08 October 1968
Supreme Court
Download

ARJAN SINGH AND ANR. Vs THE STATE OF PUNJAB AND ORS.

Case number: Appeal (civil) 463 of 1966


1

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 6  

PETITIONER: ARJAN SINGH AND ANR.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF PUNJAB AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 08/10/1968

BENCH: HEGDE, K.S. BENCH: HEGDE, K.S. SHAH, J.C. MITTER, G.K. GROVER, A.N.

CITATION:  1970 AIR  703            1969 SCR  (2) 347

ACT:     Pepsu  Tenancy  and  Agricultural Lands  (Amendment  and Validation)  Act  XVI  of 1962 ss.  1(2)  and  7--Expression "this  Act"   in  s.  7--if  referred to  principal  Act  or Amendment  Act--Whether   s.  32-KK   introduced  into   the principal  Act came into force on 30th October 1956 in  view of  provisions of s. 1(2) or from commencement of  principal Act.

HEADNOTE:     The  Pepsu  Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act  XIII  of 1955  came  into  force on March 6,  1955,  whereby  it  was provided  that every land owner would be entitled to  select any parcel or parcels of land not exceeding the  permissible limit, which was fixed at 30 standard acres.  The  principal Act was amended in 1956 by the inclusion of Chapter 4A which provided for the Government taking over the surplus lands in the  hands  of a land owner.  Another Amendment Act  III  of 1959  which  was  made  operative  from  January  19,   1959 incorporated  into  the   principal  Act  s.  32(FF)   which provided that except in certain specified cases no  transfer or  other  disposition of land effected after  21st  .August 1956  could affect the rights of the State Government  under the  Act.  In 1962 the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural  Lands (Amendment  and  Validation)  Act XVI of  1962  was  passed. Section  7  of this Act introduced a new s.  32KK  into  the principal  Act whereby it was provided that land owned by  a Hindu  undivided  family would be deemed to be land  of  one land  owner and, a partition of land owned by such a  family shall  be  deemed  to.  be a disposition  of  land  for  the purposes  of s. 32-FF.  Section 1(2) of ’the  Amendment  Act provided  that Sections 2, 4, 5, 7 and 10 "shall  be  deemed to.  have come into force on the 30th day of  October,  1956 and  the  remaining provisions of this Act shall  come  into force at once,".     The  first  Appellant together with his son  the  second Appellant  and two other sons were members of a joint  Hindu family  which  owned  agricultural  lands  in  Punjab.   The Appellant’s  family  divided  their  family  property  by  a Registered Partition Deed on September 6, 1956 and necessary

2

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 6  

changes  were  thereafter  made in  the  mutation  register. After  Act  III of 1959’ came into force, the  Collector  of Sangrur started proceedings under Chapter 4A of the Act  for determining the surplus lands in the hands of the appellant. Despite the representations of the Appellants, the Collector ignored the partition effected in the family ’and held  that about  18  standard  acres were  surplus  in   their  hands. Appeals   filed by the Appellants before  the  Commissioner, Patiala  Division  and the State Government  were  rejected. The   Appellants  then  challenged  the  orders   of   these authorities  by  a  writ  petition under  Art.  226  of  the Constitution,  but this was dismissed’ by a Single Judge  of the High Court who took the view that as s. 32-KK had become a  part of the principal Act, the words "this Act"  in  that section must refer to the principal Act and not  to  Section 7 of the Amendment Act.  A Division Bench of the High  Court dismissed  an  appeal following an earlier decision  of  the Court in Bir Singh and Ors. v. The State of Punjab and  Ors. (1963) P.L.R. 961.  In the appeal to this Court there was no dispute  that  if the partition entered into in  the  family was.  taken  into  consideration,  the  lands  held  by  the different sharers would’ be within the permissible limits. 348 HELD:  The  orders  impugned in the writ  petition  must  be quashed. A  reading  of the various provisions of the 1962  Act  show that  the legislature intended that s. 7 of that  Act  which introduced s. 32-KK into the principal Act should be  deemed to have come into force on the 30th October 1956.  The words "this  Act"  in s. 7 of the Amendment Act (s. 32-KK  of  the principal  Act) were intended to refer to the Amendment  Act ’and  not to the principal Act.  It is true that  ordinarily when  a  section is incorporated into the principal  Act  by ’means  of an amendment, reference in that section to  "this Act"  means the  principal Act.  But in view of sub-s.   (2) of  s. 1 of the Amendment Act of 1962 that construction  had become impermissible.  Every statute has to be construed  as a  whole and the construction given should be ’a  harmonious one.   It was not permissible for the Court to.  proceed  on the basis that the legislature had enacted sub-s. (2) of  s. 1  of the Amendment Act 1962, by oversight.  If any  mistake had  crept into that section  it  was  for  the  legislature to correct the same. [352 C--F]

JUDGMENT:    CIVIL  APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.  463  of 1966.    Appeal  by  special leave from the  judgment  and  order, dated  March 30, 1964 of the Punjab High Court  in   Letters Patent. Appeal No. 24 of 1963.     E. C. Agrawala and Champat Rai, for the appellant.     Harbans Singh and R.N. Sachthey, for the respondents.     The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     Hegde,  J.  Though several questions of law were  raised in  this appeal by special leave, after hearing the  Counsel for  the parties on one of those questions, namely  on  what date s. 32 (KK) of the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural  Lands Act 1955 (Act No. XIII of 1955) (to be hereinafter  referred to as the Principal Act) should be deemed to have come  into force,  we  did  not think it necessary to hear  the.Counsel for the parties on the other questions raised in the appeal.     Before  examining  the  question  of  law  referred   to hereinbefore it is necessary to set out the material facts.

3

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 6  

   The second appellant is the son of the first  appellant. The  appellants alongwith Charanjit Singh and  Darshan,  the two  other  sons of the first appellant were  members  of  a joint Hindu family. That family owned agricultural lands  in the  village  Hathoa, Tehsil Malerkotla,  District  Sangrur. The  principal Act  came  into force on March 6, 1955.   The preamble  to  that Act says that it is an Act to  amend  and consolidate  the law relating to tenancies  of  agricultural lands  and to provide for certain measures of land  reforms. That Act provided that:                     "subject to the provisions of s. 5 every               land   .owner  owing  land  exceeding   thirty               standard acres shall be en- 349 titled  to  select for personal cultivation  from  the  land held  by  him  in.the State as a land owner  any  parcel  or parcels  of  land  not  exceeding  in  aggregate  area   the permissible  limit  and  reserve  such  land  for   personal cultivation  by intimating his selection in  the  prescribed form and manner to the Collector." The permissible limit is thirty standard acres.  Under  that Act,  there was no provision for Government taking over  the lands  that were in excess of the permissible  limits.   The appellants’ family divided their family properties as per  a registered partition deed on September 6, 1956.   Thereafter necessary  changes in the mutation register were made.   The principal  Act was amended in 1956 as per Amendment  Act  15 of   1956   which  came  into  force,  it  appears   several alienations were effected by to the principal Act Chapter 4A which provides for Government ’taking over the surplus lands in the hands of a land owner i.e. the lands in excess of the permissible limit.  After that amendment came into force, it appeals several alienations were effected by the land owners to  get out of the reach of the law.  Neither the  principal Act  nor  the  Amendment effected  in  1956  prohibited  any alienation.  Then came the Pepsu  Tenancy  and  Agricultural Lands  (Amendment)  Act,  No.  HI of  1959  which  was  made operative  from January 19, 1959.  Among other    provisions that  Amendment  Act incorporated into the  Act  s.   32(FF) which says:                    "Save  in  the case of land  acquired  by               the   State Government under any law  for  the               time   being  in  force  or  by  an  heir   by               inheritance  or  up  to 30th July  1958  by  a               landless  person  or a  small  landowner   not               being  a relation as prescribed of the  person               making  the transfer or disposition  of  land,               for consideration up to an area which with  or               without the area owned or held by him does not               in the aggregate exceed the permissible limit,               no  transfer  or  other  disposition  of  land               effected   after  21st  August,  1956,   shall               affect  the   right of  the  State  Government               under this Act to the surplus area to which it               would  be  entitled but for such  transfer  or               disposition  :" This Section has a proviso which reads:                    "Provided   that  any  person   who   has               received  any advantage under such transfer or               disposition of land shall be bound to  restore               it,  or  to make compensation for it,  to  the               person from whom he received it." In 1962 the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands  (Amendment and Validation) Act, No. XVI of 1962 was passed.  It 350

4

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 6  

crone into force on July 20, 1962.  two sections in that Act which are relevant for our present purpose are ss. 7  and  1 Section 7 reads:                    "Insertion of new section 32-KK in  Pepsu               Act 13  of 1955.--After section 32-KK  of  the               principal  Act,the following section shall  be               inserted, namely :--                     "32-KK.  Land owned by  Hindu  undivided               family.    to   be   deemed   land   of    one               landowner.---Notwithstanding          anything               contained in this Act or in any other law  for               the time being in force,--                      (a)   where,  immediately  before   the               commencement  this  Act, a landowner  and  his               descendants   constitute  a  Hindu   undivided               family, the landowned  by  such family  shall,               for  the purposes. of this Act, be deemed  to.               be   the  land  of  that  landowner   and   no               descendant shall, ’as. member of such  family,               be  entitled to claim that in respect  of  his               share  of such land he is a landowner  in  his               own right; and                      (b)  a  partition of land  owned  by  a               Hindu  undivided family referred to in  clause               (a)  shall  be deemed to be a  disposition  of               land for the  purposes of  section 32-FF."                       Explanation  :--In this  section,  the               expression  "descendant" includes  an  adopted               son." Section 1 sets out the short title and commencement of  that Act. That Section reads:               "This  Act may be called the Pepsu     Tenancy               and    Agricultural  Lands   (Amendment    and               Validation)  Act, 1962.                       (2)  Section 2, section 4, section  5,               section  7 and section 10 shall be  deemed  to               have  come  into  force on  the  30th  day  of               October  1956 and the remaining provisions  of               this Act shall come into force at once." After  the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands  (Amendment) Act  No.  III  of 1959 came into  force,  the  Collector  of Sangrur started proceedings under Chapter 4A of the Act  for determining   the  surplus  lands  in  the  hands   of   the appellants.     In    those    proceedings    despite    the representations of the appellants, the Collector ignored the partition  effected  in  the family  of  the  appellants  in determining the surplus lands in the hands of the members of the  family.   He considered them as one unit  and  on  that basis  held that eighteen standard acres and 51/2  units  of lands are surplus in their hands.  There is no dispute  that if  the partition entered into in the family had been  taken into consideration, the  lands 351 held by the different sharers are within permissible  limit. The appellants unsuccessfully went up in appeal against that order  to the Commissioner, Patiala Division.   Against  the order  of the Commissioner, the appellants appealed  to  the State  Government but that appeal was rejected on  September 1,  1961.   Thereafter the appellants filed Civil  Writ  No. 1418 of 1961 in the High Court of PUnjab at Chandigarh under Art.  226 of the  Constitution challenging the decisions  of respondents  1  to 3.  The  learned Single Judge  who  heard that  petition dismissed the same on November 27, 1962.   He held  that as s. 32(KK) had become a part of  the  principal Act the words "this Act" in that section  must refer to  the

5

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 6  

principal  Act.  and not to s. 7 of the Amendment  Act.  The decision  of  the  learned Single Judge was  affirmed  by  a Division  Bench  of  that Court.   That  bench  followed  an earlier decision of that Court in Bit Singh and Ors. v.  The State  of Punjab and Ors.(1).  At this stage we may  mention that  in  the  Punjab High Court at  one  stage  there  were conflicting   decisions  on  the  question  of   law   under consideration.   It  is  not necessary  to  refer  to  those decisions as grounds on which they differed are referred  to in  Bit Singh’s case(1).  The decisions  which   have  taken the  same view as taken by the High Court in this case  have ignored  the significance of s. 1 (2) of the 1962  Amendment Act.   They have exclusively focussed their attention on  s. 32(KK) and the supposed reasons for its enactment.     It  is,  a well settled rule of  construction  that  no. provision in a statute should be given retrospective  effect unless  the  legislature by express terms  or  by  necessary implication  has  made  it retrospective and  that  where  a provision  is made retrospective,  care should be taken  not to extend its retrospective effect beyond what was intended.     To accept the line o.f reasoning adopted by the  learned Judges  of  the  High  Court who decided  this  case  is  to completely  ignore sub-s. (2) of s. 1 of the 1962  Amendment Act.  That Section in specific terms says that s. 32(KK) (s. 7  of the Amendment Act) shall be deemed to have  come  into force  on the  30th  day  of October 1956.  We fail  to  see how  we  can ignore this mandate of the  legislature.   That provision   clearly   brings  out  the  intention   of   the legislature.   There  is  no ambiguity in  it.   It  is  not possible  to  adopt  any rule of  construction  which  would necessitate  the Court to ignore that provision.  It is  not possible to accept the conclusion of the High Court that  s. 32(KK)  must be deemed to have come into force on  the  date the  principal   Act  came  into force namely  on  March  6, 1955.  That is not even the case of the respondents.  Clause (b)  of  s.  32(KK) which is the  clause  relevant  for  our present purpose would be a meaningless provision unless  the same is read along with s. 32(FF) which was for (1) [1963] P.L.R. 961. 352 the. first time incorporated into the principal Act in  1959 though  it affects all transfers and other  dispositions  of land effected after August 21, 1956.  It is not the case  of the    respondents   that   the   transfers   effected    or the .partitions made before August 21, 1956. ,are within the mischief  of s. 32(FF) or s. 32(FF)  read  with  s.  32(KK). Therefore  there is no basis for saying that s.  32(KK)  has been  given  retrospective  effect  as  from  the  date  the principal Act came into force.     On  a  reading of the various provisions  of  the  Pepsu Tenancy  and Agricultural Lands (Amendment  and  Validation) Act,  1962, it appears to us that the  legislature  intended that  s. 7 of that .Act which introduced into the  principal Act s. 32(KK) should  be deemed to. have come into force  on the  30th  October  1956. Evidently the  draftsman  when  he drafted  s. 7 of that Act had in his mind the Amendment  Act and not the principal Act.  The words "this Act" in s. 7  of the  Amendment  Act (s. 32-KK of the principal Act)  in  our opinion  were intended to refer to  the  Amendment  Act  and not to the principal Act.  It is true that ordinarily when a Section  is incorporated into the principal Act by means  of an amendment, reference in that Section to "this Act"  means the principal Act. But in view of sub-s. (2) of s. 1 of  the Amendment   Act  of  1962  that  construction   has   become impermissible. Every statute has to be construed as a  whole

6

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 6  

and  the construction given should be a harmonious  one.  It may  be that the legislature intended that s. 32(KK)  should be  deemed  to  have come  into force on  the  30th  day  of October  1956, on which day s. 32(FF) became a part  of  the principal Act.  It is possible that the legislature did. not intend to give to that Section the same retrospective effect as it had given to s. 32(FF).  It is not permissible for  us to  proceed  on the basis that the legislature  had  enacted subs.  (2) of s. 1 of the Amendment Act 1962  by  oversight. If  any  mistake had crept into that Section it is  for  the legislature to correct the same and it is not for this Court to  proceed on the supposition that the same was enacted  by oversight.     For  the reasons mentioned above this appeal is  allowed and  the orders impugned in the Writ Petition  are  quashed. The  respondents shall pay the costs of the appellants  both in this  Court as well as in the High Court. R.K.P.S.                                  Appeal allowed. 353