REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 1233-1234 OF 2002

Arulvelu & Another ..    Appellants

Versus

State represented by the Public Prosecutor & Another ..    Respondents  

J U D G M E N T

Dalveer Bhandari, J.

1. These appeals are directed against the judgment of the  

High Court of Madras dated 12.3.2002 in Criminal Appeal  

No.  315  of  1992  and  Criminal  R.C.  No.  691  of  1991  

respectively.

2. In the instant case, the High Court has reversed the  

judgment of acquittal passed by the II Additional Assistant  

Sessions Judge, Periyar District in Sessions Case No. 45 of  

1999 and convicted the accused persons.

3. Brief facts which are necessary to dispose of the matter  

are recapitulated as under:

This appeal is filed by Arulvelu, A-1 and Krishnasamy,  

A-2 (father of A-1).  Appellant Arulvelu has been convicted  

under  section  304-B  of  the  Indian  Penal  Code  (for  short  

‘IPC’) and sentenced to seven years rigorous imprisonment  

and he has been further convicted under section 498-A IPC  

and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for a period of two  

years and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/-, in default to suffer  

three  months  rigorous  imprisonment.   Appellant  accused  

no.2 has been imposed sentence of fine of Rs.1,000/- under  

section  498-A  of  IPC,  in  default  to  suffer  simple  

imprisonment for a period of three months.

4. Before  the marriage of  Arulvelu with Mangayarkarasi  

(since deceased), an agreement was entered into to the effect  

that towards the consideration of the marriage, deceased’s  

father P.W.1 would give gold ornaments of the weight of 50  

sovereigns along with other articles and a car to Arulvelu.

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5. The father of the deceased could give ornaments of the  

weight of only 30 sovereigns of gold and also could not give  

the  car  as  undertaken.   Instead  of  giving  the  remaining  

ornaments of 20 sovereigns and a car, P.W.1 in all gave only  

Rs.5,000/- in small installments.  This was the main cause  

of annoyance of Arulvelu and his family members with the  

deceased.  It is the case of the prosecution that accused nos.  

1 to 3 had been torturing the deceased Mangayarkarasi by  

demanding a car and money.

6. A  baby  boy  was  born  to  Arulvelu  and  the  deceased  

Mangayarkarasi.  Arulvelu told his wife that he would take  

back her along with the newly born child only if ornaments  

of  the  weight  of  5  sovereigns  and  a  cash  amount  of  

Rs.5,000/- were given to him.   The father of the deceased  

had given ornaments  of  the weight  of  4 sovereigns and a  

cash of Rs.5,000/- to the first accused.  The first accused  

had  taken  back  the  deceased  and  the  child  only  after  

receiving the aforementioned articles from P.W.1.    

7. The first accused had demanded the balance ornament  

of the weight of one sovereign when the second child was  

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born. The father of the deceased gave ornament of the weight  

of one sovereign.   

8. The  first  accused  had  sent  the  deceased  

Mangayarkarasi many times to her father for getting money  

for doing business.  According to the prosecution, since the  

car was not given to the first accused, he had beaten and  

tortured the deceased asking her to get the car from P.W.1.  

Mangayarkarasi  ultimately  became disgusted  with  her  life  

and at 11.30 a.m. on 15.3.1989, she committed suicide by  

hanging herself.   

9. The  prosecution,  in  order  to  prove  its  case,  had  

examined 20 witnesses.  K. Ramalingam P.W.1 is the father  

of  the  deceased.   D.  Latha  P.W.4  is  the  sister  of  the  

deceased.  S.T.P.  Muthusamy  Mudaliar  P.W.5  is  the  

neighbour.  Thirumathi N. Yasodha P.W.2 is the tenant of  

P.W.1and  P.W.3  A.    Periasamy  is  the  person  who  had  

arranged the marriage of the first accused and the deceased.  

V.P. Subramaniam P.W.6 is a close relative of the deceased.  

N.Manickam  P.W.8  is  a  member  of  the  Panchayat.   S.A.  

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Periasamy P.W.9 is another Sambandhi of P.W.1 who later  

on turned hostile.    

10. The fact that the deceased had committed suicide by  

hanging herself  is undisputed.  The question which arises  

for  our adjudication is  whether  the appellant  is  guilty  for  

compelling the deceased to commit suicide.   According to  

the prosecution she was forced to commit suicide because of  

consistent  demands  of  dowry  made  by  the  first  accused.  

According to P.W.1 the father of the deceased, his daughter  

committed suicide because he could not give gold and a car  

as agreed before her marriage.  The accused persons started  

torturing and harassing the deceased which ultimately led to  

suicide.

11. The  trial  court  in  its  lengthy  and  comprehensive  

judgment has dealt with the prosecution evidence and also  

all the 33 material exhibits.  According to the learned trial  

Judge, the evidence of P.W.1 that he agreed to give balance  

ornaments was not corroborated by P.W.3.   According to the  

trial court, P.W.1 had admitted that for the first time, he told  

the court that accused no. 2 demanded 40 sovereigns and  

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the same was not stated either before the police officers or  

during Revenue Divisional Officer’s enquiry.    According to  

the  trial  Judge,  P.Ws.  15,  17  and  20  would  depose  that  

P.W.1 has not told about the demand of ornaments during  

his  cross-examination.  The  trial  court  further  held  that  

P.W.1 had admitted that he did not tell about the demand of  

40 sovereigns of gold by accused no. 2 during the course of  

investigation, it is his case that an agreement was reached at  

35 sovereigns.   This has been corroborated by P.W.3 also.  

P.W.15,  the  Revenue  Division  Officer  who  conducted  the  

enquiry  and  who  also  held  the  inquest  came  to  the  

conclusion that the death was due to cruelty meted out to  

the deceased by way of demand of dowry.      He has stated  

in the cross examination that during enquiry P.W.1 did not  

tell  him  that  first  accused  demanded  5  sovereigns  as  a  

condition  to  take  his  wife  and  the  child  after  delivery.  

P.W.15  further stated that during enquiry P.W.1 did not tell  

him that  the  first  accused  demanded  Rs.10,000/-  for  his  

business.    During  cross-examination  on  the  side  of  the  

accused, P.W.15 had admitted as follows:

“P.W.1  stated  that  in  his  evidence  that  A2  demanded 50 sovereign of gold before marriage,  

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but he accepted to put only 30 sovereign of gold  and remaining 20 sovereign will  be given later  and if the business goes well then he will get a  car. But he never stated in his evidence that A2  demanded  40  sovereign  of  gold  and  P.W.1  refused and then accepted to give later.”

12. The  trial  judge,  while  discussing  the  evidence  of  

P.W.15,  found  that  there  was  no  demand  of  bridal  gifts  

before the marriage.    The trial judge disbelieved the version  

of  P.W.3  holding  that  he  is  not  related  to  P.W.1  and  he  

pleaded ignorance about the date and month of meeting of  

P.W.1 and accused no. 2.  The trial judge also disbelieved the  

testimony  of  P.W.1  regarding  giving  of  4  sovereigns  and  

Rs.5,000/-  to  the  first  accused after  the  birth  of  the  first  

child and another sovereign of jewel at the time of birth of  

the  second child  for  the  reason that  those  facts  were  not  

spoken to during investigation.  This part of the prosecution  

case  is  disbelieved.   The  trial  judge  has  clearly  held  that  

P.W.1 deposed for the first time in the court with regard to  

demand of a car. He did not mention this fact in the first  

information report.

13. Ex. P.8 is the suicide note of the deceased which reads  

as under:

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“Nobody  is  responsible  for  my death.  Children  should be handed over to mother’s house.”

In the suicidal  note,  the deceased had not implicated any  

accused.  This factor has also weighed heavily with the trial  

court in acquitting all the accused.   The argument on behalf  

of the accused was that the accused no. 1 had suspected the  

character of his mother-in-law and other members of his in-

law’s family,  so he did not want the deceased to visit  her  

parents’  house  and  to  resolve  the  dispute  Panchayat  was  

held  and,  as  per  the  version  of  P.W.1,  according  to  the  

decision of Panchayat, P.W.1 should not go to the house of  

the accused and the deceased and accused nos. 1 to 3 also  

should not go to the house of P.W.1.    As per the version of  

the accused,  the decision of  the Panchayat not permitting  

the deceased to go to her  parents  perhaps led to suicide.  

The trial court after carefully examining the entire evidence  

acquitted the accused.

14. According to the High Court, if she (the deceased) had  

no  problem  in  her  marital  house  and  she  was  living  

peacefully  with  her  husband  and  in-laws,  what  was  the  

necessity for her to commit suicide?  Why should she write  

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in  her  suicide  note  to  leave  her  children  in  her  mother’s  

house?  According to the High Court, unless an intolerable  

harassment was meted out to her, there was absolutely no  

necessity  for  her  to  write  like  this  that  the  children  be  

handed over  to her mother’s  house.    Therefore,  the High  

Court  held that,  in  all  probabilities,  there  was demand of  

dowry and the deceased was harassed by the first accused  

and therefore, she committed suicide.

15. The High Court set aside the judgment of the trial court  

on the count that the trial court gave undue emphasis on the  

minor  inconsistencies  and  contradictions.  The  High  Court  

discarded  the  version  of  the  trial  court  regarding  P.W.1’s  

deposition for the first time in court regarding demand of car  

which  he  did  not  mention  in  the  first  information  report  

(FIR).  

16. The High  Court  observed that  the  FIR cannot  be  an  

encyclopedia to contain all the details of history of the case.  

This approach of the High Court does not seem to be correct.  

The  FIR  should  at  least  mention  a  broad  story  of  the  

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prosecution and not mentioning of material and vital facts  

may affect the credibility of the FIR.

17. The trial court doubted the veracity of the statement of  

P.W.1  because  it  did  not  find  any  corroboration  of  the  

statement  of  P.W.1 with the statement of  P.W.3 regarding  

agreeing  to  give  the  balance  gold  sovereigns.    The  High  

Court without any basis discarded the judgment of the trial  

court.  

18. The trial judge observed that the testimony of P.W.1 is  

not credible because he for the first time in the court had  

stated that accused no. 2 had demanded 40 sovereigns.  This  

was  not  stated  either  before  the  police  officer  or  during  

Revenue Divisional Officers’ enquiry.  

19. The  trial  court  disbelieved  the  version  of  P.W.1  

regarding  giving  4  sovereigns  and  Rs.5,000/-  to  the  first  

accused  after  the  birth  of  the  first  child  and  another  

sovereign of jewel at the time of birth of the second child for  

the reason that those facts were not spoken to during the  

investigation.  The  High  Court  held  this  part  of  the  

prosecution case unbelievable, but the fact remains that the  

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demand  of  dowry  was  proved  beyond  doubt  through  the  

evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 3.   This approach of the High Court  

is not correct.

20. The  High  Court  ought  to  have  considered  the  entire  

evidence in a proper perspective.   Unless comprehensive view  

of  the  entire  evidence  is  taken  in  the  proper  perspective,  a  

correct conclusion may not be possible.  In this case, there has  

been acquittal by the trial court and, while reversing the order  

of acquittal, the High Court ought to have carefully considered  

the following circumstances:

(1) In  the  suicide  note  Ex.  P-8,  the  deceased  has  not  

implicated any of  the accused. This is  indeed a very  

significant  and  vital  factor  which  ought  to  have  

received proper attention by the High Court.

(2) There  is  no  credible  evidence  to  suggest  that  soon  

before the death, the deceased has been subjected to  

cruelty  or  harassment  by  the  accused in  connection  

with any demand of dowry which led to a serious act of  

committing suicide.

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(3) The  High  Court  failed  to  consider  that  the  marriage  

took  place  in  the  year  1983  and  the  deceased  

committed suicide in the year 1989 i.e. after more than  

six years of the marriage.  There are two small children  

out  of  the  wedlock.   It  is  quite  improbable  that  

ordinarily there would be consistent demands of dowry  

after six years.  The fact of consistent demands is not  

established from clear evidence of the prosecution.   

(4) The distance between the matrimonial  home and the  

parental home of the deceased is merely one kilometer.  

There  are  many  houses  around  the  house  of  the  

accused.   It  is  submitted  that  there  was  neither  a  

whisper nor any complaint was filed by P.W.1 before  

the deceased committed suicide.   

(5) It appears from the statement under section 313 IPC  

that  A-1  wanted  his  wife  (deceased)  to  keep  some  

distance from her parental home.  It transpired in the  

meeting  of  the  Panchayat  that  to  settle  the  dispute  

between  the  husband  and  wife  and  to  reduce  the  

affinity  of  the  wife  (deceased)  towards  her  parental  

home (One  kilometer  away from the  parental  home),  

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the Panchayat took the decision that both the families  

should not visit each other.  The impact of the decision  

of  Panchayat  on  the  deceased  was  not  properly  

appreciated by the High Court.  

(6) S.A. Periyasamy P.W.9 has not supported the case of  

the  prosecution.   He  has  stated  that  “we  told  

Ramalingam  that  he  and  his  wife  should  not  go  to  

Arulvelu”s house often”.  He has also admitted that A-1  

and Magaiyarkarsi (deceased) were living happily.

(7) Ramalingam P.W.1  has  stated  that  he  consoled  and  

advised his daughter to be bold as they would not come  

to  see  her  as  per  the  dictum of  the  Panchayat  and  

wisely handle the situation at her matrimonial house.  

In fact the suggestion of defence is that the Panchayat  

was  convened  as  there  was  a  serious  apprehension  

about the character of the mother of the deceased and  

her family.  That is why in the Panchayat no discussion  

about dowry demand was whispered.  Moreover, if the  

first appellant did not like his deceased wife, he would  

not be keen on keeping her with him.

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(8) It  appears  that  the  Panchayat’s  decision  caused  

serious depression to the deceased. It is submitted that  

the deceased’s strong affinity towards her parents and  

her inability to cope up with the situation coupled with  

her  sickness,  she  was driven  to  such a  situation  to  

commit suicide.

(9) R.  Murugesan  P.W.15,  the  RDO  who  prepared  the  

inquest report has also stated about the panchayat’s  

decision and has opined that “the reason for her death  

may be the control exerted on her that she should not  

go to her mother’s house”.

(10) The trial  court  has observed that  when the  accused  

were questioned under section 313 Cr.P.C., they filed a  

written statement jointly.  In that written statement it  

has  been  explained  that  –  “Due  to  mental  agony,  

incurable  stomach-ache,  pain over  the body and the  

control by the first accused that she should not go to  

the  house  of  her  parents,  Mangayarkarasi  had  

committed suicide”.   Further that “Arulvelu, without  

marrying for the second time for several years looked  

after the children with lot of love and affection so that  

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the children may not feel the absence of their mother.  

The family of accused is a joint family.  In that family,  

accused nos. 1 to 3 and Vijayakumar, another son of  

accused nos. 2 and 3 and his wife Padma are living  

jointly.”

(11) The  trial  court  noticed  serious  contradictions  and  

inconsistencies  in  the  evidence  of  P.W.1  and  those  

became relevant particularly when the High Court was  

dealing with the order of acquittal.

(12) There are material contradictions in the statements of  

P.W.1 and P.W.3.  P.W.1 says after the birth of first  

child there was demand.  Whereas P.W.3 says after 6-7  

months of  the marriage there was demand.  Further  

P.W.1 says that 20 days before the occurrence A-2 and  

A-3 said that customary gifts were not good.  Whereas  

P.W.3  says  that  after  6-7  months  of  1st incident  

deceased  was  told  that  the  articles  were  not  good.  

P.W.1  says  30  sovereigns.   However,  P.W.3  says  35  

sovereigns.   P.W.1 has stated that he said to A-2 that  

he could give 20 sovereign later on.  However, P.W.3  

does  not  corroborate  the  same.   Though  P.W.3  has  

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stated  that  A-2  demanded  car  during  the  marriage  

negotiation, however, P.W.3 has not corroborated the  

evidence of P.W.1 with regard to the demand of car.   

It  is submitted that none of the investigating officers  

have supported P.W.1  with regard to  the  demand of  

jewels, car, cash and/or with regard to harassment to  

the deceased due to non fulfillment of the above said  

items.

(13) A.  Periyasamy P.W.3  has  not  been examined  by  the  

DSP  Sivanandam,  RDO,  Karuppusamy  and  others.  

Only CB CID Velu examined him.  CB CID, Velu has  

stated that P.W.3 told him that the (a) P.W.1 is not his  

relative (b) not a family friend (c) accused is also not  

related  (d)  that  he  did  not  go  for  condolence  when  

Mangai died (e) he does not know about Seer Varisai (f)  

he  does  not  know  about  the  dates  on  which  he  

arranged the talks.  However during his deposition he  

has admitted that he knows Palaniappan, the brother  

of Rukmani (P.W.1’s wife) and he is his relative. P.W.20  

has  admitted  that  P.W.3  has  said  that  Ramlingam  

(P.W.1) is his family friend.  For the above said reasons  

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the evidence was of P.W.3 was not relied upon the trial  

court.   It  is  submitted  that  the  High  Court  has  not  

considered these aspects.   

(14) D. Latha P.W.4 stated that she was present during the  

talks  when  the  demand  during  the  marriage  

negotiation  took  place.   However,  P.W.3  says  during  

talks  except  P.W.1  and  A-2  no  body  was  present.  

Further none of the witnesses including P.W.1 has said  

that P.W.4 was present during the talks.

K.  Sivanandhan,  Deputy  Superintendent  of  Police  

P.W.17  has  stated  that  P.W.4  has  not  stated  that  

failure to buy a car became a problem.  She has not  

stated about the demand of 50 sovereigns and a car.  

Therefore the trial court has disbelieved the presence of  

P.W.4 during the talks.

D. Latha P.W.4 has not given in her evidence that she  

had known personally that little by little 20 sovereign  

were given.  The trial court has held that P.W.4 does  

not  speak anything about the  timings of  the torture  

like four weeks, 20 days or 8 days before the death.

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(15) S.T.P.  Muthusamy  Mudaliar  P.W.5’s  testimony  does  

not inspire confidence.   He says that during the verbal  

argument between A-1 and Rukmani Amma, A-1 asked  

about  car.  However,  Yasodha P.W.2  did  not  say  the  

same.  Further, Rukmani Amma was not examined. It  

is  submitted  that  the  trial  court  has  discussed  the  

contradictions  between P.W.2,  P.W.1  and P.W.5  and  

about utterance with regard to car in the quarrel and  

therefore the trial court has not relied on P.W.5.  It is  

submitted  that  apart  from Rukminiammal,  Shaktivel  

(P.W.1’s son) and Planniappan was also not examined  

by the prosecution.

(16)  S.A. Periyasamy P.W.9  (Sambandhi of P.W.1) has not  

supported the case of prosecution.   He says that he  

advised Ramlingam that they should not go to A-1’s  

house  often.   During  his  cross-examination  he  has  

stated  that  “I  understood  that  Arulvelu  and  

Mangaiyarkarasi were living a happy matrimonial life.  

There is a Car in my son Sivakumar’s name TNC-4128.  

Its RC was in the name of Ramalingam S/o Palaniappa  

Mudhaliar.”

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(17) The  Assistant  Judicial  Magistrate  PW 11 has  stated  

that  crime  number  of  Exhibit  A-1  has  been  

manipulated.    Further,  P.W.13  has  stated  that  

“Ramalingam has  given  only  one  complaint  on  that  

day. Exhibit A13 is the first original copy.   Exhibit A18  

is  the  original  of  another  set  of  copies  taken.   The  

person  who  has  written  Exhibit  13  has  not  written  

Exhibit A18”.  The trial court has also discussed the  

discrepancy with regard to Exh. A-13 and Exh.A-18.

(18) R. Murugesan P.W.15, RDO who prepared the inquest  

report  has  admitted  that  Yashoda  (P.W.2)  was  

examined  on  30.03.89.   He  also  stated  that  nearly  

1000 houses would be there.  It was crowded area with  

many houses.  However, no neighbour was examined  

as a witness.  Further, P.W.17 has admitted that A-1  

said to him that he (A-1) brought the doctor.  However,  

P.W.15 did not believe the same.  It is submitted that  

P.W.15  has  not  given  any  cogent  reason  for  

disbelieving the same. It is submitted that the conduct  

of P.W.15 (the RDO) was adversely commented by the  

trial court.

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(19) R.Murugesan P.W.15 has stated that Rukmaniammal  

said that on 18.3.89 Mangayarkarsi came to the house  

as  she  was  ill.   She  asked  as  to  why  did  she  

(Rukmaniammal) made controversy in a house where  

the death had taken place.  She has also stated that  

on  21.3.89  she  had  sent  medicine  and  tablets  to  

Mangayarkarasi’s husband’s house through a car.  It  

is submitted that R. Murugesan P.W.15 has admitted  

that Ramlingam (P.W.1) has not stated that A-1 had  

told  him  that  he  was  going  to  get  into  another  

marriage.   Further,  he  (P.W.1)  did  not  say  about  

demand of 5 sovereigns, Rs.10,000/- and that dowry  

was not enough.  He (P.W.1) has also not stated before  

P.W.15 that Mangayarkarsi came to his house 8 days  

before and told that she could live only if he buys a  

car.   Further,  P.W.1 had also not stated before  him  

that on Tuesday their daughter’s parents in law asked  

them to buy a car.  P.W.15 has further admitted that  

Yashoda  (P.W.2)  had  stated  that  A-1  came  to  

Rukmanniammal and told that ‘because of you, A am  

very ashamed’. P.W.15 has also stated that P.W.1 had  

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not  told  him  that  before  marriage  there  was  any  

discussion about dowry on presence of some persons.  

Further that none of the witnesses has stated that they  

discussed about jewels and car before the marriage.

(20) The Panchayat’s decision coupled with the condition of  

illness  could  have  driven  the  deceased  to  commit  

suicide.  This possibility cannot be ruled out. P.W.15  

has  also  stated  that  on  22.3.89  a  panchayat  was  

convened  to  decide  on the  issue  of  dispute  between  

both  the  families.   In  that  Panchayat  it  has  been  

decided that they should not visit each others house  

and Mangaiyarkarasi has to be advised accordingly.

(21) The High Court has made erroneous observation that:  

“It  is  not  the  panchayat  decision  that  the  deceased  

should not visit her parents. The only thing is P.W.1  

should not go to the house of the accused”.

As per the case of prosecution and as per the evidence  

it  is  crystal  clear  that  the  Panchayat’s  decision  was  

that ‘both the familier should not visit each other’.

21

(22) The  High  Court  failed  to  appreciate  that  the  

prosecution has failed to prove that with all certainty,  

the dowry demand was the only cause for the deceased  

to  commit  suicide.   The  High  Court  has  simply  

presumed  with  the  following  words:  “The  immediate  

temptation for her to commit suicide appears to be the  

demand of a car and subsequent quarrel of the first  

accused with the mother of the deceased. She has died  

in her in-law’s house.  Why should she commit suicide  

if she was happily living with the first accused?”

21. These are some of the material  and vital  aspects which  

clearly demonstrate that the trial court has carefully analyzed  

the entire evidence on record and the view taken by the trial  

court is certainly a possible or plausible view.

22. In our considered opinion, the approach of the High Court  

in the impugned judgment is not in consonance with the settled  

principles  of  criminal  jurisprudence.   The  High  Court  while  

reversing the judgment of the trial court observed that “in all  

probabilities, I am inclined to hold that there was demand of  

dowry and the deceased was harassed by the first accused and  

22

therefore,  she  committed  suicide.”   In  criminal  cases  the  

conviction can be sustained only when there is clear evidence  

beyond reasonable doubt.  The accused cannot be convicted on  

the  ground  that  in  all  probabilities  the  accused  may  have  

committed the crime.  The approach of the High Court is wholly  

fallacious and unsustainable in law.   

23. The  real  question  which  falls  for  our  consideration  is  

whether the view which has been taken by the trial court was a  

possible or a plausible view.

24. We have carefully perused the judgment of the trial court  

and the impugned judgment of the High Court.  The trial court  

very minutely examined the entire evidence and all documents  

and exhibits on record.  The trial court’s analysis of evidence  

also seems to be correct.  The trial court has not deviated from  

the normal  norms or  methods of  evaluation of  the  evidence.  

By no stretch of imagination, we can hold that the judgment of  

the trial  court  is based on no evidence or evidence which is  

thoroughly  unreliable  and  no  reasonable  person  would  act  

upon it  and consequently  the  judgment  of  the  trial  court  is  

perverse.

23

25. We also fail to arrive at the conclusion that the discussion  

and  appreciation  of  the  evidence  of  the  trial  court  is  so  

outrageously  defies  logic  as  to  suffer  from  the  vice  of  

irrationality  incurring  the  blame  of  being  perverse  and  the  

findings rendered by the trial court are against the weight of  

evidence.   The law is well settled that, in an appeal against  

acquittal, unless the judgment of the trial court is perverse, the  

Appellate Court would not be justified in substituting its own  

view and reverse the judgment of acquittal.

26. The expression ‘perverse’ has been dealt with in number of  

cases.   In  Gaya  Din  (Dead)  through  LRs.  &  Others  v.  

Hanuman Prasad (Dead) through LRs.  & Others  (2001)  1  

SCC  501  this  Court  observed  that  the  expression  ‘perverse’  

means that the findings of the subordinate authority are not  

supported  by  the  evidence  brought  on  record  or  they  are  

against  the  law  or  suffer  from  the  vice  of  procedural  

irregularity.

27. In Parry’s (Calcutta ) Employees’ Union v. Parry & Co.  

Ltd.  &  Others  AIR  1966  Cal.  31,  the  Court  observed  that  

24

‘perverse finding’ means a finding which is not only against the  

weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence itself.

28. In  Triveni Rubber & Plastics  v.  Collector of  Central  

Excise,  Cochin  AIR 1994 SC 1341,  the Court  observed that  

this is not a case where it can be said that the findings of the  

authorities  are  based  on  no  evidence  or  that  they  are  so  

perverse that no reasonable person would have arrived at those  

findings.

29. In  M. S. Narayanagouda v.  Girijamma & Another AIR  

1977  Kar.  58,  the  Court  observed  that  any  order  made  in  

conscious violation of pleading and law is a perverse order.  

30. In  Moffett  v.  Gough,  1 L.R. 1r. 371, the Court observed  

that a perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is  

not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against  

the evidence.  

31. In  Godfrey  v. Godfrey 106 NW 814,  the Court  defined  

‘perverse’ as turned the wrong way, not right; distorted from the  

right;  turned  away  or  deviating  from  what  is  right,  proper,  

correct etc.  

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32. The  expression  “perverse”  has  been  defined  by  various  

dictionaries in the following manner:

1. Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary of Current English  Sixth Edition

PERVERSE:  Showing deliberate determination to behave in a way  that most people think is wrong, unacceptable or unreasonable.

2. Longman  Dictionary  of  Contemporary  English  –  International Edition

PERVERSE:  Deliberately  departing  from  what  is  normal  and  reasonable.

3. The New Oxford Dictionary of English – 1998 Edition

PERVERSE: Law (of a verdict) against the weight of evidence or the  direction of the judge on a point of law.  

4. New Webster’s Dictionary of the English Language (Deluxe  Encyclopedic Edition)

PERVERSE: Purposely deviating from accepted or expected behavior  or opinion; wicked or wayward; stubborn; cross or petulant.

5. Stroud’s  Judicial  Dictionary of  Words & Phrases,  Fourth  Edition

PERVERSE: A perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that  is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against  the evidence.

33. In Shailendra Pratap & Another v. State of U.P. (2003)  

1 SCC 761, the Court observed thus:

“We are of the opinion that the trial court was  quite  justified  in  acquitting  the  appellants  of  the  charges as the view taken by it was reasonable one  and  the  order  of  acquittal  cannot  be  said  to  be  perverse.  It  is  well  settled  that  appellate  court  

26

would not be justified in interfering with the order  of  acquittal  unless  the  same  is  found  to  be  perverse. In the present case, the High Court has  committed an error in interfering with the order of  acquittal  of  the  appellants  recorded  by  the  trial  court as the same did not suffer from the vice of  perversity.”

34. In  Kuldeep Singh v.  The Commissioner  of  Police  &  

Others (1999) 2 SCC 10, the Court while dealing with the scope  

of Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution observed as under:

“9. Normally the High Court and this Court  would  not  interfere  with  the  findings  of  fact  recorded at the domestic enquiry but if the finding  of  “guilt”  is  based on no evidence,  it  would be a  perverse finding and would be amenable to judicial  scrutiny.

10. A broad distinction has, therefore, to be  maintained  between  the  decisions  which  are  perverse and those which are not.  If a decision is  arrived  at  on  no  evidence  or  evidence  which  is  thoroughly  unreliable  and  no  reasonable  person  would  act  upon  it,  the  order  would  be  perverse.  But if  there is  some evidence on record which is  acceptable  and  which  could  be  relied  upon,  howsoever compendious it may be, the conclusions  would not be treated as perverse and the findings  would not be interfered with.”

35. The  meaning  of  ‘perverse’  has  been examined  in  H.  B.  

Gandhi,  Excise  and  Taxation  Officer-cum-  Assessing  

Authority, Karnal & Others v. Gopi Nath & Sons & Others  

1992 Supp (2) SCC 312, this Court observed as under:

27

“7. In  the  present  case,  the  stage  at  and  the  points on which the challenge to the assessment in  judicial review was raised and entertained was not  appropriate.  In our opinion, the High Court was in  error  in  constituting  itself  into  a  court  of  appeal  against the assessment.  While it was open to the  respondent to have raised and for the High Court to  have considered whether the denial of relief under  the proviso to Section 39(5) was proper or not, it  was not open to the High Court re-appreciate the  primary  or  perceptive  facts  which were  otherwise  within  the  domain  of  the  fact-finding  authority  under  the  statute.   The  question  whether  the  transactions were or were not sales exigible to sales  tax constituted an exercise in recording secondary  or inferential facts based on primary facts found by  the statutory authorities. But what was assailed in  review  was,  in  substance,  the  correctness  –  as  distinguished from the legal permissibility – of the  primary  or  perceptive  facts  themselves.   It  is,  no  doubt, true that if a finding of fact is arrived at by  ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking  into  consideration  irrelevant  material  or  if  the  finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from  the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being  perverse,  then,  the  finding  is  rendered  infirm  in  law.”

36. The legal position seems to be well settled and consistent  

at least since 1934 when the Privy Council decided the case of  

Sheo Swarup & Others v.  King Emperor AIR 1934 PC 227 in  

which the Court (per Lord Russell) observed as under:

“..the  High  Court  should  and  will  always  give  proper weight and consideration to such matters as  (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility  of the witnesses, (2) the presumption of innocence  in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly  

28

not  weakened  by  the  fact  that  he  has  been  acquitted at his trial, (3) the right of the accused to  the benefit of any doubt, and (4) the slowness of an  appellate  Court  in  disturbing  a  finding  of  fact  arrived at  by a Judge  who had the advantage  of  seeing the witnesses..”

The aforesaid decision was followed in subsequent judgments of  

this Court. [See: Surajpal Singh & Others v. The State, AIR  

1952 SC 52;  Tulsiram Kanu  v.  The State, AIR 1954 SC 1,  

Atley  v.  State of  Uttar Pradesh AIR 1955 SC 807;  Balbir  

Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1957 SC 216; M.G. Agarwal v.  

State of Maharashtra AIR 1963 SC 200;  Khedu Mohton &  

Others v. State of Bihar, (1970) 2 SCC 450; Bishan Singh &  

Others  v.  The State of Punjab  (1974) 3 SCC 288;  K. Gopal  

Reddy v.  State of Andhra Pradesh (1979) 1 SCC 355;  Tota  

Singh  &  Another  v.  State  of  Punjab  (1987)  2  SCC  529;  

Sambasivan & Others v. State of Kerala (1998) 5 SCC 412;  

Bhagwan Singh & Others v. State of M.P. (2002) 4 SCC 85;  

Harijana Thirupala & Others  v.  Public  Prosecutor,  High  

Court  of  A.P.,  Hyderabad (2002)  6  SCC  470;  State  of  

Rajasthan  v.  Raja Ram  (2003) 8 SCC 180;  Budh Singh &  

Others  v. State of UP  (2006) 9 SCC 731; Kalyan Singh  v.  

State of MP (2006) 13 SCC 303; Kallu alias Masih & Others  

29

v. State  of  MP (2006)  10  SCC  313;  and  State  of  Goa  v.  

Sanjay Thakran & Another, (2007) 3 SCC 755]  

37. In Shambhoo Missir & Another v. State of Bihar (1990)  

4 SCC 17, this Court observed thus:  

“We  are  of  the  view  that  the  High  Court  has  interfered with the order of acquittal passed by the  trial court not only for no substantial reasons but  also  by  ignoring  material  infirmities  in  the  prosecution case. Hence, we allow the appeals and  set aside the order of the High Court convicting and  sentencing the accused in both the appeals.”

38. In Chandrappa & Others v. State of Karnataka (2007)  

4 SCC 415, this Court reiterated the legal position as under:

“(1) An appellate  court has full  power to review,  reappreciate  and  reconsider  the  evidence  upon  which the order of acquittal is founded.

(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no  limitation,  restriction  or  condition  on  exercise  of  such power and an appellate court on the evidence  before  it  may reach its  own conclusion,  both  on  questions of fact and of law.   

(3) Various  expressions,  such  as,  “substantial  and  compelling  reasons”,  “good  and  sufficient  grounds”,  “very  strong  circumstances”,  “distorted  conclusions”,  “glaring  mistakes”,  etc.  are  not  intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate  court  in  an  appeal  against  acquittal.  Such  phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes  of  language”  to  emphasise  the  reluctance  of  an  appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to  curtail the power of the court to review the evidence  and to come to its own conclusion.

30

(4) An  appellate  court,  however,  must  bear  in  mind  that  in  case  of  acquittal,  there  is  double  presumption in favour of the accused.  Firstly, the  presumption of innocence is available to him under  the  fundamental  principle  of  criminal  jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed  to  be  innocent  unless  he  is  proved  guilty  by  a  competent  court  of  law.  Secondly,  the  accused  having  secured  his  acquittal,  the  presumption  of  his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and  strengthened by the trial court.       

                                                  (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on  the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate  court  should  not  disturb  the  finding  of  acquittal  recorded by the trial court.”

39. In Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2008) 10 SCC  

450,  a  two  Judge  Bench  of  this  Court  of  which  one  of  us  

(Bhandari, J.) was a member had an occasion to deal with most  

of  the cases referred in this  judgment.   This Court  provided  

guidelines for the Appellate Court in dealing with the cases in  

which  the  trial  courts  have  acquitted  the  accused.   The  

following principles emerge from the cases above:

1. The accused is  presumed to  be innocent  until  proven  guilty.   The  accused  possessed  this  presumption when he was before the trial court.  The  trial  court’s  acquittal  bolsters  the  presumption that he is innocent.  

2. The power of reviewing evidence is wide and the  appellate  court  can  re-appreciate  the  entire  

31

evidence on record. It can review the trial court’s  conclusion with respect to both facts and law,  but  the  Appellate  Court  must  give  due  weight  and  consideration  to  the  decision  of  the  trial  court.  

3. The appellate court should always keep in mind  that the trial court had the distinct advantage of  watching the demeanour of  the witnesses.  The  trial court is in a better position to evaluate the  credibility of the witnesses.  

4. The  appellate  court  may  only  overrule  or  otherwise disturb the trial court’s acquittal if it  has  “very  substantial  and  compelling  reasons”  for doing so.  

5.  If  two  reasonable  or  possible  views  can  be  reached - one that leads to acquittal, the other to  conviction  -  the  High  Courts/appellate  courts  must rule in favour of the accused.   

40. This  Court  in  a  recently  delivered  judgment  State  of  

Rajasthan v. Naresh @ Ram Naresh  2009 (11) SCALE 699  

again examined judgments of this Court and laid down that “An  

order of acquittal should not be lightly interfered with even if  

the court believes that there is some evidence pointing out the  

finger towards the accused.    This  Court  has dealt  with the  

scope of interference with an order of acquittal in a number of  

cases.”

41. Careful scrutiny of all these judgments lead to the definite  

conclusion  that  the  appellate  court  should  be  very  slow  in  

32

setting  aside  a  judgment  of  acquittal  particularly  in  a  case  

where two views are possible.  The trial court judgment can not  

be  set  aside  because  the  appellate  court’s  view  is  more  

probable.  The appellate court would not be justified in setting  

aside the trial court judgment unless it arrives at a clear finding  

on marshalling the entire evidence on record that the judgment  

of the trial court is either perverse or wholly unsustainable in  

law.  

42. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Banne Alias Baijnath and  

Ors. (2009)  4 SCC 271,  a two-Judge Bench of  this  court  of  

which one of us (Bhandari, J.) was a member had an occasion  

to deal with this controversy in detail has laid down some of the  

circumstances  in  which  this  court  would  be  justified  in  

interfering  with  the  judgment  of  the  High  Court.   The  

circumstances discussed in the  judgment  are  illustrative  not  

exhaustive.   

i) The High Court’s decision is based on totally  erroneous view of law by ignoring the settled  legal position;   

ii) The High Court’s conclusions are contrary to  evidence and documents on record;  

33

iii) The  entire  approach  of  the  High  Court  in  dealing with the evidence was patently illegal  leading to grave miscarriage of justice;  

iv) The  High   Court’s  judgment  is  manifestly  unjust and unreasonable based on erroneous  law and facts on the record of the case;   

v) This  Court  must  always  give  proper  weight  and consideration to the findings of the High  Court;

vi) This  Court  would  be  extremely  reluctant  in  interfering with a case when both the Sessions  Court  and the High Court  have recorded an  order of acquittal.

43. The  appellate  courts  must  keep  in  view  these  

aforementioned observations in dealing with the appeals where  

the trial court has acquitted the accused.

44 In  Dhanapal  v.  State  by  Public  Prosecutor,  Madras  

(Criminal  Appeal  No.987  of  2002  decided  on  September  1,  

2009), this Court again examined the aforementioned decisions  

and analyzed the principles emerging out of the said decisions,  

it seems to us that despite series of judgments, the High Court  

has not clearly appreciated the legal position.  Unquestionably,  

the Appellate Court has power to review and re-appreciate the  

entire  evidence  on  record.   The  appellate  court  would  be  

justified in reversing the judgment of acquittal only if there are  

34

substantial and compelling reasons and when the judgment of  

the trial court is found to be perverse judgment.  Interfering in  

a routine manner where other view is possible is contrary to the  

settled legal position crystallized by aforementioned judgments  

of this Court.  The accused is presumed to be innocent until  

proven guilty.  The accused possessed this presumption when  

he was before the trial court.  The trial court’s acquittal bolsters  

the  presumption  that  he  is  innocent.   This  fundamental  

principle must be kept in view while dealing with the judgments  

of acquittal passed by the trial court.

45. We  have  re-examined  the  entire  case  because  of  the  

conflicting judgments of the Trial  Court and the High Court.  

On  careful  marshalling  of  the  entire  evidence  and  the  

documents on record, we arrive at the conclusion that the view  

taken by the trial court is a possible and plausible view.  The  

judgment of the trial court cannot be termed as perverse.  The  

High Court ought not to have substituted the same by its own  

possible  view.   The  impugned  judgment  of  the  High  Court  

cannot  stand  the  scrutiny  of  the  well  settled  legal  position  

which has been crystallized for more than 80 years since the  

case of  Sheo Swarup.  In the facts and circumstances of this  

35

case, we are constrained to set aside the impugned judgment of  

the High Court.   

46. Consequently,  these  appeals  filed  by  the  appellants  are  

allowed.  The impugned judgment of the High Court set aside  

and that of the trial court is restored.   

..............................J.                      (Dalveer Bhandari)

..............................J.                                         (Dr. B.S. Chauhan)

                            New Delhi; October 7, 2009.

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