REPORTABLE

            IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA               CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

            CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8417 OF 2009             (Arising out of SLP©No.10675 of 2007)

Ashok Kumar        ….Appellant

VERSUS

Ved Prakash & Ors.               …Respondents

                  J U D G M E N T

TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.

1. Leave granted.   

2. This appeal has been filed by the tenant/appellant from  

the judgment and final order dated 5th of March, 2007  

passed  by  the  High  Court  of  Punjab  &  Haryana  at  

Chandigarh  in  Civil  Revision  Case  No.3943  of  2005  

whereby the High Court had dismissed the civil revision  

case and affirmed the order of the appellate authority as  

well as of the Rent Controller thereby directing eviction of  

the  tenant/appellant  from  a  shop  constructed  on  the  

ground floor at Plot No.12, bearing Municipal No.179 (a),  

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Ward No.3,  New Anaj  Mandi,  Sohna,  District  Gurgaon  

(Haryana)  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  the  ‘tenanted  

premises’).

3. The  case  made  out  by  the  original  landlord  Mr.  Om  

Prakash (since deceased) in his eviction petition can be  

narrated as follows:  

The tenanted premises was let out to the tenant/appellant  

in the year 1982 in which the appellant was carrying on the  

business  of  Commission  Agent.  The  case  of  bonafide  

requirement as pleaded by the original landlord was that the  

original landlord and his two sons were carrying on the same  

business as that of the appellant and as the original landlord  

had  decided  to  settle  his  elder  son  Ved  Prakash  in  the  

tenanted premises in the business of  Commission Agent and  

the younger  son Arun Kumar  in  another  shop occupied by  

another tenant, he was constrained to file the eviction petition  

on the ground of bonafide requirement and a separate eviction  

proceeding  was  also  filed  against  the  other  tenant  by  the  

original  landlord.   In  spite  of  repeated  reminders  to  the  

tenant/appellant  to  vacate  the  tenanted  premises,  the  

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tenant/appellant having failed to vacate the same, the original  

landlord was constrained to file the eviction proceeding against  

the tenant/appellant.

4. The tenant/appellant entered appearance and contested  

the eviction proceeding denying the material allegations  

made  in  the  application  for  eviction.  In  his  written  

objection, the tenant/appellant had categorically denied  

that  the  respondent  had any  bonafide  requirement  for  

use and occupation of his son for starting a business of  

Commission Agent in the tenanted premises. Accordingly,  

the tenant/appellant sought for dismissal of the eviction  

petition.

5. The  Rent  Controller,  Gurgaon,  by  his  order  dated  

31.05.2004, had allowed the application for eviction inter  

alia holding that the original  landlord had successfully  

proved  his  bonafide  requirement  of  the  tenanted  

premises.  Feeling  aggrieved  by  this  order  of  the  Rent  

Controller, an appeal was taken by the tenant/appellant  

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before the Appellate authority which affirmed the findings  

of the Rent Controller, Gurgaon and dismissed the appeal  

of the tenant/appellant.  Again feeling aggrieved by the  

order of the appellate authority, a revision petition was  

filed by the appellant  before the High Court  of  Punjab  

and  Haryana  which  was  dismissed  by  the  impugned  

order affirming the findings of the Appellate Authority as  

well as of the Rent Controller, Gurgaon.  Be it mentioned  

herein that the original landlord, as noted hereinearlier,  

died during the pendency of the Civil Revision case in the  

High  Court  and  the  present  respondents  were  

substituted in his place.   

6. Before us, the pivotal issue that was seriously raised by  

the learned counsel for the appellant was as follows: -

(i) Whether the landlord would be entitled to evict  

his tenant from a non-residential premises on the  

ground  of  bonafide  requirement  under  the  

Haryana  Urban  (Control  of  Rent  and  Eviction)  

Act,  1973  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  the  ‘Act’)  

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when Section 13 of the Act provides for eviction of  

the tenant only  in case of residential building if  

the landlord requires it for his own occupation,  

and is not occupying another residential building  

in the urban area concerned and has not vacated  

such building without sufficient cause after the  

commencement  of  East  Punjab  Urban  Rent  

Restriction Act, 1949 in the said urban area?

7. On  the  aforesaid  issue,  we  have  heard  the  learned  

counsel  appearing  for  the  parties  and  examined  the  

materials on record.  According to the learned counsel for  

the appellant, since Section 13 of the Act does not permit  

a  landlord to evict  a tenant who is  in occupation of  a  

non-residential  building  on  the  ground  of  bonafide  

requirement, the question of evicting the appellant from  

the tenanted premises under Section 13 of the Act would  

not arise at all.  This submission of the learned counsel  

for the tenant/appellant was seriously contested by the  

learned counsel for the respondent.  Before we take up  

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this issue for our consideration, it would be appropriate  

to refer to Section 13 of the Act which runs as under :-

“Eviction of tenants- (1) A tenant in possession of a building or rented  

land shall  not be evicted therefrom except in  accordance with the provisions of this section.

(2) …………………………..(Omitted  because  it  is   not necessary for our purpose)   

(3) A landlord may apply to the controller for an  order directing the tenant to put the landlord in  possession-

(a) in case of residential building  , if- (i) he  requires  it  for  own  occupation,  is  not  

occupying another  residential  building in the  urban  area  concerned  and  has  not  vacated   such  building  without  sufficient  cause  after   the  commencement  of  1949  Act  in  the  said  urban area.”

8. A plain reading of Section 13 of the Act would show that  

it  permits  a  landlord  to  evict  a  tenant  only  from  a  

residential  premises  and  not  from  the  non-residential  

premises.   It  is  an  admitted  position  that  the  

landlord/respondent sought to evict the tenant from the  

tenanted premises for his own use and occupation, which  

was let out for non-residential purposes.      

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9. The Act was enacted by the Legislature in order to control  

the  increase  of  rent  of  certain  buildings  and  rented  lands  

situated within the limits of urban areas and the eviction of  

tenants therefrom.  Section 2 (g) of the Act defines “residential  

building”  which  means  any  building  which  is  not  a  non-

residential  building.   Section  11  of  the  Act  prohibits  

conversion  of  a  residential  building  into  a  non-residential  

building.  Section 13 of the Act deals with eviction of a tenant.  

10. At this stage, we need to consider a different Act namely,  

the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act,  1949 (in short  

“East Punjab Rent Act”),  which was enacted long before the  

Act  of  1973, with which, we are concerned as we find that  

somewhat similar  provisions have been enacted in both the  

Acts by the Legislature.  Section 13 of the East Punjab Rent  

Act, before its amendment, contained provisions for eviction of  

a tenant from a residential as well as from a non-residential  

premises.   However,  the  Legislature,  by  introducing  an  

amendment to the East Punjab Rent Act, had deleted the word  

“non-residential  premises”  from Section 13 of  the  Act,  from  

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which it will be clear that the landlord cannot seek eviction of  

a tenant after amendment from a non-residential premises for  

his bonafide requirement which was available to the landlord  

before  the  introduction  of  the  Amendment  Act  in  1956.  

This  amendment  was  introduced  by  East  Punjab  Rent  

Restriction (Amendment) Act 1956, which came into force on  

24th of September, 1956.   

11. The constitutionality of the Amendment Act of 1956 by  

which  deletion  of  the  word  “non-residential  premises”  for  

eviction of  a  tenant  on the ground of  bonafide  requirement  

under  Section  13 of  the  East  Punjab Rent  Act  came under  

challenge in this Court in the case of Harbilas Rai Bansal Vs.  

State of Punjab 1996 (1) SCC 1, in which this Court held the  

aforesaid  amendment  of  the  East  Punjab  Rent  Act  as  

unconstitutional and directed as follows :-

“We  allow  the  appeal,  set  aside  the  impugned  judgment  of  the  High  Court,  declare  the  above  said  provisions  of  the  amendment  as   constitutionally  invalid  and  as  a  consequence  restore  the  original  provisions  of  the  Act  which   were  operating  before  coming  into  force  of  the   amendment.  The  net  result  is  that  a  landlord-

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under the Act-can seek eviction of a tenant from a  nonresidential  building  on  the  ground  that  he  requires  it  for  his  own  use.  The parties  to  bear  their own costs.”  

12. After the amendment of Section 13 of the East Punjab  

Rent Act, by which the word “non-residential premises” was  

deleted by judicial pronouncement, a landlord seeking eviction  

of his tenant on the ground of bonafide requirement would be  

entitled to file such eviction proceeding not only in respect of a  

residential premises, but also from a non-residential premises.  

13. While  deciding  the  constitutionality  of  the  aforesaid  

amendment  of  the  East  Punjab Rent Act,  this  Court  in the  

aforesaid  decision  namely,  Harbilas  Rai  (supra)  had  also  

considered another decision of this Court in Gyan Devi Anand  

Vs. Jeevan Kumar (1985) 2 SCC 683.  In Gyan Devi Anand  

(supra),  this  Court  also  felt  the  difficulty  of  the  landlord  to  

evict  his  tenant  in  respect  of  a  non-residential  premises.  

While  considering  this  aspect,  this  Court  in  that  decision  

observed as under :-

“The legislature in its wisdom did recognise this fact and  the Legislature has provided that bona fide requirement   of  the  landlord  for  his  own  use  will  be  a  legitimate   

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ground under the Act for the eviction of his tenant from  any  residential  premises.  This  ground  is,  however,   confined  to  residential  premises  and  is  not  made  available in case of commercial premises. A landlord who  lets  out commercial premises to a tenant under certain   circumstances may need bona fide the premises for his   own use under changed conditions in some future date   should not in fairness be deprived of his right to recover   the commercial premises. Bona fide need of the landlord   will  stand very much on the same footing in regard to   either class of  permises,  residential  or commercial.  We  therefore,  suggest  that  Legislature  may  consider  the   advisability of making the bona fide requirement of the   landlord a ground of eviction in respect of  commercial   premises as well.”

14. From  the  aforesaid  observation  of  this  Court,  it  is  

therefore clear that this Court in 1985 felt this difficulty and  

suggested  that  suitable  legislation  or  amendment  to  the  

Statute should be made by the Legislature.   

15. In Gian Devi (supra), the question that was raised before  

the Constitutional Bench was whether under the Delhi Rent  

Control  Act,  1958,  the  statutory  tenancy  in  respect  of  

commercial premises was heritable or not.  While answering  

this question in Gian Devi Anand (supra), this Court answered  

the question in the affirmative.   The observations that were  

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made  by  this  Court  in  Gian  Devi  Anand  (supra),  as  noted  

hereinealier, were made, keeping in view the hardship being  

caused  to  the  landlords  of  non-residential  premises,  who  

cannot  evict  their  tenants  even  on  the  ground  of  bonafide  

requirement  for  personal  use.   Accordingly,  in  view  of  our  

discussions made hereinabove and in view of the observations  

made by this Court in the aforesaid two decisions, the only  

conclusion  that  can  be  drawn  is  that  a  landlord  can  seek  

eviction of his tenant on the ground of bonafide requirement  

not  only  from  residential  premises  but  also  from  a  non-

residential premises under the East Punjab Rent Act.   

16. This  view was  also  approved  by  a  Three-Judge  Bench  

decision of this Court in  Rakesh Vij Vs. Dr. Raminder Pal  

Singh Sethi and others 2005 (8) SCC 504 in which, it has  

been held that eviction of a tenant who is occupying a non-

residential premises of a landlord, on the ground of bonafide  

requirement  under  the  East  Punjab  Rent  Act,  would  be  

available in which the decision in Harbilas’ case (supra) was  

followed.   

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17. Following the decision of the Harbilas’ Case (supra) and  

the other  decisions referred to hereinabove,  this  Court  in a  

recent  decision  reported  in  Mohinder  Prasad  Jain  Vs.  

Manohar Lal Jain 2006 (2) SCC 724 held that a landlord is  

entitled to seek eviction of a tenant under the Act from a non-

residential building on the ground that the landlord bonafide  

required  the  tenanted  premises  for  his  own  use  and  

occupation.  In para 5 of the said decision in that case, this  

Court observed as under :-

 “We may notice that this Court in Harbilas Rai   Bansal v. State of Punjab held such a provision to  be unconstitutional, whereas in Gian Devi Anand  v.  Jeevan  Kumar  somewhat  different  note  was   struck. The question recently fell for consideration  before  a  three-Judge  Bench  of  this  Court  in   Rakesh  Vij  v.  Dr.  Raminder  Pal  Singh  Sethi   wherein this Court upheld the ratio  laid down in  Harbilas Rai Bansal (supra) stating:

We  allow  the  appeal,  set  aside  the  impugned  judgment of the High Court, declare the abovesaid   provisions  of  the  amendment  as  constitutionally   invalid and as a consequence restore the original  provisions of the Act which were operating before  coming into force of the amendment. The net result  is that a landlord "under the Act" can seek eviction   of a tenant from a non- residential building on the  

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ground  that  he  requires  it  for  his  own  use.(Emphasis supplied)”

18. In  view  of  the  aforesaid  decision  of  this  Court,  which  

followed the earlier decisions although on different Rent Acts,  

we  need  not  delve  on  this  question  any  further  but  our  

Judgment  will  not  be  completed  if  we  do  not  consider  the  

decisions  cited  by  the  learned  counsel  on  behalf  of  the  

appellant.  As noted hereinearlier, the learned counsel for the  

appellant submitted before us that since the Act only permits  

a  landlord  to  evict  a  tenant  on  the  ground  of  bonafide  

requirement from a residential building and nothing has been  

stated  in  that  provision  or  right  has  been  created  on  the  

landlord to evict a tenant from a non-residential building on  

the  ground  of  bonafide  requirement,  it  is  not  open  to  the  

landlord  to  apply  for  eviction  of  a  tenant  from  a  non-

residential  premises  on the  ground of  bonafide  requirement  

when  such  ground  was  not  specifically  conferred  by  the  

Legislature under Section 13 of the Act or to the landlord to  

apply  for  eviction  of  the  tenant  from  the  non-residential  

premises.  Therefore, according to the learned counsel for the  

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appellant, the decision in Mohinder Prasad Jain (supra), which  

was delivered under the Act, is not a good law and, therefore,  

the matter may be referred to a larger Bench for consideration  

of this question.  In support of this submission, the learned  

counsel  for  the  appellant  had  cited  a  number  of  decisions  

namely,  Common Cause  Vs.  Union of  India  and Ors.  JT  

2003 (Suppl.2)  SC 270,  Padmasundara Rao and Ors.  Vs.  

State of Tamil Nadu and Ors. (2002) 3 SCC 533, Union of  

India Vs. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal AIR 1992 SC 96, Naveen  

Kohli Vs. Neethu Kohli 2006 (4) SCC 558 and Vishnu Dutt  

Sharma Vs. Manju Sharma 2009 (3) SCALE 425.     

19. We have carefully considered the aforesaid decisions of  

this Court, as noted hereinearlier.  It is difficult to accept that  

the decisions cited by the learned counsel for the appellant in  

support of his aforesaid submission will lead us to hold that  

the landlord shall not be entitled to evict a tenant from a non-

residential  premises  for  bonafide  requirement,  when  such  

ground for eviction has been made available only in case of  

residential premises.  In our view, the view taken in Mohinder  

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Prasad Jain (Supra) cannot be said to be a bad law on the  

ground that it was really an usurpation of legislative duties on  

the part of the Court by any stretch of imagination.   

20. Therefore, the decisions cited by the learned counsel for  

the appellant cannot be relied upon for the purpose of holding  

that the Court is not conferred with the power to entertain an  

eviction  petition  against  a  tenant  relating  to  non-residential  

premises as, in our view, the correct interpretation of bonafide  

requirement of a landlord of a residential building must include  

a  non-residential  building  as  well  in  view  of  the  decisions  

referred to hereinabove.  In this connection, we may also add  

that it may be pertinent to note that in the case of  Satyawati  

Sharma (Dead) by LRs. Vs. Union of India and another 2008  

(5) SCC 287, a similar provision in the Delhi Rent Act, 1958  

was found to be unconstitutional.  In this connection, reference  

may be made to para 38 of the said decision, which reads as  

under :-

“38. In view of the above discussion, we hold   that  Section  14(1)(e)  of  the  1958  Act  is   violative of the doctrine of equality embodied  

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in  Article  14  of  the  Constitution  of  India  insofar  as  it  discriminates  between  the  premises  let  for  residential  and  non- residential  purposes  when  the  same  are   required  bona  fide  by  the  landlord  for  occupation for himself or for any member of  his  family  dependent  on  him  and  restricts   the latter's right to seek eviction of the tenant   from the premises let for residential purposes  only.

21. Thus,  in  view  of  the  overall  discussions  made  

hereinabove, we are unable to accept the submission of the  

learned counsel for the appellant that an eviction petition filed  

by a landlord for eviction of a tenant cannot be filed under  

Section 13 of the Act when such eviction proceeding relates to  

a non-residential building.   

22. Before parting with this Judgment, a short submission of  

the learned counsel for the appellant needs to be dealt with.  

According to the learned counsel for the appellant, the case of  

Harbilas     (supra)  and  Rakesh Vij (Supra) were rendered on  

the amendments made to East Punjab Rent Act, whereas the  

case of  Mohinder Prasad Jain (supra) and the issue before  

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us concerned removing a classification which existed from the  

inception of the legislation.

23. Therefore,  according  to  the  learned  counsel  for  the  

appellant, a decision and reasoning concerning East Punjab  

Rent  Act  cannot  apply  to  a  question  with  respect  to  the  

present  Act  because  both  the  legislations  are  products  of  

different legislatures and the rationale behind one cannot be  

compared at par with that of the other.   

24. The learned counsel for the appellant, in support of this  

contention, relied on a decision of this Court in the case of  

State  of  Madhyapradesh  v.  G.C.Mandawar,  AIR 1954 SC  

493 and strong reliance on para 9 of this decision was pressed  

by the learned counsel for the appellant, which may be quoted  

:-

Paragraph 9: “It is conceivable that when the  same  Legislature  enacts  two  different  laws   but in substance they form one legislation,  it   might  be  open to  the  Court  to  disregard  the  form and treat them as one law and strike it   down,  if  in  their  conjunction  they  result  in   discrimination. But such a course is not open  where,  as  here,  the  two  laws  sought  to  be  

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read  in  conjunction  are  by  different  Governments and by different legislatures.”

25. There is no quarrel in the aforesaid principle laid down  

by this Court in the aforesaid decision.  However, we do not  

see why the decision concerning one legislation cannot hold  

persuasive  value  for  the  Court,  while  considering  the  

constitutionality  of  a  very  similar  provision,  albeit  in  a  

different legislation.   

26. It  is  not  in  dispute  that  the  original  landlord  died,  as  

noted herein, during the pendency of the Civil Revision case in  

the  High  Court.   There  is  a  faint  argument  of  the  learned  

counsel for the appellant that on such date, the requirement of  

the landlord had perished.  In our view, there is no merit in  

this  submission  of  the  learned  counsel  for  the  appellant.  

Looking at the averments made in the eviction petition, where  

the  original  landlord  has  categorically  pleaded  that  the  

requirement  was  for  his  son  who  presently  is  the  landlord  

because of the death of the original plaintiff, the question of  

abatement of the eviction proceeding cannot arise at all.  That  

apart,  the  submission  so  made  before  us  by  the  learned  

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counsel for the appellant was not even raised by the appellant  

before the High Court where the original landlord died and the  

present respondents have been substituted in his place.      

27. In this view of the matter, we do not find any substance  

in the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant.  No  

other  question  was  raised  by  the  learned  counsel  for  the  

appellant in support of this appeal and accordingly, we do not  

find any merit in this appeal.  The appeal is thus dismissed.  

There will be no order as to costs.   

…………………...J.  [Tarun Chatterjee]

New Delhi;              ……………… ….….J. December 17, 2009.         [V. S. Sirpurkar]  

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