportunity.  The question is whether para 3 of the  Standing order  No.  17  provides  for  such  second opportunity being  given to  the delinquent  ? The  relevant words are  " all  dismissal order  shall be  passed  by  the Manager alter giving the accused an opportunity to offer any explanation". The  underlined words are wholly inappropriate to convey the idea of a second hearing on opportunity on the question of  punishment but  appropriate in  the context  of seeking an  explanation in  regard to the alleged misconduct charged against  him. An  explanation’ is  to be called from the ’accused’  which suggests  that the same is to be called for prior to the recording of finding that the delinquent is guilty of  misconduct: it  is the alleged misconduct that is to be explained by him and not the proposed punishment. On a plain reading of the relevant words no second opportunity of showing   cause   against   the   proposed   punishment   is contemplated either  expressly or  by necessary implication. In other  words, it  is clear   to  us that  the opportunity spoken of  by para  3 OE  S.O. 17  is the  opportunity to be given to  the delinquent  to meet  the charge framed against him. In this connection it will be pertinent to mention that the concerned  S.O. was  framed and came into force on March 1, 1946 and was duly certified on October 16, 1954 under the Industrial employment (Standing orders) Act, 1946 i.e. prior to the  enunciation of  the  law  by  Courts  regarding  the observance of  the principles  of natural  justice  such  as issuance  of   a  charge-sheet,   holding  of   an  inquiry, opportunity to lead evidence, etc. and it is well-known that after the  enunciation of  these principles  model  standing orders have  been framed  to provide  for the detailed steps required to  be undertaken  during a domestic inquiry. Since

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the Instant  Standing  order  was  certified  prior  to  the formulation of the above principles it merely 370 contains  a  bald  provision  for  ‘giving  the  accused  an opportunity to  offer  any  explanation’.  In  other  words, different stages  in domestic  inquiry  were  never  in  the contemplation of  the framers  of the  S.O. That  being  the position it would be difficult to attribute any intention to the framers  thereof to  provide for  a  second  opportunity being given  to the  delinquent of showing cause against the proposed punishment.  The latter part of para 3 merely casts a  unilateral  obligation  on  concerned  authority  or  the officer to  give due  consideration to  the gravity  of  the misconduct and  the previous  record of  the  delinquent  in awarding the maximum punishment.      It is  true that  the Arbitrator  has undoubtedly taken the view  that the  opportunity spoken of by para 3 does not refer to  the opportunity  to meet the charges but refers to the further  opportunity being  given to  the delinquent  to show cause  against the  graver punishment of dismissal that may be  proposed to  be inflicted  on him.  But for reaching such a conclusion he has resorted to some involved reasoning which is  not warranted  by the  Standing order if read as a whole. According  to him  in  the  earlier  paragraph  which speaks of  awarding lighter punishment there is no reference to any  opportunity being  given to  meet the charges but no punishment not  even lighter  punishment  can  be  inflicted without inquiry  being held  according to  the principles of natural justice  and if such an inquiry as implicit in cases of lighter  punishments it  would be  so in  cases of graver punishment like  dismissal and  since  specific  mention  of opportunity as  made in  cases of  graver punishment  in the relevant sentence  para 3  it must  have a  meaning and  the words cannot  be considered a surpulsage and, therefore, the opportunity mentioned  in the  relevant sentence  of para  3 refers  to   the  second  opportunity  being  given  to  the delinquent at  the stage  of inflicting  the  punishment  of dismissal. The  High Court  has confirmed  the view  of  the basis that  the first  part of the Standing order deals with several punishments and requires finding of guilt in respect of each  one of  them  and  this  procedure  is,  therefore, different from  that which has been contemplated in the last part of  the Standing  order and  that last  part deals only with the  punishment of  dismissal and  for that  punishment alone makes  a special provision that no order awarding that punishment will  be  passed  unless  the  Manager  gives  an opportunity to  a workman  to offer  his explanation. In our opinion, the  view of the Arbitrator as also the view of the High Court  proceed on an assumption that the Standing Order No.  17   deals  with   two  different   stages   concerning disciplinary proceedings against a delinquent, first holding of a 371 departmental inquiry  into the  charges where  principles of natural justice must be implied and second the infliction of graver punishment  before awarding which opportunity to show cause has  been provided  for; but  the plain reading of the Standing Order  read as  a whole  does not  warrant any such assumption  and,   therefore,  we   do  not  feel  that  the construction  placed   on  Standing  Order  No.  17  by  the Arbitrator  or   the  High   Court  is  possible  much  less reasonably possible.  The ratio  of this Court’s decision in Agnani (W.M.) v. Badri Das & Ors. (supra) is, therefore, not attracted.      In view  of the  construction which  we are  placing on

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S.O. No.  17, it will be clear that the only ground on which inquiry was  held to be invalid by the Arbitrator and by the High Court  must disappear. Admittedly, opportunity to offer explanation in regard to the alleged misconduct was not only afforded but  was availed  of by  the concerned four workers (including Rama  Shankar and  Burma) Pradhan)  by submitting their written  explanations to  the Manager  whereafter  the departmental inquiry was held by H.S. Mathur. In other words S.O. 17  was fully  complied  with  and  what  is  more  the Arbitrator has  held that the inquiry was otherwise fair and valid. The solitary ground on which the  inquiry was held to be invalid  having  disappeared  it  must  follow  that  the Arbitrator had  no Jurisdiction  to enter into the merits of the case  or interfere  with  the  punishment  of  dismissal inflicted upon  Rama Shankar and Burma Pradhan. That part of the Arbitrator’s  award which has been confirmed by the High Court is,  therefore, set aside. The alternative contentions raised by counsel for the Management in these appeals do not survive. C.A.  No. 209  of 1973 (filed by the Management) is allowed and  C.A. No. 1140 of 1974 (filed by the two workmen Rama Shankar  and Burma pradhan) is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. H.S.K.                               C.A. 209/72 allowed                               and CA. 1140/74 dismissed. 372