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PETITIONER: ARNOLD RODRICKS & ANR.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 14/03/1966

BENCH:

ACT: The  Commissioners  of Divisions Act, 1957 (Bom.  Act  8  of 1958). ss. 3(3) and 3(4)-Validity of-Delegation of powers to State Government whether excessive. Land  Acquisition Act (1 of 1894) s. 3(f)(2)  introduced  by Bombay  Amendment  Act  35  of  1953-Amended  definition  of ’public purpose’  whether valid.

HEADNOTE: The office of commissioner was abolished in Bombay State  in 1950  but  it was revived in 1958 by  the  Commissioners  of Division Act passed by the Bombay Legislature.  The Schedule to  the  Act amended various enactments for the  purpose  of conferring  powers  on Commissioners  thereunder.   Sections 3(3)  of  the  Act gave power to  the  State  Government  by notification  to amend or delete any entry in  the  Schedule for  the purpose of imposing any conditions or  restrictions in the exercise of powers and discharge of duties  conferred or imposed on the Commissioner or to withdraw them.  Section 3(4)  of the Act gave the State Government power  to  confer and  impose on the Commissioner powers and duties under  any other  enactment  for the time being in force and  for  that purpose by notification to amend that enactment.  By  virtue of this power the State Government of Bombay by notification conferred  certain powers under the Land Acquisition Act  on the  Commissioner and amended the relevant sections  of  the Land  Acquisition  Act  accordingly.  Under  the  powers  so conferred  the  Commissioner of Bombay, in  1962,  commenced land  acquisition  proceeding in respect  of  certain  lands owned  by  the  appellants,  the  alleged  purpose  of   the acquisition  being "development and utilisation of the  said lands   as  an  industrial  and  residential   area".    The petitioner  filed  writ  petitions  under  Art.  32  of  the Constitution challenging the acquisition proceedings on  the grounds,mainly   that   (i)  s.  3(3)  and   3(4)   of   the commissioners Act constituted excessive delegation of  power to  the State Government and amounted to abdication  of  its functions by the State Legislation and that (ii)  definition of ’public purpose’ as amended by the Bombay Legislature  by introducing  s.  3 (f) (2) in the Land Acquisition  Act  was ultra vires. HELD:Per Gajendragadkar, C.J., Hidayatullah and  Sikri, JJ.-(i)  The object of a. 3(3) of the Commissioners  Act  is two  fold;  first  to enable the Government  to  impose  any conditions  or  restrictions on the exercise of  powers  and discharge  of  duties  on  Commissioners  and  secondly   to withdraw  them  in  case it is felt  that  the  Commissioner should not exercise these powers.  There can be no objection to  this  since  the State Government is in  charge  of  the

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administration and the whole object of the Commissioners Act is  Co  enable it to run the administration as  smoothly  as possible.   The  law which the Commissioners  or  the  State Government  or  the  other authorities  have  to  administer remains the same; it is only the authority that is  changed. [897 E-G] (ii)It  cannot be said that the powers conferred  under  s. 3(3)  and  3(4)  on  the  State  Government  are   unguided. Sections 6 and 7 of the Act 885 886 indicate  the kinds of powers which may be conferred on  the Commissioner.  Further the very nature of the office held by the Commissioner and the duties performed by him up to  1950 would  show  that  it  is  only  the  duties  of  the  State Government  and of officers of equivalent  rank  discharging revenue and executive duties which would be conferred on the Commissioner.   There  can  be no  difference  in  principle between the State Legislature inserting a section in an  Act enabling  the  State  Government to delegate  its  power  to another authority and the Legislature in view of the  change in  the administrative set-up conferring power on the  State Government   to   confer  not  only  its   own   duties   on Commissioners   but  also  of  other   officers   performing executive and revenue duties. [895 C-E] (iii)The  State  Legislature  cannot be  said  to  have abdicated  its powers in favour of the executive for it  has laid  down the legislative policy and wisely left it to  the State Government to reorganise the administration consequent on  the  setting up of Commissioners Divisions.   The  State Government is after all in charge of the administration  and it  knows specially in view of its previous experience  what powers of existing authorities including itself can suitably be conferred on the Commissioners. [897 G898A]: (iv)It was not necessary to get the President’s assent  for the  notification amending the Land Acquisition Act  because the  amendment of the Act became effective by virtue of  the Commissioners  Act  which  had received the  assent  of  the President, and not by virtue of the notification. [898 C] (v)  It was riot necessary to decide the question as to  the validity of s.(f)(2) of the Land Acquisition Act as enacted by  the  Bombay State Legislature because  the  purpose  for which  the  land  were acquired in the present  case  was  a ’public  purpose’ as defined in the Land Acquisition Act  as it   stood   before  the  amendment  made  by   the   Bombay Legislature, and it was not necessary for the respondents to rely  on  the  amendment to  sustain  in  the  notification. Public  purpose  varies  with the time  and  the  prevailing conditions  in  towns  like  Bombay  are  such  that  it  is imperative  that the State should do all it can to  increase the  availability of residential and industrial sites.   The welfare  of  a large section of the community is  a  ’public purpose’. [899 D-E; 902 E] (Vi)There is no law which requires a scheme to be  prepared before  issuing notifications under ss. 4 and 6 of the  Land Acquisition  Act. [Desirability of preparing such  a  scheme before disposal of sites suggested]. [903 D] Case law referred to. Per  Wanchoo  and Shah JJ. (dissenting).-(i)  The  amendment introduced  by  s.  3(f)(2) in  the  definition  of  ’public purpose’  was within the concept of public purpose  in  Art. 32(2)  of the Constitution and could not be struck  down  as ultra vires. [911 B] (ii)By enacting s. 3(3) of the Commissioners Act the  State Legislature in effect says that though it considers that the Commissioner should have certain powers it has conferred  on

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him in the Schedule, the State Government may withdraw those powers.   This is not a provision for delegated  legislation but  a transfer by the Legislature of its own power to  make law  to the executive.  Further, if it can be considered  to be  conferment of power of delegated legislation it  suffers from the vice of excessive delegation inasmuch as it gives a power to the executive to the extent of repealing a part  of the law made by the legislature [912 G--913 B] (iii)The language of s. 3(4) is of the widest amplitude and gives blanket power to the State Government to amend any enactment which 887 may  be in force for the time being in the State  by  making necessary entries in the Schedule.  The provision cannot  be read  to  mean that it authorises the  State  Government  to delegate  only its executive powers and duties  under  other enactments  besides those mentioned in the Schedule  to  the Commissioner by the State Legislation.  It is not a case  of providing  merely  for delegated  legislation  properly  so- called  but  amounts to complete transfer of  its  power  of legislation  by the legislature in this matter to the  State Government.  Sub-s. (4) wag therefore ultra vires and Sub-S. (5) which is consequential on it must fall with it. [913  C- D, H; 915 H-916B] (iv)As the proceedings under the land Acquisition Act  were taken   by  the  Commissioner  by  powers  derived  from   a notification  under  s. 3(4) the Commissioner ACt  which  is ultra   vires  the  said  proceedings  must  be    must   be quashed.[918 A]

JUDGMENT: ORIGINAL  JURISDICTION : Writ Petitions Nos. 66 and  146  of 1965. Petitions under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for the enforcement of fundamental rights. Niren De, Additional Solicitor-General, Malcolm Pereira,  B. R.  Agarwala,  G.  L.  Sanghi  and  H.  K.  Puri,  for   the petitioners (in both the petitions). M.C.  Setalvad, N. S. Bindra and B. R. G. K.  Achar,  for the respondents (in both the petitions). The  judgment  of  GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.  J.  HIDAYATULLAH  and SIKRI, JJ, was delivered by SIKRI J. The dissenting  opinion of WANCHOO AND SHAH JJ. was delivered by WANCHOO, J. Sikri,  J.  These two petitions under Art. 32  of  the  con- stitution raise substantially the same questions of law  and were  heard  together and may conveniently  be  disposed  of together.   It  would be convenient to give a few  facts  in Writ Petition No. 66 of 1965. The petitioners who are citizens of India are owners of some land  in Greater Bombay in the South Salsetta Taluka in  the Bombay Suburban District.  There are four respondents to the petition; the first is the State of Maharashtra, the  second the  Commissioner,  Bombay Division, the third  the  Special Land  Acquisition  Officer and the  fourth  the  Maharashtra Industrial    Development   Corporation,   established    by notification  under the Maharashtra  Industrial  Development Act,  1961.   The  predecessor  in  office  of  the   second respondent, by notification dated March 30, 1962,  published in  the  Maharashtra Government Gazette, purporting  to  act under  s. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1  of  1894)- hereinafter  referred to as the Act-notified that  the  land belonging to the petitioners was likely to be needed "for  a public purpose, viz., for development

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888 and  utilisation  of  the said lands as  an  industrial  and residential  area".   By  the said  notification  the  third respondent  was appointed to per,form the functions  of  the Collector  under  s. 5-A of the Act in respect of  the  said lands.   Pursuant  to the said notification the  third  res- pondent  issued  a  notification under s. 4(1)  of  the  Act calling upon the petitioners to file their objections to the acquisition   of  the  said  lands  under  the   Act.    The petitioners filed their statement of objections and took the objection  that  the  purpose  for  which  the  lands   were required,  viz.,  development and utilisation  of  the  said lands as an industrial and residential area, was vague  and was  not  genuinely  or  properly  a  public  purpose.   The petitioners further pointed out that the said lands and  the contiguous lands of the petitioners formed a compact area of land  situate on the Central Salsette Railway Track and  the said  area  could by reason of its location  be  easily  and without  in the least degree adversely affecting the  scheme of  the  acquisition  be excluded therefrom  and  should  be released   from   acquisition   accordingly.    The    first petitioner, Arnold Rodricks, pointed out in his letter dated October 5, 1963, addressed to the Assistant Secretary to the Government  of Maharashtra, that the Government had  already acquired about 3 acres of his land for University Campus  in addition  to his other lands acquired earlier by  the  State Government  and  that the said lands and  the  land  bearing Survey  No. 330 Hissa No. 2(part) and Survey No.  313  Hissa No.  14  were the only lands left with the  petitioners  and that the  petitioners  required the  same  for  their  own residential   home.    On  October  7,  1963,   the   second respondent, being satisfied after considering the report  of the  Collector  under sub-s. (2) of s. 5-A of Act  that  the said lands were needed to be acquired at the public ,expense for a public purpose, declared under the provisions of s.  6 of  the  Act  that the lands were required  for  the  public purpose of "development and utilisation of the said lands as industrial  and  residential area." After the issue  of  the notification under s. 6, usual notices under s. 9, cls.  (3) and (4) were issued by the third respondent and pursuant  to these  notices  the petitioners filed  their statement  of claim  for  compensation  with the  third  respondent  under protest   and   without  prejudice  to  their   rights   and contentions.  In the petition, the notifications dated March 30,   1962  and  October  7,  1963,  and   the   acquisition proceedings and the enquiries purported to be held under  s. 5A  and  s. 11 of the Act are challenged as  being  illegal, invalid and inoperative in law and without and/or in  excess ,of jurisdiction, etc., on various grounds. Before we mention the points urged before us it is necessary to   mention  that  the  Bombay  Legislature   amended   the definition of the expression "public purpose" in s. 3 of the Act, and the definition in the Act as amended by the  Bombay Legislature reads as follows :-               (f)   the expression "Public purpose" includes               889               (1)   the   provision  of   village,sites   in               districts in which the Appropriate  Government               shall  have  declared by notification  in  the               official Gazette that it is customary for  the               Government  to  make  such  provision  and   a               housing   scheme  as  defined  in-  the   Land               Acquisition (Bombay Amendment) Act, 1948; and               (2)   the acquisition of land for purposes  of               the development of areas from public  revenues

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             or some fund controlled or managed by a  local               authority  and subsequent disposal thereof  in               whole  or  in part by  lease,  assignment,  or               sale,  with  the object  of  securing  further               development." The validity of s. 3(f)(2) above has been questioned  before us.  Further, the Act was amended, by Virtue of notification issued  under  s.3  (4)  of  the  Bombay  Commissioners   of Divisions  Act,  1957 (Bombay Act 8 of 1958)-which  for  the sake  of  brevity will be referred to as  the  Commissioners Act.   The notification had amended ss. 3A, 4, 5A, 6, 7  and 17 of the Act as follows               "1. In section 3A,               (i)   after  the  words  "State   Government",               where they occur for the first time, the words               "or the Commissioner" shall be inserted;               (ii)  after the words "by the State Government               in this behalf" the words "or, as the case may               be,    any   officer   authorised    by    the               Commissioner" shall be inserted.               2.    In section 4-               (i)   in  sub-section  (1), after  the  words,               "appropriate  Government"  the words  "or  the               Commissioner" shall be inserted;               (ii)  in  sub-section  (2), after  the  words,               "such  Government" the words "or, as the  case               may   be,  by  the’  Commissioner"  shall   be               inserted.               3.In section 5A, in sub-section (2)  after               the words "appropriate Government", where they               occur at two places the words "or, as the case               may   be,  of  the  Commissioner"   shall   be               inserted.               4.    In Section 6-               (i) in sub-section(1)-               (a) after the words "appropriate Government"               the  words  "or,  as  the  case  may  be,  the               Commissioner" shall inserted;               126up.  CI/66-14               890               (b)   after  the words "its orders" the  words               "or,  as the case may be, under the  signature               of the Commissioner" shall be inserted;               (ii)in  sub-section  (3),  after  the  words               "appropriate Government" the words "or, as the               case  may  be,  the  Commissioner"  shall   be               inserted.               5.In  section 7, after the words "in  this               behalf" the Words "or, as the case may be, the               Commissioner" shall be inserted,               6.    In section 17-               (i)   in  sub-section  (1),  after  the  words               "appropriate  Government"  the words  "or  the               Commissioner" shall be inserted.               (ii)  in sub-section (2)-               (a)   after  the words "the State  Government"               the  words  "or  the  Commissioner"  shall  be               inserted;               (b)   after the words "appropriate Government"               the  words  "or, as the case may  be,  of  the               Commissioner" shall be inserted;               (iii) in sub-section (4)-               (a)   after the words "appropriate Government"               where they occur at two places, the words  "or               the case may be, of the Commissioner" shall be

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             inserted;               (b)   for  the words "it does so  direct"  the               words  "it  or  he does so  direct"  shall  be               substituted."               Mr.   Niren   De,   the   learned   Additional               Solicitor-General  appearing on behalf of  the               petitioners, raised four points before us,               (1)That the declarations under ss. 4 and  6               of  the  Act  are essential  features  or  are               related to essential legislative policies  and               as such ss. 4 and 6 can only be amended by the               legislature;               (2)That  s. 3(4) of the  Commissioners  Act               suffers from excessive delegation;               (3)That s. 3(4) of the Commissioners Act is an               abdication of the powers of the legislature in               favour of the executive; and               (4)Amendment  of the Act by a  notification               is   a  law  which  requires  assent  of   the               President  under arts. 31(2) and art.  254  of               the  Constitution, and the assent  not  having               been obtained, the notification is bad.  891 It  would  be  convenient to take  the  first  three  points together  because in substance they raise the point that  s. 3(4)  is bad, because the legislature should have  performed the  functions  entrusted to the State Government  under  s. 3(4)  of the Commissioners Act.  Mr. Niren De contends  that from  1857 onwards the Indian statutes had made it the  duty of the State Government to decide whether a land was  likely to  be  needed  for a public purpose or  not  and  once  the Government   was   satisfied  the   declaration   was   made conclusive.   He says that this is an essential  legislative feature   of  the  Land  Acquisition  Act  and  the   Bombay Legislature   should   have  directly   amended   the   Land Acquisition Act and not empowered the State Government to do so.   He  says  that the State Legislature  has  not  really decided  that this essential legislative feature  should  be changed  and it is incompetent to confer that power  on  the State  Government.  He further points out that  there  never has been any power of delegation in the Land Acquisition Act since  1857.   He  says  that  it  is  well-settled  that  a legislature, cannot empower an executive authority to change an Act in any essential features.  He further urges that the Commissioners  Act does not give any guidance to  the  State Government  as  to which Acts should be amended or  not  and powers of which officers should be taken away and  conferred on  the Commissioners.  He urges that the language  is  wide enough even to enable the judicial functions of courts under the  Civil Procedure Code and Criminal Procedure Code to  be conferred on the Commissioners. Mr. Setalvad, who appears on behalf of the respondents, says that  what  you have to consider is the  legislative  policy underlying   the   Commissioners  Act  and  not   the   Land Acquisition  Act.  He says that there is enough guidance  in the Commissioners Act and in the history of the  legislation to  enable  the State Government to decide what  powers  and duties should be conferred on the Commissioners.  He further says  that  the State Government being in,  charge-  of  the administration   of   the  State  knows  what   duties   can appropriately be conferred on the Commissioners.  He  points out  that the institution of the Commissioners is not a  new thing;  it  was in existence before and  as  the  Government found   it   necessary   to  revive   the   institution   of Commissioners  instead of amending each act  separately  and

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conferring  powers on the State Government to  delegate  its functions,  it passed a comprehensive  legislation  enabling the  State  Government to do it.  He says that  it  must  be remembered that the Commissioners are revenue and  executive officers  and there is no question of conferring  powers  on them  under  the  Criminal  Procedure  Code  or  the   Civil Procedure Code. Let  us then first examine the scheme of  the  Commissioners Act and the history of the legislation.  The preamble of the Commissioners Act reads as follows 892               "Whereas  it is expedient to provide  for  the               offices  of Commissioners of divisions in  the               State of Bombay, for prescribing their  powers               and duties and to make provisions for  matters               consequent  on the provision for such  offices               and for certain other matters."               The  "Commissioner". is defined to  mean  "the               Commissioner  of a division  appointed  under               the law relating to land revenue as amended by               the  Schedule  to this Act." The  Bombay  Land               Revenue  Code,, 1879, has been amended by  the               Schedule  and we may notice S. 6A inserted  by               the Schedule.  Section 6A is as follows               "6.  (1) The Commissioners of divisions  shall               be appointed by the State Government.               (2)   The  Commissioners  shall  exercise  the               powers and discharge the duties conferred  and               imposed  on a Commissioner under this  Act  or               under any law for the time being in force, and               so  far  as is consistent therewith  all  such               other    powers   or   duties    of    appeal,               superintendence   and  control  within   their               respective  divisions, and over  the  officers               subordinate  to them as may from time to  time               be prescribed by the State Government.               (3)   The Commissioners shall also, subject to               the control and the general or special  orders               of the State Government, exercise such  powers               and  discharge  such  duties,  as  the   State               Government  may confer or impose on  them  for               the   purpose   only  of  carrying   out   the               provisions  of any law for the time  being  in               force, and so far as is consistent therewith."               ’It   will be noticed that the Commissioner is               enabled by sub-s.6A-(2)   to  exercise  powers               and discharge duties conferred not only by the               Bombay  Land Revenue Code 1879 but  any  other               law  for the time being in force.   "Division"               is defined to mean the territories formed into               a division under the Bombay Land Revenue Code,               1879, or under that Code in its application to               the Kutch and Saurashtra areas of the State of               Bombay,  or  under  the  Madhya  Pradesh  Land               Revenue  Code,  1954, or under  the  Hyderabad               Land Revenue Act.  "Divisional officer"  means               an  officer  appointed  as  such,  immediately               before  the commencement of the  Commissioners               Act, under the provisions of-               (i)   section  5  of the Bombay  Land  Revenue               Code, 1879, or that section of the Code in its               application to the Kutch area of the State  of               Bombay,               (ii)  Section  5  of  the  said  Code-in   its               application  to  the Saurashtra  area  of  the

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             State  of Bombay and read with the  Government               Notification in the Legal Department                893               (iii) No.  25398/B, dated 1st November,  1956,               issued   under  section  122  of  the   States               Reorganisation  Act, 1956, section 9-A of  the               Madhya  Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1954,  read               with  Government Notification in  the  Revenue               Department  No.RVA.1556-R, dated 1st  November               1956, or (iv) section 4 of the Hyderabad Land Revenue Act. "Existing law" is defined as "any enactment of a Legislature other  competent authority in relation to matters  specified in  List&  11  and  III  in  the  Seventh  Schedule  to  the Constitution  in force in any part of the State  immediately before  the commencement of this Act and includes any  rule, bye-law,  regulation, order, notification, scheme,  form  or other instrument having the force of law made, prescribed or issued  under any such enactment." Section 3 may be set  out in full;               "3.  (1)  For  the  purposes  of  constituting               offices  of  commissioners  of  divisions  and               conferring  powers  and  imposing  duties   on               Commissioners and for certain other  purposes,               the  enactments specified in column 1  of  the               Schedule  to this Act shall be amended in  the               manner and to the extent specified in column 2               thereof               (2)The   Commissioner   of   a    division,               appointed  under  the  law  relating  to  land               revenue as amended by the said Schedule, shall               exercise  the powers and discharge the  duties               conferred  and imposed on the Commissioner  by               any law for the time being in force, including               the enactments referred to in sub-section  (1)               as amended by the said Schedule.               (3)The State Government may by notification               in  the Official Gazette amend or  delete  any               entry  in  the  Schedule for  the  purpose  of               imposing any conditions or restrictions on the               exercise  of  powers and discharge  of  duties               conferred  or imposed on the  Commissioner  or               withdrawing them, as the case may be, and  the               Schedule shall be amended accordingly.               (4)The  State  Government  may  confer  and               impose  on the Commissioner powers and  duties               under  any other enactment for the time  being               in  force  and  for that  purpose  may,  by  a               notification  in the Official Gazette, add  to               or  specify  in  the  Schedule  the  necessary               adaptations   and   modifications   in    that               enactment by way of amendment; and thereupon-               (a)every  such enactment shall  accordingly               be  amended  and have effect  subject  to  the               adaptations and modifications so made, and                894               (b)the Schedule to this Act shall be deemed               to be amended by the inclusion therein of  the               said provision for amending the enactment."               Section  4  repeals the  Bombay  Commissioners               (Abolition  of  Office)  Act,  1950,  and  the               Central  Provinces  and  Berar   Commissioners               (Construction  of  References) Act  1948.  The               Bombay  commissioners  (Abolition  of  Office)               Act,1950  (Bom. Act 28 of 1950) had  abolished

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             the  office  of the Commissioner  and  further               provided that wherever a reference was to  the               Commissioner, the reference should be read  as               a reference to the State Government or to such               authority  as  the  State  Government  may  by               general or special order appoint.  The Central               Provinces     and     Berar      Commissioners               (Construction of References) Act, 1948 (61  of               1948)    had    similarly    abolished     the               Commissioners Divisions of Nagpur, Jubbulpore,               Chhatisgarh  and Berar, and had provided  that               the  appointment  of  Commissioners  to  these               Divisions shall cease.  By S. 4 it was further               provided   that   "all  enactments   and   all               notifications,   orders,  rules  and   byelaws               issued, made or prescribed under any enactment               which  immediately before the commencement  of               this  Act were in force shall be construed  as               if references therein to the Commissioner were               references to the State Government or to  such               authority  as  the State  Government  may,  by               notification, appoint."               Sections  5, 6, 7 and 8 of  the  Commissioners               Act may also be set out in full :               "5.  If at the commencement of this  Act,  any               legal  proceedings  are  pending  to  which  a               Divisional   Officer  or  Director  of   Local               Authorities is a party, the Commissioner shall               be  substituted for the Divisional Officer  or               the Director ,of Local Authorities in the said               proceedings.               6.    Subject  to the provisions made  in  the               Schedule, all existing laws shall, unless  the               context  otherwise requires, be ,construed  as               if   references  therein  to  the   Divisional               Officer,  or,  as  the case  may  be,  to  the               Director of Local Authorities were  references               to the Commissioner.               7.    All instruments or documents executed or               made before the commencement of this Act under               or with reference to any existing law or  any               enactment  specified  in the  Schedule  shall,               unless  the  context  otherwise  requires,  be               construed  as  if references  therein  to  the               Divisional  Officer or the Director  of  Local               Authorities    were    references    to    the               Commissioner.               8.    All proceedings including proceedings by               way  of  appeals, revision or  review  pending               under  any  existing  law  before  the   State               Government or a Divisional Officer or                895               Director  of  Local Authorities or  any  other               officer  or authority immediately  before  the               commencement of this Act shall, where disposal               of the proceedings falls within the purview of               the powers and duties of the Commissioner,  be               transferred  to the Commissioner for  disposal               according to law." It  seems to us that the underlying policy or the  essential legislative   feature  of  the  Commissioners  Act   is   to reintroduce  the  old offices of  Commissioners  and  confer powers  and  duties  on them which  could  appropriately  be discharged by them.  The Legislature has no doubt left it to the State Government to decide whether any duties imposed on

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it  or  some  of the auhorities should  now  under  the  new administrative  set  up  system be discharged  by  the  Com- missioners.   But  the Legislature has definitely  given  an indication  of the kinds of powers that may be conferred  on them, in ss. 6 and 7. Further, the very nature of the office held by a Commissioner and the duties performed by him up to 1950  would  show that it is only the duties  of  the  State Government  and of officers of equivalent  rank  discharging revenue and executive duties which would be conferred on the Commissioner.  We see no difference in principle between the State Legislature inserting a section in an Act enabling the State Government to delegate its power to another  authority and   the  Legislature  in  view  of  the  change   in   the administrative  set  up  conferring  powers  on  the   State Government   to   confer  not  only  its   own   duties   on Commissioners   but  also  of  other   officers   performing executive and revenue duties. This  Court  upheld the validity of s. 4  of  the  Essential Supplies  (Temporary  Powers)  Act, 1946  (24  of  1946)  in Harishankar  Bagla  v.  The  State  of  Madhya   Pradesh(1). Section 4 was in the following terms:               "4.  The  Central Government may  by  notified               order  direct  that the power to  make  orders               under  section  3 shall in  relation  to  such               matters  and  subject to such  conditions,  if               any, as may be specified in the direction,  be               exercisable also by-               (a)   such officer or authority subordinate to               the Central Government, or               (b)   such State Government or such officer or               authority subordinate to a State Government as               may be specified in the direction."               The Court observed as follows:-               "Section  4  of the Act was  attacked  on  the               ground that it empowers the Central Government               to delegate its own               (1)   [1955] 1 S.C.R. 380 at pp. 389-390.                896               power  to make orders under section 3  to  any               officer or authority subordinate to it or  the               Provincial  Government  or to any  officer  or               authority   subordinate  to   the   Provincial               Government as specified in the direction given               by  the Central Government.  In  other  words,               the  delegate has been authorised  to  further               delegate its powers in respect of the exercise               of  the  powers  of  section  3.  Mr.  Umrigar               contended  that  it was  for  the  Legislature               itself  to specify the particular  authorities               or  officers  who could exercise  power  under               section  3  and  it  was’  not  open  to   the               Legislature to empower the Central  Government               to   say  what  officer  or  authority   could               exercise  the power.  Reference in  this  con-               nection  was  made  to two  decisions  of  the               Supreme Court of the United States of America-               Panama  Refining Co. v. Ryan(1) and  Schechter               v.  United States(2).  In both these cases  it               was  held that so long as the policy  is  laid               down and a standard established by a  statute,               no unconstitutional delegation of  legislative               power  is  involved  in  leaving  to  selected               instrumentalities  the making  of  subordinate               rules   within  prescribed  limits   and   the               determination of facts to which the policy  as

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             declared  by  the  Legislature  is  to  apply.               These  decisions in our judgment do  not  help               the contention of Mr. Umrigar as we think that               section 4 enumerates the classes of persons to               whom  the  power could be  delegated  or  sub-               delegated by the Central Government and it  is               not correct to say that the  instrumentalities               have  not  been selected  by  the  Legislature               itself.   The decision of their  Lordships  of               the    Privy  Council  in  Shannon’s   case(3)               completely  negatives  the  contention  raised               regarding the invalidity of section 4. In that               case  the  Lt.-Governor in Council  was  given               power to vest in a marketing board the  powers               conferred  by  section 4A(d)  of  the  Natural               Products  Marketing  (British  Columbia)  Act,               1936.  The attack on the act was that  without               constitutional    authority    it    delegated               legislative  power  to  the  Lt.-Governor   in               Council.   This  contention  was  answered  by               their  Lordships  in these terms:  "The  third               objection is that it is not within the  powers               of  the Provincial Legislature to delegate  so               called legislative powers to the  Lt.-Governor               in  Council, or to give him powers of  further               delegation.   This objection appears to  their               Lordships  subversive of the rights which  the               Provincial  Legislature enjoys  while  dealing               with  matters  falling within the  classes  of               subjects in relation to which the Constitution               has  granted legislative powers.   Within  its               appointed sphere the Provincial Legislature is               as supreme as any other Parliament; and it  is               unnecessary to               (1) 293 U.S. 388.        (3) [1938] A.C. 708.               (2) 295 U.S. 495.               897               try to enumerate the innumerable occasions  on               which  Legislatures, Provincial, Dominion  and               Imperial,  have entrusted various persons  and               bodies with similar powers to those  contained               in this Act." It  would be noticed that s. 4 of the Essential  Supplies  ( Temporary  Powers)  Act,  1946,  left  it  to  the   Central Government to decide three things; (1) the matters which can be delegated to the officers or authorities subordinate, (2) the  conditions  subject to which the power to  make  orders under  s.  3 be exercised, and (3) the  officers  who  would exercise the power to make orders under S. 3. In the present case,  the  Legislature has specified that it  is  only  the Commissioners to whom powers in an act can be delegated.  If a section similar to sub-s. (4) of s. 3 of the Commissioners Act  had been inserted in every Act relating to  matters  in Lists   11  and  111,  it  would  have  been  difficult   to distinguish  the decision in Bagla’s(1) case, except on  the ground  that the State Government is also enabled to  confer powers of some other authorities on Commissioners.  This  in our opinion does not make any difference because the  Bombay Act  28 of 1950 had also enabled State Government to  confer powers of Commissioners on some other authorities. We  may  mention that at one stage of the arguments  it  was contended  that sub-s. (3) of s. 3 of the Commissioners  Act enabled the State Government to amend the Schedule and  this showed   the  extent  of  delegation  made  to   the   State Government.   But, in our opinion, the object of sub-s.  (3)

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is  two fold; first to enable the Government to  impose  any conditions  or  restrictions on the exercise of  powers  and discharge  of duties on the Commissioners, and secondly,  to withdraw  them  in case it is felt  that  the  Commissioners should  not exercise those powers.  We see no  objection  in entrusting this function to the State Government because, as mentioned  above, the State Government is in charge  of  the administration and the whole object of the Commissioners Act is  to  enable it to run the administration as  smoothly  as possible.  After all, the law which the Commissioners or the State Government or the other authorities have to administer remains the same; it is only the authority that is changed. It is really not necessary to consider the other cases cited before us because the general principles are quite clear and it is only in their application that difficulties arise.  We have  come  to the conclusion that the Legislature  has  not abdicated itself in favour of the executive but it has  laid down essential legislative policy and wisely left it to  the State Government to reorganise the administration consequent on  the  setting up of Commissioners  Division.   The  State Government  is after all in charge of administration and  it knows,  specially in view of its previous  experience,  what powers (1)  [1955] 1 S.C.R. 380. 898 of  existing  authorities including itself can  suitably  be conferred  on  the Commissioners.  We may mention  that  the Bombay  High Court has in two decisions (Ganesh  Varayan  v. Commissioner   Nagpur  Division,  Nagpur(1)  and   Sadruddin Suleman Jhaveri v. J. H. Patwardhan(2)upheld the validity of the Commissioners Act. This  takes  us  to the fourth point,  namely,  whether  the assent  of the President was necessary to  the  notification amending   the   Act.  ,It  is  common   ground   that   the Commissioners  Act  received assent of the  President.   The question  that  is raised is whether it  is  necessary  that assent  of  the  President  should  be  obtained  for  every notification  issued under the Commissioners Act  which  has the  effect  of amending any legislation in respect  of  the matters  in  the  concurrent List, i.e. List  III.   In  our opinion,  it is not necessary because the amendment  of  the Act became effective by virtue of the Commissioners Act  and not  by  virtue of the notification.  This Court  was  faced with  a similar problem in Harishanker Bagla and Another  v. The  State  of  Madhya Pradesh(3)  and  repelled  a  similar contention in the following words:               "Conceding, however, for the sake of  argument               that to the extent of a repugnancy between’ an               order made under section 3 and the  provisions               of  an  existing  law, to the  extent  of  the               repugnancy,  the existing law stands  repeated               by implication, it seems to us that the repeal               is  not  by any Act of the delegate,  but  the               repeal  is  by  the  legislative  Act  of  the               Parliament  itself.   By  enacting  section  6               Parliament  itself has declared that an  order               made   under  section  3  shall  have   effect               notwithstanding  any  inconsistency  in   this               order with any enactment other than this  Act.               This is not a declaration made by the delegate               but  the Legislature itself has  declared  its               will that way in section 6. The abrogation  or               the implied repeal is by force of the legisla-               tive declaration contained in section 6 and is               not by force of the order made by the delegate

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             under section 3. The power of the delegate  is               only  to make an order under section  3.  Once               the delegate has made that order its power  is               exhausted.   Section 6 then steps  in  wherein               the  Parliament has declared that as  soon  as               such an order comes into being that will  have               effect   notwithstanding   any   inconsistency               there-, with contained in any enactment  other               than this Act." In  our opinion the above reasoning applies to the facts  of this  case  and the Commissioners Act  having  received  the assent  of  the  President it is  not  necessary  that  some further  assent  of  the President :should  be  given  to  a notification.  We may mention that we are assu- (1) [1964] 66 B.L.R. 807      (2) I.L.R. [1965] Bom. 394.              (3) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 380 at p. 392. 899 ning  and not laying down that it is possible to obtain  the assent of the President under the Constitution to the  issue of a notification. In  conclusion we see no force in the contentions raised  by Mr. De on behalf of the petitioners and this takes us to the next  petition (W.P. No. 146 of 1965) in which  Mr.  Pereira has  raised some additional points.  He raised three  points before  us; (1) that no hearing was given to the  petitioner under s. 5A of the Act; (2) that the declaration under s.  6 is  a colourable exercise of power and (3) that s. 3(f)  (2) of  the Act, as amended in Bombay, is void and there  is  no public purpose involved in issuing the notification under s. 6 of the Act. There  is  no force in the first point because we  find,  on looking  at  the  record, that  the  petitioners  raised  no objections  to  the acquisition and they  never  wanted  any hearing  on  this  point.  As they did  not  object  to  the acquisition, it is difficult to see what enquiries had to be made under s. 5A. We  may  next  take up the question of the  validity  of  s. 3(f)(2).   In  our view it is not necessary to  decide  this point  because  we  have come to  the  conclusion  that  the notifications  issued under ss. 4 and 6 specified  a  public purpose;   the  purpose  specified  was     development   and utilisation of the said lands as industrial and  residential areas."  In  our opinion this purpose is  a  public  purpose within  the  Land  Acquisition Act as it  stood  before  the amendment  made  by  the Bombay Legislature and  it  is  not necessary  for the respondents to rely on the  amendment  to sustain the notification.  This Court in State of Bombay  v. Bhanji  Munji(1) upheld the requisitioning of  premises  for housing  a  person having no housing  accommodation  on  the ground that this was a public purpose.  This Court  observed at page 783 as follows:               "In the present set of cases there is proof of               a   public  purpose.  it  is  given   in   the               affidavits made on behalf of the State and  in               the  subsequent orders just quoted, namely  to               house the homeless.  At that time the  housing               situation in Bombay was acute, largely due  to               the  influx of refugees.  Questions of  public               decency, public morale, public health and  the               temptation  to  lawlessness and  crime,  which               such a situation brings in its train, at  once               arose;  and the public conscience was  aroused               on  the ground of plain humanity.  A  race  of               proprietors   in   the  shape   of   rapacious               landlords  who thrived on the misery of  those

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             who could find no decent roof over their heads               sprang into being.  Even the efficiency of the                             administration    was    threatened   because               Government  servants  could  not  find  proper               accommodation.   Milder efforts to  cope  with               the evil proved ineffective.  It was necessary               therefore for Government take more drastic               (1)   [1955] 1 S.C.R. 777.                900               steps  and  in  doing so they  acted  for  the               public  weal.  There was consequently a  clear               public   purpose  and  an   undoubted   public               benefit."               In  the affidavit of S. R. Naik, Special  Land               Acquisition  Officer,  it is stated  that  the               State  Government had set up a study group  to               consider  and  recommend  on  various  matters               relating  to  congestion  in  the  Island   of               Bombay.  The Study group, inter alia, found               "The said Study Group found as a result of its               inquiry  that  there  had  been  a  phenomenal               increase  in the population of the  Island  of               Bombay  from 1948 to 1958 during which  period               the population had shot up from 14.89 lakhs in               1941 to an estimated 31 lakhs at the close  of               1958.  It found that this enormous increase in               population  had  resulted  in  congestion   of               traffic,  deficiency in open spaces  and  play               fields  for’ schools, overcrowding in  trains,               overcrowding  in  houses,  creation  of  slums               etc.,  and that the increased  population  had               also  constituted an increasingly  intolerable               burden  on  the  sanitary  circumstances   and               public utilities of the Island.  According to               the  estimate of the Study Group based on  the               formula  adopted  by the Director  General  of               Health Services of the Government of India the               population of Greater Bombay would increase to               a total staggering figure of 75 lakhs, by  the               year 1958.               The Study Group also found that just as  there               was  a  heavy concentration of  population  in               Greater  Bombay  in a small area  of  169  sq.               miles  there  was  also  a  concentration   of               industries  in Greater Bombay.  It found  that               of  the  total  number  of   11,539’registered               factories  in the State of Maharashtra  as  in               1958  Greater  Bombay  had  3,539   registered               factories  which meant that one-third  of  the               total  number  of factories in  the  State  of               Maharashtra were in Greater Bombay alone.   Of               the  total  number  of  factories  in  Greater               Bombay  as  many as 76 % were located  in  the               Island  of Bombay which admeasures only  26.19               sq. miles out of the total Greater Bombay area               of  169  sq. miles.  All  these  factories  in               Greater Bombay employ 44 % of the total number               of  factory workers in the State and 85  %  of               the  factory  workers in Greater  Bombay  were               concentrated  within  the  Island  of   Bombay               alone.   All  these  factors gave  rise  to  a               number  of problems including the  problem  of               traffic     housing     accommodation      and               deterioration of public utility services.

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             As  regards housing the Study  Group  observed               that  in  the  year  1958  there  were   about               57,37,000  tenements in Greater Bombay of  all               categories including a large portion               901               of single room tenements.  At the rate of five               persons to a tenement the Study Group observed               that  the  then existing tenements  were  only               enough  for 28 lakhs persons leaving 15  lakhs               persons  to  be still  provided  with  housing               accommodation.   The growth in population  and               the concentration of the population in a small               area  also led to the deterioration of  public               utility  services  as observed  by  the  Study               Group.  The Study Group suggested a number  of               measures  for  relieving  the  congestion   of               population  and  industries  in  the   Greater               Bombay  including the shifting of  industries,               the  establishment of industrial estates,  the               establishment  of industries in  the  suburbs,               the development of the suburbs, reclamation of               land and reclamation of salt pans."               In  our opinion, on these facts it  cannot  be               held  that  the  impugned  notifications  were               issued  to subserve not a public  purpose  but               some private purpose.  It was observed by this               Court  in  Babu  Barkva Thakur  v.  The  State               Bombay;(1)               "It  has been recognised by this Court in  the               case  of The State of Bombay V.  Bhanji  Munji               and   Another(2)   that   providing    housing               accommodation  to  the homeless  is  a  public               purpose.  In an industrial concern employing a               large number of workmen away from their  homes               it is a social necessity that there should  be               proper  housing  accommodation  available  for               such  workmen.  Where a larger section of  the               community  is  concerned,  its  welfare  is  a               matter of public concern."               In Pandit Jhandu Lal v. The State of Punjab(3)               it was observed at page 467 :               "There is also no doubt that the structures to               be made on the land would benefit the  members               of the Co-operative Society.  But, the private               benefit  of  a  large  number  of   industrial               workers  becomes  public  benefit  within  the               meaning of the Land Acquisition Act."               It  was held in that case that acquisition  of               building  sites  for  residential  houses  for               industrial labourers was for a public  purpose               even  apart  from  s. 17(2)  of  the  Act,  as               amended   by  the  Land  Acquisition   (Punjab               Amendment) Act.               In  Smt.  Somawanti v. The State of  Punjab(4)               it was observed :               "Broadly   speaking  the  expression   "public               purpose" would, however, include a purpose  in               which the general               (1) [1961]1 S.C.R 128 at p  137.               (2) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 777.                (3) [1961] 2 S.C.R. 459.                (4) A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 151                902               interest  of the community as opposed  to  the               particular interest of individuals is directly

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             and vitally conterned."               It was further observed at p. 163               "Public  purpose  is bound to  vary  with  the               times and the prevailing conditions in a given               locality  and  therefore  it would  not  be  a               practical   proposition  even  to  attempt   a               comprehensive definition." It  was  urged before us that the State Government  was  not entitled  to  acquire  property from A and  give  it  to  B. Reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme  Judicial Court of Massachusetts (204 Mass. 607).  But as pointed  out by this Court, public purpose varies with the times and  the prevailing conditions in localities, and in some towns  like Bombay  the conditions are such that it is  imperative  that the State should do all it can to increase the  availability of residential and in dustrial sites.  It is true that these residential and industrial sites will be ultimately allotted to  members  of  the public and they  would  get  individual benefit, but it is in the interest of the general  community that  these  members of the public should be  able  to  have sites  to  put  up residential houses and sites  to  put  up factories.    The   main  idea  in  issuing   the   impugned notifications  was  not to think of the private  comfort  or advantage  of  the  members of the public  but  the  general public  good.   At any rate, as pointed out in  Babu  Barkya Thakur v. The State of Bombay(1) a very large section of the community is concerned and its welfare is a matter of public concern.   In our view the welfare of a large proportion  of persons  living in Bombay is a matter of public concern  and the  notifications  served to enhance the  welfare  of  this section  of  the community and this is public  purpose.   In conclusion  we  hold that the notifications  are  valid  and cannot  be impugned on the ground that they were not  issued for any public purpose. Mr.   Pereira  then  urged  that  the   notifications   were colourable.    We  are  not  able  to  appreciate  how   the notifications  are serving Any collateral object.   He  said that he used the word "colourable" in the sense used by this Court  in Mst.  Somawanti v. State of  Punjab(2)  Mudholkar, J., observed as follows :               "If  the purpose for which the land  is  being               acquired   by   the  State   is   within   the               legislative   competence  of  the  State   the               declaration  of the Government will  be  final               subject,  however,  to  one  exception.   That               exception  is  that if there is  a  colourable               exercise of power the declaration will be open               to challenge at the instance of the  aggrieved               party.  The power committed to the  Government               by  the  Act is a limited power in  the  sense               that it can be exer-               (1) [1961] 1 S.C.R. 128.               (2) A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 151.                903               cised  only where there is a  public  purpose,               leaving  aside for a moment the purpose  of  a               company.    If  it  appears  that   what   the               Government is satisfied about is not a  public               but a private purpose or no purpose at all the               action  of the Government would be  colourable               as not being relatable to the power  conferred               upon it by the Act and its declaration will be               a  nullity.   Subject to  this  exception  the               declaration of the Government will be final." No material has been placed before us that the exercise  of’

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the  power  by the Government is colourable in  this  sense. The Government has the power to issue the notifications  for a  public  purpose, and, as we have already  held  that  the notifications were issued for a public purpose, there is  no question of any colourable exercise of the power. Lastly,  he  contended that the Government  had  not  before issuing the notifications prepared any scheme.  This is true that  the Government has not uptil now prepared  any  scheme for  the  utilisation  of  the  developed  sites.   But  the notification  itself shows that the sites would be  used  as residential  and  industrial sites.  There is  no  law  that requires   a  scheme  to  be  prepared  before   issuing   a notification  under  s.  4 or s. 6 of  the  Act.   We  have, however,.   no  doubt  that  the  Government  will,   before disposing of the sites, have a scheme for their disposal. In  the  result we see no force in any  of  the  contentions urged  before  us  and we hold that  the  notifications  are valid.  The petitions accordingly fail and are dismissed but there will be no order as to costs. Wanchoo, J. We regret we are unable to agree. These two petitions under Art. 32 of the Constitution  raise common questions of law and will be dealt with together.  We may  briefly state the facts in W. P. 66.  The facts in  the other petition are exactly similar except that the dates  of the notifications are in some cases different and the  lands notified  are  also  different.   On  March  30,  1962,  the Commissioner of Bombay Division issued a notification  under s.  4  of  the  Land  Acquisition  Act,  No.  1  of’   1894, (hereinafter referred to as the Act).  By this  notification he declared that certain lands were likely to be needed  for a  public purpose, namely, "for development and  utilisation of  the said lands as an industrial and  residential  area". In consequence, objections were invited under s. 5-A of  the Act  and  the Special Land Acquisition Officer,  Bombay  and Bombay  Suburban  District  was notified as  the  person  to perform  the  functions of a Collector under s. 5-A  of  the Act.   After the proceedings under s. 5-A of’ the  Act  were over,  the  Commissioner  issued  another  notification   on October 7, 1963 under s. 6 of the Act.  By this notification he 904 declared that certain lands out of those notified under s. 4 were  needed  to be acquired at the public expense  for  the public  purpose already specified.  Some of the  lands  were however  exempted  and  the notification  under  s.  4  with respect  thereto was cancelled.  The petitioners are  owners of  some of the lands included in the notification under  s. 6.  On  receipt of the notice under s. 9 of  the  Act,  they represented to Government that their lands be released  from acquisition.  They were informed that this could not be done and  thereupon the present petition was filed  to  challenge the legality of the proceedings taken under the Act. Two  main contentions have been urged in these petitions  on behalf  of  the  petitioners.   In the  first  place  it  is contended that the impugned acquisition is not for a  public purpose and is intended for sale to private persons, limited companies  and  corporations for monetary gain, and  in  any case,  the change in the definition of "public  purpose"  by the Land Acquisition (Bombay Amendment) Act, No. 35 of 1953, (hereinafter  referred  to as the 1953Act) by  which  a  new clause was added in s. 3 (f) of the Act was ultra vires  the concept  of  "public  purpose" within the  meaning  of  that phrase in Art. 31 (2) of the Constitution.  The added clause is in these words               "The  acquisition of land for purposes of  the

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             development  of areas from public revenues  or               some  fund  controlled or managed by  a  local               authority  and subsequent disposal thereof  in               whole or in part by lease, assignment or sale,               with   the   object   of   securing    further               development." The  second attack arises in this way.  By the Bombay  Corn- missioners  (Abolition of Office) Act, (No. 28 of 1950)  the office  of  the  Commissioner in the  State  of  Bombay  was abolished  and  the  functions  of  the  Commissioner   were transferred to the State Government or to such authority as the  State  Government  may  by  general  or  special  order appoint.   In  1958, how,ever, the Bombay  Commissioners  of Divisions  Act, No. 8 of 1958, (hereinafter referred  to  as the 1958 Act) was passed by which the office of Commissioner of  Division  in the State of Bombay was  revived.   We  are concerned in the present appeal mainly with s. 3 (4) of this Act.  By section 3 (1) it is provided that "for the purposes of  constituting offices of Commissioners of divisions  ,and conferring  powers and imposing duties on Commissioners  and for  certain  other purposes, the  enactments  specified  in column I of the Schedule to this Act shall be amended in the manner  and  to the extent specified in column  2  thereof". Sub-section (2) thereof provided that "the Commissioner of a division,  appointed  under  the law  relating  to  land  as amended by the said Schedule, shall exercise the powers and discharge   the  duties  conferred  and  imposed   ,on   the Commissioner by any- law for the time being in force, 905 including  the  enactments  referred to  in  sub-s.  (1)  as amended  by the said Schedule".  The Schedule made a  number of  amendments in the Bombay Revenue Code (No. 5  of  1879), the main amendment being that s. 6 provided for  appointment of  Commissioners for each division and s. 6-A provided  for powers  and  duties of Commissioners.  Further,  in  certain sections of the Land Revenue Law as applied to various areas in   the  reconstituted  State  of  Bombay  after  the   re- organisation   of   1956,  the   word   "Commissioner"   was substituted for the "State Government" in various  sections. Changes  were  also made in the Hyderabad Land  Revenue  Act (No. 8 of 1317 F.) and the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue  Code (No. 2 of 1955) to bring them into line with this Act and to provide  for the office of Commissioner and its  powers  and duties.   Besides  these changes in the  Land  Revenue  Code applicable  to  various areas in the re-organised  State  of Bombay,  the Schedule also made amendments in various  other Acts in force in the State of Bombay and "Commissioner"  was substituted  for "State Government" in these Acts.   Besides this,  "Commissioner  was  also substituted  for  "Board  of Revenue" in certain Acts in force in areas which came to the re-organised State of Bombay from the former Part B State of Hyderabad.  Changes were also made in the Police Act (No.  5 of  1861)  and  "Commissioner,  was  introduced  in  certain sections  thereof and a provision was made that  the  Magis- trate  of the District should be under the  general  control and  direction of the Commissioner.  Some changes were  made in the Saurashtra Police Act (No. 18 of 1954), the Hyderabad District  Police  Act,  (No.  X of 1329 F)  and  the  Bombay District  Police Act, (No. 4 of 1890).  Thus  sections  3(1) and  3(2) as enacted by the Bombay legislature gave  certain powers and imposed certain duties on Commissioners read with the amendments in the Schedule to the 1958 Act.               Further  provision  was made  in  sub-sections               (3),  (4)  and (5) which may now be  set  out.               They read thus :

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             "(3) The State Government may by  notification               in  the Official Gazette amend or  delete  any               entry  in  the  Schedule for  the  purpose  of               imposing  any  conditions or  restrictions  on               the.  exercise  of  powers  and  discharge  of               duties    conferred   or   imposed   on    the               Commissioner  or withdrawing them as the  case               may  be,  and the Schedule  shall  be  amended               accordingly.               (4)   The  State  Government  may  confer  and               impose  on the Commissioner powers and  duties               under  any other enactment for the time  being               in  force  and  for that  purpose  may,  by  a               notification in the Official Gazette add to or               specify   in   the  Schedule   the   necessary               adaptations   and   modifications   in    that               enactment by way of amendment; and thereupon--               q2Sup CI/66-12 906 (a)  every  such enactment shall accordingly be amended  and have effect subject to the adaptations and modifications  so made, and (b)  the Schedule to this Act shall be deemed to be  amended by the inclusion therein of the said provision for  amending the enactment. (5)  The  State  Government may at any time in  like  manner cancel  a notification under sub-section (4), and  thereupon the   relevant  enactment  shall  stand  unamended  by   the cancelled  notification  and the Schedule shall  be  altered accordingly." It  will be seen that these three sub-sections  provided  an integrated scheme.  By sub-section (3) the State  Government is  given the power by notification in the Official  Gazette to amend or delete any entry in the Schedule for the purpose of  imposing any conditions or restrictions on the  exercise of  powers and discharge of duties conferred or  imposed  on the  Commissioner or withdrawing them, as the case  may  be, and the Schedule shall be amended accordingly.   Sub-section (4)  empowers the State Government to confer and  impose  on the Commissioner powers and duties under any other enactment for the time being in force.  It further empowers the  State Government for that purpose by notification in the  Official Gazette  to add to or specify in the Schedule the  necessary adaptations  and modifications in that enactment by  way  of amendment.  On such notification, such other enactment shall accordingly  be  amended  and have  effect  subject  to  the adaptations  and modifications so made, and the Schedule  to the 1958 Act, shall be deemed to be amended by the inclusion therein  of the said provision for amending  the  enactment. By sub-section (5) the State Government was given the  power to cancel a notification made under sub-s. (4) and thereupon the   relevant  enactment  shall  stand  unamended  by   the cancelled  notification  and the Schedule shall  be  altered accordingly.   The contention of the petitioners is that  by these sub-sections, and particularly by sub-s. (4) of s.  3, there  was excessive delegation of legislative power to  the State  Government and further that these three  sub-sections amount   to   the  legislature  abdicating  its   power   of legislation  in  favour of the State Government.  So  it  is urged  that these provisions, and particularly s. 3(4),  are ultra  vires the power of the legislature inasmuch  as  they suffer  from the vice of excessive delegation and amount  to abdication of its power of legislation by the legislature in favour of the executive. The  petitions  have  been opposed on behalf  of  the  State

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Government, and it is contended that the new clause added to s.  3(f) of the Act by the 1953 Act by which the  definition of "public 907 purpose"  was  amended is valid and what  the  addition  has provided  is within the concept of "public purpose" as  used in  Art.  31(2) of the Constitution.  Further it  is  denied that  the  object  of the State  Government  in  making  the acquisition  is merely to sell the land acquired to  private parties,  private  limited  companies  or  corporations  for monetary  gain.  As to s. 3(4) it is contended that it  does not  suffer from the vice of excessive delegation  and  does not  amount  to abdication of its legislative power  by  the legislature in favour of the executive. We  shall first consider the question whether  the  addition made  by  the  Act  of 1953 in  the  definition  of  "public purpose"  is ultra vires the concept of "public purpose"  as used  in Art. 31(2) of the Constitution.  "Public  purpose", is  not  defined in Art. 31 of the Constitution; nor  is  it possible to lay down any hard and fast definition of "public purpose".  The phrase came up for consideration before  this Court in the State of Bihar v. Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh  of  Darbhanga  and  Others(1).   In  that  connection Mahajan  J.  (as  he then was)  observed  that  "the  phrase ’public purpose’ has to be construed according to the spirit of  the  times  in  which  the  particular  legislation   is enacted."  He  also  referred to Art. 39  of  the  Directive Principles of State Policy in construing the phrase  "public purpose"  after coming into force of the  Constitution.   In the  same  case, Das J. (as he then was) observed  that  "no hard  and fast definition can be laid down as to what  is  a ’public purpose’ as the concept has been rapidly changing in all  countries, but it is clear that it is the  presence  of the  element  of  general interest of the  community  in  an object  or  aim that transforms such object or  aim  into  a public purpose, and whatever furthers the general  interests of  the community as opposed to the particular  interest  of the individual must be regarded as a public purpose." We respectfully agree with these observations.  There can be no  doubt that the phrase "public purpose" has not a  static connotation,  which is fixed for all times.  There can  also be no doubt that it is not possible to lay down a definition of what "public purpose" is, particularly as the concept  of public  purpose may change from time to time.  There  is  no doubt  however  that  "public purpose"  involves  in  it  an element  of general interest of the community  and  whatever furthers  the general interest must be regarded as a  public purpose.   It  is  in the light of this  concept  of  public purpose,  which is not static and is changing from  time  to time and in which there must always be an element of general interest  of  the  community that we have  to  look  at  the addition  made by the 1953 Act in the definition of  "public purpose" in s. 3 (f)     of the Act. (1) [1952] S.C.R. 889. 908 We. have already set out the addition.  It is in two  parts. The first part provides for acquisition of land for purposes of  the  development of areas from public revenues  or  some fund controlled or managed by a local authority.  So far  as this  part is concerned, it is conceded by  learned  counsel for  the petitioners that development of areas with the  aid of  public revenue or some fund controlled or managed  by  a local authority would be a public purpose.  Under this  part the  land  would  be acquired by the State  or  by  a  local authority   for   the  purpose  of  development   and   this

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development will consist, _generally speaking, of  levelling land,  providing  roads  thereon,  providing  drainage   and electric  lines and such other amenities as should  be  made available  at the time when the acquisition is made and  the land  is developed.  Such development generally speaking  is not  possible  through private agencies.  As  we  have  said already,  it  is not disputed on behalf of  the  petitioners that  such development would be a public purpose within  the concept of the phrase in Art. 31(2) of the Constitution. The  attack of the petitioners is on the second part of  the addition  in  1953 which provides for  "subsequent  disposal thereof  in whole or in part by lease, assignment, or  sale, with  the  object of securing further  development."  It  is urged   that  all  these  words  mean  is  that  after   the development envisaged in the first part of the addition  the State or the local authority would be free to dispose of the land  acquired in whole or in part by lease,  assignment  or sale,  apparently  to private persons.  This,  it  is  said, means  that the State or the local authority  would  acquire land  in  the first instance and develop it  in  the  manner already  in dilated and thereafter make profit  by  leasing, assigning  or selling it to private individuals  or  bodies. It  is  also  said that the  object  of  securing    further development which is the reason sale or lease etc. is a very vague  expression  and there is nothing to  show  what  this further  development comprises of.It is true that when  this part  speaks of "subsequent disposal thereof in whole or  in part by lease, assignment or sale", it is not unlikely  that this disposal will take place to private persons and thus in an  indirect way the State would be acquiring the land  from one set of individuals and disposing it of to another set of individuals after some development.  If this were all, there may  be some force in the argument that such acquisition  is not  within the concept of "public purpose" as used in  Art. 31(2).   But  this  in our opinion is not  all.   We  cannot ignore  the  words  "with the  object  of  securing  further development", which appear in this provision. it would  have been a different matter if the provision had stopped at  the words "lease, assignment or sale " ; but the provision  does not stop there.  It says that such lease, assignment or sale must be with the object of securing further development, and these 909 words must be given some meaning.  It is true that the words "further  development" have not been defined, but  that  was bound  to be so, for further development would  depend  upon the  nature of the purpose for which the land  is  acquired. Of  course, it is possible that further development  can  be made  by  the State itself or by the local  authority  which acquires the land; but we see no reason why the State or the local  authority  should  not have the  power  to  see  that further   development  takes  place  even  through   private agencies by lease, assignment or sale of such land.  So long as  the object is development and the land is made  fit  for the purpose for which it is acquired there is, no reason why the  State  should  not be permitted  to  see  that  further development  of  the land takes place in the  direction  for which the land is acquired, even though that may be  through private agencies.  We have no doubt that where the State  or the local authority decides that further development  should take place through private agencies by disposal of the  land so acquired by way of lease, assignment or sale, it will see that  further  development which it has in  mind  does  take place.  We can see no reason why if the land so acquired  is leased,  assigned or sold, the State or the local  authority

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should not be able to impose terms on such lessee,  assignee or vendee that will enable further development on the  lines desired  to  take  place.  We also see no  reason  why  when imposing  terms,  the State or the local authority  may  not provide  that  if  the further development  it  desires  the lessee,  assignee or the vendee to make is not  made  within such reasonable time as the State or the local authority may fix,  the  land  will  revert to  the  State  or  the  local authority  so that it may again be used for the  purpose  of further development which was the reason for the acquisition of the land. Take  the  case where land is acquired for  the  purpose  of development of certain areas for residential purposes.   The State   or  the  local  authority  levels  the  land   where necessary,  makes  a  lay  out,  provides  roads,  drainage, electric lines and such other amenities as may be  available whereafter houses have to be built.  The State or the  local authority  may  build these houses itself, but there  is  no reason why if the purpose is development of certain land  as a residential area, the State or the local authority may not lease,  assign or even sell the lands laid out  and  already developed  in  order that further  development  of  building houses  may be achieved.  In such a case it will  always  be open  to  the  State Government or the  local  authority  to provide,  and  we  have  no doubt that  it  will  always  so provide,  that  the  persons to whom  the  land  is  leased, assigned  or sold carry out the further object of  building houses.  There is also no reason why the State or the  local authority  should  not  provide  for  the  terms  on-  which residential  buildings would be made, the specifications  of such 910 buildings,  and the time within which they should  be  made. There  is  also no reason why the terms should  not  provide that if the further object of development is not carried out within a reasonable time, the land would revert to the State or the local authority to be used for the purpose for  which it  was  acquired.  We have no doubt that the State  or  the local  authority  would see that such terms are  imposed  on those  to whom lands are leased, assigned or sold  with  the object of further development, by constructing houses  where the  scheme  is for residential purposes.  We have  also  no doubt that in imposing terms, the State or the local  autho- rity  will  see  that  the  purpose  for  which  the  lease, assignment  or  sale  is  made  is  carried  out  within   a reasonable  time, failing which the land will revert to  the State  or  the local authority.  These matters  are  in  our opinion  implicit in the words "with the object of  securing further  development", and we have no reason to  think  that the  State or the local authority would just dispose of  the land  so  acquired by lease or assignment  or  sale  without caring  to see that further development which was the  basis of acquisition takes place. We may refer in this connection to a similar provision in S. 41  of the Act, which provides for an agreement between  the private  company  for  which the land is  acquired  and  the State, and which lays down that the agreement shall  provide the  terms on which the land shall be held by  the  company. There  is in our opinion no doubt that when  this  provision speaks of "with the object of securing further  development" it  implicitly requires that before the land so acquired  is leased,  assigned or sold, the State or the local  authority shall see that the purpose for which the acquisition is made is  carried  out  by persons to whom  the  land  is  leased, assigned or sold.  There is also in our opinion implicit  in

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this  provision that the State or the local authority  would impose  terms  on the persons to whom the  land  is  leased, assigned  or sold and the terms should be such as to  ensure that the object of further development takes place within  a reasonable’  time  and if the persons to whom  the  land  is leased  or  assigned or sold do not carry  out  that  object within a reasonable time, the land would revert to the State or the local authority so that it may again be used for  the purpose for which the acquisition was made.  If this-is  the true   import   of   the   words   "with   the   object   of securing,further development" in this provision-and we  have no doubt that it is so-we fail to see how the provision made by  the  1953 Act Providing for development in  two  stages, first  by the State or the local authority itself by  making the land fit for the purpose for which acquisition is  made, and then by private persons also after the land is developed by  the  State or the local authority, is not for  a  public purpose  within the meaning of that phrase in Art. 31(2)  of the Constitution.  Population in India is rising and more 911 or more industries are coming into being.  Therefore’  where the  acquisition  is  with  the  object  of  providing   for residential and industrial development, we see no reason why such  provision  would  not be included in  the  concept  of public purpose in the present context.  We are therefore  of opinion that the words "with the object of securing  further development"  have a meaning and if that meaning is what  we have  stated above (as to which we have no doubt) it  cannot be  said  that this provision made by the 1953  Act  is  not within  the concept of Art. 31(2) of the  Constitution.   We therefore  hold that the amendment by the 1953  Act  already set  out  above is within the concept of public  purpose  in Art. 31(2) of the Constitution and cannot be struck down  as ultra vires. Delegated legislation is a well known modem device.  In view of the complexities of modem life it is not possible for the legislature  to  find time to make all  the  detailed  rules which  are  necessary  to  carry  out  the  purposes  of  an enactment;  so  it  delegates to  an  appropriate  executive authority the power to make rules.  But before doing so, the legislature  itself enacts the law under which the power  is delegated and lays down the essential policy of the Act  and all  such essential matters which require to be included  in the Act itself.  Having thus provided for all such essential matters  in the enactment itself, the legislature leaves  it to  a  subordinate authority which may be  some  appropriate executive authority to frame detailed rules to carry out the purposes of the Act.  These rules are ancillary and subserve the  purposes of the enactment.  They cannot go against  the provisions  of the enactment and cannot in any  manner  make any change in the provision of the enactment and are  merely for  the purpose of carrying out the essential policy  which the  legislature  has  laid down in  the  enactment  itself. These  rules  are  called delegated legislation  and  it  is important to remember that this delegated legislation cannot in any way change the provisions of the enactment itself and must  only be resorted to for carrying out the  purposes  of the legislation itself.  Such being the nature of  delegated legislation  we have to see whether the impugned  provisions of  s. 3 are in accord with these principles.  If  they  are not and if the legislature has conferred powers on the State Government  beyond this such conferment of power  cannot  be delegated  legislation  and is really an abdication  of  its power  by  the  legislature  and  transfer  of  it  to   the executive.

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This brings us to a consideration of s. 3. Sub-sections  (1) and  (2)  of s. 3 read with the Schedule confer  powers  and impose  duties  on the Commissioner by virtue  of  the  1958 ’Act.  itself.  Then comes sub-section (3), and let  us  see what  exactly  it provides.  The State Government  is  given power  by this sub-section to amend or delete any  entry  in the Schedule.  The amendment is for the purpose of  imposing any conditions or restrictions on the 912 exercise  of  powers and discharge of  duties  conferred  or imposed  on the Commissioner while deletion is with  respect to  withdrawing any powers conferred by the Schedule on  the Commissioner.   Leaving out the question of amendment,  sub- section (3) confers power on the State Government to  delete any  entry from the Schedule if it desires to  withdraw  any powers  conferred  on the Commissioner  by  the  legislature itself in the Schedule.  In effect therefore the legislature says  by  sub-s. (3) that though it has deemed  fit  in  its wisdom  to  confer a certain power on the  Commissioner,  it leaves  it  to the State Government to withdraw  that  power from the Commissioner and     delete the necessary entry  in the Schedule with respect thereto.  So the State  Government is given carte blanche to take away     all  or any  of  the powers  conferred  by  the  legislature  itself  under   the Schedule.   It  may also be added that the Schedule  in  the present  case  is very different from the  Schedule  in  the Edward Mills Co. Limited v. The State of Ajmer(1).  In  that case s. 27 of the Minimum Wages Act. (11 of 1948) gave power to the appropriate government after necessary formalities to add  to the schedule any employment in respect of  which  it was  of opinion that minimum rates of wages should be  fixed under  that Act.  It will be seen that the schedule in  that Act merely enumerated certain employments while the Schedule in  the 1958 Act amends a large number of enactments.   This method  is merely a convenient device for making  amendments in  other enactments which would otherwise have found  place in  the  main body of the 1958 Act.  Further s.  27  of  the Minimum Wages Act did not give any power to the  appropriate government to delete any entry from the schedule; it  merely gave  power  to  the appropriate government to  add  to  the schedule  and that delegation was upheld by this Court.   It will thus be seen that the provision in sub-s. (3) by  which the  State Government is even given the power to delete  any entry in the Schedule and withdraw if it wants to do so  the power conferred on the Commissioner by the legislature is  a very  different matter from addition to the  schedule  which was permitted by the Minimum Wages Act. It is clear that sub-s. (3) judged by the test of  delegated legislation has gone far beyond what the legislature can  do when  it delegates its functions to an  executive  authority for  making  subordinate legislation’ As we  have  indicated above, sub-section (3) confers power on the State Government even  to the extent of deleting any entry from the  Schedule and  withdrawing the power conferred by the  legislature  in its wisdom on the Commissioner.  This in our opinion is  not delegated legislation but transfer by the legislature of its power  in  the matter of legislation to the  executive.   In effect  the legislature says that though it  considers  that the Commissioner should have certain powers it has conferred on (1)  [1955] 1 S.C.R. 735. 913 him in the Schedule, the State Government may withdraw those powers   which  it  has  thought  fit  to  confer   on   the Commissioner.   We  are of the opinion that this  is  not  a

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provision  for delegated legislation but a transfer  by  the legislature  of  its  power to make law  to  the  executive. Further if it can be considered to be conferment of power of delegated legislation, it suffers from the vice of excessive delegation  inasmuch as it gives power to the  executive  to the  extent  of  repealing a part of the  law  made  by  the legislature. Then we come to sub-s. (4) and let us see what it  provides. It  says that the State Government may confer and impose  on the Commissioner powers and duties under any other enactment for  the time being in force and further gives power to  the State  Government to amend any such enactment by  adding  to the entries to the Schedule.  The language of the  provision is  of the widest amplitude and gives blanket power  to  the State  Government  to amend any enactment which  may  be  in force  for the time being in ,the State by making  necessary entries  in the Schedule.  It is however urged on behalf  of the  State  that we should read down this provision  in  two respects.   As  the words stand, they confer  power  on  the State  Government to amend any enactment for the time  being in force even though that enactment may be a law under  List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution.  It is  urged that the legislature could not have meant to confer power on the State Government by this provision with respect to  laws under  List I of the Seventh Schedule to  the  Constitution, for  the  legislature  itself  had  no  power  to  make  any amendment  in  laws  referable  to List  I  of  the  Seventh Schedule.  We are of the opinion that the provision in  sub- s. (4) can be read down to this extent that the  legislature could  never  have  intended  to give  power  to  the  State Government  in matters in which it had itself no power.   We shall therefore proceed on the basis that in sub-section (4) the  legislature  only referred to enactments which  it  was itself  competent  to  pass under Lists 11 and  III  of  the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. Secondly,  it is urged that we should read down this  provi- sion and hold that all that the legislature intended thereby was  to give to the State Government power to confer on  the Commissioner  powers  and  impose  upon  him  duties  of  an executive  nature  which were conferred and imposed  on  the State  Government by laws referable to Lists II and  III  of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution.  It is also  urged that all that the legislature intended by this provision  in sub-section  (4) was to confer on the State  Government  the power  to  delegate  its own  executive  power  under  other enactments  not  specified  in  the  Schedule  to  the  Com- missioner.   We are unable to see on what principle  we  can read down this provision in this manner.  Even if we look at the sche- 914 dule as it was passed by the legislature we find that though mostly "Commissioner" was substituted for "State Government" in the enactments specified in the Schedule there are  other provisions  in  the Schedule as enacted by  the  legislature which go beyond this.  The Schedule therefore is of no  help in  reading down the provision in sub-s. (4) in  the  manner suggested.  Besides what learned counsel for the State  asks when he says that we should read down the provision in  sub- s.  (4)  is that we should re-draft it  altogether  and  add words in it which are not to be found therein.   Sub-section (4) says that the State Government may confer and impose  on the   Commissioner  powers  and  duties  under   any   other enactment.   The nature of these powers and duties  are  not specified  in the provision, and we fail to see how  we  can add words in the sub-section, which would delimit the nature

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of  these  powers  and duties as,  merely  executive  powers conferred by other enactments on the State Government.  Sub- section (4) as it stands therefore does not merely authorise the State Government to delegate its executive power to  the Commissioner  under other enactments; it empowers the  State Government to confer any powers and impose any duties  under any  other enactment and to do so by amendment of the  other enactment,  and if notification envisaged therein  is  made, the other enactment is accordingly amended and the  Schedule is  also  amended by the inclusion of the provision  in  the notification.   As  the words of sub-section  (4)  stand  we cannot in any way read down this provision to mean that , it only  authorises  the  State  Government  to  delegate   its executive  powers and duties under other enactments  besides those  mentioned in the Schedule to the Commissioner by  the legislature.  If that was all that the legislature intended, we do not see why a suitable provision to that effect  could not have been made by the legislature in sub-s. (4).  It  is however  clear from the scheme of S. 3 that is not all  that the legislature intended.  We have already referred to  sub- s.  (3)  and  held that by that  provision  the  legislature empowered  the State Government to amend or repeal  the  law contained  in the Schedule to the 1958 Act.  By  sub-section (4)  it further empowered the State Government to amend  any other  law not mentioned in the Schedule, though  of  course with the object of conferring powers and imposing duties  on the  Commissioner  under other enactments which  might  have been conferred by those enactments on other authorities.  In effect  therefore the legislature was empowering  the  State Government  by sub-s. (4) to substitute  "the  Commissioner" for the other authorities which might be mentioned in  other enactments with respect to any powers and duties thereunder. Taking  a concrete case to illustrate our point and to  show the  far reaching effect of the provision in sub-s.  (4)  we may refer to s.     18 of the Act.  Under that provision the Collector has the power 915 to  make reference to court in certain circumstances on  the application of a person who has not accepted the award  made by  the Collector.  Sections 20 to 28 confer powers  on  the court and impose duties on it when dealing with  references. The  Act  was  not one of the enactments  mentioned  in  the Schedule as it was originally passed by the legislature.  On the  wide words used in sub-s. (4) it would be possible  for the  State  Government  to confer on  the  Commissioner  the powers conferred on the court and duties imposed on it by s. 18 to s. 28 by substituting the word "Commissioner" for  the word  "court"  in the relevant provisions.  If that  is  the extent  of  the power conferred on the State  Government  by sub-s. (4)-(and we have no doubt that it is so)-it is not  a case of providing merely for delegated legislation  properly so-called  but amounts to complete transfer of its power  of legislation  by the legislature in this matter to the  State Government.   We  fail to see why if the  intention  of  the legislature  was  merely to provide for  delegation  of  its executive power by the State Government to the  Commissioner a  simple provision to the effect that the State  Government may  delegate  its power under any enactment  for  the  time being in force to the Commissioner was not made.  Instead we find an integrated scheme in sub-sections (3), (4) and  (5). By sub-section (3), the State Government is given the  power to  amend the Schedule enacted by the legislature  and  take away  from the Commissioner powers which the legislature  in its  wisdom thought fit to confer on him.  This is  done  by providing  for deletion of any entry in the Schedule.   Then

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by sub-section (4) power is given to the State Government to confer  powers and impose duties on the  Commissioner  under any  other enactment by amending that enactment.  Lastly  by sub-section (5) the State Government was given the power  to undo  what  it had done under sub-section (4)  and  on  such action  being  taken  the original provision  in  the  other enactments  would  revive.  This scheme is  clear  from  the provisions  of  sub-sections  (3), (4) and (5)  and  in  our opinion clearly amounts to transfer of its legislative power by  the legislature to the State Government with respect  to matters  dealt with in these sub-sections.  Further if  this is  to be treated as a kind of delegation, then  these  sub- sections  suffer from the vice of excessive  delegation  for they not only authorise the State Government to frame  rules in  the nature of subordinate legislation but give power  to it to undo what the legislature itself has done by the  1958 Act; they also give further power to the State Government to amend what the legislature may itself have provided in other enactments already in force or what it may provide by  other enactments  to  be  passed  in future.   We  have  no  doubt therefore that sub-s. (4) cannot be read down in the  manner urged  on behalf of the State.  There is also no doubt  that as  this  provision  stands it is  a  complete  transfer  of legislative power by the legislature to the executive within the  ambit of sub-s. (4).  Sub-section (5) is  consequential to, 916 sub-s. (4) and will fall along with it.  We are therefore of opinion  that the provisions contained in sub-sections  (3), (4)  and  (5) of S. 3 of the 1958 Act which are  clearly  an integrated   scheme  are  ultra  vires  the  power  of   the legislature  for they amount to transfer by the  legislature of its legislative power to the State Government, and in any case  suffer from the vice of excessive delegation  if  such conferment  of power can be called delegation for  the  pur- poses of subordinate legislation. We may now refer to two decisions of the Bombay High Court in  which S. 3(4) of the 1958 Act has been  upheld,  namely, (i) Ganesh Narayan v. Commissioner, Nagpur Division(1),  and (ii)  Sadruddin  Suleman  Jhaveri  v.  Patwardhan(2).   With respect we find that in these two cases no attempt has  been made to construe the actual words used in S. 3(4) and it has been  assumed  that  the section merely  allowed  the  State Government to confer on the ,Commissioner powers and  impose duties  which  have been conferred or imposed on  the  State Government  under other enactments.  We have  construed  the words used in S. 3(4) and we are of the opinion that this is not  what they mean.  The words are of very  wide  amplitude and as they stand they confer on the State Government  power to amend any other Act and confer on the Commissioner powers and  impose duties under those acts which may be conferred thereunder  on any authority.  Further there is  nothing  in the words of s. 3(4) confining conferment of powers of  exe- cutive  nature  only.  As the words stand,  any  powers  and duties   of   any  authority  can  be   conferred   on   the Commissioner. Nor do we think that the principles laid down in the case of Her  Majesty, the Queen v. Burah(3) and of Re.   Delhi  Laws Act,  1912(4)  help  to sustain the  validity  of  S.  3(4). Burah’s  case(4) was a case of conditional  legislation  and not of delegated legislation.  Act 22 of 1869 was enacted to remove the Garo Hills from the jurisdiction of the tribunals established  under the General Regulations and Act  and  for other  purposes.  It was to apply in the first  instance  to Garo  Hills but S. 9 thereof gave power to  the  Lieutenant-

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Governor to extend the provisions of this Act or any of them to the Jaintia Hills, the Naga Hills and to such portion  of the Khasi Hills as for the time being forms part of  British India.   By  virtue of this power,  the  Lieutenant-Governor issued a notification extending the provisions of this  Act to  the Khasi and Jaintia Hills and excluding therefrom  the jurisdiction of the Courts of Civil and Criminal Judicature. The Privy Council upheld the validity of S. 9 as a piece  of conditional legislation.  It (1)  [1964] 66 Bom.  Law Reporter 807. (3)  [1878] L.R. 5 I.A. 178. (2)  I.L.R. [1965] Bom. 394. (4)  [1951] S.C.R. 747. 917 will  be  seen  however  that  all  that  was  left  to  the Lieutenant-Governor by s. 9 was to apply a certain law which had  been  passed by a competent legislature  to  a  certain area.   There was no provision in the law for any  amendment of  that law or any other law before its application to  new territories.   There is therefore no parallel  between  that case and the present case. We  are further of opinion that Re.  Delhi Laws Act  case(1) also cannot help the State.  The main question in that  case was  about  the  extension of certain  laws  with  necessary adaptations  and  modifications to Delhi.  It  was  in  that connection  that this Court held that was  also  conditional legislation and laws in force. in other parts of India could be extended to Delhi subject to necessary modifications  and adaptations.  Even so this Court pointed out that it was not open  to the authority on whom such power was  conferred  to modify  them  in any essential feature when  ordering  their extension.  )"at constitutes "essential feature" of a  piece of legislation was a matter over which there was  difference of  opinion  between the learned Judges of this  Court;  but they were agreed that no essential feature could be  altered by  the power given to the executive to apply other laws  in force in India to the territory of, Delhi by modification or adaptation.   This  would  also be more or less  a  case  of conditional  legislation and not of  delegated  legislation. As  pointed out by Mukherjea J. (as he was then) at p.  1009 in Re.  Delhi Laws Act’s case(1) "to repeal. or abrogate  an existing  law  is the exercise of an  essential  legislative power".  The amendment of a particular law falls also in the same  category,  for  an amendment in effect  amounts  to  a partial  repeal  of the existing provision  with,  may  be,, substitution  in its place of another provision.   What  the legislature has done in the present case is to give power to the  executive to amend other laws as it thinks fit for  the purpose  of conferring powers on the Commissioner and  this in,  our opinion is conferment of an  essential  legislative function on the executive which cannot be justified on  the- principles laid down in Re.  Delhi Laws Act case(1).  As  we read  s.  3(4), we are clearly of opinion  that  it  confers power on the State Government to amend any law it deems  fit for  the purpose of conferring any powers and  imposing  any duties  on  the Commissioner which may be imposed  by  other laws  on  any authority.  This is beyond the  power  of  the legislature  and  is  really  abdication  of  its  essential function  in this matter; and if it is a case of  delegation it  suffers from the vice of excessive delegation.   We  are therefore  of the opinion that the two cases of  the  Bombay High Court are not correctly decided. it is not in dispute that the amendments to the Act by which the power of the State Government was also conferred on  the Commissioner  under  sections 4, 5A and 6 of  the  Act  were

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made- (1)  [1951] S.C.R. 747. 918 by notifications under s. 3(4) of the 1958-Act.  As we  have held that s. 3(4) of the 1958 Act is ultra vires the  powers of  the  legislature and as the Commissioner  had  no  power under  the  Act before such amendments to ss. 4, 5-A  and  6 were  made  under s. 3(4) the notifications issued  in  this case under ss. 4 and 6 must fall and must be quashed. In the view we have taken it is unnecessary to consider  the other points which have been raised in these petitions.   We would   therefore   allow  the  petitions  and   quash   the notifications  under  ss. 4 and 6 of the Act issued  by  the Commissioner in the present ,cases.                                  Petitions allowed. (1) [1951] S.C.R. 747. 919