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CASE NO.: Appeal (crl.)  473-474 of 2003 Appeal (crl.)  668-669 of 2003 Appeal (crl.)  678-679 of 2003

PETITIONER: Arun Paswan, S.I.                                                

RESPONDENT: State of Bihar & Ors.                                               

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 12/12/2003

BENCH: S.N. VARIAVA  & H.K. SEMA.

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T

SEMA,J

       These appeals are directed against the judgment and order dated  5.3.2003 passed by the Special Bench of High Court of Judicature at Patna.   By the aforesaid order, the Special Bench convicted the appellants S.I. Arun  Paswan, S.I. Sakaldeo Yadav and S.I. Syed Ahmad Khan to undergo  sentence of two months’ simple imprisonment in CWJC No. 1220/2002 with  MJC No. 722/2002.  The appellant - Sudarshan Prasad Mandal, Dy.  Superintendent of Police was sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/- and in  default simple imprisonment for 15 days.   Criminal Appeal Nos. 473-474 of  2003 have been preferred by S.I. Arun Paswan, Criminal Appeal Nos. 668- 669 of 2003 have been preferred by S.I. Sakaldeo Yadav and S.I. Syed  Ahmad Khan and Criminal Appeal Nos. 678-679 of 2003 have been  preferred by Sudarshan Prasad Mandal, Dy. Superintendent of Police.           We have heard Mr. Sushil Kumar, learned Senior Advocate on behalf  of the appellant in Crl. A. Nos. 473-474 of 2003; Mr. Jaspal Singh, learned  Senior Advocate on behalf of appellants in Crl. A. Nos. 668-669 of 2003 and  Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned Senior Advocate in Crl. A. Nos. 678-679 of  2003.  We have also heard Mr. B.B. Singh, learned counsel for the  respondent-State in all the appeals.           We deem it not necessary to recite the genesis of the incident leading  to the filing of the complaint by the learned District & Sessions Judge,  Sasaram.  Suffice it to say that the criminal contempt has been initiated  against the appellants herein pursuant to the complaint of 19th January, 2002  lodged by the learned District and Sessions Judge, Sasaram addressed to the  Registrar General of the High Court of Judicature at Patna.  In the report it is  stated inter-alia that in the pending investigation of P.S. Case No.  200/2001  under Sections 302 and 201/34 I.P.C. for which a bail application No.  1671/2001 was pending on account of non-production of case diary,  the  investigation officer - S.I. Arun Paswan (contemner) was directed to produce  the case diary on 10.1.2002 on which date, on the request of the public  prosecutor, the case was adjourned to 16.1.2002 on the ground that the I.O.  had gone to Banka for giving evidence in a case and the case diary would be  produced on the next date.  But on 16.1.2002 also, the case diary was not  produced.  The learned District & Sessions Judge, thereafter, issued a show  cause notice to the I.O. to appear personally before him as to why he should  not be prosecuted under Section 349 Cr.P.C.  On 19.1.2002, the contemner -  I.O. appeared before him and filed show cause.  He produced the case diary,  which was found to be written only upto 28.11.2001.  It was also found that  the I.O. was present at the police station on 9.1.2002 till 7.00 A.M. but he  did not send the case diary and, therefore, the shown cause was rejected.    By order dated 19.1.2002, the learned District Judge directed the contemner  to remain present in Court till the rising of the Court at 4.30 P.M. and to file  further show cause.   The complainant further stated that while he was  hearing another criminal matter in the court after recess, a group of persons

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in plain clothes as also in police uniform were seen on the road in front of  his court room in the civil court premises and after some time they started  raising abusive slogans against him.  The learned District Judge stated that  he was informed by his bodyguard, some of the senior members of bar  associations and also by officers and employees of the civil court that the  band of police officers was being led by Sudarshan Prasad Mandal, Dy. S.P.  Sasaram;  S.I. Sakaldeo Yadav, posted at Police Lines Dehri; and S.I. Syed  Ahmad Khan of Police Line Dehri.  It is further stated in the complaint that  the complainant learnt from the judicial officers, members of the bar and  some of the officers of the executive that a meeting was held in the chamber  of the Dy. Superintendent of Police where the Superintendent of Police was  also present for creating pandemonium and to assault the District Judge.   The aforesaid complaint was followed by another complaint dated  22/23.1.2002.  In the subsequent complaint, the complainant inter-alia  categorically stated that he had received the information by the staff of the  civil court and some of the advocates that the police officers of the District  of Rohtas had assembled for a meeting for reviewing law and order situation  on the eve of Panchayat Elections to be held on the next day i.e. 20.01.2002  and S.I. Arun Paswan, who was ordered to remain in the Court after  rejection of his first show cause went out during the recess hours and asked  them to come to the court premises and they were led by one Dy. S.P.,  Sasaram.  They were raising slogans of  "District Judge Murdabad,  Bhagalpur Dohrana Hai" and other abusive slogans.  It is also stated that  they were present in the court premises with their official arms with them for  creating trouble and causing disruption in the court function.  They also  abused the presiding Judge raising slogans against the judiciary as also  challenging its authority with an intent to criminally assaulting the District  Judge after hatching conspiracy.  It is also stated in the complaint that  Dy.  S.P., Sasaram had held the meeting alongwith the participating officers  of  the police on 19.1.2002 in the chamber of the Dy.S.P.  The civil court  building, court room and chamber of the complainant were situated on the  southern side of the G.T. Road and  that of the S.D.M. and Dy. S.P. were  situated opposite to the civil court building, on the northern side of the G.T.  Road.             He has also stated in the complaint that D.I.G. Shahabad Range called  him up at 9.00 P.M. on 20.1.2002 and told him that F.I.R. was to be lodged  against him and actually the F.I.R. was received on 21.1.2002.          On receipt of the complaint, a special Bench was constituted and  notices were issued to the contemners as to why contempt proceedings  should not be initiated against them.  The High Court also directed the  Director General of Police and the Additional Director General of Police to  appear before the Court.  They were asked to file affidavit.  The Additional  Director General of Police made spot enquiry and submitted the report on  27.1.2002 along with the affidavit.  The High Court, after examining the fact  finding report of the Additional Director General of Police and other  material on record found the contemners guilty and recorded the sentence as  above.          The submissions of learned counsel for the appellants are all based on  denial of finding of facts, recorded by the Additional Director General of  Police and accepted by the High Court, and are almost common in all except  one legal submission made by Mr. Jaspal Singh, learned Senior counsel  appearing for appellants in Crl. A. Nos. 668-669 of 2003, which we shall be  dealing at an appropriate time.           It is argued by Mr. Sushil Kumar, learned Senior counsel on behalf of  the appellant - S.I. Arun Paswan (Crl. A. Nos. 473-474 of 2003) that he was  the second I.O. of the case and had not received any information to produce  the case diary.  It is argued that pursuant to the show cause notice he had  tendered apology which ought to have been accepted.  It is further argued  that the contemner was present inside the court room at the time when  slogans in the abusive language were being shouted against the Judge and  the judiciary outside the court and he had not played any role therein.  At  this stage, it is pertinent to dispose of this argument.           Before the Additional Director General of Police, S.I. Arun Paswan  had appeared and gave evidence.  He admitted that he had written the F.I.R.  P.S. case No. 46/2002 lodged on 19.1.2002 under Sections 342/504 I.P.C.

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and Sections 3/4 of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention  of Atrocities) Act against the District and Sessions Judge.  It is unthinkable  that S.I., who is a part and parcel of the administration of justice, could have  filed an F.I.R. against the District and Sessions Judge for such offences.   This itself disclosed the frame of the mind of the contemner towards the  judicial officers and judicial administration.           He has also stated that during the lunch break he did not go out as the  District Judge had ordered him to remain present in Court till 4.30 P.M.  It is  the specific case of the contemner that he remained present in the court room  throughout the day from 11 A.M. to 4.30 P.M. and he had no idea as to who  were the persons shouting slogans against the Judge.  He had also stated that  he made a request to the District & Sessions Judge to permit him to go out  so that he could talk to the persons and pacify them.  This would clearly  show that he was aware of the fact as to who were the persons who were  shouting slogans against the Judge and this was because of his detention  which had provoked them to indulge in shouting slogans against the Judge.   It is material on record that there was a lunch recess in court.  It is difficult  to believe that the contemner remained present in the court room throughout  the day even during the lunch recess.  The learned District and Sessions  Judge, in his subsequent report, had categorically stated that during the lunch  recess the contemner had gone outside and talked to the police officers, who  had assembled there in connection with law and order meeting.  He also  stated that the contemner incited the officers assembled there to retaliate  against the judicial officers and the District and Sessions Judge, in particular.   It is, therefore, clear that the immediate reaction of the police officers in  shouting slogans against the District and Sessions Judge and the judicial  officers was because of the detention of the contemner, and without his  meeting the officers so assembled they would not have known about his  detention.  There is a direct nexus between his detention and the shouting of  slogans and vandalism against the District and Sessions Judge and the  judicial officers.  We have already noticed the manner in which the  contemners had conducted themselves as police officers.  Such acts  committed by the police officers were grossly contemptuous and beyond  condonable limits.  In our view, therefore, the High Court was right in  rejecting the apology tendered by them.           Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned Senior counsel appearing for appellant in  Crl. A. No. 678-679/2003 strenuously urged that the contemner - Sudershan  Prasad Mandal, Dy.S.P. was not aware at first that such slogan shouting had  taken place at civil court premises and only after he came to know that he  went to the spot and pacified the officers.  This contention is belied by the  facts of the case.  It is admitted that on the said date the contemner was  present in the SDM’s office where a meeting was being held for  review of  law and order situation for the Panchayat elections, to be held on the next  day.  It is the contention of Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned Senior counsel that at  the particular time, the contemner was sitting in the SDM’s office and he had  no knowledge as to what was happening in the civil court.   The fact of the  case is that the office of the SDM is situated on the North of G.T. Road and  the civil court is situated on the south of the G.T. Road, i.e. to say it was  across the G.T. Road.  In such a situation, it is difficult to believe that the  Dy. S.P., when sitting with the SDM, would not know as to what was  happening in the adjacent building.  This apart, Mr. Srikant Kachhap, S.I.,  who was posted as Police Inspector-cum-In-charge of the Police Station,  Sasaram and was present in the meeting held in the office of the SDM, had  stated that he had received information at about 2.45 P.M. that S.I. Arun  Paswan, in-charge of the Police Station, Bikramganj had been detained in  the court by the District and Sessions Judge and this information was also  received by the junior inspectors and the Police Inspector sitting with him in  the meeting.  He also stated that this information was also within the  knowledge of Dy. S.P. Mandal, but he did not stop the junior inspectors  from going towards the court nor he went to the court premises promptly.   He further stated that had the Dy. S.P. Mandal stopped the officers from  going to the court premises or reached the court premises immediately  thereafter, the unfortunate incident would have been averted.   He further  stated that the other junior inspectors, who had come to take part in the  meeting, also moved towards the court.  He further stated that he prevented

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all of them from doing so but they did not pay any heed to him and moved  towards the court.  He categorically stated that at that time, the contemner -  Sh. Sudarshan Prasad Mandal, Dy. S.P., Sasaram was present in the office of  the Sub Divisional Officer.  It is hard to believe that all the junior police  officers assembled at that place had received information at about 2.45 P.M.  but the Dy. S.P., who is the senior police officer, would not know about the  incident which would have enabled him to take precautionary measures at  appropriate time.  The argument that the contemner had not received the  information about the incident is, therefore, inherently unbelievable and  cannot be accepted.           Mr. Jaspal Singh, learned counsel appearing for the contemners in Crl.  A. Nos. 668-669 of 2003 strongly urged that there was breach of principles  of natural justice inasmuch as the contemners were not afforded an  opportunity of cross-examining the witnesses, who had deposed against  them.  He further submitted that the name of the contemners is not  mentioned in the complaint of the District and Sessions Judge.  It is further  argued that the contemners - S.I. Sakaldeo Yadav and S.I. Syed Ahmad  Khan were not at all present on the spot as they were at Dehri Police Lines at  that particular time.   It is further argued that the contempt proceedings initiated against the  contemners by the High Court are incompetent and are hit by proviso to  Section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 as according to him, Section   345, Crl. Procedure Code, 1973 empowers any civil, criminal or revenue  court to punish summarily a person who is found guilty of committing any  offence under Section 175, 178, 179, 180 or Section 228 of the Penal Code  in the view or presence of the court.           We are unable to accept the submissions made by the learned counsel  for the appellants.  With regard to non-disclosing of the names of the  contemners in the complaint it is factually incorrect.  In the subsequent  complaint of 22/23.1.2002, the name of the contemners S.I. Sakaldeo Yadav  and S.I. Syed Ahmad Khan were clearly mentioned.           Regarding breach of principles of natural justice - both the contemners  appeared before the Additional Director General of Police and gave their  statements.  It was open to them to cross-examine any witness deposed  against them, which opportunity they did not avail.  Since the contemners  have not availed of this opportunity before the Enquiry Officer, the plea of  non-observance of principles of natural justice is not tenable.  S.I. Sakaldeo  Yadav, at that particular time, was the President of Bihar Police Officers’  Association.  S.I. Syed Ahmad Khan was the Secretary of the Association.   As President and Secretary of the Association, they were expected to have  first hand information about each and every incident in connection with the  affairs of the police personnel.  In fact, they would be the first person to be  informed of any incident in connection with the welfare of the police  personnel.  In the deposition before the Additional Director General of  Police, Srikant Kachhap - Police Inspector-cum-Officer-in-charge, had  categorically stated that at about 2.45 P.M. he got information that the  District and Sessions Judge had detained officer in-charge of Bikramganj  and he also got the information that the President of Bihar Police  Association S.I. Sakaldeo Yadav and Secretary S.I. Syed Ahmad Khan had  departed from Police Line Dehri and going towards court campus.  The  contemner Sakaldeo Yadav had stated that on 19.1.2002, he was at his  residence at Dehri.  At about 4.15 P.M. the contemner S.I. Syed Ahmad  Khan, who is the Secretary of the Association, had informed him that the  District Judge had detained the Officer Incharge of Police Station  Bikramganj.  He has also stated that on that date he had reached Sasaram at  1645 hrs.  This contention has been rightly rejected by the Additional  Director General of Police and also by the High   Court.  At the Bar it is not disputed by counsel on both sides that the  distance from Dehri to Sasaram is about 37-38 km.  If the statement is  believed that he received the information at 4.15 P.M., it is impossible that  he reached Sasaram at 4.45 P.M., i.e. within 30 minutes of the receipt of the  information.  It is utterly impossible to cover a distance of 37-38 kms. within  30 minutes, unless one travels in a jet speed all throughout.  This would  clearly show that the two contemners were at Sasaram at the time of the  incident and in fact they led the mob in shouting slogans in abusive language

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and vandalism against the Judge and the judicial officers.  It is, therefore,  clear that these two officers set up false defence to escape punishment.  The  fact that they put up false defence is also clearly indicative of their presence  at the spot and participation at the time of the incident.           We now proceed to dispose of the argument advanced by Mr. Jaspal  Singh, learned Senior counsel that the High Court was incompetent to  initiate the contempt proceedings.  It is urged by Mr. Jaspal Singh, learned  Senior counsel  that the contempt proceedings initiated against the  contemners are hit by  proviso to Section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act,  1971 as according to him Section 345, Crl. Procedure Code, 1973 empowers  any civil, criminal or revenue court to punish summarily a person who is  found guilty of committing any offence under Section 175, 178, 179, 180 or  Section 228 of the Penal Code in the view or presence of the court.         To answer this question, it will be relevant to make a quick survey of  Section 345 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 which corresponds to  Section 480 of the earlier Criminal Procedure Code.  Section 345 reads:  "345. Procedure in certain cases of contempt. - (1) When any  such offence as is described in section 175, section 178, section  179, section 180 or section 228 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of  1860) is committed in the view or presence of any civil,  Criminal or Revenue Court, the Court may cause the offender  to be detained in custody and may at any time before the rising  of the Court on the same day, take cognizance of the offence  and, after giving the offender a reasonable opportunity of  showing cause why he should not be punished under this  section, sentence the offender to fine not exceeding two  hundred rupees, and, in default of payment of fine, to simple  imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month,  unless such fine be sooner paid.  

(2)In every such case the Court shall record the facts  constituting the offence, with the statement (if any) made by the  offender as well as the finding and sentence.  

(3)If the offence is under section 228 of the Indian Penal Code  (45 of 1860), the record shall show the nature and stage of the  judicial proceeding in which the Court interrupted or insulted  was sitting, and the nature of the interruption or insult."

A fascicule reading of Section 345 of the Code it is clear that offences  under Section 175, 178, 179, 180 or 228 would constitute contempt only if  they are committed in the view or presence of the Court.  This would also  show that offences under Sections 175, 178, 179, 180 or 228 per se do not  amount to contempt.  They are contempt only if they are committed  "in the  view or presence of the Court", otherwise they remain offences under the  Indian Penal Code simpliciter.   In the present case the alleged slogan shouting and leveling abusive  language against the Judge took place outside the Court.  Therefore, the  District and Sessions Judge rightly has not taken any action under Section  345 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and, therefore, the jurisdiction of the  High Court would not be ousted.  The rational behind it is quite obvious.   There would be no reason why the High Court should invoke its jurisdiction  when the Court against whom contempt is committed, in the view or  presence of the Court, can itself take action.  Thus, bar of the jurisdiction of  the High Court imposed by proviso to Section 10 of the Contempt of Courts  Act is not attracted in the cases where the offences under Sections 178, 179,  180 and 228 of the IPC are not committed in the view or presence of the  Court.           Similar question was raised before the Constitution Bench of this  Court   in the case of  Bathina Ramakrishna Reddy   vs.   State of Madras  reported in AIR 1952 SC 149.  This Court considered the ambit of Section  2(3) of Contempt of Courts Act (1926).  This is in para-materia to the  proviso to Section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.  In this case  defamatory statements were made.  Action in contempt was taken.  It was

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argued that the allegations amounted to an offence of defamation and  consequently jurisdiction of High Court was barred.  This argument was  negatived.  It was held that jurisdiction of the High Court is excluded only in  cases when the acts alleged are punishable as contempt under specific  provisions of Indian Penal Code.  It is held that if the act alleged merely  amounts to an offence of other description for which punishment is provided  for in the Indian Penal Code, then the jurisdiction of the High Court to take  cognizance is not taken away.  In this case it also held as follows:-

"(9) It may be pointed out in this connection that although the  powers of the High Courts in India established under the Letters  Patent to exercise jurisdiction as Superior Courts of Record in  punishing contempt of their authority or processes have never  been doubted, it was a controversial point prior to the passing  of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1926, as to whether the High  Court could, like the Court of King’s Bench in England, punish  contempt of courts subordinate to it in exercise of its inherent  jurisdiction.  The doubt has been removed by Act XII (12) of  1926 which expressly declares the right of the High Court to  protect subordinate Courts against contempt, but subject to this  restriction, that cases of contempt which have already been  provided for in the Indian Penal Code should not be taken  cognizance of by the High Court.   This seems to be the  principle underlying S. 2(8), Contempt of Courts Act.  What  these cases are, need not be exhaustively determined for  purposes of the present case, but some light is undoubtedly  thrown upon this matter by the provision of S. 480, Criminal  P.C., which empowers any civil, criminal or revenue Court to  punish summarily a person who is found guilty of committing  any offence under Ss. 175, 178, 179, 180 or S. 228, Penal Code  in the view or presence of the Court.  We are not prepared to  say, as has been said by the Patna High Court in Jyanendra  Prasad  v. Gopal, 12 Pat.172 that the only section of the Indian  Penal Code which deals with contempt committed against a  Court of justice or judicial officer is S.228.  Offences under Ss.  175, 178, 179 and 180 may also, as S. 480, Criminal P.C.  shows, amount to contempt of Court if the "public servant"  referred to in these sections happens to be a judicial officer in a  particular case.  It is well known that the aim of the contempt  proceeding is "to deter men from offering any indignities to a  Court of justice" and an essential feature of the proceeding is  the exercise of a summary power by the Court itself in regard to  the delinquent.  In the cases mentioned in S. 480, Criminal P.C.,  the Court has been expressly given summary power to punish a  person who is guilty of offending its dignity in the manner  indicated in the section.  The Court is competent also under  S.482, criminal P.C. to forward any case of this description to a  Magistrate having jurisdiction to try it, if it considers that the  offender deserves a higher punishment than what can be  inflicted under S.480.  Again the Court is entitled under S. 484,  to discharge the offender on his submitting an apology,  although it has already adjudged him to punishment under  S.480 or forward his case for trial under S. 482.  The mode of  purging contempt by tendering apology is a further  characteristic of a contempt proceeding.  It seems, therefore,  that there are offences which are punishable as contempt under  the Indian Penal Code and as subordinate Courts can  sufficiently vindicate their dignity under the provisions of  criminal law in such cases the legislature deemed it proper to  exclude them from the jurisdiction of the High Court under S.2  (3), Contempt of Courts Act, but it would not be correct to say  that the High Court’s jurisdiction is excluded even in cases  where the act complained of, which is alleged to constitute  contempt, is otherwise an offence under the Indian Penal  Code."                                                           (emphasis supplied)

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       In the case of State of Madhya Pradesh  vs.   Revashankar reported  in AIR 1959 SC 102 allegations were made which amounted to insult.  The  argument was that an offence under Section 228 IPC was made out and thus  the High Court had no jurisdiction.  Thus, an identical argument was made.   Such an argument was negatived.  This court held that if the conduct is one  which scandalizes the Court and impairs administration of justice, the  jurisdiction of the High Court would not be barred.  In the present case also  it is not a mere personal insult to the District Judge.  Such conduct of police  officers scandalizes the Court itself and impairs administration of justice  inasmuch as it tends to demoralize the judicial officers and makes it difficult  for them to perform their duties fearlessly.  We, therefore, reject this  submission.          In the result, there is no merit in the appeals and they, accordingly,  stand dismissed.