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PETITIONER: ARUN VYAS & ANR.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: ANITA VYAS

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       14/05/1999

BENCH: K.Venkataswami, Syed Shah Mohammed Quadri

JUDGMENT:

S.SHAH MOHAMMED QUADRI,J

       Leave is granted.

     This appeal is from the judgment and order of the High Court of Rajasthan at Jabalpur in S.B.Crl.Revision No.316/96 dated  March  17, 1998 setting aside the order of  discharge passed  in favour of the appellants by the Additional  Chief Judicial  Magistrate, Jodhpur on April 23, 1996.  The  facts giving  rise  to  this  appeal may briefly  be  noted  here. Appellant No.1 married the respondent in accordance with the Hindu  rites on May 20, 1986.  They were blessed with a girl on  January 2, 1988.  The respondent, in the complaint filed before  the Court on October 18, 1995, alleged that she  was beaten  up by her husband, mother-in-law and sisters-in- law as  her  parents failed to satisfy the demand of  dowry  and ultimately  she  was  pushed  out of the  house  on  October 13,1988.   The  complaint was filed against  the  appellants under  Sections  498-A, 406 IPC read with Section 6  of  the Dowry  Prohibition  Act  before  Additional  Chief  Judicial Magistrate,  Jodhpur,  under  Section  190(1)  Cr.P.C.,  who ordered  investigation  by police.  The police  investigated the  complaint  under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.  and  submitted charge-sheet  (final  report)  under Section  498-A  IPC  on December  22,  1995.  On that report the learned  Magistrate took  cognizance of offence under Sections 498-A as well  as 406  IPC and issued summons to the appellants.  The case was posted  on April 23, 1996 for framing charges.  On that  day it was submitted on behalf of the accused that the complaint was  barred  by limitation and that referring the  case  for investigation  to  the police itself was bad, therefore,  no charges  could be framed against the accused.  That plea  of the  appellants found favour from the learned Magistrate who discharged the appellants by his order dated April 23, 1996. The  respondent challenged the validity of that order of the learned  Magistrate  before the High Court of  Rajasthan  in S.B.Cr.No.316 of 1966.  On March 17,1998, the High Court set aside  the order of the learned Magistrate and directed  him to  proceed  with  the  case from the  stage  where  he  had discharged  the  accused and decide the same  in  accordance with  law.  It is that order of the High Court which is  the subject-matter  of  this  appeal.  Mr.Adarsh  Goel,  learned senior  counsel appearing for the appellant, contended  that

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the  High  Court  has committed illegality in  holding  that there  was no delay in filing the complaint and in observing that  even if there was delay in view of Section 468 Cr.P.C. the  learned  Magistrate  should  not  have  overlooked  the provisions  of  Section  473  Cr.P.C.   He  argued  that  no provision in Cr.P.C.  provides that after taking cognizance, the  learned  Magistrate  could   not  have  discharged  the appellants  and that the reasons given by the High Court  in setting  aside  the  order  of the  learned  Magistrate  are erroneous  in  law.   Mr.Pallav Shishodia,  learned  counsel appearing  for the respondent, submitted that the respondent was  subjected  to  cruelty and harassed for the  demand  of dowry  and  she  was  sent  out  of  the  matrimonial  home, therefore, the High Court was justified in setting aside the order  of  the learned Magistrate who did not take  note  of Section  473 Cr.P.C.  and directing him to proceed with  the case.   On  this above submissions, two questions arise  for consideration,  namely :  (i) whether the learned Magistrate can  discharge  an  accused after taking  cognizance  of  an offence by him but before the trial of the case;  and

     (ii)  whether  the  learned Magistrate  was  right  in discharging the appellants on the grounds that the complaint was barred by limitation under Section 468 Cr.P.C.

     Point  No.(i) :  The answer to this point can be found in  Section  239 Cr.P.C.  which is in the following terms  : "239.   When  accused  shall  be   discharged  -  If,   upon considering the police report and the documents sent with it under  Section  173 and making such examination, if any,  of the  accused  as the Magistrate thinks necessary  and  after giving  the  prosecution and the accused an  opportunity  of being heard, the Magistrate considers the charge against the accused  to  be groundless, he shall discharge the  accused, and record his reasons for so doing."

     A perusal of the aforementioned section shows that the Magistrate  has  to  discharge  the accused  :   if  (1)  on consideration  of  (a) the police report, (b) the  documents filed  under  Section  173  Cr.P.C.;  and  (2)  making  such examination, if any, of the accused as the Magistrate thinks necessary;   and  (3) after giving the prosecution  and  the accused  an opportunity of being heard, he considers  charge against  the  accused  to  be  groundless.   This   section, however, casts an obligation on the Magistrate to record his reasons  for  holding  that  the charge  is  groundless  and discharging  the accused.  Section 239 has to be read  along with Section 240 Cr.P.C.  If the Magistrate finds that there is  prima facie evidence or the material against the accused in  support of the charge (allegations) he may frame  charge in accordance with Section 240 Cr.P.C.  But if he finds that the charge (the allegations or imputations) made against the accused  do  not  make  out a prima facie case  and  do  not furnish  basis  for  framing charge, it will be  a  case  of charge  being  groundless,  so  he  has  no  option  but  to discharge  the  accused.   Where the Magistrate  finds  that taking  cognizance of the offence itself was contrary to any provision  of  law, like Section 468 Cr.P.C., the  complaint being  barred by limitation, so he cannot frame the  charge, he has to discharge the accused.  Indeed in a case where the Magistrate  takes  cognizance of an offence  without  taking note  of Section 468 Cr.P.C., the most appropriate stage  at which  the accused can plead for his discharge is the  stage of  framing the charge.  He need not wait till completion of

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trial.   The Magistrate will be committing no illegality  in considering that question and discharging the accused at the stage  of  framing  charge if the facts so  justify.   Point No.(ii)  :  The new Code of Criminal Procedure Code contains Chapter  XXXVI,  (Sections  467  to 473)  which  deals  with limitation  for  taking  cognizance   of  certain  offences. Section  467  defines that the period of limitation for  the purposes  of  that Chapter, to mean the period specified  in Section 468 for taking cognizance of offence.  Bar to taking cognizance  on  the  expiry  of  period  of  limitation  and extension  of period of limitation, are dealt in by Sections 468  and  473  respectively.  The point of  commencement  of period  of  limitation in the case of continuing offence  is embodied  in  Section  472  and in the  case  other  than  a continuing  offence  is  contained  in  Section  469.    The provisions  for exclusion of time in computing the period of limitation are incorporated in Sections 470 and 471.  It may be  noted  here that the object of having Chapter  XXXVI  in Cr.P.C.   is  to protect persons from prosecution  based  on stale  grievances  and complaints which may turn out  to  be vexatious.   The reason for engrafting rule of limitation is that  due  to long lapse of time necessary evidence will  be lost  and persons prosecuted will be placed in a defenseless position.   It will cause great mental anguish and  hardship to  them and may even result in miscarriage of justice.   At the  same time it is necessary to ensure that due to  delays on  the  part of the investigating and prosecuting  agencies and  the  application  of rules of limitation  the  criminal justice system is not rendered toothless and ineffective and perpetrators  of  crime  are   not  placed  in  advantageous position.   The Parliament obviously taking note of  various aspects,  classified  offences into two  categories,  having regard  to  the  gravity of offences, on the  basis  of  the punishment  prescribed  for them.  Grave offences for  which punishment  prescribed is imprisonment for a term  exceeding three  years  are  not brought within the ambit  of  Chapter XXXVI.   The  period  of limitation is prescribed  only  for offences  for which punishment specified is imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years and even in such cases wide discretion  is  given to the Court in the matter  of  taking cognizance  of an offence after the expiry of the period  of limitation.   Section  473  provides that if  any  Court  is satisfied  on the facts and in the circumstances of the case that  the  delay has been properly explained or that  it  is necessary  so to do in the interests of justice, it may take cognizance  of an offence after the expiry of the period  of limitation.   This section opens with a non obstante  clause and  gives  overriding  effect  to it  over  all  the  other provisions  of Chapter XXXVI.  It is useful to read  Section 468  Cr.P.C.  here :  "468.  Bar to taking cognizance  after lapse  of the period of limitation - (1) Except as otherwise provided  elsewhere  in  this  Code,  no  Court  shall  take cognizance  of  an  offence  of the  category  specified  in sub-section  (2),  after  the  expiry   of  the  period   of limitation.

     (2) The period of limitation shall be -

     (a) six months, if the offence is punishable with fine only;

     (b)  one  year,  if  the offence  is  punishable  with imprisonment  for  a  term not exceeding one  year  but  not exceeding three years.

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     (c)  three  years, if the offence is  punishable  with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years.

     (3)  For  the purposes of this section, the period  of limitation,  in  relation  to offences which  may  be  tried together,  shall be determined with reference to the offence which  is punishable with the more severe punishment or,  as the case may be, the most severe punishment."

     A  perusal  of the provision, extracted  above,  shows that  Sub-section  (1) of Section 468 enjoins that no  Court shall  take  cognizance  of  an offence  of  the  categories specified in sub-section (2), after the expiry of the period of  limitation  mentioned therein.  This rule  is,  however, subject  to  the other provisions of the Code.   Sub-section (2) specifies the period of limitation of six months, if the offence  is punishable with fine only;  of one year, if  the offence  is  punishable  with imprisonment for  a  term  not exceeding  one  year and of three years, if the  offence  is punishable  with imprisonment for a term exceeding one  year but  not  exceeding three years.  Sub-section (3)  which  is inserted  by  Act 45 of 1978, deals with a  situation  where offences,  are  tried  together  and directs  that  for  the purposes  of that section the period of limitation shall  be determined with reference to the offence which is punishable with  the more severe punishment or, as the case may be, the most  severe  punishment.   The essence of  the  offence  in Section  498-A  is  cruelty as defined  in  the  explanation appended to that section.  It is a continuing offence and on each  occasion  on  which the respondent  was  subjected  to cruelty,  she would have a new starting point of limitation. The   last  act  of  cruelty   was  committed  against   the respondent,  within  the  meaning  of  the  explanation,  on October  13,  1988  when,  on the  allegation  made  by  the respondent  in  the complaint to Additional  Chief  Judicial Magistrate,  she  was forced to leave the matrimonial  home. Having  regard to the provisions of Sections 469 and 472 the period  of limitation commenced for offences under  Sections 406 and 498-A from October 13, 1988 and ended on October 12, 1991.   But the charge-sheet was filed on December 22, 1995, therefore, it was clearly barred by limitation under Section 468(2)(c  )  Cr.P.C.  It may be noted here that Section  473 Cr.P.C.   which  extends the period of limiation is  in  two parts.   The  first  part contains non obstante  clause  and gives overriding effect to that section over Sections 468 to 472.  The second part has two limbs.  The first limb confers power  on  every  competent court to take cognizance  of  an offence after the period of limitation if it is satisfied on the  facts  and  in the circumstances of the case  that  the delay  has  been  properly  explained and  the  second  limb empowers such a court to take cognizance of an offence if it is  satisfied  on the facts and in the circumstances of  the case  that  it  is necessary so to do in  the  interests  of justice.  It is true that the expression ‘in the interest of justice’ in Section 473 cannot be interpreted to mean in the interest  of  prosecution.   What the Court has  to  see  is ‘interest of justice’.  The interest of justice demands that the  Court  should  protect  the oppressed  and  punish  the oppressor/offender.   In complaints under Section 498-A  the wife  will invariably be oppressed, having been subjected to cruelty  by the husband and the in-laws.  It is,  therefore, appropriate  for the Courts, in case of delayed  complaints, to construe liberally Section 473 Cr.P.C.in favour of a wife who  is  subjected  to cruelty if on the facts  and  in  the

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circumstances  of  the case it is necessary so to do in  the interests  of  justice.  When the conduct of the accused  is such  that  applying rule of limitation will give an  unfair advantage  to  him or result in miscarriage of justice,  the Court  may take cognizance of an offence after the expiry of period  of limitation in the interests of justice.  This  is only illustrative not exhaustive.  Any finding recorded by a Magistrate  holding  that  the  complaint to  be  barred  by limitation without considering the provisions of Section 473 Cr.P.C will be a deficient and defective finding, vulnerable to  challenge  by  the aggrieved party.  In  this  case  the complaint   was   clearly  barred  by  limitation   and   no explanation  was offered for inordinate delay;  this is what the  learned Magistrate took note of and concluded that  the complaint was barred by limitation.  This is correct insofar as  the offence under Section 406 is concerned.   Therefore, in regard to Section 406 the order of the learned Magistrate discharging  the  appellants  cannot be faulted  with.   But regarding offence under Section 498-A the learned Magistrate did  not  advert  to the second limb of the second  part  in Section  473  Cr.P.C.  referred to above.  The order of  the learned  Magistrate on this aspect was unsustainable so  the High Court has committed no illegality in setting aside that part  of  the  order of the learned  Magistrate.   In  Vanka Radhamanohari  (Smt.)  vs.   Vanka   Venkata  Reddy  &  Ors. [(1993) 3 SCC 4], the wife who was subjected to cruelty left the  matrimonial  home  in  1985.  In  1990  she  filed  the complaint  alleging  cruelty  and maltreatment  against  the husband  and  mother-in-law  and further  stating  that  the husband  had  remarried.  The Magistrate took cognizance  of offences  under Sections 498-A and 494 IPC.  On the petition of  the  husband under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the  High  Court quashed  the  complaint.   This Court, on  appeal  from  the judgment  of the High Court, held that the High Court  erred in  quashing the complaint as Section 468 Cr.P.C.  could not be  applied  to  offence under Section 494 IPC  (for  it  is punishable  with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 7 years) and even in respect of offence under Section 498-A, the attention of the High Court was not drawn to Section 473 Cr.P.C.   While setting aside the impugned order of the High Court   this  Court  observed  :   "As  such,  courts  while considering  the question of limitation for an offence under Section  498-A  i.e.  subjecting a woman to cruelty  by  her husband  or  the relative of her husband, should judge  that question,  in  the light of Section 473 of the  Code,  which requires  the  Court, not only to examine as to whether  the delay  has been properly explained, but as to whether "it is necessary to do so in the interests of justice"."

     For  the  reasons stated above the High Court was  not correct  insofar  as  the  order of  Magistrate  relates  to Section  406  IPC.  But in regard to offence  under  Section 498-A  IPC  no exception can be taken to the impugned  order under  appeal as the learned Magistrate did not take note of Section  473  Cr.P.C.,  while   ordering  discharge  of  the appellants.   Now the learned Magistrate shall consider  the question  of  limitation taking note of Section 473  Cr.P.C. in the light of observations made hereinabove.  Accordingly, the appeal is allowed in part.