08 July 2008
Supreme Court
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ASLAM MOHD. MERCHANT Vs COMPETENT AUTHORITY .

Bench: S.B. SINHA,V.S. SIRPURKAR, , ,
Case number: Crl.A. No.-001053-001053 / 2003
Diary number: 1001 / 2003
Advocates: E. C. AGRAWALA Vs SUSHMA SURI


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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1053 OF 2003

Aslam Mohd. Merchant …Appellant

  Versus

Competent Authority & Ors. …Respondent

     WITH        CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1054 OF 2003

     WITH CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1055 OF 2003

     WITH CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1056 OF 2003

     WITH  CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1057 OF 2003

J U D G M E N T

S.B. SINHA,  J :

INTRODUCTION

1. Interpretation  and  application  of  Chapter  VA  of  the  Narcotic

Drugs  and  Psychotropic  Substances  Act,  1985  (for  short,  “the  Act”)

providing for forfeiture of property derived from or used in illicit traffic,

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is in question in this batch of appeals which arise out of a judgment and

order dated 27.11.2002 passed by the High Court of Bombay in Criminal

Writ Petition No. 1095 of 2002.

OVERVIEW

2. One Iqbal  Mohammed Memon alias  Iqbal  Mirchi  (“Mirchi”,  for

short) is related to the appellants.   aPPELLANT No. 2 is his first wife,

Appellant  No.3  is  second  wife,  Appellant  No.  4,  Abdul  Kadar  Mohd.

Merchant,  is  one  of  his  brothers,  Appellant  No.  5,  Shir  Firoz  Mohd.

Memen, is his  second brother whereas Petitioner No. 6, Aslam Mohd.

Merchant, is his third brother.  Appellant No.7, Nazma Aslam Merchant,

is  his  brother’s wife, Appellant No.8, Zaibunnisa  Memon, is his sister

and Appellant No. 9, Arij Mohd. Merchant, is the brother-in-law of the

said Iqbal Mohammed Memon.   

An order of preventive detention was passed against him for his

alleged involvement in illicit  trafficking under the Prevention of Illicit

Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act,  1988 (for

short the “PITNDPS”) on or about 29.9.1994.  The same, however, could

not be served on him as he had left India.  

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A pre execution writ  petition filed on his behalf  was dismissed.

The said order of detention is still operative.

3. The said Iqbal Mirchi is, thus, a ‘person’ within the meaning of

Section 68A(C) of the Act.   Appellants being his relatives in terms of

Section 68H of the Act were issued with notices directing them to show

cause as to why the properties mentioned therein should not be forfeited

being  ‘illegally  acquired  properties’.   Causes  were  shown  pursuant

thereto.  Opportunities of hearing were also afforded.  Whereas some of

the properties belonging to the appellants were directed to be forfeited,

some were released.   

The  Appellate  Tribunal  on  appeals  having  been  preferred

thereagainst  by  the  appellants  by  a  common  order  dated  26.7.2002

affirmed  the  said  findings.    Some  more  properties,  however,  were

directed to be released opining that they did not come within the purview

of the defeinition of ‘illegally acquired properties’.

4. Writ Petitions preferred thereagainst by the appellants have been

dismissed  by  the  High  Court  by  reason  of  the  impugned  judgment,

holding that the proceedings were validly initiated against them.

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CONTENTIONS  

5. Whereas,  on  one  hand,  the  submissions  of  the  learned  counsel

appearing on behalf of the appellants is that the conditions precedent for

initiating a valid proceeding, namely, formation of ‘reason to believe’ on

the part of the authority wherefor reasons are required to be recorded in

writing  had not  been fulfilled,  the submission  of  Mr.  B.B.  Singh,  the

learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent on the other hand,

is  that  a  notice  containing  general  allegations  would  meet  the

requirements  of  law.    According  to  the  learned  counsel,  once  the

noticees were informed that they were relatives of the ‘person’ referred to

in Section 68A and valuable properties stand in their name, which were

acquired beyond their  known source of income, it  will  be for them to

satisfy the authority that acquisition of the property by them has nothing

to  do  with  the  purported  income  derived  by  ‘Mirchi’  out  of  illicit

trafficking of narcotic, drug and psychotropic substances.

On behalf of the appellants, it was furthermore urged:

(i) Even a perusal of from the order passed by the competent

authority, it would appear that one of the properties had been purchased

by one of the appellants herein much prior to her marriage to ‘Mirchi’

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and as such the question of such a property having been acquired out of

the “illegally acquired property” does not and cannot arise.   

(ii) Appellants having filed their income tax returns and wealth

tax returns wherein the properties were shown to have been purchased

from their  own  income,  the  impugned  order  is  wholly  unsustainable.

Although orders of assessment passed by an authority under the said Act

having regard to the provisions contained in Section 68W thereof may

not be conclusive, but, the same carry a presumption of correctness and

thus were required to be treated as evidence.  

(iii) The  competent  authority,  on  the  basis  of  the  purported

investigation  report  or  otherwise,  was  required  to  show  that  the

properties in question were in fact purchased from the tainted money and

it was not for the appellants to prove contra.   

(iv) As the only relevant consideration for passing an order in

terms of Section 68H of the Act is that the property had been acquired

from the tainted income, it is sufficient for the noticee to show that the

said allegations were not correct.   

(v) The  competent  authority  was  required  to  keep  distinction

between his  function  and  the  one  under  the  Income Tax Act  and  the

Wealth Tax Act in mind; his jurisdiction being limited, that is, whether

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the  properties  were  illegally  acquired  properties  or  not,  wherefor  he

could not have gone further and hold that only because the noticees had

not been able to trace the source of their income, the properties were to

be treated to be illegally acquired property, which may be only a relevant

factor but would not necessarily lead to the said conclusion.

THE ACT

6. The Act was enacted to consolidate and amend the law relating to

narcotic  drugs,  to  make  stringent  provisions  for  the  control  and

regulation  of  operation  relating  to  narcotic  drugs  and  psychotropic

substances, to provide for the forfeiture of property derived from, or used

in,  illicit  traffic  in  narcotic  drug  and  psychotropic  substances,  to

implement  the provisions  of  the International  Convention  on Narcotic

Drugs and Psychotropic Substances and for matters connected therewith.

7. Chapter  VA was inserted in the Act by Act No. 2 of 1989.   It

appears  that  the said  amendment  was carried out having regard to the

International Convention as referred to in Section 2(ix) of the Act, which

read as under:-

“2. Definitions.  –  In  this  Act,  unless  the  context otherwise requires, -

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(i) ***** ***** ***** *****

 ****** ***** *****

*****

(ix) “International Convention” means -

(a) the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961 adopted  by  the  United  Nations  Conference  at New York in March, 1961;

(b) the  protocol,  amending  the  Convention mentioned  in  sub-clause  (a),  adopted  by  the United Nations Conference at Geneva in March, 1972;

(c) the  Convention  on  Psychotropic  Substances, 1971 adopted by the United Nations Conference at Vienna in February, 1971 ; and

(d) any other  international  convention,  or protocol or  other  instrument  amending  an  international convention,  relating  to  narcotic  drugs  or psychotropic  substances  which may be ratified or acceded to by India after the commencement of this Act.”

8. Section 68A of the Act applies to persons specified in sub-section

(2) thereof which would,  inter alia,  include every person in respect  of

whom an order of detention has been made under the PITNDPS.

9. It also applies to persons who are relatives of a person inter alia

against whom an order of detention has been issued or his associate(s).

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Section 68B is the interpretation section.    

We may notice some of the provisions contained therein.

“Section 68B.  Definitions –  In  this  Chapter,  unless  the context otherwise requires –  

**** **** **** **** ****

(b)  "Associate" in relation to a person whose property is liable to be forfeited under this Chapter, means, -

(i) Any individual who had been or is residing in the residential  premises (including out houses) of such person;

****         ****      ****       ****       ****

(ii) Any individual who had been or is managing the affairs or keeping the accounts of such person;

(iii) Any association of persons, body of individuals, partnership  firm,  or  private  company  within  the meaning of the Companies Act, 1956, of which such person had been or is a member, partner or director;

**** **** ****  (vi) The trustee of any trust, where, -

(1) The trust has been created by such person; or

(2) The, value of the asset contributed by such person  (including  the  value  of  the  assets,  if any,  contributed  by him earlier)  to  the  trust amounts on the date on which contribution is made, to not less than twenty per cent of the value of the assets of the trust on that date,

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(g)  "Illegally  acquired  property"  in  relation  to  any person to whom this Chapter applies, means, -

(i)  Any  property  acquired  by  such  person, whether  before  or  after  the  commencement  of this Chapter, wholly or partly out or by means of any  income,  earnings  or  assets  derived  or obtained from or attributable to the contravention of any provisions of this Act; or

(ii)  Any  property  acquired  by  such  person, whether  before  or  after  the  commencement  of this  Chapter,  for  a  consideration,  or  by  any means wholly or partly traceable to any property referred  to  in  sub-clause  (i)  or  the  income  or earning from such property,  

And includes, -

(A)  Any  property  held  by  such  person  which would  have  been,  in  relation  to  any  previous holder thereof, illegally acquired property under this clause if such previous holder had not ceased to hold it, unless such person or any other person who  held  the  property  at  any  time  after  such previous holder or, where there are two or more such previous holders, the last of such previous holders  is  or was a transferee in good faith  for adequate consideration;

(B)  Any  property  acquired  by  such  person, whether  before  or  after  the  commencement  of this  Chapter,  for  a  consideration  or  by  any means, wholly or partly traceable to any property falling under item (A), or the income or earnings therefore;

(h)  "Property"  means  property  and  assets  of  every description, whether corporeal or incorporeal, movable or  immovable,  tangible  or  intangible  and  deeds  and instruments,  evidencing  title  to,  or  interest  in,  such property or assets  derived from, or used in,  the illicit traffic,

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(i) "Relative" means, -

(1) Spouse of the person;

(2) Brother or sister of the person;

(3) Brother or sister of the spouse of the person;

(4)  Any  lineal  ascendant  or  descendant  of  the person;

(5)  Any  lineal  ascendant  or  descendant  of  the spouse of the person;

(6) Spouse of a person referred to in sub-clause (2) or sub-clause (3), sub-clause (4) or sub-clause (5);

(7) Any lineal descendant of a person referred to in sub-clause (2) or sub-clause (3);

(j)  "Tracing"  means  determining  the  nature,  source, disposition, movement, title or ownership of property;

Section  68(C)  provides  for  prohibition  in  respect  of  holding

illegally acquired property in the following terms:-

“68C.  Prohibition  of  holding  illegally  acquired property -  (1)  As from the  commencement  of  this Chapter, it shall not be lawful for any person to whom this  Chapter  applies  to  hold  any  illegally  acquired property either by himself or through any other person on his behalf.

(2)  Where  any  person  holds  any  illegally  acquired property  in  contravention  of  the  provisions  of  sub- section  (1)  such,  property  shall  be  liable  to  be

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forfeited  to  the  Central  Government  in  accordance with the provisions of this Chapter:

Provided that no property shall be forfeited under this Chapter if such property was acquired, by a person to whom this  Act  applies,  before a period of six years from  the  date  he  was  arrested  or  against  whom  a warrant or authorisation of arrest has been issued for the commission of an offence punishable under this Act or from the date the order or detention was issued, as the case may be.”

Section 68E provides as to how illegally acquired property shall be

identified, stating:

“68E. Identifying illegally acquired property - (1) Every  officer  empowered  under  section  53  and every officer-in-charge of a police station shall, on receipt of information is satisfied that any person to whom  this  Chapter  applies  holds  any  illegally acquired property, he may, after  recording reasons for doing so, proceed to take all steps necessary for tracing and identifying such property.

(2)  The  steps  referred  to  in  sub-section  (1)  may include  any  inquiry'  investigation  or  survey  in respect  of  any  person,  place,  property,  assets, documents, books of account in any Bank or public financial institution or any other relevant matters.

(3) Any inquiry, investigation or survey referred to in sub-section (2) shall be carried out by an officer mentioned  in  sub-section  (1)  in  accordance  with such  directions  or  guidelines  as  the  competent authority may make or issue in this behalf.”

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Section 68F provides for seizure or freezing of illegally acquired

property  in the following terms:-

“68F.   Seizure or freezing of illegally acquired property   - (1) Where any officer conducting an inquiry  or  investigation  under  Section  68E  has reason to believe that  any property in relation to which  such  inquiry  or  investigation  is  being conducted  is  an  illegally  acquired  property  and such property is likely to be concealed, transferred or dealt  with in  any manner which will  result  in frustrating any proceeding relating to forfeiture of such property under this Chapter, he may make an order for seizing such property and where it is not practicable to seize such property, he may make an order that such property shall not be transferred or otherwise  dealt  with,  except  with  the  prior permission of the officer making such order, or of the competent authority and a copy of such order shall be served on the person concerned.”   

The procedure in relation to forfeiture of property is contained in

Sections 68H and 68I thereof in the following terms:-

“68H.  Notice  of  forfeiture  of  property  -(1)  If, having regard to the value of the properties held by any person to whom this Chapter applies, either by himself or through any other person on his behalf, his known sources of income, earnings or assets, and any other information or material available to it as a result  of  a  report  from  any  officer  making  an investigation  under  Season  68-E or  otherwise,  the competent  authority  has  reason  to  believe  (the reasons  for  such  belief  to  be  recorded  in  writing) that  all  or  any  of  such  properties  are  illegally acquired properties, it may serve a notice upon such person  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  the  person

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affected) calling upon him within a period of thirty days specified in the notice to indicate the sources of his  income,  earning  or  assets,  out  of  which  or  by means of which he has acquired such property, the evidence  on  which  he  relies  and  other  relevant information and particulars, and to show cause why all  or  any of  such properties,  as  the  case may be, should  not  be  declared  to  be  illegally  acquired properties and forfeited to the Central Government under this Chapter.

(2)  Where  a  notice  under  sub-section  (1)  to  any person  specifies  any  property  as  being  held  on behalf of such person by any other person, a copy of the notice shall be served upon such other person:

Provided that no notice for forfeiture shall be served upon any person referred to in clause (cc)  of sub- section 68 A or relative of a person referred to in that clause or associate of a person referred to in that clause or holder of any property which was at any time previously held by a person referred to in that clause.  

68I. Forfeiture of property in certain cases - (1) The competent authority may, after considering the explanation, to the show cause notice issued, under Section  68-H and the materials  available  before  it and after giving to the person affected (and in a case where  the  person  affected  holds  any  property specified in the notice through any other person, to such other person also) a reasonable opportunity of being heard, by order, record a finding whether all or  any  of  the  properties  in  question  are  illegally acquired properties:

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Provided that if the person affected (and in a case where  the  person  affected  holds  any  property specified  in  the  notice  through  any  other  person such other person also) does not appear before the competent  authority or represent  his  case before it within a period of thirty days specified in the show- cause notice,  the competent authority may proceed to record finding under this sub-section ex parte on the basis of evidence available before it.

(2) Where the competent  authority is  satisfied that some of  the  properties  referred  to  in  show cause notice  are  illegally  acquired  properties  but  is  not bale to identify specifically such properties, then, it shall  be  lawful  for  the  competent  authority  to specify  the  properties  which,  to  the  best  of  its judgment,  are  illegally  acquired  properties  and record a finding accordingly under sub-section (2).

(3) Where the competent authority records a finding under this section to the effect that any property is illegally acquired property, it shall declare that such property  shall,  subject  to  the  provisions  of  this Chapter, stand forfeited to the Central Government free from all encumbrances.

Provided that no illegally acquired property of any person  who  is  referred  to  in  clause  (cc)  of  sub- section  (2)  of  section  68A or relative  of  a  person referred  to  in  that  clause  or  associate  of  a  person referred to in that clause or holder of any property which was at any time previously held by a person referred to in that clause shall stand forfeited.

(4) Where any shares in a company stand forfeited to the Central Government under this Chapter, then, the  company  shall,  notwithstanding  anything contained in the Companies Act, 1956 or the articles of association of the company, forthwith register the Central  Government  as  the  transferee  of  such shares.”

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Section 68J provides for burden of proof as;

“68J.  Burden of proof - In any proceedings under this Chapter, the burden of proving that any property specified in the notice served under Section 68-H is not illegally acquired property shall be on the person affected.”

Section 68W provides:-

68W.   Findings under other laws not conclusive for proceedings under this Chapter – No finding of any officer or authority under any other law shall be conclusive for the purposes of any proceedings under this Chapter.

THE PROCEEDINGS

10. The Show Cause Notice was issued on 17.12.1999. It detailed as

many as forty items of properties.  In their reply to show cause notice,

noticees-appellants  contended  that  they  were  concerned  only  with  11

properties which was accepted.  Proceedings in respect of the unrelated

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properties were dropped and, thus,  continued in respect  of the said 11

properties stating:-

“27.    After the replies to the Show Cause Notice were  received  from  the  affected  person  it  was found that many of the properties were disclaimed by them.  This necessitated further verification and enquiries  were  conducted  and  it  was  found  that most  of  the  properties  are  under ownership/possession of different persons who are not noticees.   The affected person have disclaimed the properties mentioned at Sl. Nos. 6, 7, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27 and 38.   It was further informed that the properties at Sl. No. 36 i.e.,  (i)  Rabia Mansion (ii) Mariam Lodge  and  (iii)  Sea  View  are  owned  by  “Sir Mohammed Yusuf Trust”.    It  was further  stated that  the  properties  at  sr.  nos.  3  and  33  are  not owned by them but are tenanted properties.   After preliminary  inquiries  conducted  by  office  it  was felt that in these cases provisions of Section 68-H (2) / 68-L of the NDPS Act need to be complied with and therefore, in the interest of justice it has been  decided  to  take  up  those  cases  separately. This  order,  therefore,  is  confined  only  to  the properties  which  have  been  claimed  by  the affected persons, i.e., properties at Sl. Nos. 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 34, 35, 37 and 39.”

The material  part  of the  said show cause  notice is  contained in

paragraphs 15 and 16 thereof which read as under:-

“15. Whereas AP1 had been absconding since the issue of the detention order and is reportedly living in  England  with  AP3.  Exhaustive  investigations

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into  the  properties  of  the  AP1  by  various enforcement agencies including the Anti-Narcotic Cell,  C.B. C.I.D. /C.B.I.  Mumbai had resulted in issue of freezing orders in respect of 11 properties in the name of AP1 & AP3 and 5 others.   These freezing  orders  were  confirmed  by  the  then Competent  Authority, SAFEMA/NDPS, Mumbai. The  Aps  filed  detailed  and  voluminous submissions  before  the  Competent  Authority which included Income-tax and Wealth-tax returns and other  relevant  documents.    On the basis  of these submissions,  the  then Competent  Authority released 7 properties and forfeited the remaining 4 to  the  Central  Government  free  from  all encumbrances.   It  is pertinent to note that the 4 properties which were finally forfeited were in the name of AP3 with one property jointly held with AP1.   The Aps could not prove the legality of the sources  by which  these  properties  were acquired by them.   The property in question now are jointly held by AP1 to AP11 in similar manner.   These properties  have  never  found  any  mention  in  the submissions  made  by  the  APs  nor  they  were declared  by  the  Aps  in  the  proceedings  under Chapter V A of the NDPS Act considered by the then Competent Authority nor it was disclosed to any enforcement agencies in any manner.

16. Whereas  considering  the  above  and  the background of AP1 and his  involvement  in drug smuggling & in drug trafficking on a massive scale and also the fact that AP2 to AP11 have no source of legal  income of their  own by means of which they could have acquired such huge and valuable properties  mentioned hereinbefore,  I  have  reason to  believe  that  the  said  properties  and  assets  as mentioned in para 14 have been acquired from the illegal income or source generate or earned by AP1 through or out of drug trafficking and have to be considered  as  illegally  acquired  property  as defined under sub-section (g) of section 68B of the NDPS Act.”

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11. From a perusal of the said notice to show cause, it is evident that

admittedly another proceeding had been initiated against them.   

12. Four properties were directed to be forfeited; seven were released.

13. The  second  proceedings  with  which  we  are  concerned  herein

continued  in  respect  of  the  11  properties.    Indisputably  again  in  the

earlier proceedings, income tax returns had been brought on records.

14. The relevant provisions of the Smugglers and Foreign Exchange

Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act, 1976 (for short “SAFEMA”)

and Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS) are

in pari materia.

15. Contentions  were  raised  that  the  show  cause  notice  shows

complete non-application of mind on the part of the competent authority,

as ;

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(i) 28  unconnected  properties  including  the  property  of  Late

Fatima Amin which formed part of the separate proceeding had

been included.

(ii) The properties mentioned therein had never been mentioned by

the appellants  in the previous proceedings,  although they did

not form part thereof.

ISSUE

16. The  core  question  which,  therefore,  arises  for  consideration  is

what are the statutory requirements for initiating a valid proceeding.

INTERPRETATION

17. Chapter  VA  contains  stringent  provisions.    It  provides  for

forfeiture of property.   Such property, however, as the heading of the

Chapter shows, must be derived from or used in illicit traffic.   Illegally

acquired property in relation to any person to whom the chapter applies

would mean only such property which was acquired wholly or partly out

of or by means of any income attributable to the contravention of any

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provision of the Act or for a consideration wholly or partly traceable to

any property referred to in sub-clause (i) or the income or earning from

property.

18. It  is,  therefore,  evident  that  the  property  which  is  sought  to  be

forfeited must be the one which has a direct nexus with the income etc.

derived by way of contravention of any of the provisions of the Act or

any property acquired therefrom.    What is meant by identification of

such property having regard to the definition of ‘identifying’ is, that the

property was derived from or used in the illicit traffic.

19. The property having regard to the  said definition would include

any  of  the  properties  described  therein  and  deeds  of  instruments

evidencing interest therein derived from or used in the illicit traffic.

In  the  aforementioned  context,  the  word  “person”  also  assumes

importance which leads  to  determining the nature,  source,  disposition,

movement, title or ownership of the property.   Direction to forfeiture of

a property is  in two parts.   Firstly,  it  has to be identified  in  terms of

Section 68-F of the Act.   For the said purpose, a satisfaction must be

arrived at by the authority specified therein to the effect that the person

concerned had been holding any illegally acquired property.  Secondly,

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on the basis of such information, he is entitled to take steps for tracing

and identifying the property.  

The Authority is also entitled to seize or freeze such a property.  

20. Before,  however,  the  actual  order  of  forfeiture  of  such  illegally

acquired  property  is  passed,  issuance  of  a  notice  to  show  cause  is

essential so as to fulfill the requirements of natural justice.

Such a notice is to be issued by the Authority having regard to:

(i) The value of the property held by the person concerned,

(ii) His known source of income, earning or assets,  

(iii) Any other information or material made available as a result of

a report from any officer making an investigation under Section

68-E of the Act or otherwise.

21. When the aforementioned conditions are satisfied, the competent

authority would be entitled to issue a show cause notice, if he has reason

to  believe,  wherefore  reasons  are  to  be  recorded  in  writing  that  the

properties are illegally acquired properties.

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22. Once  the  notice  to  show  cause  is  found  to  be  satisfying  the

statutory requirements  which  are  condition  precedent  therefor,  a  valid

proceeding  can  be  said  to  have  been  initiated  for  forfeiture  of  the

property.   Only in a case where a valid proceeding has been initiated, the

burden of proof that any property specified in the notice is not illegally

acquired property, would be on the ‘person’ affected.

23. Before,  however,  an  order  of  forfeiture  can  be  passed,  the

Competent Authority must not only comply with the principles of natural

justice, he is  also required to apply his mind on the materials brought

before him.   It  is  also necessary that  a finding that all  or any of the

properties in question were illegally acquired properties is recorded

24. The competent  authority has  a  vast  power  as  is  provided under

Section 68-R of the Act.  He is not bound by any finding of any officer or

authority under any other law as the same would not be conclusive for

the purpose of any proceeding under the said chapter.  

Analysis of the aforementioned provisions clearly establish that a

link must be found between the property sought to be forfeited and the

income  or  assets  or  properties  which  were  illegally  acquired  by  the

person concerned.

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25. We  may,  however,  at  this  juncture  also  notice  that  during  the

course of the proceedings,  the learned advocate of the appellants  by a

letter  dated 19.2.2000 requested the competent  authority to  supply the

reasons  for  issuing  the  notice.   In  response  thereto,  the  prescribed

authority by a letter  dated 23.2.2000, stated that  the reasons  had been

incorporated in the respective show cause notices.  Evidently, therefore,

no other reason was available for being supplied.

26. We may also  notice  some observations  made in  the  proceeding

sheet  of  the  Competent  Authority  dated  29.12.2000  which  is  in  the

following terms :-

“On  going  through  the  certificate  in  respect  of SP/Satara  it  may  be  seen  that  they  have  simply informed details of the ownership in re present and past  only.  Nowhere they have mentioned in  clear words  whether  nexus  between  the  present  holder and  sh.  Iqbal  mirchi  is  there  nor  are  properties claimed by sh. Iqbal mirchi and his family members mentioned  in  Show Cause  Notice  dated  17/11.  as per  (illegible)  association/  nexus  of  present  holder of  properties  between  iqbal  mirchi  can’t  be established  as  still  they  are  silent  on  the  issue. However, the matter shall be decided on merits by C.A. during the course of proceedings.   Put up for instructions.”

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It shows that till  the said date, no material  had been brought on

record to show that any nexus or a link between the properties sought to

be forfeited and thus in case of ‘Mirchi’ it was merely a perception of the

competent authority alone.

27. We are unable to accept the contention of Mr. Raju Ramchandran,

the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants that only because

a  large  number  of  properties  had  been  mentioned  in  the  show cause

notice, the same by itself is demonstration of complete non-application of

mind on the  part  of  the competent  authority.  Identification  of such a

property  although  might  have  been made in  an  inquiry   made by the

officer in-charge of a Police Station; however, when the proceeding was

initiated,  the  question  as  to  whether  such  properties  were  illegally

acquired properties or not, was required to be ultimately determined by

the competent authority alone.

28. It  is,  however,  beyond  any  doubt  or  dispute  that  a  proper

application of mind on the part of the competent authority is imperative

before a show cause notice is issued.    

Section 68-H of the Act provides for two statutory requirements on

the part of the authority viz: (i) he has to form an opinion in regard to his

‘reason to believe’; and (ii) he must record reasons therefor.     

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Both  the  statutory  elements,  namely,  ‘reason  to  believe’  and

‘recording  of  reasons’  must  be  premised  on  the  materials  produced

before  him.    Such  materials  must  have  been  gathered  during  the

investigation  carried  out  in  terms  of  Section  68-E  or  otherwise.

Indisputably therefore, he must have some materials before him.  If no

such  material  had  been  placed  before  him,  he  cannot  initiate  a

proceeding.  He cannot issue a show cause notice on his own ipse dixit.

A roving enquiry is not contemplated under the said Act as properties

sought  to  be  forfeited  must  have  a  direct  nexus  with  the  properties

illegally acquired.

29. It is now a trite law that whenever a statute provides for ‘reason to

believe’,  either the reasons should appear on the face of the notice or

they must be available on the materials which had been placed before

him.    

We have noticed hereinbefore that when the authority was called

upon  to  disclose  the  reasons,  it  was  stated  that  all  the  reasons  were

contained in the show cause notices themselves.   They, however, in our

opinion, do not contain any reason so as to satisfy the requirements of

sub-section (1) of Section 68H of the Act.

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A Constitution Bench of this Court in  Attorney General for India

and Others Vs Amratlal Prajivandas and Others [(1994) 5 SCC 54 while

considering the validity of the provisions of the Smugglers and Foreign

Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act, 1976, opined:

“44…The  relatives  and  associates  are  brought  in only  for  the  purpose  of  ensuring  that  the  illegally acquired  properties  of  the  convict  or  detenu, acquired or kept in their names, do not escape the net of the Act.   It is a well-known fact that persons indulging  in  illegal  activities  screen the  properties acquired from such illegal activity in the names of their  relatives  and  associates.    Sometimes  they transfer  such  properties  to  them, may be,  with  an intent to transfer the ownership and title.   In fact, it is  immaterial  how such relative  or associate  holds the  properties  of  convict/detenu  –  whether  as  a benami or as a mere name-lender or as a bona fide transferee  for  value  or  in  any other  manner.    He cannot  claim  those  properties  and  must  surrender them to  the  State  under  the  Act.    Since  he  is  a relative  or  associate,  as  defined  by  the  Act,  he cannot  put  forward  any defence  once  it  is  proved that  that  property  was  acquired  by  the  detenu  – whether  in  his  own  name  or  in  the  name  of  his relatives and associates…”

Holding  that  such  provisions  had  been  enacted  to  counteract

several  devices that may be adopted by the persons concerned,  it  was

stated:-

“By  way  of  illustration,  take  a  case  where  a convict/detenu purchases a property in the name of

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his relative or associate – it does not matter whether he intends such a person to be a mere name lender or whether he really intends that such person shall be the  real  owner  and/or  possessor  thereof  –  or  gifts away or otherwise transfers his properties in favour of any of his relatives or associates, or purports to sell them to any of his relatives or associates – in all such cases, all the said transactions will be ignored and  the  properties  forfeited  unless  the convict/detenu or his relative/associate,  as the case may be, establishes that such property or properties are  not  “illegally  acquired  properties”  within  the meaning of Section 3(c).   In this view of the matter, there  is  no  basis  for  the  apprehension  that  the independently acquired properties of such relatives and associates will also be forfeited even if they are in no way connected with the convict/detenu.   So far as the holders (not being relatives and associates) mentioned in Section 2(2)(e) are concerned, they are dealt  with  on  a  separate  footing.   If  such  person proves  that  he  is  a  transferee  in  good  faith  for consideration, his property – even though purchased from a convict/detenu – is not liable to be forfeited. It is equally necessary to reiterate that the burden of establishing  that  the  properties  mentioned  in  the show-cause  notice  issued  under  Section  6,  and which  are  held  on  that  date  by  a  relative  or  an associate of the convict/detenu, are not the illegally acquired properties of the convict/detenu, lies upon such relative/associate.   He must establish that the said property has not been acquired with the monies or assets provided by the detenu/convict or that they in  fact  did  not  or  do  not  belong  to  such detenu/convict.”

The relevant portion of the summary of the said judgment

reads as under:-

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“(4) The  definition  of  “illegally  acquired properties”  in  clause  (c)  of  Section  3  of SAFEMA is not invalid or ineffective.

(5)The  application  of  SAFEMA  to  the  relatives and associates [in clauses (c) and (d) of Section 2(2)] is equally valid and effective inasmuch as the purpose and object of bringing such persons within  the  net  of  SAFEMA  is  to  reach  the properties of the detenu or convict, as the case may be, wherever they are, howsoever they are held and by whomsoever they are held.   They are  not  conceived  with  a  view  to  forfeit  the independent  properties  of  such  relatives  and associates as explained in this judgment.  The position of ‘holders’ dealt with by clause (e) of Section  2(2)  is  different  as  explained  in  the body of the judgment.”

30. A similar question again came up before a Three Judges’ Bench of

this Court in Fatima Mohd. Amin (Smt.) (Dead) Through LRs. Vs. Union

of India and Another [(2003) 7 SCC 436], wherein relying upon Amratlal

Prajivandas (supra), it was held;

“7. ……We do not find any averments to the effect that the property acquired by the appellant is a benami property of her son or the same was illegally acquired from her son.

8. The contents of the said notices, even if taken at their face value do not disclose any reason warranting action against the appellant. No allegation whatsoever has been made to this effect that there exists any link or nexus between the property sought to be forfeited and the illegally acquired money of the detenu(s).

9. As  the  condition  precedent  for  initiation  of  the proceedings  under  SAFEMA  did  not  exist,  the

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impugned orders of forfeiture cannot be sustained. In that  view  of  the  matter,  the  appeals  deserve  to  be allowed. The order under challenge is set aside.”

31. Our  attention,  however,  has  been  drawn to  a decision  of  a two

Judge Bench of this Court in Kesar Devi (Smt.) Vs. Union of India and

Others  [(2003) 7 SCC 427] wherein  Fatima Mohd. Amin (supra) was

distinguished by a Bench of this Court, inter alia, opining that no nexus

or link between the money of the debt and property sought to be forfeited

is required to be established under the Scheme of the Act, stating;

“10…The condition precedent for issuing a notice by the competent  authority under Section 6(1)  is that  he  should have  reason to  believe that  all  or any  of  such  properties  are  illegally  acquired properties and the reasons for such belief have to be recorded in writing. The language of the section does  not  show  that  there  is  any  requirement  of mentioning any link or nexus between the convict or detenu and the property ostensibly standing in the  name of  the  person  to  whom the  notice  has been issued…

“13. We are, therefore, clearly of the opinion that under  the  scheme  of  the  Act,  there  is  no requirement on the part of the competent authority to mention or establish any nexus or link between the  money  of  the  convict  or  detenu  and  the property sought to be forfeited. In fact, if such a condition is imposed, the very purpose of enacting SAFEMA would be frustrated, as in many cases it would  be  almost  impossible  to  show  that  the property  was  purchased  or  acquired  from  the money provided by the convict  or detenu.  In the present case, the appellant is the wife of the detenu and she  has  failed  to  establish  that  she  had  any income of her own to acquire the three properties. In  such  circumstances,  no  other  inference  was

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possible except that it was done so with the money provided by her husband.”

32. We, with utmost respect to the learned Judges express our inability

to agree to the said observations.  The necessity of establishing link or

nexus in our opinion is writ large on the face of the statutory provision as

would appear from the definition of ‘illegally acquired property’ as also

that of ‘property’.  The purport and object for which the Act was enacted

point out to the same effect.

33. Fatima Mohd.  Amin  (supra)  was  followed  by a  Bench  of  this

Court  in  P.P.  Abdulla Vs.  Competent  Authority [(2007)  2  SCC 510],

wherein it was observed :

“7. Learned  counsel  submitted  that  it  has  been expressly  stated  in  Section  6(1)  that  the  reason  to believe of the competent authority  must be recorded in  writing.  In  the  counter-affidavit  it  has  also  been stated in para 8 that the reasons in the notice under Section 6(1) were recorded in writing. In our opinion this  is  not  sufficient.  Whenever  the  statute  requires reasons to be recorded in writing, then in our opinion it is incumbent on the respondents to produce the said reasons  before  the  court  so  that  the  same  can  be scrutinised in order to verify whether they are relevant and  germane  or  not.  This  can  be  done  either  by annexing  the  copy  of  the  reasons  along  with  the counter-affidavit  or  by  quoting  the  reasons somewhere in  the  counter-affidavit.  Alternatively,  if the  notice  itself  contains  the  reason  of  belief,  that notice  can  be  annexed  to  the  counter-affidavit  or quoted in it. However, all  that has not been done in this case.

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8. It must be stated that an order of confiscation is a very  stringent  order  and  hence  a  provision  for confiscation  has  to  be  construed  strictly,  and  the statute must be strictly complied with, otherwise the order becomes illegal.”

It was also observed:-

“10. In the present case, in the notice dated 15-3-1988 issued to the appellant under Section 6(1) of the Act (copy of  which  is  annexed as Annexure P-1 to  this appeal),  it  has not  been alleged therein  that there is any such link or nexus between the property sought to be forfeited and the alleged illegally acquired money of the appellant.”

34. In the final order, the rule of evidence as envisaged under Section

68-I  read  with  Section  68-J  of  the  Act  must  be  applied.    A person

affected would be called upon to discharge his burden provided a link or

nexus is traced between the holder of the property proceeded against and

an illegal activity of the detenu.   Such a formation of belief is essential.

35. Mr. B.B. Singh, however, has drawn our attention to a decision of

this  Court  in  State  of  Gujarat  and  Another  Etc. Vs.  Mehboob  Khan

Usman Khan Etc. [1968 3 SCR 746].   

This Court therein, was considering the provisions of the Bombay

Police Act of 1951.  The said statute postulated externment of the noticee

on the basis of ‘general allegations’ made against him    Keeping in view

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the statutory requirements,  this  Court  opined that  ‘general  allegations’

made in the notice would subserve the statutory requirements stating:-

“…..Without  attempting  to  be  exhaustive  we  may state that when a person is stated to be a “thief”, that allegation  is  vague.  Again,  when  it  is  said  that  “A stole  a  watch  from  X on  a  particular  day  and  at  a particular  place”,  the  allegation  can  be  said  to  be particular. Again, when it is stated that “X is seen at crowded bus stands and he picks pockets” it  is of a general nature of a material allegation. Under the last illustration,  given  above,  will  come the  allegations, which,  according  to  the  Gujarat  High  Court,  suffer from being too general, or vague. Considering it from the point of view of the party against whom an order of  externment  is  proposed  to  be  passed,  it  must  be emphasized that when he has to tender an explanation to  a  notice,  under  Section  59,  he  can  only give  an explanation, which can be of a general nature. It may be open to him to take a defence, of the action being taken, due to mala fides, malice or mistaken identity, or he may be able to tender proof of his general good conduct,  or  alibi,  during  the  period  covered  by the notice  and  the  like.  The  allegations  made  in  the notices,  issued  under  Section  59,  as  against  the respective  respondents,  in  our  opinion,  contain  the general  nature  of  the  material  allegations  made against  each  of  them,  in  respect  of  which  the respondents had been given a reasonable opportunity of tendering an explanation, regarding them……”  

(emphasis supplied)

This  Court,  therefore,  in  the  fact  situation  obtaining  in  the  said

case was satisfied as regards compliance of the statutory requirements.

General or vague allegations in a case of this nature would not subserve

the statutory purposes and objects.

36. Reliance  has  also  been  placed  on  Pandharinath  Shridhar

Rangnekar  Vs.  Dy. Commr. of Police,  State of Maharashtra [(1973) 1

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SCC 372].  Therein again the provisions of the Bombay Police Act were

involved.

The said  decision  ex-facie  has  no application  to  the fact  of  the

present case.     

REASON TO BELIEVE

37. This  brings  us  to  the  next  question  as  to  what  does  the  term

“reason to believe” mean.  We may in this behalf notice some precedents

operating in the field.

38. In the context of the provisions of Section 147 of the Income Tax

Act, this Court in  Phool Chand Bajrang Lal Vs.  ITO : [1993] 203 ITR

456] held:-

“From a combined review of the judgments of this court, it follows that an Income-tax Officer  acquires jurisdiction  to  reopen an assessment  under  section 147(a) read with section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, only if  on the basis  of specific,  reliable and relevant  information  coming  to  his  possession subsequently, he has reasons, which he must record, to believe that, by reason of omission or failure on the  part  of  the  assessee  to  make  a  true  and  full disclosure  of  all  material  facts  necessary  for  his assessment  during  the  concluded  assessment proceedings, any part of his income, profits or gains chargeable  to  income-tax  has  escaped  assessment. He  may  start  reassessment  proceedings  either because some fresh facts  had come to light  which were not previously disclosed or some information

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with regard to the facts previously disclosed comes into  his  possession  which  tends  to  expose  the untruthfulness of those facts.   In such situations, it is  not  a  case  of  mere  change  of  opinion  or  the drawing of a different inference from the same facts as  were  earlier  available  but  acting  on  fresh information.   Since the belief is that of the Income- tax Officer,  the sufficiency of  reasons  for forming this belief is not for the court to judge but it is open to an assessee to establish that there in fact existed no belief or that the belief was not at all a bona fide one  or  was  based  on  vague,  irrelevant  and  non- specific  information.    To  that  limited  extent,  the court may look into the conclusion arrived at by the Income-tax Officer and examine whether there was any material available on the record from which the requisite belief could be formed by the Income-tax Officer  and  further  whether  that  material  had  any rational connection or a live link for the formation of the requisite belief.”

See also Income Tax Officer Vs.  Lakshmani Mewal Das [(1976)

103 ITR 437].

In Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax v. Rajesh Jhaveri Stock

Brokers Pvt. Ltd. [2007 (8) SCALE 396], interpreting the term ‘reason to

believe’ as used under Section 247 (a) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, it

was opined :

“To  confer  jurisdiction  under  Section  247(a)  two conditions were required to be satisfied firstly the AO must  have  reason  to  believe  that  income  profits  or gains  chargeable  to  income  tax  have  escaped assessment, and secondly he must also have reason to believe that such escapement has occurred by reason

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of  either  (i)  omission  or  failure  on  the  part  of  the assessee  to  disclose  fully  or  truly  all  material  facts necessary for his assessment of that year.  Both these conditions were conditions  precedent  to be satisfied before the AO could have jurisdiction to issue notice under  Section  148  read  with  Section  147(a).   But under  the  substituted  Section  147  existence  of  only the  first  condition  suffices.   In  other  words,  if  the assessing  officer  for  whatever  reason  has  reason  to believe that income has escaped assessment, it confers jurisdiction to reopen the assessment.”  

NON APPLICATION OF MIND

Applying these tests, it  is evident that the statutory requirements

have not been fulfilled in the present case.

39. Non-  application  of  mind  on  the  part  of  the  competent  officer

would also be evident from the fact that a property named ‘Rose Villa’

which  was  the  subject  matter  of  the  decision  of  this  Court  in  Fatima

Amin (supra), was also included herein.

Once the show cause notice is found to be illegal, the same would

vitiate all subsequent proceedings.    

40. In  Dilip  N.  Shroff Vs.  Joint  Commissioner  of  Income  Tax,

Mumbai and Another   [(2007) 6 SCC 329], this Court held:

“86.  It is of some significance that in the standard pro forma used by the assessing officer in issuing a

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notice despite the fact that the same postulates that inappropriate  words  and  paragraphs  were  to  be deleted, but the same had not been done.   Thus, the  assessing  officer  himself  was  not  sure  as  to whether  he  had  proceeded  on  the  basis  that  the assessee  had  concealed  his  income  or  he  had furnished inaccurate particulars.   Even before us, the  learned  Additional  Solicitor  General  while placing the order of assessment laid emphasis that he  had  dealt  with  both  the  situations.    The impugned  order,  therefore,  suffers  from  non- application of mind.   It was also bound to comply with  the  principles  of  natural  justice.   (See Malabar Industrial Co. Ltd. Vs. CIT)”

RECORDING OF REASONS

41. Submission of Mr. Singh that the appellants have not been able to

discharge the burden of proof which was on them from the impugned

orders, it would appear that they have utterly failed to prove their own

independent income; they being close relative of the detune as in terms

of  the  statutory requirements  ,  it  was  for  them to  show that  they had

sufficient income from those properties.

42. Had the show cause notice been valid, Mr. B.B. Singh, might have

been right, but if the proceedings themselves were not initiated validly,

the competent authority did not derive any jurisdiction to enter into the

merit of the matter.   

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Legality  and/or  validity  of  the  notice  had  been  questioned  at

several stages of the proceedings.  Despite their asking, no reason was

disclosed  by  the  authority  to  the  appellants.   They  had  asked  for

additional  reasons, if  any, which were not reflected in the show cause

notices.  None was disclosed.

43. It is also relevant to notice that the High Court opined that there

had been  a  proper  application  of  mind  on  the  part  of  the  Competent

Authority  and  Appellate  Tribunal  as  they had released  some items of

properties.  Application of mind on the part of the Competent Authority

and the Appellate Tribunal at the subsequent stage was not in question;

what  was in  question was non application of  mind on the part  of  the

authority prior to issuance of the notice.     

CONCLUSION

44. We  are  not  unmindful  of  the  purport  and  object  of  the  Act.

Dealing in narcotics is a social evil that must be curtailed or prohibited at

any cost.  Chapter VA seeks to achieve a salutary purpose.   But, it must

also be borne in mind that right to hold property although no longer a

fundamental right is still a constitutional right.  It is a human right.  

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The provisions of the Act must be interpreted in a manner so that

its constitutionality is upheld.   The validity of the provisions might have

received  constitutional  protection,  but  when  stringent  laws  become

applicable as a result whereof some persons are to be deprived of his/her

right in a property, scrupulous compliance of the statutory requirements

is imperative.  

45. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgments cannot

be sustained.   They are set aside accordingly.  The appeals are allowed.

However, it would be open to the respondents to initiate fresh proceeding

(s)  in  accordance  with  law,  if  they  are  so  advised.   In  the  facts  and

circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs.

………………………….J. [S.B. Sinha]

..…………………………J. [V.S. Sirpurkar]

New Delhi; July 08, 2008

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