REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.      287              OF 2009 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 838 of 2007)

Ashabai Machindra Adhagale …..Appellant

Versus

State of Maharashtra and Ors. ….Respondents

J U D G M E N T

Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. An interesting question of law arises in this appeal. Background facts

in a nutshell are as follows:

Appellant  filed First  Information Report  (in  short  the ‘FIR’) under

Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the ‘Code’)

at  Newasa  Police  Station,  District  Ahmednagar,  alleging  commission  of

offence  punishable  under  Section  3(1)(xi)  of  the  Scheduled  Castes  and

Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (in short the ‘Act’).

A  petition  under  Section  482  of  Code  was  filed  by  respondent  No.3

(hereinafter referred to as the ‘accused’). The basic stand was that in the FIR

the  caste  of  accused  was  not  mentioned  and  therefore  the  proceedings

cannot be continued and deserved to be quashed. The High Court placing

reliance on earlier decisions of the High Court allowed the petition.  

3. In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant submitted

that the view taken by the Bombay High Court is contrary to one taken by

the Orissa High Court. It is submitted that the offence primarily relates to

purported perpetration of crime on the victim because of his or her caste. It

is for the accused to show that he does not belong to higher caste and that is

a matter of evidence. It is not that in the instant case there was no reference

to the  caste  of  an accused as it  is  clearly mentioned in  the FIR that  the

offence  is  relatable  to  Section  3(1)(xi)  of  the  Act.  Therefore,  there  is  a

reference though indirectly to the caste of the accused. Even otherwise it is

submitted  that  the  non-mention  of  the  caste  of  the  accused  cannot  be  a

ground to quash the proceedings. At the framing of charge or in case the

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charge sheet  is  filed and/or during trial  the accused can establish that he

does  not  belong  to  higher  caste.  It  is  submitted  that  FIR  is  not  an

encyclopedia of all events and basic ingredients of offence are clearly made

out.  

4. Learned counsel for respondent No.3, on the other hand, submitted

that  Section  3(1)  itself  provides  that  the  offence  should  have  been

committed  by a  person who is  not  a  member of  the  Scheduled Caste  or

Scheduled  Tribe,  unless  that  specific  mention  is  made  no  offence  is

disclosed.  

5. Learned counsel for the respondent referred to various judgments of

Bombay High Court in this regard supporting his stand. e.g.  Manohar S/o

Martandrao Kulkarni and Anr. v.  State of Maharashtra and Ors. (2005 (4)

Mh.L.J. 588)

6. It is also submitted that the complainant i.e. the appellant is harassing

people by filing frivolous petitions taking shelter of the fact that she belongs

to scheduled caste. Therefore, placing strong reliance on the observations of

this Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992 Supp (1) SCC 335), it is

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submitted that the proceedings deserved to be quashed which according to

him the High Court rightly did.  

7. In  Superintendent  of  Police,  CBI and Ors. v.  Tapan  Kumar Singh

(2003 (6) SCC 175) this Court elaborately dealt with the need of an FIR. It

was inter-alia observed as follows:

“20. It is well settled that a first information report is not an  encyclopaedia,  which  must  disclose  all  facts  and details  relating  to  the  offence  reported.  An  informant may lodge a report about the commission of an offence though he may not know the name of the victim or his assailant.  He may not  even  know how the  occurrence took place. A first informant need not necessarily be an eyewitness so as to be able to disclose in great detail all aspects of the offence committed. What is of significance is  that  the  information  given  must  disclose  the commission of a cognizable offence and the information so lodged must provide a basis for the police officer to suspect the commission of a cognizable offence. At this stage it is enough if the police officer on the basis of the information  given  suspects  the  commission  of  a cognizable offence, and not that he must be convinced or satisfied that a cognizable offence has been committed. If he has reasons to suspect, on the basis of information received,  that  a  cognizable  offence  may  have  been committed,  he  is  bound  to  record  the  information  and conduct  an  investigation.  At  this  stage  it  is  also  not necessary  for  him  to  satisfy  himself  about  the truthfulness of the information. It is only after a complete investigation  that  he  may  be  able  to  report  on  the truthfulness  or  otherwise of  the  information.  Similarly, even if the information does not furnish all the details he must find out those details in the course of investigation

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and collect all the necessary evidence. The information given disclosing the commission of a cognizable offence only sets in motion the investigative machinery, with a view to collect all necessary evidence, and thereafter to take  action  in  accordance  with  law.  The  true  test  is whether the information furnished provides a reason to suspect the commission of an offence, which the police officer concerned is empowered under Section 156 of the Code to investigate. If it does, he has no option but to record  the  information  and  proceed  to  investigate  the case either himself or depute any other competent officer to conduct the investigation. The question as to whether the  report  is  true,  whether  it  discloses  full  details regarding the manner of occurrence, whether the accused is  named,  and  whether  there  is  sufficient  evidence  to support the allegations are all matters which are alien to the  consideration  of  the  question  whether  the  report discloses the commission of a cognizable offence. Even if  the  information  does  not  give  full  details  regarding these matters, the investigating officer is not absolved of his  duty  to  investigate  the  case  and  discover  the  true facts, if he can.

xx xx xx   

22. The High Court has also quashed the GD entry and the investigation on the ground that the information did not disclose all the ingredients of the offence, as if the informant  is  obliged  to  reproduce  the  language  of  the section,  which  defines  “criminal  misconduct”  in  the Prevention of Corruption Act. In our view the law does not  require the mentioning of all  the ingredients of the offence in the first information report. It is only after a complete  investigation  that  it  may  be  possible  to  say whether any offence is made out on the basis of evidence collected by the investigating agency.”

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8. Similarly, in Masumsha Hasanasha Musalman v. State of Maharashtra

(2000 (3) SCC 557), this Court noted that with reference to Section 3(2)(v)

of the Act that to attract the provisions of said section the sine qua non is

that the victim should be a person who belongs to a Scheduled Caste or a

Scheduled Tribe  and that the offence under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in

short  ‘IPC’)  is  committed  against  him  on  the  basis  that  such  a  person

belongs to a Scheduled Caste or a Schedule Tribe. In the absence of such

ingredients no offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the Act arises.  The view in

Masumsha’s case  (supra)  was  reported  in  Dinesh  @ Buddha v.  State  of

Rajasthan (2006 (3) SCC 771).   

9. The  scope  for  interference  on  the  basis  of  an  application  under

Section 482 of Code is well known.  

10. Section 482 does not confer any new powers on the High Court. It

only  saves  the  inherent  power  which  the  Court  possessed  before  the

enactment of the Code. It  envisages three circumstances under which the

inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order

under the Code (ii)  to prevent  abuse of the process  of court,  and (iii)  to

otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to

lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent

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jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide

for all cases that may possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers

apart  from  express  provisions  of  law  which  are  necessary  for  proper

discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the

doctrine which finds expression in the section which merely recognizes and

preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All courts, whether civil or

criminal  possess,  in  the absence of  any express  provision,  as  inherent  in

their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to

undo a wrong in course of administration of justice on the principle "quando

lex aliauid alicui concedit, concedere videtur et id sine guo res ipsae esse

non potest" (when the law gives a person anything it gives him that without

which it cannot exist). While exercising powers under the section, the court

does  not  function  as  a  court  of  appeal  or  revision.  Inherent  jurisdiction

under the section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and

with  caution  and  only  when  such  exercise  is  justified  by  the  tests

specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito

justitiae to do real and substantial  justice for the administration of which

alone courts exist. Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice

and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice,

the court has power to prevent abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the

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court,  to  allow  any  action  which  would  result  in  injustice  and  prevent

promotion of justice, on exercise of the powers court would be justified to

quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to

'abuse  of  the  process  of  court  or  quashing  of  these  proceedings  would

otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is  disclosed by the

report, the court may examine the question of fact. When a report is sought

to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the

report  has  alleged  and  whether  any  offence  is  made  out  even  if  the

allegations are accepted in toto.

11. In R.P.  Kapur v.  State  of  Punjab AIR  1960  SC  866  this  Court

summarized some categories of cases where inherent power can and should

be exercised to quash the proceedings.

(i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against

the institution or continuance e.g. want of sanction;

(ii)  where  the  allegations  in  the  first  information  report  or

complaint taken at its face value and accepted in their entirety

do not constitute the offence alleged;

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(iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no

legal  evidence  adduced  or  the  evidence  adduced  clearly  or

manifestly fails to prove the charge.

12. In dealing with the last category, it is important to bear in mind the

distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is

evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case

where  there  is  legal  evidence  which,  on  appreciation,  may  or  may  not

support the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of

the  Code  the  High  Court  would  not  ordinarily  embark  upon  an  enquiry

whether  the  evidence  in  question  is  reliable  or  not  or  whether  on  a

reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not be sustained. That is the

function of the trial Judge. Judicial process should not be an instrument of

oppression,  or,  needless  harassment.  Court  should  be  circumspect  and

judicious  in  exercising  discretion  and  should  take  all  relevant  facts  and

circumstances into consideration before issuing process, lest it would be an

instrument  in  the  hands  of  a  private  complainant  to  unleash  vendetta  to

harass  any  person  needlessly.  At  the  same  time  the  section  is  not  an

instrument  handed  over  to  an  accused  to  short-circuit  a  prosecution  and

bring about its sudden death. The scope of exercise of power under Section

482 of  the Code.  and the categories of cases  where the High Court  may

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exercise its power under it relating to cognizable offences to prevent abuse

of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice were set

out in some detail by this Court in  State of Haryana v.  Bhajan Lal (1992

Supp (1) 335). A note of caution was, however, added that the power should

be exercised sparingly and that too in rarest of rare cases. The illustrative

categories indicated by this Court are as follows:

"(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report

or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and

accepted  in  their  entirety  do  not  prima  facie  constitute  any

offence or make out a case against the accused.

(2)  Where  the  allegations  in  the first  information  report  and

other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a

cognizable  offence,  justifying  an  investigation  by  police

officers  under  Section  156 (1)  of  the  Code  except  under  an

order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155 (2) of

the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or

complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do

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not  disclose  the  commission  of  any offence  and make out  a

case against the accused.

(4)  Where  the  allegations  in  the  FIR  do  not  constitute  a

cognizable  offence  but  constitute  only  a  non-cognizable

offence,  no  investigation  is  permitted  by  a  police  officer

without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section

155 (2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or "complaint are so

absurd  and  inherently  improbable  on  the  basis  of  which  no

prudent  person can ever reach a just  conclusion that  there is

sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the

provisions  of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a

criminal  proceeding  is  instituted)  to  the  institution  and

continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific

provision in the Code. or Act concerned, providing efficacious

redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

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(7)  Where a criminal  proceeding  is  manifestly  attended with

mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted

with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused

and  with  a  view  to  spite  him  due  to  private  and  personal

grudge."

13. As  noted  above,  the  powers  possessed  by  the  High  Court  under

Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power

requires great caution in its exercise. Court must be careful to see that its

decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent

power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High

Court being the highest court of a State should normally refrain from giving

a prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and

hazy,  more  so  when  the  evidence  has  not  been  collected  and  produced

before the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal,  are of

magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient

material.  Of course, no hard and fast  rule can be laid  down in regard to

cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of

quashing the proceeding at any stage. (See State of Orissa v.  Saroj Kumar

Sahoo (2005) 13 SCC 540 and Minu Kumari v. State of Bihar AIR 2006 SC

1937).

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14. It  needs  no  reiteration  that  the  FIR  is  not  expected  to  be  an

encyclopedia.  As  rightly  contended  by learned  counsel  for  the  appellant

whether the accused belongs to scheduled caste or scheduled tribe can be

gone into when the matter is being investigated.  It is to be noted that under

Section  23(1)  of  the  Act,  the  Scheduled  Castes  and  Scheduled  Tribes

(Prevention  of  Atrocities)  Rules,  1995  (in  short  the  ‘Rules’)  have  been

framed.   

15. Rule  7  deals  with  the  investigating  officer.   Under  Rule  7

investigation has to be done by an officer not  below the rank of Deputy

Superintendent of Police.  

16. After  ascertaining  the facts  during  the  course of  investigation  it  is

open to the investigating officer to record that the accused either belongs to

or  does  not  belongs  to  scheduled  caste  or  scheduled  tribe.  After  final

opinion is formed, it is open to the Court to either accept the same or take

cognizance. Even if the charge sheet is filed at the time of consideration of

the charge, it is open to the accused to bring to the notice of the Court that

the materials  do not show that the accused does not belong to scheduled

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caste  or  scheduled  tribe.  Even  if  charge  is  framed  at  the  time  of  trial

materials can be placed to show that the accused either belongs or does not

belong to scheduled caste or scheduled tribe.   

17. So far as the scope for investigation is concerned it is relevant to note

that  sub-Section  (2)  of  Section  156  of  the  Code  provides  that  no

proceedings of a police officer in any such case shall at any stage be called

in question on the ground that the case was one which such officer was not

empowered under the section to investigate. (underlined for emphasis).   

18. Above being the position, the view taken by the Bombay High Court

does not appear to be the correct view while that of the Orissa High Court is

the correct view. Accordingly, we allow this appeal. Needless to say during

investigation or at the time of framing of charge or at the time of trial it is

open to respondent No.3 to show that  he either belongs to scheduled caste

or scheduled tribe so that  applicability  of Section 3(1)(xi)  of  the Act is

ruled out.  

……………………………………J. (Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT)

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……………………………………J. (Dr. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA)

……………………………………J. (H.L. DATTU)

New Delhi, February 12, 2009

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