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PETITIONER: ASHOKA MARKETING LTD. AND ANR. ETC. ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK AND ORS. ETC. ETC.

DATE OF JUDGMENT07/08/1990

BENCH: AGRAWAL, S.C. (J) BENCH: AGRAWAL, S.C. (J) MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (CJ) RAY, B.C. (J) KANIA, M.H. SAIKIA, K.N. (J)

CITATION:  1991 AIR  855            1990 SCR  (3) 649  1990 SCC  (4) 406        JT 1990 (3)   417  1990 SCALE  (2)200

ACT:     Delhi  Rent Control Act, 1958: Sections 14, 22,  50  and 54-Tenant  of ‘Public Premises’--Tenancy terminated  or  ex- pires under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised  Occu- pants)  Act, 1971--Whether entitled to invoke the  statutory protection of Rent Control Act, 1958.     Public  Premises  (Eviction of  Unauthorised  Occupants) Act,   1971.’   Sections   2(e),   4(0   and   7(3)--‘Public Premises’--Whether  includes premises belonging to  Nationa- lised banks--Tenant in such premises--Tenancy expires or  is terminated--Whether  can  invoke protection  of  Delhi  Rent Control Act, 1958.

HEADNOTE:     The appellants/petitioners were tenants in the  premises belonging to the respondent Banks/Life Insurance Corporation of  India. Their tenancy had expired or had been  terminated by  the  respondents  and  eviction  proceedings   initiated against  them  under the provisions of the  Public  Premises (Eviction  of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971. Writ  peti- tions under Article 226 were filled by the appellants in the High Court challenging the orders of eviction passed against them,  which were dismissed; hence these appeals.  The  writ petitioners  moved this Court directly under Article  32  of the  Constitution  against  the notices  of  termination  of tenancy issued to them.     The  Public  Premises Act of 1971 was  preceded  by  two enactments the Government Premises (Eviction) Act 1950,  and the  Public  Premises (eviction of  unauthorised  occupants) Act, 1958 which were declared unconstitutional by  different High Courts.     Jagu  Singh  v.  M. Shaukat Ali, (58  Cal.  W.N.  1066); Satish  Chander & Anr. v. Delhi Improvement Trust, AIR  1958 Punjab  1; Brigade Commander, Meerut Sub Area v. Ganga  Pra- sad,  AIR  1956 All. 507; P.L. Mehar etc.  v.  D.R.  Khanna, etc.,  AIR 1971 Delhi 1 and Northern India Caterers  Private Ltd. v. State of Punjab & Anr., [1967] 3 SCR 399. 650

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   This led to the enactment of the Public Premises Act  in 1971.  The validity of this act was upheld by this Court  in Hari Singh v. The Military Estate Officer, [1973] 1 SCR 515.     Before this Court, the contentions were advanced by  the parties  mainly on two questions (i) whether the  provisions of  the Public Premises Act were applicable to the  Premises belonging  to  a  nationalised bank; and  (ii)  whether  the provisions  of the Public Premises Act override  the  provi- sions of the Delhi Rent Control Act.     In  regard to the applicability of the  Public  Premises act, it was inter alia contended that the premises belonging to  a  nationalised bank or insurance company did  not  fall within  the  ambit of the definition  of  ’Public  Premises’ contained in Section 2(e) of the Public Premises Act for the reason  that  the  nationalised bank was not  a  company  as defined  in Section 3 of the Companies Act, 1956 and it  was also  not  a corporation established by or under  a  Central Act.  On the other hand, it was contended that the  respond- ents being nationalised bank, was a corporation  established by  a Central Act, viz., the Bank Nationalisation  Act,  and the  premises belonging to a nationalised bank were  ’public premises’  under section 2(e)(2)(ii) of the Public  Premises Act.     In regard to the second question, each side claimed that the  enactment relied upon by it was a special  statute  and the  other enactment was general, and also invoked  the  not obstante  clause contained in the enactment relied upon.  In this connection, it was argued on behalf of the  respondents that the Public Premises Act having been enacted by  Parlia- ment  in exercise of legislative power under Article  246(1) of the Constitution in respect of matters enumerated in  the Union  List would ipso-facto override the provisions of  the Rent  Control  Act enacted in exercise  of  the  legislative powers under Article 246(4) in respect of matters enumerated in the concurrent list. Dismissing the appeals and the writ petition, this Court,     HELD: (1) The provisions of the Public Premises Act,  to the  extent they cover premises failing within the ambit  of the  Rent Control Act, override the provisions of  the  Rent Control  Act,  and a person in  unauthorised  occupation  of public premises under Section 2(e) of the Act cannot  invoke the protection of the Rent Control Act. [694D-E]     (2)  After the second world war there has been  develop- ment of a new pattern of public corporation in England as an instrument of plan- 651 ning  in the mixed economy. The general  characteristics  of such a public corporation is that it is normally created  by a  special statute; it has no shares and no  share  holders, either  private  or  public, and its share  holder,  in  the symbolic sense, is the nation represented through Government and  Parliament; and it has the legal status of a  corporate body  with independent legal personality. There has  been  a similar growth of this type of public corporation in  other. countries. This trend is also evident in our country.  since Independence  and a number of such public corporations  have been constituted by Acts of Parliament. [668A-C]     (3) The expression ’Corporation’ in Section  2(e)(2)(ii) of the Public Premises Act would include public corporations of the new pattern constituted under the Central Acts where- in  the entire paid-up capital vests in the Central  Govern- ment. [670G]     S.S.  Dhanoa v. Municipal Corporation, Delhi,  [1981]  3 SCR 864, distinguished.     (4)  In  order  to constitute a corporation  it  is  not

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necessary  that there should be shareholders or members  and that  in  the  new pattern of public  corporation  that  has developed there are no shareholders or members. [671G]     Bank  of  New South Wales & Ors. v.  The  Common-wealth, [1948] 76 CLR 1 and R.C. Cooper v. Union of India, [1970]  3 SCR 530, referred to.     Oriental Bank of Commerce v. Delhi Development  Authori- ty, [1985] 55 Company Cases 81, overruled.     (5)  Provisions  of the Banks Nationalisation  Act  show that  the nationalised Bank has been constituted as  a  dis- tinct  juristic  person by the Act and it is  owned  by  the Central Government. They further indicate that the  nationa- lised  bank  has all the attributes of the  new  pattern  of public corporation. [667B]     (6)  The  object  of the legislation  in  enlarging  the definition  of  ’public  premises’ in Section  2(e)  of  the Public  Premises Act is to make available the  machinery  of the  Act for evicting unauthorised occupants not  only  from the  premises belonging to the Central Government  but  also from premises belonging to Companies, Corporation and statu- tory  bodies in which the Central Government has a  substan- tial interest. [670D-E] 652     (7)  Under  Section 2(e)(2)(i) premises belonging  to  a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956, in which not  less than fifty one percent of the paid-up  capital  is held by the Central Government, are to be treated as  public enterprises.  It  could not be the intention  of  Parliament that premises belonging to public corporations whose  entire paid-up capital vests in the Central Government and who  are the  instrumentalities of State would be excluded  from  the ambit of the definition of ’public premises’. [670E-G]     (8) Keeping in view the provisions of the Banks  Nation- alisation Act the nationalised bank is a corporation  estab- lished  by a Central Act and it is owned and  controlled  by the Central Government. The premises belonging to a nationa- lised bank are public premises under Section 2(e)(2)(ii)  of the Public Premises Act. [671 H; 672A]     (9)  There is no warrant for confining the scope of  the definition of ’public premises’ contained in section 2(e) to premises  used for residential purposes only and to  exclude premises used for commercial purposes from its ambit. [672D] Hari  Singh  v. Military Estate Officer, [1973] 1  SCR  515, referred to.     (10)  No distinction can be made between  premises  used for  residential purposes and premises used  for  commercial purposes in the matter of eviction of unauthorised occupants of  public premises and the consideration which  necessitate providing  a  speedy machinery for eviction  of  persons  in unauthorised occupation of public premises apply equally  to both the types of public premises. [673B-C]     (11)  The  definition of  the  expression  ’unauthorised occupation’ contained in Section 2(g) of the Public Premises Act  is in two parts. The second part of the  definition  is inclusive  in  nature and expressly  covers  continuance  in occupation  by any person of the public premises  after  the authority  (whether  by way of grant or any  other  mode  of transfer) under which he was allowed to occupy the  premises has expired or has been determined for any reason  whatsoev- er. The words "whether by way of grant or any other mode  of transfer" in this part of the definition are wide in  ampli- tude  and  would cover a lease because lease is  a  mode  of transfer  under  the Transfer of Property Act.  [673F;  G-H; 674B]     Brigadier  K.K.  Verma v. Union of India, AIR  1954  Bom

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358, distinguished. 653     Lallu Yeshwant Singh v. Rao Jagdish Singh & Ors., [1968] 2 SCR 203, and Express Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v.  Union of India & Ors., [1985] Suppl. 3 SCR 302, referred to.     (12)  It  is true that there is no  requirement  in  the Public Premises Act that the Estate Officer must be a person well versed in law. But, that, by itself, cannot be a ground for  excluding  from the ambit of the said Act  premises  in unauthorised  occupation of persons who obtained  possession of the said premises under a lease when the Public  Premises Act  and the Rules framed thereunder provide for a right  of appeal of the District Judge against an order of the  Estate Officer. which shows that the final order that is passed  is by a judicial officer. [675F-H]     Maganlal  Chhagganlal (P) Ltd. v. Municipal  Corporation of Greater Bombay & Ors., [1975] 1 SCR 1, referred to.     (13) As regards rent control legislations enacted by the State  legislatures, the position is well settled that  such legislation fail within the ambit of entries 6, 7 and 13  of List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. [682E]     Indu Bhushan Bose v. Rama Sundari Devi & Anr., [1970]  1 SCR  443; V. Dhanpal Chettiar’s v. Yesodai Ammal,  [1980]  1 SCR  334; Jai Singh Jairam Tyagi Etc. v. Mamanchand  Ratilal Agarwal & Ors.,  [1980] 3 SCR 224; Accountant and Secretari- al  Services  Pvt.  Ltd. & Anr. v. Union of  India  &  Ors., [1988] 4 SCC 324, referred to.     (14) The Rent Control Act has been enacted by Parliament in  relation to the Union Territory of Delhi in exercise  of the legislative power conferred under Article 246(4) of  the Constitution  which  empowers Parliament to make  laws  with respect to any matter for any part of the territory of India not included in a State notwithstanding that such matter  is a matter enumerated in the State List. [682G]     (15)  The  Public  Premises Act  deals  with  Government property as well as property belonging to other legal  enti- ties mentioned in clauses (2) and (3) of Section 2(e) of the Public Premises Act. In so far as it relates to eviction  of unauthorised  occupants from premises belonging to or  taken on  lease  or requisitioned by or on behalf of  the  Central Government, the Public Premises Act would fail within  entry 32  of  List I being law with respect to a property  of  the Union. The property belonging to the various legal  entities mentioned  in  clauses (2) and (3) of Section  2(e)  of  the Public Premises Act cannot be regarded as property of 654 the Union and the Public Premises Act cannot be held to have been enacted under entry 32 of List I in respect of the said properties. In so far as it deals with a lessee or  licensee of  premises  other than premises belonging to  the  Central Govt; the Public Premises Act has been enacted in exercising the  legislative power in respect of matters  enumerated  in the concurrent list. [682H; 683A-C]     (16) Both the statutes, viz. the Public Premises Act and the Rent Control Act, have been enacted by the same legisla- ture,  Parliament, in exercise of the legislative powers  in respect  of the matters enumerated in the  Concurrent  List. [684C] Accountant  and Secretarial Services Pvt. Ltd. v.  Union  of India And Ors., [1988] 4 SCC 324; Smt. Saiyada Mossarrat  v. Hindustan  Steel  Ltd., [1989] 1 SCC 272 and  L.S.  Nair  v. Hindustan Steel Ltd., AIR 1980 MP. 106, referred to.     (17)  The  Rent Control Act makes a departure  from  the general  law  regulating the relationship  of  landlord  and tenant contained in the Transfer of Property Act inasmuch as

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it  makes provision for determination of standard  rent,  it specifies  the  grounds  on which a landlord  can  seek  the eviction of a tenant, it prescribes the forum for  adjudica- tion  of  disputes  between landlords and  tenants  and  the procedure which has to be followed in such proceedings.  The Rent  Control  Act can, therefore, be said to be  a  special statute  regulating the relationship of landlord and  tenant in the Union Territory of Delhi. [686D-F]     (18)  The Public Premises Act is also a special  statute relating  to eviction of unauthorised occupants from  public premises. [689E]     Jain Ink Manufacturing Company v. Life Insurance  Corpo- ration of India & Anr., [1981] 1 SCR 498, referred to.     (19)  Both the enactments, namely, the Rent Control  Act and  the Public Premises Act, are special statutes in  rela- tion  to  the  matters dealt with  therein.  Therefore,  the exception  contained  in  the principle  that  a  subsequent general  law  cannot derogate from an  earlier  special  law cannot be invoked and in accordance with the principle  that the  later laws abrogate earlier contrary laws,  the  Public Premises Act must prevail over the Rent Control Act.  [686H; 687A]     J.K.  Cotton  Spinning & Weaving Mills Co. Ltd.  v.  The State  of Uttar Pradesh, [1961] 3 SCR 185; U.P. State  Elec- tricity Board v. Hari 655 Shankar  Jain, [1979] 1 SCR 355 and Life Insurance  Corpora- tion v. D.J. Bahadur, [1981] 1 SCR 1083, referred to.     (20) In the case of inconsistency between the provisions of two enactments, both of which can be regarded as  Special in  nature. the conflict has to be resolved by reference  to the purpose and policy underlying the two enactments and the clear  intendment conveyed by the language of  the  relevant provisions therein. [688G]     Shri Ram Narain v. The Simla Banking and Industrial  Co. Ltd., [1956] SCR 603; Kumaon Motor Owners’ Union Ltd. v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, [1966] 2 SCR 121 and Sarwan Singh v. Kasturi Lal, [1977] 2 SCR 421, referred to.     (21)  Keeping in view the object and purpose  underlying both  the  enactments  viz., the Rent Control  Act  and  the Public  Premises Act, the provisions of the Public  Premises have to be construed as overriding the provisions  contained in the Rent Control Act. [690H]        The Parliament was aware of the non obstante  clauses contained in Section 14 and 22 and the provisions  contained in Sections 50 and 54 of the Rent Control Act when it enact- ed  the Public Premises Act containing a specific  provision in  Section  15 barring jurisdiction of  all  courts  (which would  include  the Rent Controller under the  Rent  Control Act).  This  indicates  that Parliament  intended  that  the provisions of the Public Premises Act would prevail over the provisions  of  the Rent Control Act inspite  of  the  above mentioned  provisions  contained in the  Rent  Control  Act. [691A-B]     (23) The scope of the provisions of the Public  Premises Act cannot be cut down on the basis of an apprehension  that the corporations may be induced to earn profits by  purchas- ing  property  in possession of tenants at a low  price  and after buying such property evict the tenants after terminat- ing their tenancy and thereafter sell the said property at a much  higher  value. Every activity of  a  public  authority especially in the background of the assumption on which such authority enjoys immunity from the rigours of the Rent  Act, must  be informed by reason and guided by the public  inter- est. [693F; E-G]

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   M/s Dwarkadas Marfatia and Sons v. Board of Trustees  of the Port of Bombay, [1989] 3 SCC 293, referred to.

JUDGMENT:     CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2368  of 1986 Etc. 656     From the Judgment and Order dated 30.5.1986 of the Delhi High Court in CW No. 1295 of 1986.     K.K.  Venugopal,  A.K. Ganguli, Yogeshwar  Prasad,  P.R. Seetharaman,  S.K. Gupta and A.K. Srivastava for the  Appel- lants.     Soli J. Sorabjee, Attorney General, Kapil Sibbal,  Addi- tional  Solicitor  General.  G.L. Sanghi,  S.  Ganesh,  Mrs. Sushma Suri, EMS Anam, Atul Namda. Aman Vachher, S.K. Mehta, Kailash Vasdev and S.R. Srivastava for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     S.C.  AGRAWAL, J. The common question which  arises  for consideration  in these appeals, by special leave,  and  the writ petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution is, whether  a person who was inducted as a tenant in  premises, which  are  public premises for the purpose  of  the  Public Premises  (Eviction  of Unauthorised  Occupants)  Act,  1971 (hereinafter referred to as the ’Public Premises Act’),  and whose  tenancy  has expired or has been terminated,  can  be evicted from the said premises as being a person in unautho- rised-occupation of the premises under the provisions of the Public Premises Act and whether such a person can invoke the protection of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958  (hereinafter referred to as the ’Rent Control Act’). In short, the  ques- tion  is, whether the provisions of the Public Premises  Act would  override  the provisions of the Rent Control  Act  in relation to premises which fall within the ambit of both the enactments.     Civil  Appeals Nos. 2368 and 2369 of 1986 relate to  the premises which are part of a building situated at 5  Parlia- ment  Street,  New Delhi. The said building  originally  be- longed  to  Punjab National Bank Ltd.,  a  banking  company. Ashoka  Marketing Ltd. (Appellate No. 1 in Civil Appeal  No. 2368 of 1986) and M/s Sahu Jain Services Ltd. (Appellant No. 1 in Civil Appeal No. 2369 of 1986) were tenants of premises located  in  the said building since July 1st,  1958.  As  a result  of the enactment of the Banking Companies  (Acquisi- tion  and Transfer of Undertakings) Act.  1970  (hereinafter referred to as the ’Banks Nationalisation Act’), the  under- taking of the Punjab National Bank Ltd., was transferred and vested in Punjab National Bank a body corporate  constituted under  the  provisions  of the said Act  and  the  aforesaid appellants  became the tenants of Punjab National  Bank.  By notices  dated May 18, 1971 issued under Section 106 of  the Transfer  of Property Act, the tenancies of both the  appel- lants were terminated by 657 Punjab National Bank, with effect from, November, 30,  1971. Thereafter,  the said Bank initiated proceedings  under  the Rent  Control  Act  against both the  appellants.  In  those proceedings  an objection was raised by the said  appellants that  proceedings  for eviction under the Rent  Control  Act were not maintainable in view of the provisions contained in the  Public  Premises Act. During the pendency of  the  said proceedings  under  the Rent Control Act,  proceedings  were initiated by the Estate Officer against the appellants under the provisions of the Public Premises Act and while the said

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proceedings  under  Public  Premises Act  were  pending  the earlier  proceedings  initiated under the Rent  Control  Act were dismissed by the Additional Rent Controller, Delhi,  by orders  dated August 6, 1979. In the proceedings, under  the Public  Premises Act, the Estate Officer passed  orders  for eviction against the appellants and the appeals filed by the appellants  against  the said orders of the  Estate  Officer were dismissed by the Additional District Judge. Delhi.  The appellants  filed  writ petitions under Article 226  of  the Constitution,  in the Delhi High Court. The said writ  peti- tions  were dismissed by the High Court by orders dated  May 30,  1986. Aggrieved by the said orders of the  High  Court, the  appellants  have filed these  appeals  after  obtaining special leave to appeal.     Civil Appeal No. 3725 of 1986 relates to an office  room in  the Allahabad Bank Building situated at  17,  Parliament Street,  New Delhi. The said building belongs  to  Allahabad Bank,  a body corporate constituted under the provisions  of the  Banks Nationalisation Act. The said premises  were  let out to Pt. K.B. Parsai, the appellant in this appeal, for  a period  of three years with effect from, February  1,  1982. After  the  expiry of the said period  eviction  proceedings under the provisions of the Public Premises Act were  initi- ated  to  evict the appellant and in those  proceedings  the Estate  Officer  passed an order dated March 29,  1986.  The appellant  filed  a writ petition under Article 226  of  the Constitution,  wherein  he challenged the  validity  of  the order  passed by the Estate Officer. The said writ  petition was dismissed by the Delhi High Court by order dated  August 7,  1986.  The appellant has filed this appeal  against  the said  decision of the Delhi High Court after obtaining  Spe- cial Leave to Appeal.     Writ  Petition No. 864 of 1985, relates to  premises  in the building located at 10, Darya Ganj, New Delhi. The  said building  originally  belonged to Bharat  Insurance  Company Limited,  as  Insurance Company which was carrying  on  life insurance  business. M/s Bennett Coleman & Co. Ltd.,  (peti- tioner  No. 1 in the writ petition) was in occupation  of  a part of the said property as a tenant under M/s Bharat 658 Insurance  Co. Ltd. since 1948. The life insurance  business was  nationalised under the Life Insurance Corporation  Act, 1956 whereby the Life Insurance Corporation was  established and  the life insurance business carried on by  the  various insurance companies, including M/s Bharat Insurance  Company Ltd.,  was  nationalised and vested in  the  Life  Insurance Corporation. As a result petitioner No. 1 became a tenant of the Life Insurance Corporation. The Life Insurance  Corpora- tion  gave  a notice under Section 106 of  the  Transfer  of Property Act terminating a tenancy of petitioner No. 1  with effect from, August 31, 1953 and thereafter proceedings  for eviction  were initiated against petitioner No. 1 under  the provisions  of  the Public Premises Act  and  notices  dated December  15, 1984 were issued by the Estate  Officer  under Section  4(1) and Section 7(3) of the Public  Premises  Act. Feeling  aggrieved  by these notices  the  petitioners  have filed the writ petition.     Before  we proceed to deal with the submissions  of  the learned  counsel for the appellants in the appeals  and  for the  petitioners in the writ petition (hereinafter  referred to  as ’the petitioners’) it would be relevant to advert  to the legislative history of Public Premises Act.     The Public Premises Act was preceded by two such  enact- ments.  The  first enactments was  the  Government  Premises (Eviction)  Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as ’the  1950

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Act’)  which  was enacted by Parliament to provide  for  the eviction of certain persons from Government premises and for certain matters connected therewith. It was confined, in its application,  to premises (a building or a part of a  build- ing) belonging to or taken on lease or requisitioned by  the Central Government and it empowered the competent  authority tO  evict a person in unauthorised occupation of such  prem- ises after issuing a notice to such person. The 1950 Act did not  define the expression "unauthorised occupation" and  it also  did not prescribe the procedure to be followed by  the competent  authority before passing the order  of  eviction. There  was a provision for appeal to the Central  Government against  the order of the competent authority. The 1950  Act was declared as unconstitutional by the Calcutta High  Court (in  Jagu Singh v. M. Shaukat Ali, 58 Cal. WN 1066)  and  by the Punjab High Court (in Satish Chander & Anr. v. Delhi Im- provement Trust, Etc., AIR 1958 Punjab 1) on the ground that it  imposed  unreasonable restriction on the  fight  of  the citizens to acquire, hold and dispose of property guaranteed under  Article  19(1)(f)  of the Constitution,  and  by  the Allahabad High Court (in Brigade Commander, Meerut Sub  Area v.  Ganga Prasad, AIR 1956 All. 507) on the ground  that  it was violative 659 of the rights to equality guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution.     Thereupon Parliament enacted the Public Premises  (Evic- tion  of  Unauthorised  Occupants)  Act,  1958  (hereinafter referred to as ’the 1958 Act’). In the 1958 Act, the defini- tion of Public Premises was enlarged to include, in relation to  the  Union  Territory of Delhi,  premises  belonging  to Municipal  Corporation of Delhi, or any municipal  committee or  notified area committee and premises belonging to  Delhi Development  Authority.  In  the 1958  Act,  the  expression "unauthorised occupation" was defined. It also laid down the procedure to be followed by the Estate Officer for  evicting a  person in unauthorised occupation of public premises  and it  made provision for filing an appeal against every  order of  the  Estate Officer before the District  Judge  or  such other Judicial Officer in that district of not less than ten years  standing as the District Judge may designate in  that behalf.  In Northern India Caterers Private Limited  v.  The State  of Punjab & Anr., [1967] 3 SCR 399 Section 5  of  the Punjab Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act,  1959 was held to be void by this Court on  the  ground that the said provision conferred an additional remedy  over and  above the remedy by way of suit and that  by  providing two alternative remedies to the Government and in leaving it to the unguided discretion of the Collector to resort to one or the other and to pick and choose some of those in occupa- tion  of public properties and premises for the  application of  the  more drastic procedure under Section  5,  the  said provision  was violative of Article 14 of the  Constitution. The  provisions contained in the Punjab Act were similar  to those  contained in the 1958 Act. Keeping in view the  deci- sion of this Court in Northern India Caterers Private Limit- ed’s  case  (supra),  Parliament  enacted  Public   Premises (Eviction  of  Unauthorised Occupants) Amendment  Act,  1968 whereby the 1958 Act was amended and Section 10E was  intro- duced  and  a bar was created to the jurisdiction  of  civil court  to  entertain any suit or proceeding  in  respect  of eviction  of  any person in unauthorised occupation  of  any public  premises or the recovery of the arrears of the  rent or damages payable under the provisions of the 1958 Act. The Delhi  High Court (in P.L. Mehra etc. v. D.R. Khanna,  etc.,

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AIR  1971 Delhi 1)held that whole of the 1958 Act  was  void under  Article  15(2) being violative of the  provisions  of Article 14 of the Constitution and the amendment of 1968 was ineffective-     This led to the enactment of the Public Premises Act  by Parliament  in  1971. It was brought into effect  from  16th September, 1958, 660 the  date on which the 1958 Act came into force. The  provi- sions  of the Public Premises Act are similar to those  con- tained in the 1958 Act. The definition of ’public  premises’ contained  in  Section 2(e) of the Public Premises  Act  has been widened so as to include premises belonging to or taken on lease by or on behalf of a company, as defined in Section 3  of the Companies Act, 1956, in which not less than  fifty one  per cent of the paid-up capital is held by the  Central Government  as  well as premises belonging to  or  taken  on lease by or on behalf of any corporation (not being a compa- ny, as defined in Section 3 of the Companies Act in 1956, or a local authority) established by or under a Central Act and owned and controlled by the Central Government. It  contains certain  additional provisions, providing for  offences  and penalties  (Section 11), liability of heirs and  representa- tives  (Section  13) recovery of rent etc. as an  arrear  of land revenue (Section 14) and bar of jurisdiction of  Courts (Section  15). The validity of the Public Premises  Act  was upheld  by this Court in Hari Singh & Ors. v.  The  Military Estate Officer & Anr., [1973] 1 SCR 5 15.     The  Public  Premises  Act was amended in  1980  by  the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants)  Amend- ment Act, 1980, whereby the definition of ’public  premises’ in Section 2(e) was amended to include premises belonging to or taken on lease by or on behalf of certain autonomous  and statutory organisations, viz., any University established or incorporated by any Central Act, any Institute  incorporated by  the  Institutes of Technology Act, 1961,  any  Board  of Trustees constituted under the major Port Trusts Act,  1963, and  the  Bhakra Management Board and as  well  as  premises belonging  to  or  taken on lease by any  Company  which  is subsidiary  of  a  Company as defined in Section  3  of  the Companies  Act,  1956 in which not less than fifty  one  per cent of  the paid-up capital is held by the Central  Govern- ment.  By  the said Amending Act of 1980, the  total  period taken  in  eviction proceedings was also sought to  be  cur- tailed  by  reducing the period for  showing  cause  against notice of eviction, the period within which an  unauthorised occupant should vacate the premises after eviction order has been passed and the period for filing an appeal against  the order of an Estate Officer. By the said Amending Act of 1980 provisions were also made, by inserting Sections 5A, 5B  and 5C,  to deal with the squatting or spreading of goods on  or against  or in front of any public premises and  removal  of unauthorised constructions or encroachments on public  prem- ises. The Public Premises Act was further amended in 1984 by the  Public  Premises (Eviction of  Unauthorised  Occupants) Amendment Act, 1984 whereby certain further amendments  were made to provide for increased penalties and 661 making  the offences under the Act cognisable and to  enable the  Estate Officers to exercise their powers under the  Act effectively.     As  stated in the preamble, the Public Premises Act  has been  enacted  to provide for the eviction  of  unauthorised occupants  from public premises and, for certain  incidental matters.  In  Section 2, various expressions have  been  de-

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fined.  The definitions of the following  expressions  which are of relevance are reproduced as under: "(c) "Premises" means any land or any building or part of  a building and includes-- (i) the garden, grounds and out houses. if any, appertaining to such building or part of a building, and (ii)  any  fitting  affixed to such building or  part  of  a building for the more beneficial enjoyment thereof;" "(e) "Public Premises" means-- (1) any premises belonging to, or taken on lease or requisi- tioned  by,  or on behalf of, the  Central  Government,  and includes  any such premises which have been placed  by  that Government, whether before or after the commencement of  the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants)  Amend- ment  act, 1980 under the control of Secretariat  of  either House of Parliament for providing residential  accommodation to any member of the staff of that Secretariat; (2)  any premises belonging to, or taken on lease by, or  on behalf of,-- (i)  any  company as defined in Section 3 of  the  Companies Act,  1956 (1 of 1956) in which not less than fifty one  per cent  of  the paid-up share capital is held by  the  Central Government or any Company which is a subsidiary (within  the meaning of the Act) of the first mentioned company, (ii)  any  corporation (not being a company  as  defined  in Section  3  of the Companies Act, 1956 ( 1 of  1956),  or  a local  authority) established by or under a Central Act  and owned or controlled by the Central Government, 662 (iii)  any  University established or  incorporated  by  any Central Act, (iv)  any Institute incorporated by the Institutes of  Tech- nology Act, 1961 (59 of 1961); (v)  any Board of Trustees constituted under the Major  Port Trusts Act, 1963 (38 of 1963); (vi)  the Bhakra Management Board constituted under  Section 79  of the Punjab Recoganisation Act, 1966 (31 of 1966)  and that Board as and when renamed as the Bhakra-Beas Management Board under Sub-section (6) of Section 80 of the Act; and (3) in relation to the Union Territory of Delhi-- (i)  any premises belonging to the Municipal Corporation  of Delhi, or any municipal committee or notified area committee and (ii) any premises belonging to the Delhi Development Author- ity,  whether  such premises are in the  possession  of,  or leased out by the said Authority." "(g)  "Unauthorised Occupation", in relation to  any  public premises,  means the occupation by any person of the  public premises without authority for such occupation, and includes the  continuance by any person of the public premises  after the authority (whether by way of grant or any other mode  of transfer) under which he was allowed to occupy the  premises has expired or has been expired for any reason whatsoever." Section 3 makes provision for appointment by Central Govern- ment of gazetted officer of Government or officers of  equal rank of the statutory authority as Estate Officers.  Section 4  relates to issue of show cause against order of  eviction and provides as under: "(1)  If the Estate Officer is of opinion that  any  persons are  in unauthorised occupation of any public  premises  and that they should be evicted, the Estate Officer shall  issue in  the  manner  hereinafter provided a  notice  in  writing calling 663 upon  all  persons concerned to show cause why an  order  of

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eviction should not be made. (2) The notice shall-- (a)  specify the grounds on which the order of  eviction  is proposed to be made; and (b)  require  all  persons concerned, that is  to  say,  all persons  who  are,  or may be, in occupation  of,  or  claim interest in, the public premises ,-- (i) to show cause, if any, against the proposed order on  or before such date as is specified in the notice, being a date not earlier than seven days from the date of issue  thereof; and (ii) to appear before the Estate Officer on the date  speci- fied in the notice alongwith the evidence which they  intend to  produce  in  support of the cause shown,  and  also  for personal hearing, if such hearing is desired. (3)  The Estate Officer shall cause the notice to be  served by  having it affixed on the outer door or some  other  con- spicuous  part  of  the public premises and  in  such  other manner  as may be prescribed, whereupon the notice shall  be deemed to have been duly given to all persons concerned. (4) Where the Estate Officer knows or has reasons to believe that  any persons are in occupation of the public  premises, then, without prejudice to the provisions of subsection (3), he  shall cause a copy of the notice to be served  on  every such person by post or by delivering or tendering it to that person or in such other manner as may be prescribed." Section 5 relates to eviction of unauthorised occupants  and provides as under’ "(1)  If, after considering the cause, if any, shown by  any person  in  pursuance of a notice under Section  4  and  any evidence  produced by him in support of the same  and  after personal hearing, if any, given under clause (b) of sub- 664 section  (2) of Section 4, the estate officer  is  satisfied that  occupation  of public premises  is  unauthorised,  the estate officer may make an order of eviction, for reasons to be  recorded  therein, directing that  the  public  premises shall  be  vacated on such date as may be specified  in  the order,  by all persons who may be in occupation  thereof  or any  part thereof, and cause a copy of the order to  be  af- fixed  on the outer door or some other conspicuous  part  of the public premises. (2) If any person refuses or fails to comply with the  order of  eviction  on or before the date specified  in  the  said order or within fifteen days of the date of its  publication under sub-section (1) whichever is later, the estate officer of  any other officer duly authorised by the estate  officer in this behalf may after the date so specified or after  the expiry  of the period aforesaid, whichever is  later,  evict that person from, and take possession of the public premises and  may, for that purpose, use such force as may be  neces- sary." Section  5A provides for removal of  unauthorised  construc- tions/structures  or fixtures, cattle or other  animal  from public  premises. Section 5B deals with demolition of  unau- thorised  constructions.  Section  5C  empowers  the  Estate Officer  to seal unauthorised constructions. Section 6  pro- vides  for disposal of property left on public  premises  by unauthorised occupants. Section 7 empowers the Estate  Offi- cer to require payment of rent or damages on account of  use and occupation of public premises alongwith interest by  the person found in unauthorised occupation. Section 8 lays down that an Estate Officer shall, for the purpose of holding any inquiry under the Act, have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908,  when

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trying to suit in respect of certain matters, viz. summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on  oath, requiring discovery and production  of  documents; and  any  other matter which may be  prescribed.  Section  9 provides for an appeal from every order of the Estate  Offi- cer in respect of any public premises passed under  Sections 5,  5B,  5C  and 7 to an appellate officer who  shall  be  a district judge of the district in which the public  premises are situated or such other judicial officer in the  district of  not less than ten years’ standing as the district  judge may designate in this behalf. It also prescribes the  period of  limitation  for filing such appeals and also  lays  down that the appeal shall be disposed of by the appellate  offi- cer  as  expeditiously  as possible.  Sections  10  attaches finality to the orders 665 made by an Estate Officer or appellate officer and  provides that the said orders shall not be called in questions in any original  suit  application or execution proceeding  and  no injunction shall be granted by any court or other  authority in  respect of any action taken or to be taken in  pursuance of  any  power  conferred by or under the  Act.  Section  11 provides  for  offences and penalties and Section  11A  lays down  mat the offences under Section 11 would be treated  as cognizable  offences under the Code of  Criminal  Procedure, 1973.  Section  15  relates to bar of  jurisdiction  and  it provides as under: "No  court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit  or proceeding in respect of-- (a) the eviction of any person who is in unauthorised  occu- pation of any such public premises, or (b)  the  removal of any building, structure of  fixture  or goods, cattle or other animal from any public premises under Section 5-A, or (C) the demolition of any building or other structure  made, or ordered to be made, under Section 5B, or (cc)  the sealing of any erection or work or of  any  public premises under Section 5-C, (d)  the  arrears of rent payable under sub-section  (1)  of Section  7  or  damages payable under  sub-section  (2),  or interest payable under sub-section (2-A) of that section, (e) the recovery of-- (i)  costs of removal of any building, structure or  fixture or g.gods. cattle or other animal under Section 5-A, or (ii) expenses of demolition under Section 5-B, or (iii)  costs awarded to the Central Government or  statutory authority under sub-section (5) of Section 9, or (iv)  any  portion of such rent, damages, cost  of  removal, expenses  of  demolition  or costs awarded  to  the  Central Government or the statutory authority." 666     In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 18 of the Public  Premises  Act, the Central Government has  made  the Public  Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants)  Rule, 1971  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  the  ’Public  Premises Rules’).  Rule  5 of said Rules relates to  holding  of  in- quiries and Rule 9 relates to procedure in appeals.     We  will  first deal with the contentions urged  by  the learned counsel for the petitioners with regard to the scope of  the definition of the expression ’Public Premises’  con- tained  in Section 2(e) and ’unauthorised occupation’,  con- tained in Section 2(g) of the Public Premises Act.     As  mentioned  earlier, the appeals relate  to  premises belonging  to nationalised Banks, viz. Punjab National  Bank and Allahabad Bank, constituted under the provisions of  the

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Banks Nationalisation Act. It has been urged by Shri Yogesh- wer  Prasad, that the premises belonging to  a  nationalised bank  do  not  fall within the ambit of  the  definition  of ’Public  Premises’ contained in Section 2(e) of  the  Public Premises Act, for the reason that nationalised bank is not a company  as defined in Section 3 of the Companies Act,  1956 and  it is also not a corporation established by or under  a Central  Act. The submission of the learned counsel for  the respondent banks is that the nationalised bank is a corpora- tion established by a Central Act, viz. the Banks Nationali- sation  Act,  and the premises belonging to  a  nationalised bank are ’public premises’ under Section 2(e)(2)(ii) of  the Public Premises Act. The question which, therefore, requires to be considered is whether a nationalised bank is a  corpo- ration established by or under a Central Act and is owned or controlled by the Central Government.     The  nationalised banks have been established under  the Banks  Nationalisation Act, wherein the  nationalised  banks have  been  described as ’corresponding new bank’.  In  sub- section  (i) of Section 3 of the Banks Nationalisation  Act, it  has been provided that on the commencement of  the  said Act, there shall be constituted such corresponding new banks as are specified in the First Schedule. In subsection (2) of Section 3, it is laid down that the paid-up capital of every corresponding  new  bank constituted under  sub-section  (1) shall,  until  any provision is made in this behalf  in  any scheme made under Section 9, be equal to the paid-up capital of  the existing bank in relation to which it is the  corre- sponding new bank. Sub-section(3) of Section 3 provides that the  entire capital of the new bank shall stand  vested  in, and  allotted to the Central Government. Sub-section (4)  of Section 3 lays down that every corresponding new bank  shall be a body corpo- 667 rate with perpetual succession and a common seal with power, subject to the provisions of the said Act, to acquire,  hold and dispose of property, and to contract, and may sue and be sued in its name. From the aforesaid provisions contained in Section  3  of the Banks Nationalisation act it  is  evident that the nationalised banks have been established under  the provisions of the said Act and the same are distinct  juris- tic  persons  with  perpetual succession and  the  power  to acquire,  hold and dispose of property and to  contract  and having  the right to sue and be sued in their own  name  and further that the entire capital of the said banks is  vested in  the Central Government, meaning thereby, that  the  said banks are owned by the Central Government.     Shri  Yogeshwer Prasad has pointed out that, in view  of Section 3(4) of the Banks Nationalisation Act, the  nationa- lised  bank  is a body corporate and not a  corporation  and that  there is a distinction between a body corporate and  a corporation  inasmuch as a body corporate  includes  bodies, such  as companies, co-operative societies, etc., which  are not corporations. Reliance has been placed in this regard on the  decision of Delhi High Court in Oriental Bank  of  Com- merce and Another v. Delhi Development Authority and  Anoth- er, [1985] 55 Company Cases 81. We find no substance in this contention.     In English law a corporation has been defined as "a body of  persons or an office which is recognised by the law  has having  a  personality which is distinct from  the  separate personalities of the members of the body or the  personality of the individual holder for the time being of the office in question." (See Halsbury’s Laws of England, Fourth  Edition, Volume  9, Para 1201). Generally speaking, corporations  are

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of two kinds; corporation aggregate and corporation sole.  A corporation aggregate has been described as an  incorporated group  of co-existing persons and a corporation sole  as  an incorporated  series  of  successive  persons,  (Salmond  on Jurisprudence,  12th Edition P 308. The distinctive  feature of a corporation are that it has the capacity of  continuous existence  and  succession, notwithstanding changes  in  its membership and it possesses the capacity of taking,  holding and  conveying property, entering into contracts. suing  and being sued, and exercising such other powers and priviledges conferred  on  it by law of its creation just as  a  natural person may (See S.S. Dhanoa v. Municipal Corporation,  Delhi &  Ors.,  [1981] 3 SCR 864. Corporations  aggregate  may  be public  or  private. A public corporation is  a  corporation formed  for a public purpose e.g. local government  authori- ties, and it is usually incorporated by a public general Act of Parliament. A private corporation is a corporation formed for profit 668 e.g. a limited company, and it is usually incorporated under a statutory enactment. After the second world war there  has been development of a new pattern of public corporations  in England  as an instrument of planning in the mixed  economy. The general characteristics of such a public corporation  is that it is normally created by a special statute; it has  no shares and no shareholders either private or public, and its shareholder, in the symbolic sense, is the nation represent- ed through Government and Parliament; the responsibility  of the public corporation is to the Government, represented  by the  competent Minister and through the Minister to  Parlia- ment;  the administration of the public corporation  is  en- tirely  in  the hands of a board which is appointed  by  the competent Minister; and it has the legal status of a  corpo- rate body with independent legal personality. (See W. Fried- man: The New Public Corporations and the Law [1947] 12  Mod. LR  234-236.)  There  is a similar growth of  this  type  of public  corporation in other countries. This trend  is  also evident  in our country since independence and a  number  of such  public corporations have been constituted by  Acts  of Parliament.     The distinction between such a public corporation and  a corporation generally known in law has been explained in the following observations of Denning L.J., as he then was:-- "The  Transport  Act, 1947, brings into  being  the  British Transport Commission, which is a statutory corporation of  a kind  comparatively new to English law. It has many  of  the qualities  which  belong to corporations of other  kinds  to which we have been accustomed. It has, for instance, defined powers which it cannot exceed; and it is directed by a group of men whose duty it is to see that those powers are proper- ly used. It may own property, carry on business, borrow  and lend money, just as any other corporation may do, so long as it keeps within the bounds which Parliament has set. But the significant difference in this corporation is that there are no  shareholders  to subscribe the capital or  to  have  any voice in its affairs. The money which the Corporation  needs is  not raised by the issue of shares but by borrowings  and its borrowing is not served by debentures; but is guaranteed by  the Treasury. If it cannot repay, the loss falls on  the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom; that is to say,  on the taxpayer. There are no shareholders to elect the  direc- tors  or to fix their remuneration. There are no profits  to be  made or distributed." (Tamfin v. Hannaford, [1950] 1  KB 18). 669

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   Reference has already been made to the provisions of the Banks  Nationalisation Act which show that the  nationalised bank  has been constituted as a distinct juristic person  by the Act and it is owned by the Central Government. There are other provisions in the Banks Nationalisation Act which show that  the general superintendence, direction and  management of  the affairs of the business of the bank is vested  in  a Board of Directors constituted by the Central Government and the Central Government has the power to remove a person from the  membership  of the Board of Directors (Section  7(2)  & 7(3) and in the discharge of its functions the Bank is to be guided  by  such directions in regard to matters  of  policy involving  public  interest as the Central  Government  may, after  consultation with the Governor of the  Reserve  Bank, give (Section 8). This indicates that the nationalised  bank has all the attributes of the new pattern of public corpora- tion.     Merely because the expression ’body corporate’  has-been used  in relation to the nationalised banks in Section  3(4) of the Banks Nationalisation Act and the expression  ’corpo- ration’  has not been used, does not mean that the  nationa- lised bank is not a corporation. The expression ’body corpo- rate’ is used in legal parlance to mean a ’public or private corporation’ (Black’s Law Dictionary p. 159).     Shri Yogeshwer Prasad has urged that in order to consti- tute  a corporation there must exist persons, i.e.  members, composing it, and that this element is missing in the natio- nalised  banks inasmuch as the Banks Natiolisation Act  does not provide for any membership to these banks. This  conten- tion  is without any merit because, as noticed  earlier,  in the new pattern of public corporations which have developed, there  are no shares and no shareholders, either  public  or private, and its shareholder, in the symbolic sense, is  the nation  represented  through Government  and  Parliament.  A similar  contention  was  raised before the  High  Court  of Australia  in  the  Bank of New South Wales &  Ors.  v.  The Commonwealth, [1948] 76 C.L.R. 19 in relation to the Common- wealth  Bank established as a body corporate by the  Common- wealth  Bank  Act, 1945. While  rejecting  this  contention, Latham C.J. has observed: "The Commonwealth Parliament has declared that the bank is a corporation and the Court must on this, as on many  previous occasions,  accept that the bank (though it has no  corpora- tors) exists as a new kind of juristic person." (p. 227) 670 Similarly Dixon J. has observed: "Although  the  Commonwealth Bank is declared to be  a  body corporate there are no corporators. I see no reason to doubt the  constitutional power of the Federal Parliament,  for  a purpose  within its competence, to create a juristic  person without  identifying  an individual or a  group  of  natural persons  with it, as the living constituent or  constituents of the corporation. In other legal systems an abstraction or even an inanimate physical thing has been made an artificial person as the object of rights and duties." (p. 36 1)     It may also be mentioned that in R.C. Cooper v. Union of India,  [1970]  3  SCR 530 this Court,  while  referring  to nationalised  banks constituted under the provisions of  the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Ordinance,  1969,  has  treated the  nationalised  banks  as corporations.     While construing the expression ’corporation’ in Section 2(e) (2)(ii) of the Public Premises Act it cannot be ignored that the object of the legislation in enlarging the  defini- tion of ’public premises’ in Section 2(e) is to make  avail-

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able  the  machinery of the Act  for  evicting  unauthorised occupants  not only from the premises belonging to the  Cen- tral  Government but also from premises belonging to  Compa- nies, Corporations and statutory bodies in which the Central Government   has  a  substantial  interest.  Under   Section 2(e)(2)(i)  premises  belonging to  a  company  incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956, in which not less than  fifty one  per cent of the paid-up capital is held by the  Central Government,  are to be treated as public premises. It  could not  be the intention of Parliament that premises  belonging to public corporations whose entire paid-up capital vests in the Central Government and who are the instrumentalities  of State would be excluded from the ambit of the definition  of ’public  premises’. In our opinion,. therefore, the  expres- sion  ’corporation’  in Section 2(e)(2)(ii)  of  the  Public Premises  Act would include public corporations of  the  new pattern  constituted  under  the Central  Acts  wherein  the entire paid-up capital vests in the Central Government.     Shri Yogeshwere Prasad has placed reliance on the  deci- sion  of  this Court in S.S. Dhanoa’s case  (supra)  wherein this Court has considered the question whether the Co-opera- tive Store Ltd., a cooperative society registered under  the Bombay Co-operative Societies 671 Act,  1925 is a corporation established by or under  a  Cen- tral,  Provincial or State Act, for the purposes  of  clause Twelfth  of Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code. This  Court has  observed that a corporation established by or under  an Act  of legislature could only mean a body  corporate  which owes  its existence and not merely its corporate  status  to the Act and a distinction has been drawn between a  corpora- tion established by or under an Act and a body  incorporated under  an Act. It has been held that the Co-operative  Store Ltd.,  which  is a society registered under the  Bombay  Co- operative  Societies  Act,  1925, is not  a  statutory  body because it is not created by a statute and that it is a body created  by an act of a group of individuals  in  accordance with  the  provisions of a Statute. This decision  does  not lend  any  assistance to the contention  of  Shri  Yogeshwer Prasad.     In  Oriental Bank of Commerce’s case (Supra)  the  over- ruled  question for consideration was, whether the  Chairman of  a  nationalised bank is a public  servant  and  sanction under  Section 197 of Code of Criminal Procedure was  neces- sary  to  prosecute  him. M.L. Jain, J. has  held  that  the nationalised bank is a body corporate and not a  corporation within  the meaning of clause Twelfth of Section  21  I.P.C. and, therefore, the Chairman of the nationalised bank is not a  public servant under Section 21 I.P.C. The learned  Judge has  further  held that even if the nationalised bank  is  a corporation,  the  Chairman of the said bank is not  in  the service or pay of the bank and further (in the facts of  the case)  it could not be said that the Chairman was acting  or purporting to act in the discharge of official duty. Sachar, J. did not consider it necessary to deal with the  question, as to whether the nationalised bank is a corporation because he  was  of the view that Section 197 Cr. P.C. was  not  at- tracted. For the reasons mentioned earlier, the judgment  of Jian,  J. insofar as it draws a distinction between a  ’body corporate’ and a ’corporation’ and laws down that the natio- nalised  bank, though a ’body corporate’ is not  a  corpora- tion,  cannot be upheld. The other reason given by Jain,  J. is that the nationalised bank is merely a personified insti- tution  having no members and is, therefore, not a  corpora- tion.  This view also cannot be sustained. We  have  already

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pointed out that in order to constitute a corporation it  is not  necessary that there should be shareholders or  members and  that in the new pattern of public corporation that  has developed there are no shareholders or members.     Keeping in view the provisions of the Banks Nationalisa- tion Act we are of the opinion that the nationalised bank is a  corporation established by a Central Act and it is  owned and controlled by the 672 Central Government. The premises belonging to a nationalised bank  are public premises under Section 2(e)(2)(ii)  of  the Public Premises Act. We are, therefore, unable to accept the contention of Shri Yogeshwar Prasad that premises  belonging to  a nationalised bank do not fall within the ambit of  the definition of ’public premises’ contained in Section 2(e) of the Public Premises Act.     Shri Yogeshwer Prasad has also urged that ’public  prem- ises’ as defined in Section 2(e) of the Public Premises Act, must  be confined to premises let out for  residential  pur- poses only and should not cover premises let out for commer- cial  purposes and that if premises let out  for  commercial purposes are included, Section 2(e) would be rendered uncon- stitutional as being violative of the provisions of Articles 14,  19(1)(g)  and 21 read with Articles 39 and  41  of  the Constitution.  The  submission of Shri Yogeshwer  Prasad  is that a construction which would sustain the constitutionali- ty  of  the provisions of Section 2(e) should  be  preferred over a construction which would render them  constitutional. We find no force in this contention.     There  is  no  warrant for confining the  scope  of  the definition of ’public premises’ contained in Section 2(e) to premises used for residential purposes only and to  excluded premises  used  for commercial purposes from its  ambit.  In Hari  Singh  v. Military Estate Officer, (Supra)  a  similar contention  was advanced and it was argued that the  expres- sion  ’premises’ in Public Premises Act would not  apply  to agricultural land. This Court rejected that contention  with the observation: "The  word ’premises’ is defined to mean any land. Any  land will include agricultural land. There is nothing in the  Act to  exclude  the applicability of the  Act  to  agricultural land."     We  are also unable to hold that the inclusion of  prem- ises  used for commercial purposes within the ambit  of  the definition  of  ’public premises’, would render  the  Public Premises  Act as violative.of the right to equality  guaran- teed under Article 14 of the Constitution or right to  free- dom to carry on any occupation, trade or business guaranteed under  Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution or the right  to liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.  It is  difficult  to appreciate how a  person  in  unauthorised occupation of public premises used for commercial  purposes, can invoke the Directive Principles under Article 39 and  41 of the Constitution. As indicated in the 673 statement of Objects and Reasons the Public Premises Act has been  enacted  to  provide for a speedy  machinery  for  the eviction  of unauthorised occupants of public  premises.  It serves  a  public purpose, viz. making available,  for  use, public  premises  after eviction of  persons  in  authorised occupation.  The need to provide speedy machinery for  evic- tion  of persons in unauthorised occupation cannot  be  con- fined to premises used for residential purposes. There is no reason  to  assume  that such a need will not  be  there  in respect  of premises used for commercial purposes.  No  dis-

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tinction  can, therefore, be made between premises used  for residential  purposes and premises used for commercial  pur- poses in the matter of eviction of unauthorised occupants of public  premises  and the considerations  which  necessitate providing  a  speedy machinery for eviction  of  persons  in unauthorised occupation of public premises apply equally  to both the types of public premises. We are, therefore, unable to  accept the contention of Shri Yogeshwer Prasad that  the definition  of public premises contained in Section 2(e)  of the Public Premises Act should be so construed as to exclude premises used for commercial purposes from its ambit.     Shri  A.K. Ganguli, has urged that a person who was  put in  occupation of the premises as a tenant and who was  con- tinued  in such occupation after the expiry or the  termina- tion of his tenancy cannot be regarded as a person in  unau- thorised  occupation under Section 2(g) of the Public  Prem- ises Act. The submission of Shri Ganguli is that, the  occu- pation of a person who was put in possession as a tenant  is juridical  possession and such an occupation cannot  be  re- garded  as unauthorised occupation. In support of this  sub- mission, Shri Ganguli has placed reliance on the decision of the  Bombay  High Court in Brigadier K.K. Verma  &  Anr.  v. Union of India & Anr., A.I.R. 1954 Bombay 358 which has been approved  by this Court in Lallu Yeshwant Singh v. Rao  Jag- dish Singh & Ors., [1968] 2 S.C.R. 203.     The  definition of the expression ’unauthorised  occupa- tion’  contained in Section 2(g) of the Public Premises  Act is  in two parts. In the first part the said expression  has been  defined  to mean the occupation by any person  of  the Public  premises without authority for such  occupation.  It implies occupation by a person who has entered into  occupa- tion of any public premises without lawful authority as well as occupation which was permissive at the inception but  has ceased to be so. The second part of the definition is inclu- sive in nature and it expressly covers continuance in  occu- pation  by any person of the public premises after  the  au- thority (whether by way of grant or any other mode of trans- fer) under which he was allowed to occupy the premises has 674 expired  or has been determined for any  reason  whatsoever. This  part  covers a case where a person  had  entered  into occupation  legally under valid authority but who  continues in occupation after the authority under which he was put  in occupation  has  expired or has been determined.  The  words "whether  by way of grant or any other mode of transfer"  in this part of the definition are wide in amplitude and  would cover a lease because lease is a mode of transfer under  the Transfer  of  Property Act. The definition  of  unauthorised occupation contained in Section 2(g) of the Public  Premises Act  would, therefore, cover a case where a person  has  en- tered  into occupation of the public premises legally  as  a tenant  under a lease but whose tenancy has expired  or  has been determined in accordance with law.     Brigadier  K.K.  Verma & Anr. v. Union of India  &  Anr. (Supra)  was decided under the provisions of the  Government Premises  (Eviction)  Act, 1950, which did not  contain  the definition  of the expression ’unauthorised occupation’.  In that  case it has been held that under the Indian  law,  the possession  of  a tenant who has ceased to be  a  tenant  is protected  by law and although he may not have the right  to continue in possession, after the termination of the  tenan- cy,  his  possession  is juridical and  that  possession  is protected by statute, and therefore, an erstwhile tenant can never  become  a  trespasser and his  possession  cannot  be regarded as unauthorised occupation. The learned Judges have

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also observed that unless the legislature had given  indica- tion  of a clear intention that by the expression  ’unautho- rised occupation’ it meant not only person who had no  title at all but also persons who are titled at the inception  and whose  title came to an end, it would not be proper to  give an  interpretation to the expression  ’unauthorised  occupa- tion’ which would run counter to the principles of law which have been accepted in this country. After this decision  the legislature intervened and introduced the definition of  the expression ’unauthorised occupation’ in the Public  Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1958, which  defi- nition  has  been reproduced in Section 2(e) of  the  Public Premises Act and in the said definition the legislature  has taken care to make an express provision indicating that  the expression  ’unauthorised occupation’ includes the  continu- ance  in  occupation by any person of  the  public  premises after  the authority (whether by way of grant or  any  other mode  of transfer) under which he was allowed to occupy  the premises  has expired or has been determined for any  reason whatsoever.  In  the circumstances  the  petitioners  cannot derive  any assistance from the decision of the Bombay  High Court in Brigadier K.K. Verma’s case (supra). 675     Shri Ganguli has placed reliance on the decision of A.P. Sen,  J. in Express Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. Union  of India & Others, [1985] Suppt. 3 S.C.R. 382 and has submitted that  in  that case the learned Judge has  held  that  cases involving  relationship between the lessor and  lessee  fall outside  the  purview of the Public Premises  Act.  We  have carefully  perused  the said decision and we are  unable  to agree  with  Shri  Ganguli. In that case A.P.  Sen,  J.  has observed  that the new building had been constructed by  the Express  Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. after the grant of  permission by  the lessor, and, therefore, the Express Newspapers  Pvt. Ltd.  was not in unauthorised occupation of the same  within the  meaning of Section 2(g) of the Public Premises Act.  It was also held by the learned Judge that the Express Building constructed by the Express Newspapers Ltd. with the sanction of lessor on plots Nos. 9 and 10 demised on perpetual  lease can,  by  no  process of reasoning, be  regarded  as  public premises  belonging to the Central Government under  Section 2(e) of the Public Premises Act, and therefore, there was no question of the lessor applying for eviction of the  Express Newspapers  Pvt.  Ltd. under the provisions  of  the  Public Premises  Act. The aforesaid observations indicate that  the learned  Judge did not proceed on the basis that  cases  in- volving  relationship of lessor and lessee fall outside  the purview  of the Public Premises Act. On the other  hand  the said observations show that the learned Judge has held  that the  provisions  of  the Public Premises Act  could  not  be invoked in the facts of that case.     Another  submission that has been urged by Shri  Ganguli is that the question whether a tease has been determined  or not  involves  complicated questions of law and  the  estate officer, who is not required to be an officer well versed in law, cannot be expected to decide such question and,  there- fore,  it  must be held that the provisions  of  the  Public Premises  Act have no application to a case when the  person sought to be evicted had obtained possession of the premises as a lessee. It is true that there is no requirement in  the Public Premises Act that the estate officer must be a person well versed in law. But, that, by itself, cannot be a ground for  excluding  from the ambit of the said Act  premises  in unauthorised  occupation of persons who obtained  possession of the said premises under a lease. Section 4 of the  Public

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Premises  Act requires issuing of a notice to the person  in unauthorised occupation of any Public Premises requiring him to  show cause why an order of eviction should not be  made. Section  5  makes provisions for production of  evidence  in support of the cause shown by the person who has been served with  a  notice  under Section 4 and giving  of  a  personal hearing  by the estate officer. Section 8 provides  that  an estate 676 officer, shall, for the purpose of holding any enquiry under the  said Act have the same powers as are vested in a  civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit in respect of the matters specified therein namely: (a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath; (b) requiring discovery and production of documents; and (c) any other matters which may be prescribed.     Rule  5(2) of the Public Premises (Eviction of  Unautho- rised Occupants) Rules, 1971, requires the estate officer to record the summary of evidence tendered before him. Moreover Section 9 confers a right of appeal against an order of  the estate officer and the said appeal has to be heard either by the  district  judge  of the district in  which  the  public premises are situate or such other judicial officer in  that district  of not less than ten years’ standing as  the  dis- trict judge may designate in that behalf. In shows that  the final  order that is passed is by a judicial officer in  the rank of a district judge.    A  similar  contention was raised before  this  Court  in Maganlal  Chhagganlal (P) Ltd. v. Municipal  Corporation  of Greater Bombay & Others, [1975] 1 SCR 1 wherein the validity of  the  provisions of Chapter VA of  the  Bombay  Municipal Corporation  Act,’ 1888 and the Bombay  Government  Premises (Eviction)  Act, 1955 were challenged before this Court  and the said contention was negatived. Aligiriswami, J. speaking for the majority, has observed as under: "Even though the officers deciding these questions would  be administrative officers there is provision in these Acts for giving  notice to the party affected, to inform him  of  the grounds  on  which the order of eviction is proposed  to  be made, for the party affected to file a written statement and produce documents and be represented by lawyers. The  provi- sions  of the Civil Procedure Code regarding  summoning  and enforcing attendance of persons and examining them on  oath, and requiring the discovery and production of documents  are a  valuable  safeguard for the person affected.  So  is  the provision  for  appeal to the Principal Judge  of  the  City Civil Court in the city of Bombay, or to a District Judge in the district who has got to deal with the 677 matter  as  expeditiously  as possible,  also  a  sufficient safeguard as was recognised in Suraj Mail Mehta’s case."     Having dealt with the submissions of learned counsel for the  petitioners on the applicability of the  provisions  of Public  Premises Act, we may come to the main  question  in- volved  in these matters, namely, whether the provisions  of the Public Premises Act override the provisions of the  Rent Control Act. For appreciating the submissions of the learned counsel  on  this question it is necessary  to  examine  the provisions  of both the enactments. The relevant  provisions of the Public Premises Act have already been set out. We may briefly refer to the provisions of the Rent Control Act.     The  Rent Control Act has been enacted by Parliament  to provide  for the control of rents and evictions and of  rate of  hotels  and lodging houses and for the lease  of  vacant

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premises to Government, in certain areas in the Union Terri- tory  of Delhi. It extends to the areas included within  the limits  of the New Delhi Municipal Committee and  the  Delhi Cantonment  Board and to such urban areas within the  limits of  the Municipal Corporation of Delhi as are  specified  in the First Schedule to the Act (Section 1(2). The  expression ’premises is defined in Section 2(i) as under: "Premises means any building or part of a building which  is or, is intended to be, let separately for use as a residence or  for  commercial use or for any other  purpose,  and  in- cludes: (i) the garden, grounds and outhouses, if any,, appertaining to such building or part of the building; (ii) any--furniture supplied by the landlord for use in such building or part of the building; but does not include a room in a hotel or lodging house."     Section  3, which excludes the applicability of the  Act to certain premises, provide as under: "Nothing in this Act shall apply: (a) to any premises belonging to the Government; (b) to any tenancy or other like relationship created by a 678 grant  from the Government in respect of the premises  taken on lease, or requisitioned, by the Government Provided  that  where any premises belonging  to  Government have been or are lawfully let by any person by virtue of  an agreement  with the Government or otherwise, then,  notwith- standing any judgment, decree or order of any court or other authority,  the provisions ’of this Act shall apply to  such tenancy. (c)  to  any  premises, whether residential  or  not,  whose monthly rent exceeds three thousand and five hundred rupees; or (d) to any premises constructed on or after the commencement of  the  Delhi  Rent Control (Amendment) Act,  1988,  for  a period  of  ten years from the date of  completion  of  such construction."     Chapter  II (Sections 4 to 13) contains  provisions  re- garding  rent including fixation of standard  rent.  Chapter III  (Sections 14 to 25) contains provisions for control  of eviction, of tenants. Section 14 gives protection to tenants against eviction and provides that an order for eviction  of a  tenant can be passed only on one or more of  the  grounds mentioned in clauses (a) to (1) of sub-section (1).  Special provisions have been made for recovery of immediate  posses- sion  of premises in Sections 14A to 14D in respect of  cer- tain  classes  of landlords. Section 22 contains  a  special provision  for recovery of possession of premises where  the landlord is a company or a body corporate or a local author- ity or a public institution if the premises are required for the  use of employees of such landlord or, in the case of  a public  institution, for the furtherance of its  activities. In Chapter IIIA (Sections 25-A to 25-C) provisions have been made for summary trial of certain applications for  eviction on  the  ground of bona fide requirement  of  the  landlord. Chapter IV (Sections 26 to 29) contains provisions  relating to  deposit of rent. Chapter V (Sections 30 to 34)  contains provisions  relating hotels and lodging houses.  Chapter  VI (Sections 35 to 43) contains provisions relating to appoint- ment  of  controllers  and their powers  and  functions  and appeals. Section 42 makes provisions for execution of orders passed by the Controller or in appeal, as a decree of  civil court.  Section 43 attaches finality to the order passed  by the  Controller and the order passed in appeal. Chapter  VII (Sections  44 to 49) contains provisions  regarding  special

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obligations of landlords and 679 penalties. Chapter VIII (Sections 50 to 57) contains miscel- laneous  provisions. Under Section 50 jurisdiction of  civil courts  is barred in respect of matters  specified  therein. Section 54 saves the operation of certain enactments,  name- ly,  Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950, the  Slum Areas  (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956 and  the  Delhi Tenants (Temporary Protection) Act, 1956.     On a comparison of the provisions of the Public Premises Act and the Rent Control Act it will be found that:   1.  By virtue of Section 1(2) of the Public Premises  Act, the  said  Act  is applicable throughout  the  territory  of India,  whereas,  view of Section 1(2) of the  Rent  Control Act,  the said Act is confined in its application  to  areas included  within the limits of the New Delhi Municipal  Com- mittee  and  the Delhi Cantonment Board and  to  such  urban areas  within  the limits of the  Municipal  Corporation  of Delhi  as are specified in the First Schedule and any  other urban  area  included  within the limits  of  the  Municipal Corporation of Delhi to which provisions of the said Act are extended  by the Central Government by notification  in  the Official Gazette.   (2) Under Clauses (c) of Section 2 of the Public  Premises Act,  the expression ’premises’ has a wider connotation  and it  includes  open  land as well as building or  part  of  a building.  Under the Rent Control Act the expression  ’prem- ises’  as defined in clause (i) of Section 2 has a  narrower connotation  to mean any building or a part of building  and it does not cover open land.   3.  In  view of the definition of the  expression  ’public premises’ contained in clause (e) of Section 2 of the Public Premises  Act,  the said Act, in addition  to  the  premises belonging  to or taken on lease or requisitioned by,  or  on behalf of, the Central Government, is applicable to premises belonging to or taken on lease by or on behalf of the compa- nies  and statutory bodies mentioned in clauses (2) and  (3) of Section 2(e). The Rent Control Act, on the other hand, is applicable to all premises except premises belonging to  the Government  or  to any tenancy or  other  like  relationship created  by  a grant from the Government in respect  of  the premises taken on lease, or requisitioned, by the Government (Section 3). In view of the amendment introduced in  Section 3 by the Delhi Rent Con- 680 trol Act is not applicable to premises, whether  residential or  not, whose monthly rent exceeds three thousand and  five hundred  rupees  and premises constructed on  or  after  the commencement of the said Amendment Act, for a period of  ten years from the date of completion of such construction.    4. The provisions of the Public Premises Act are applica- ble  to Public Premises in occupation of a person having  no authority  for such occupation, including a person  who  was allowed  to occupy the public premises under a grant or  any other  mode of transfer and who has continued in  occupation after  the  authority under which he was allowed  to  occupy that premises has expired or has been terminated. The provi- sions  of the Delhi Rent Control Act are applicable only  to persons  who  have obtained possession of  the  premises  as tenants  and whose tenancy is continuing as well as  persons who after the expiration or termination of the tenancy  have continued in occupation of the premises.     As  a  result  of this comparison it can  be  said  that certain premises, viz. building or parts of buildings  lying within  the limits of the New Delhi Municipal Committee  and

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the  Delhi  Cantonment Board and in urban areas  within  the limits  of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi, which  belong to or are taken on lease by any of the companies or statuto- ry  bodies mentioned in clauses (2) and (3) of Section  2(e) of the Public Premises Act and which are in occupation of  a person  who  obtained possession of the said premises  as  a tenant and whose tenancy has expired or has been  terminated but  who is continuing in occupation of the same, would  ex- facie  fall within the purview of both the  enactments.  The question which, therefore, arises is whether the occupant of such  premises can seek the protection available  under  the provisions  of Rent Control Act and he can be  evicted  from the premises only in accordance with the said provisions and proceedings for eviction of such a person cannot be initiat- ed under the provisions of the Public Premises Act.     Shri  Venugopal and other learned  counsel  representing the  petitioners have urged that the Rent Control Act  is  a self-contained  code providing for regulating the  relation- ship  of  landlords and tenants and it  makes  comprehensive provisions with regard to control of rents as well as  evic- tion  of tenants and that the provision of the Rent  Control Act,  being special in nature insofar as lease-hold  proper- ties  in Delhi are concerned, would prevail over the  provi- sions of the Public 681 Premises  Act which are in the nature of general  provisions relating to eviction of unauthorised occupants from  Govern- ment  premises  in the whole country.. In  support  of  this submission  the  learned counsel for  the  petitioners  have placed  reliance on Sections 22 and 54 and the  non-obstante clause  contained in Section 14(1) of the rent Control  Act. It has also been urged by the learned counsel for the  peti- tioners  that the Public Premises Act does not  contain  any machinery  for  the termination of the tenancy and  that  in view  of the decision of this Court in V. Dhanapal  Chettiar v.  Yesodai Ammal, [1980] 1 SCR 334, the jural  relationship of landlord and tenant can come to an end only on the  pass- ing  of an order of eviction by a competent court in  accor- ding with the provisions of the Rent Control Act and that in the absence of an order of eviction under the provisions  of the Rent Control Act no proceedings can be initiated against a  person  who  came into occupation of the  premises  as  a tenant  and  who  is continuing in occupation  of  the  said premises  after the contractual tenancy has expired  or  has been terminated.     The  learned  Attorney  General and  Shri  G.L.  Sanghi, appearing on behalf of the respondents in the appeals,  have urged  that  the Public Premises Act is in the nature  of  a special  enactment making provision for speedy  and  expedi- tious recovery of possession of public premises from persons in  unauthorised  occupation of the same  whereas  the  Rent Control Act is general enactment regulating the relationship of landlord and tenant and since the Public Premises Act  is a special enactment it would override the provisions of  the Rent  Control  Act. It has also been urged that  the  Public Premises  Act is a later enactment, having been  enacted  in 1971, whereas the Rent Control Act was enacted in 1958, and, therefore,  the Public Premises Act would prevail  over  the Rent  Control Act. It has been urged that Section 15 of  the Public  Premises  Act which bars the jurisdiction  of  other Courts is in the nature of a non obstante clause which gives overriding  effect to the provisions of the Public  Premises Act.     The  learned Addl. Solicitor General, appearing for  the respondents  in the writ petitions, has adopted a  different

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line of argument. He has contended that the Public  Premises Act had been enacted by Parliament in exercise of its legis- lative  power under Article 246(1) read with entries 32,  95 and 97 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution whereas the Rent Control Act has been enacted by  Parliament in  exercise of its legislative power under  Article  246(4) read  with  entries 6, 7 and 13 of List III of  the  Seventh Schedule  to the Constitution and since the Public  Premises Act has been enacted in 682 exercise  of the legislative power under Article  246(1)  of the Constitution, it would prevail over the Rent Control Act enacted  in  exercise  of legislative  power  under  Article 246(4) of the Constitution.     At  this  stage, it may be mentioned that  in  Jain  Ink Manufacturing Company v. Life Insurance Corporation of India &  Another,  [1981] 1 SCR 498 decided by a  bench  of  three Judges, it has been held that the Public Premises Act  over- rides the provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act. In  that case  it has been observed that the scope and object of  the Public  Premises  Act is quite different from that  of  Rent Control Act and while the Public Premises Act operates in  a very  limited  field in that it applies only  to  a  limited nature  of  premises belonging only to  particular  sets  of individuals,  a  particular  set of  juristic  persons  like Companies,  Corporations or the Central Government,  whereas the  Rent  Control Act is of much wider application  and  it applies to all private premises which do not fall within the limited  exceptions  indicated in Section 2  of  the  Public Premises  Act and the object of the Rent Control Act  is  to afford  special  protection to all the  tenants  or  private landlords  or  landlords who are neither a  Corporation  nor Government or Corporate Bodies. It was, therefore, held that the Public Premises Act is a special Act as compared to  the Rent Control Act and it overrides the provisions of the Rent Control  Act. The learned counsel for the  petitioners  have assailed  the  correctness  of the said  decision  and  have submitted that it needs reconsideration.     As regards rent control legislation enacted by the State legislatures the position is well settled that such legisla- tion  fall within the ambit of entries 6, 7 and 13 List  III of  the  Seventh  Schedule to the  Constitution  (See:  Indu Bhushan  Bose v. Rama Sundari Devi & Another, [1970]  1  SCR 443;  V  Dhanpal Chettiar’s case (supra); Jai  Singh  Jairam Tyagi etc. v. Mamanchand Ratilal Agarwal & Others, [1980]  3 SCR 224 and Accountant and Secretarial Services Pvt. Ltd.  & Another v. Union of India & Others, [1988] 4 SCC 324.     The  Rent Control Act has been enacted by Parliament  in relation to the Union Territory of Delhi in exercise of  the legislative  power  conferred under Article  246(4)  of  the Constitution  which  empowers Parliament to make  laws  with respect to any matter for any part of the territory of India not included in a State notwithstanding that such matter  is a matter enumerated in the State List.     The  Public Premises Act deals with Government  property as  well as property belonging to other legal entities  men- tioned in clauses (2) 683 and  (3) of Section 2(e) of the Public Premises Act.  In  so far as it relates to eviction of unauthorised occupants from premises belonging to or taken on lease or requisitioned  by or  on behalf of the Central Government the Public  Premises Act  would  fall within entry 32 of List I  being  law  with respect  to a property of the Union. The property  belonging to  the various legal entities mentioned in clauses (2)  and

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(3)  of  Section 2(e) of the Public Premises Act  cannot  be regarded  as property of the Union and the  Public  Premises Act  cannot be held to have been enacted under entry  32  of List I in respect of the said properties. In Accountant  and Secretarial Services Pvt. Ltd. and Another v. Union of India and  Others,  (supra) this Court has held  that  the  Public Premises  Act,  in  relation to properties  other  than  the properties  belonging  to the Central  Government  has  been enacted  under the concurrent list. The  learned  Additional Solicitor  General  has placed reliance on the  decision  of this  Court  in Smt. Saiyada Mossarrat  v.  Hindustan  Steel Ltd.,   [1989] 1 SCC 272 wherein it has been held that  with regard to the subject matter of speedy eviction of  unautho- rised  occupants from properties belonging to  a  Government company, wherein the Central Government has more than  fifty one per cent of the paid-up capital, the source of authority can  be traced to entry 97 read with entry 95 of Union  List (List 1). This Court has, however, affirmed the decision  of the Division Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court in L.S. Nair v. Hindustan Steel Ltd., AIR 1980 MP 106 wherein it has been held  that insofar as the Public Premises Act deals  with  a lessee  or  licence of premises belonging  to  a  Government company,  the subject matter of the Act would be covered  by entries 6, 7 and 46 of List III. After quoting the  observa- tions of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in this regard,  this Court has observed: "Learned  counsel  for the petitioner has not been  able  to show  that  there is any infirmity in the reasoning  of  the High Court." This shows that the decision of this Court is rounded on the view  mentioned above. Since the Act was held to be  covered by entries 6, 7 and 46 of List III, it was not necessary  to invoke the residuary power of legislation under entry 97  of List I. The observations made by this Court that the  source of  authority in the matter of speedy eviction  of  unautho- rised  occupants from properties belonging to  a  Government company  wherein the Central Government has more than  fifty one per cent of the paid-up share capital can, in any  case, be  traced  to  entry 97 read with entry 95 of  List  I  are obiter in nature only. There is, therefore, no inconsistency between the decisions of this Court in Accoun- 684 tant  and  Secretarial Services Pvt. Ltd. (supra)  and  Smt. Saiyada  Mossarrat  case  (supra) inasmuch as  in  both  the decisions it is held that the Public Premises Act insofar as it  deals with a lessee or licencee of premises  other  than premises belonging to the Central Government has been enact- ed  in  exercise  of the legislative powers  in  respect  of matters enumerated in the Concurrent List. We are in  agree- ment with this view.     This  means  that  both the statutes,  viz.  the  PubLic Premises Act and the Rent Control Act, have been enacted  by the same legislature, Parliament, in exercise of the  legis- lative  powers in respect of the matters enumerated  in  the Concurrent  List.  We are, therefore, unable to  accept  the contention of the learned Additional Solicitor General  that the  Public Premises Act, having been enacted by  Parliament in  exercise  of legislative powers in  respect  of  matters enumerated  in the Union List would ipso-facto override  the provisions  of the Rent Control Act enacted in  exercise  of the  legislative powers in respect of matters enumerated  in the  Concurrent  List.  In our opinion the  question  as  to whether  the provisions of the Public Premises Act  override the  provisions  of  the Rent Control Act will  have  to  be considered  in  the  light of the  principles  of  statutory

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interpretion  applicable to laws made by the  same  legisla- ture.     One such principle of statutory interpretation which  is applied  is contained in the latin maxim:  leges  posteriors priores  conterarias abrogant, (later laws abrogate  earlier contrary. laws). This principle is subject to the  exception embodied  in the maxim: generalia specialibus non  derogant, (a general provision does not derogate from a special  one). This  means  that where the literal meaning of  the  general enactment covers a situation for which specific provision is made by another enactment contained in an earlier Act, it is presumed  that the situation was intended to continue to  be dealt  with by the specific provision rather than the  later general one (Benion: Statutory Interpretation p. 433-34).     The  rationale  of this rule is thus explained  by  this Court  in the J.K. Cotton Spinning & Weaving Mills Co.  Ltd. v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Others, [1961] 3 SCR 185: "The  rule that general provisions should yield to  specific provisions  is  not an arbitrary principle made  by  lawyers Judges but springs from the common understanding of man  and women that when the same person gives two directions 685 one covering a large number of matters in general and anoth- er  to only some of them his intention is that these  latter directions should prevail as regards these while as  regards all the rest the earlier directions should have effect." (p. 94)     In  U.P. State Electricity Board & Ors. v. Hari  Shankar Jain & Ors., [1979] 1 SCR 355 this Court has observed: "In  passing  a special Act, Parliament devotes  its  entire consideration to a particular subject. When a General Act is subsequently  passed, it is logical to presume that  Parlia- ment  has  not repealed or modified the former  Special  Act unless  it appears that the Special Act again received  con- sideration from Parliament." (p. 366)     In  Life Insurance Corporation v.D.J. Bahadur, [1981]  1 SCR 1083 Krishna Iyer, J. has pointed out: "In determining whether a statute is a special or a  general one, the focus must be on the principal subject matter  plus the particular perspective. For certain purposes, an Act may be general and for certain other purposes it may be  special and  we  cannot blur distinctions when  dealing  with  liner points of law." (p. 1127)     The  Public  Premises Act is a later  enactment,  having been enacted on 23rd August, 1971, whereas the Rent  Control Act  was enacted on 31st December, 1958. It  represents  the later  will of Parliament and should prevail over  the  Rent Control  Act unless it can be said that the Public  Premises Act is a general enactment, whereas the Rent Control Act  is a  special enactment and being a special enactment the  Rent Control Act should prevail over the Public Premises Act. The submission  of learned counsel for the petitioners  is  that the  Rent  Control Act is a special enactment  dealing  with premises in occupation of tenants, whereas the Public  Prem- ises  Act is a general enactment dealing with the  occupants of  Public Premises and that insofar as public  premises  in occupation  of tenants are concerned the provisions  of  the Rent Control Act would continue to apply and to that  extent the  provisions  of  the Public Premises Act  would  not  be applicable. In support of this submission reliance has  been placed  on the non obstante clauses contained in Section  14 and  22  of the Rent Control Act as well as  the  provisions contained in Sections 50 and 54 of the said Act. On the 686 other  hand  the learned counsel for  the  respondents  have

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urged  that  the  Rent Control Act is  a  general  enactment dealing with the relationship of landlord and tenant  gener- ally, whereas the Public Premises Act is a special enactment making provision for speedy recovery of possession of Public Premises in unauthorised occupation and that the  provisions of  the  Public  Premises Act, a later  Special  Act,  will, therefore,  override the provisions of the Rent Control  Act in  so  far  as they are applicable to  Public  Premises  in occupation of persons who have continued in occupation after the  lease has expired or has been determined.  The  learned counsel for the respondents have placed reliance on  Section 15 of the Public Premises Act which bars the jurisdiction of all  courts in respect of the eviction of any person who  is in unauthorised occupation of any Public Premises and  other matters  specified  herein. It has been submitted  that  the said  provision  is  also in the nature of  a  non  obstante clause  which gives overriding effect to the  provisions  of the Public Premises Act. Thus each side claims the enactment relied upon by it is a special statute and the other  enact- ment  is  general and also invokes the non  obstante  clause contained in the enactment relied upon.     The Rent Control Act makes a departure from the  general law  regulating  the  relationship of  landlord  and  tenant contained  in  the Trnasfer of Property Act inasmuch  as  it makes  provision  for  determination of  standard  rent,  it specifies the grounds on which a landlord can seek the evic- tion  of a tenant, it prescribes the forum for  adjudication of disputes between landlords and tenants and the  procedure which  has  to  be followed in such  proceedings.  The  rent Control Act can, therefore, be said to be a special  statute regulating  the relationship of landlord and tenant  in  the Union  Territory  of Delhi. The Public  premises  Act  makes provision for a speedy machinery to secure eviction of unau- thorised  occupants from public premises. As opposed to  the general law which provides for filing of a regular suit  for recovery of possession of property in a competent Court  and for  trial of such a suit in accordance with  the  procedure laid  down in the Code of Civil procedure, the Public  Prem- ises  Act confers the power to pass an order or eviction  of an unauthorised occupant in a public premises on a designat- ed  officer and prescribes the procedure to be  followed  by the  said officer before passing such an  order.  Therefore, the  Public Premises Act is also a special statute  relating to eviction of unauthorised occupants from public  premises. In  other words, both the enactments, namely, the Rent  Con- trol  Act and the Public Premises Act, are special  statutes in  relation to the matters dealt with therein.  Since,  the Public  premises Act is a special statute and not a  general enactment the 687 exception  contained  in  the principle  that  a  subsequent general  law  cannot derogate from an  earlier  special  law cannot be invoked and in accordance with the principle  that the  later laws abrogate earlier contrary laws,  the  Public Premises Act must prevail over the Rent Control Act.     We arrive at the same conclusion by applying the princi- ple  which is followed for resolving a conflict between  the provisions of two special enactments made by the same legis- lature.  We may in this context refer to some of  the  cases which  have come before this Court where the  provisions  of two enactments made by the same legislature were found to be inconsistent and each enactment was claimed to be a  special enactment  and had a non obstante clause  giving  overriding effect to its provisions.     In  Shri Ram Narain v. The Simla Banking and  Industrial

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Co.  Ltd.,  [1956] SCR 603 this Court  was  considering  the provisions contained in the Banking Companies Act, 1949  and the Displaced Persons (Debts Adjustment) Act, 1951. Both the enactments contained provisions giving overriding effect  to the  provisions  of the enactment over any other  law.  This Court has observed: "Each enactment being a Special Act, the ordinary  principle that  a special law overrides a general law does not  afford any clear solution in this case" (p. 613) "It  is,  therefore, desirable to determine  the  overriding effect  of  one or the other of the relevant  provisions  in these two Acts, in a given case, on much broader  considera- tions of the purpose and policy underlying the two Acts  and the  clear intendment conveyed by the language of the  rele- vant provisions therein." (p. 615)     Similarly in Kumaon Motor Owners’ Union Ltd. and Another v.  The State of Uttar Pradesh, [1966] 2 SCR 12 1 there  was conflict between the provisions contained in Rule 131(2)(gg) and (i) of the Defence of India Rules, 1962 and Chapter IV-A of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1939. Section 68-B gave overriding effect  to  the  provisions of Chapter IV(A)  of  the  Motor Vehicle Act whereas Section 43 of the Defence of India  Act, 1962, gave overriding effect to the provisions contained  in the Defence of India Rules. This Court held that the Defence of  India  Act was later than the Motor  Vehicles  Act  and, therefore,  if there was anything repugnant, the  provisions of the later 688 Act  should  prevail.  This Court also  looked  into  object behind  the two statutes, namely, Defence of India  Act  and Motor  Vehicles Act and on that basis also it was held  that the provisions contained in the Defence of India Rules would have  an overriding effect over the provisions of the  Motor Vehicles Act.     In  Sarwan Singh & Another v. Kasturi Lal, [1977] 2  SCR 421, the question for consideration was, whether the  provi- sions  of Section 14A and Chapter IIIA of the  Rent  Control Act will prevail over those contained in Sections 19 and  39 of  the  Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance)  Act,  1956. Section  14A and 25A of the Rent Control Act  contained  non obstante  clauses but in Section 54 of the Rent Control  Act it was expressly provided that nothing in the said Act shall effect  the  provisions of the Slum Areas  (Improvement  and Clearance)  Act,  1956. Moreover in Section 19 of  the  Slum Areas  (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956 mere  was  non- obstante clause and Section 39 of the said Act gave overrid- ing effect to the provisions of the said enactment over  any other Jaw. This Court has observed: "When  two or more laws operate in the same field  and  each contains  a non-obstante clause stating that its  provisions will override those of any other law, stimulating and  inci- sive  problems  of interpretation  arise.   Since  statutory interpretation  has no conventional protocol, cases of  such conflict have to be decided in reference to the obeject  and purpose of the laws under consideration." (p. 433)     After examining the special and specific purpose  under- lying  the enactment of Section 14A and Chapter IIIA of  the Rent Control act and the fact that the Rent Control Act  was a later enactment this Court held that the provisions of the Rent  Control Act would prevail over those contained in  the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956.     The principle which emerges from these decisions is that in  the case of inconsistency between the provisions of  two enactments,  both  of which can be regarded  as  Special  in nature, the conflict has to be resolved by reference to  the

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purpose  and  policy underlying the two enactments  and  the clear  intendment conveyed by the language of  the  relevant provisions  therein. We propose to consider this  matter  in the light of this principle. The  statement of objects and reasons for the  enactment  of the 689 Rent Control Act, indicates that it has been enacted with  a view: (a) to devise a suitable machinery for expeditious adjudica- tion of proceedings between landlords and tenants; (b)  to provide for the determination of the  standard  rent payable  by  tenants of the various categories  of  premises which  should be fair to the tenants, and at the same  time, provide  incentive for keeping the existing houses  in  good repairs,  and for further investment in house  construction; and (c)  to give tenants a larger measure of protection  against eviction. This  indicates that the object underlying the Rent  Control Act  is  to make provision for expeditious  adjudication  of disputes  between  landlords and tenants,  determination  of standard  rent  payable  by tenants  and  giving  protection against  eviction to tenants. The premises belonging to  the Government  are excluded from the ambit of the Rent  Control Act  which means that the Act has been enacted primarily  to regulate  the  private relationship  between  landlords  and tenants  with a view to confer certain benefits on the  ten- ants  and  at the same time to balance the interest  of  the landlords  by  providing  for  expeditious  adjudication  of proceedings between landlords and tenant.     As  mentioned earlier, the Public Premises Act has  been enacted with a view to provide for eviction of  unauthorised occupants from public premises. In the statement of  objects and  reasons for this enactment reference has been  made  to the judicial decisions whereby by the 1958 Act was  declared as unconstitutional and it has been mentioned: "The court decisions, referred to above, have created  seri- ous difficulties for the Government inasmuch as the proceed- ings  taken by the various Estate Officers  appointed  under the Act either for the eviction of persons who are in  unau- thorised  occupation of public premises or for the  recovery of rent or damages from such persons stand null and void. It has  become  impossible for Government to  take  expeditious action  even inflagrant cases of unauthorised occupation  of public  premises  and recovery of rent or damages  for  such unauthorised occupation. It is, therefore, considered imper- ative  to  restore a speedy machinery for  the  eviction  of persons who are in unauthorised occupation 690 of  public  premises keeping in view at the  same  time  the necessity  of complying with the provision of the  Constitu- tion and the judicial pronouncements, referred to above." This shows that the Public Premises Act has been enacted  to deal with the mischief of rampant unauthorised occupation of public  premises  by providing a speedy  machinery  for  the eviction of persons in unauthorised occupation. In order  to secure  this object the said Act prescribes the time  period for  the  various steps which are enquired to be  taken  for securing   eviction   of   the   persons   in   unauthorised occupation..  The  object  underlying the  enactment  is  to safeguard public interest by making available for public use premises belonging to Central Government, Companies in which the  Central Government has substantial  interest,  Corpora- tions  owned  or controlled by the  Central  Government  and

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certain  autonomous  bodies and to prevent  misuse  of  such premises.     It would thus appear that, while the Rent Control Act is intended to deal with the general relationship of  landlords and  tenants  in respect of premises other  than  government premises,  the Public Premises Act is intended to deal  with speedy recovery of possession of premises of public  nature, i.e. property belonging to the Central Government, or Compa- nies in which the Central Government has substantial  inter- est  or  Corporations  owned or controlled  by  the  Central Government  and certain corporations, institutions,  autono- mous  bodies  and local authorities. The  effect  of  giving overriding  effect to the provisions of the  Pubic  Premises Act  over  the  Rent Control Act, would  be  that  buildings belonging  to Companies Corporations and  Autonomous  bodies referred to in Section 2(e) of the Public Permises Act would be  excluded from the ambit of the Rent Control Act  in  the same  manner as properties belonging to the Central  Govern- ment.  The reason underlying the exclusion of  property  be- longing to the Government from the ambit of the Rent Control Act,  is that Government while dealing with the citizens  in respect  of property belonging to it would not act  for  its own  purpose as a private landlord but would act  in  public interest.  What  can be said with regard  to  Government  in relation  to property belonging to it can also be said  with regard to companies, corporations and other statutory bodies mentioned in Section 2(e) of the Public Premises Act. In our opinion,  therefore, keeping in view the object and  purpose underlying  both the enactments viz., the Rent  Control  Act and  the Public Premises Act, the provisions of  the  Public Premises  Act have to be construed as overriding the  provi- sions contained in the Rent Control Act. 691     As  regards the non obstante clauses contained  in  Sec- tions 14 and 22 and the provisions contained in Sections  50 and  54 of the Rent Control Act, it may be stated that  Par- liament  was aware of these provisions when it  enacted  the Public  Premises Act contained a specific provision in  Sec- tion  15  barring jurisdiction of all  courts  (which  would include  the  Rent Controller under the Rent  Control  Act). This indicates that Parliament intended that the  provisions of the Public Premises Act would prevail over the provisions of  the  Rent  Control Act inspite of  the  above  mentioned provisions contained in the Rent Control Act.     It  has been urged by the learned counsel for the  peti- tioner  that there is no conflict between the provisions  of the  Rent Control Act and the Public Premises Act  and  that both  the  provisions  can be given effect  to  without  one overriding  the other. In this regard, it has  been  pointed out  that  since no provisions has been made in  the  Public Premises  Act for the termination of the lease,  the  provi- sions  of the Rent Control Act can be held  applicable  upto the  stage  of  termination of the  lease,  and  thereafter, proceedings  can be initiated for eviction under the  provi- sions of the Public Premises Act. In support of this submis- sion,  reliance has been placed on Dhanpal  Chettiar’s  case (supra),  wherein it has been held that in view of the  spe- cial provisions contained in the State Rent Control Acts, it is  no longer necessary to issue a notice under Section  106 of  the  Transfer of Property Act to terminate  the  tenancy because inspite of the said notice the tenant is entitled to continue  in occupation by virtue of the provisions  of  the said  Acts. In the said case, it has been further laid  down that  the relationship between the landlord and tenant  con- tinues till the passing of the order of eviction in  accord-

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ance with the provisions of the Rent act, and therefore, for the  eviction of the tenant in accordance with the  law,  an order  of the competent Court under the Rent Control Act  is necessary.  This would mean that in order to evict a  person who  is  continuing in occupation after  the  expiration  or termination  of his contractual tenancy in  accordance  with law, two proceedings will have to be initiated. First, there will  be proceedings under Rent Control Act before the  Rent Controller followed by appeal before the Rent Control Tribu- nal and revision before the High Court. After these proceed- ings have ended they would be followed by proceedings  under the  Public Premises Act, before the Estate Officer and  the Appellate  Authority. In other words, persons in  occupation of  public  premises would receive greater  protection  than tenants  in premises owned by private persons. It could  not be  the intention of Parliament to confer this dual  benefit on persons in occupation of public premises. 692     It  has also been urged that in Section 22 of  the  Rent Control Act, special provision has been made for recovery of possession of premises belonging to a company or other  body corporate  or any local authority or any public  institution and  that premises belonging to companies, corporations  and autonomous  bodies mentioned in clauses (2) and (3) of  Sec- tion  2(e)  of the Public Premises would be covered  by  the said provision and that in view of this special provision it is  not necessary to have a further provision in the  Public Premises  Act  for the recovery of possession  belonging  to those  bodies, and therefore, the provisions of  the  Public Premises  Act  should be confined in  their  application  to premises  other  than premises covered by the  Rent  Control Act. Section 22 of the Rent Control Act provides as under: "Where the landlord in respect of any premises is any compa- ny  or  other body corporate of any local authority  or  any public institution and the premises are required for the use of  employees  of such landlord or in the case of  a  public institution  for  the furtherance of its  activities,  then, notwithstanding  anything  contained in Section  14  or  any other law, the Controller may, on an application made to him in  this  behalf  by such landlord, place  the  landlord  in vacant  possession of such premises by evicting  the  tenant and every other person who may be in occupation thereof,  if the Controller is satisfied-- (a)  that the tenant to whom such premises were let for  use as  a  residence  at a time when he was in  the  service  or employment of the landlord, has ceased to be in such service or employment; or (b) that the tenant has acted in contravention of the terms, express or implied, under which he was authorised to  occupy such premises; or (c)  that any other person is in unauthorised occupation  of such premises; or (d)  that the premises are required bona fide by the  public institution for the furtherance of its activities. Explanation--For  the purpose of this section,  "public  in- stitution" includes any educational institutional,  library, hospital and charitable dispensary but does not include any 693 such institution set up by any private trust."     The said special provision shows that, it enables recov- ery  of  possession or premises of which the landlord  is  a company  or other body corporate or any local  authority  or any public institution in certain circumstances viz., if the premises  are required for the use of the employees or  such landlord. In the case of public institutions possession  can

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also  be obtained under this provision if the  premises  are required  for  the furtherance of its activities.  In  other words,  recovery  of possession is  permissible  under  this provision  only  in certain circumstances  and  for  certain purposes.  Inspite of this provision Parliament has  consid- ered  it  necessary  tO extend the Public  Premises  Act  to premises belonging to companies, corporations and  statutory bodies  mentioned in Clauses (2) and (3) of Section 2(e)  by widening the definition of the expression "public  premises" in  Section 2(e) of the Public Premises Act. The  scope  and ambit  of  the aforesaid power conferred  under  the  Public Premises Act cannot be restricted by reference to the provi- sion contained in Section 22 of the Rent Control Act.     It  has been urged by the learned counsel for the  peti- tioners that many of the corporations referred to in Section 2(e)(2)(ii)  of the Public Premises Act, like  the  nationa- lised banks and the Life Insurance Corporation, are  trading corporations  and  under the provisions  of  the  enactments whereby they are constituted these corporations are required to  carry on their business with a view to earn profit,  and that there is nothing to preclude these corporations to  buy property  in possession of tenants at a low price and  after buying such property evict the tenants after terminating the tenancy  and  thereafter sell the said property  at  a  much higher value because the value of property in possession  of tenants is much less as compared to vacant property. We  are unable to cut down the scope of the provisions of the Public Premises Act on the basis of such an apprehension because as pointed out by this Court in M/s Dwarkadas Marfatia and Sons v.  Board  of Trustees of the Port of Bombay, [1989]  3  SCC 293: "Every  activity  of a public authority  especially  in  the background of the assumption on which such authority  enjoys immunity  from the rigour of the Rent Act, must be  informed by reason and guided by the public interest. All exercise of discretion or power by public authorities as the respondent, in respect of dealing with tenants in respect of which  they have  been  treated  separately and  distinctly  from  other landlords on the assumption that they would not act 694 as private landlords, must be judged by that standard." These  observations were made in the context of  the  provi- sions  of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging  Houses  Rates (Control) Act, 1947 whereby exemption from the provisions of the Act has been granted to premises belonging to the Bombay Port  Trust. The consequence of giving overriding effect  to the  provisions of the Public Premises Act is that  premises belonging  to companies and statutory bodies referred to  in Clauses  (2) and (3) of Section 2(e) of the Public  Premises Act  would be exempted from the provisions of the Rent  Con- trol Act. The actions of the companies and statutory  bodies mentioned  in  Clauses (2) and (3) of Section  2(e)  of  the Public  Premises  Act while dealing  with  their  properties under  the  Pubic Premises Act will, therefore, have  to  be judged by the same standard.     For  the reasons aforesaid, we are unable to accept  the contention  of the learned counsel for the petitioners  that the  provisions contained in the Public Premises Act  cannot be  applied to premises which fall within the ambit  of  the Rent  Control  Act. In our opinion, the  provisions  of  the Public  Premises  Act,  to the extent  they  cover  premises falling  within the ambit of the Rent Control Act,  override the  provisions  of  the Rent Control Act and  a  person  in unauthorised  occupation  of public premises  under  Section 2(e)  of  the Act cannot invoke the protection of  the  Rent

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Control Act.     In Civil Appeal No. 3723 of 1966, Shri Yogeshwer  Prasad sought to raise contentions relating to the particular facts of  that case, namely, that the termination of the lease  of the  appellant is vitiated by mala fides and that  the  said appellant  could not be held to be a person in  unauthorised occupation of the premises and further that the  proceedings have not been taken in accordance with the provisions of the Public Premises Act. We find that in this case the appellant filed a writ petition in the High Court directly against the order passed by the Estate Officer without filing an  appeal against  the said order before the Appellate Authority.  The High  Court  has held that the question of mala fides  is  a disputed  question  of fact and the same could not  be  gone into  in proceedings under Article 226 of the  Constitution. We  are in agreement of the said view of the High Court.  As regards  the other contentions we are of the view  that  the appellant cannot be permitted to agitate matters which could be agitated by him in appeal before the Appellate Authority. In  Civil  Appeals Nos. 2368 and 2369 of  1986  the  learned counsel 695 for the respondents have raised a preliminary objection with regard to the maintainability of these appeals on the ground that  the appellants, on account of their conduct,  are  not entitled  to  invoke the jurisdiction of  this  Court  under Article  136  of  the Constitution. The  submission  of  the learned counsel is that before initiating proceedings  under the  provisions  of the Public Premises Act  the  respondent Bank, viz. the Punjab National Bank, had initiated  proceed- ings  under  the Rent Control Act for the  eviction  of  the appellants had in those proceedings the appellants had filed an  objection  with  regard to the  maintainability  of  the eviction  proceedings under the Rent Control Act before  the Additional Rent Controller and thereupon the Respondent Bank initiated  proceedings for eviction of the appellants  under the  Public  Premises  Act and  thereafter  the  proceedings initiated by the respondent Bank under the Rent Control  Act were  dismissed by the Additional Rent Controller by  orders dated  the  6th  August, 1989. The learned  counsel  of  the respondents  have urged that the appellants,  having  raised the objection against the maintainability of the proceedings for  eviction under the Rent Control Act on the ground  that proceedings could only be maintained under the provisions of the  Public  Premises  Act and having  got  them  dismissed, cannot  turn round and raise an objection that the  proceed- ings  for  eviction under the Public Premises  Act  are  not maintainable and the proceedings can only be taken under the Rent  Control  Act. The learned counsel for  the  appellants have  submitted that special leave to appeal was granted  by this Court after notice to the respondents and at that stage the  respondents  had raised this objection but  this  Court granted  special  leave and it is not  permissible  for  the respondents  to agitate this question now. The orders  dated the  6th  August, 1989 which were passed by  the  Additional Rent Controller in the proceedings for eviction initiated by the  respondent  Bank  under Rent Control  Act  against  the appellants  in these appeals have been placed on  record  by the respondents and from the said orders it appears that  in the  proceedings  initiated under the Rent Control  Act  the appellants  had raised a plea that the premises in  question had been declared public premises under the Public  Premises Act  and  in  view of that the proceedings  under  the  Rent Control  Act were not competent. The said orders  also  show that  the Additional Rent Controller dismissed the  proceed-

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ings  for  eviction under the Rent Control Act on  the  view that  the Public Premises Act is applicable to  premises  in question and his jurisdiction was excluded. This would  show that the proceedings which were initiated by the  Respondent Bank  for  the  eviction of the appellants  under  the  Rent Control Act were dismissed as not maintainable on the ground that the Rent Control Act was not applicable to the premises and the premises are governed by the provisions of the 696 Public Premises Act. This finding was recorded by the  Addi- tional  Rent Controller in view of the objection  raised  by the  appellants with regard to the maintainability of  those proceedings.  In  other words, the appellants  succeeded  in those proceedings on the basis of their plea that the  prem- ises  were  not governed by the Rent Control  Act  and  were governed  by  the  provisions of the  Public  Premises  Act. Having  got the proceedings under the Rent Control Act  dis- missed  the  appellants are now raising the  plea  that  the proceedings under the Public Premises Act are not  maintain- able  and that the only remedy available is under  the  Rent Control  Act.  This  conduct of the  appellants  would  have disentitled  them  from invoking the  jurisdiction  of  this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. Since we are of the  view that the appellants cannot succeed on the  merits, we do not propose to dismiss the appeals on this preliminary ground.     In  the  result the appeals and the  writ  petition  are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.     The  appellants in Civil Appeals Nos. 2368 and  2369  of 1986 had been dispossessed from the premises in their  occu- pation after the dismissal of their appeals by the Addition- al  District  Judge. During the pendency  of  these  appeals interim orders were passed by this Court whereunder  posses- sion  of a part of the premises was restored to  the  appel- lants.  Since these appeals have been dismissed  the  appel- lants  in  both  the appeals are directed  to  handover  the possession  of the portion of the premises in their  occupa- tion to the Respondent Bank within one month.     In  Civil Appeal No. 3725 of 1986 and Writ Petition  No. 864  of 1985, this Court had passed interim  orders  staying the eviction of the petitioners in those matters. Since  the appeal  and the writ petition are being dismissed  the  said interim orders shall stand vacated. R.S.S.                                             Petitions dismissed. 697