REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.595 OF 2007

Aqeel Ahmad   …..Appellant

Versus

State of U.P.   …. Respondent  

(With Criminal Appeal Nos. 596 and 597 of 2007)

J U  D G M E N T

Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.

1. Challenge in these appeals is to the judgment of a Division Bench of

the  Allahabad  High  Court  upholding  the  conviction  of  appellant  Aqeel

Ahmad (Appellant  in Crl.  A. No.595/07) in Criminal Appeal No.2630 of

2004 but altering the sentence of death as awarded by learned Additional

District and Sessions Judge, Court No.3, Aligarh to life sentence.  Criminal

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Appeal No.2593 of 2004 filed by Ashiq Ali and Criminal Appeal No.2590

of  2004  filed  by  Mohammad  Shakir  and  Chaudhary  Aleem  were  also

dismissed.  The Criminal Reference for confirmation of death sentence as

referred  under Section 366 of  the  Code of  Criminal  Procedure,  1973 (in

short  the ‘Code’) was answered in the negative.  While Criminal  Appeal

No.595 of 2007 has been filed by Aqeel Ahmad, the other accused persons,

namely, Mohammad Shakir, Ashiq Ali and Irfan have filed Criminal Appeal

No.596  of  2007.  Since  the  accused  Ashiq  Ali  did  not  file  surrender

certificate, special leave petition was dismissed so far as he is concerned.

So far as accused Chaudhary Aleem and Irfan are concerned it is submitted

that  they have died during the  pendency of  the matter  before this  Court.

State  of  U.P.  has  filed  Criminal  Appeal  No.597  of  2007  questioning

alteration of death sentence to life sentence by the High Court.  

2. Background facts leading to the trial of accused persons as projected

by the prosecution is as follows:

A report was lodged by Ahmadur Rahman Sherwani at Police Station,

Civil Lines, Aligarh stating that some construction of lane from the crossing

of Amirnisha to Goshtwali  gali  was going on from the quota of  Khwaja

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Aleem, M.L.A. A banner was fixed by Vyapar Mandal, Amirnisha and on

the  banner,  name  of  his  son  Favad  Khan  Sherwani  was  mentioned  as

General Secretary. On 16.12.2001 at about 4.00 p.m. Shakir, Sabhasad had

taken  out  the  banner.  He  came  at  the  house  of  informant  armed  with

D.B.B.L. Gun. Irfan driver, Chaudhary Aleem, Shakir son of Shabbir and

Ashiq Ali. His sons Favad and Shahood Ali khan were present there and

they started abusing them and challenged saying that how he could dare to

fix the banner and set the banner on fire. His sons told him that since there

was a  festival  next  day,  they should  talk  about  it  later  on.  Hearing  this,

companions of Shakir Sabhasad exhorted and Shakir and appellant Aqueel

Ahmad started firing from their guns which hit both his sons. He alongwith

Iqbal  Ahmad,  Farooq  Ahmad,  Shah  Alam,  Jalaluddin,  Mohd.  Shabir,

Maroof Ahmad Khan, Majid Ali khan,  Subhash Chandra and others who

were  making  purchases  in  the  nearby  shops  came  to  rescue  them  and

accused persons firing from their country made pistols and guns went away.

His younger son Favad Khan (described as D1) died on the spot and injured

Shahood (described as D2) died in the hospital during treatment. Shah Alam

had also received fire arm injuries and he was taken to the Medical College.

The report was registered at the Police Station Civil Lines on 16.12.2001 at

6.25 p.m. and the distance of the police station is 1 km. from the place of

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occurrence.  After  the  registration of  the report,  Shri  B.K. Tiwari,  S.H.O.

Civil Lines started the investigation. He recorded the statement of scriber of

the report Om Prakash Chaturvedi, informant and Iqbal Ahmad. Thereafter,

he  reached  at  the  place  of  occurrence  and  prepared  the  site  plan  on  the

direction of the informant which is Ex.Ka-21. He prepared site plan of the

place where the banner was fixed,  which is  Ext.  Ka-22.  He prepared the

recovery  memo  of  the  blood  stained  and  plain  earth  and  prepared  the

recovery memo of empty cartridge 12 bore and one bullet. Recovery memo

of half burnt banner was prepared.  The recovery memos are Ext. Ka-23, 24

and 25. He recorded the statement of witnesses, thereafter he reached the

Medical  College  and  instructed  Sub-inspector  N.L.  Arya  to  prepare  the

inquest  memo  of  the  deceased  persons  Favad  and  Shahood.  After  the

preparation of inquest memos the dead bodies were sealed and handed over

to the constables for post-mortem examination on 17.12.2001. He recorded

the statements of Farooq Ahmad, Jalaluddin, Shakir son of Shabbir, Majid

Ali and lqbal Ahmad. Accused Shakir was arrested and his statement was

recorded. On 5.1.2002 statement of Shakir, Sabhasad was recorded and on

10.1.2002 statement of accused Aqeel Ahmad was recorded and they were

taken on police remand and on the pointing out of Shakir, Sabhasad a gun

was recovered and recovery memo was prepared which is Ext. Ka-27. On

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the pointing out of Aqeel Ahmad a gun was recovered and recovery memo

is Ext, Ka-28. On 25.1.2002 a D.B.B.L. Gun No. 17524 was recovered from

the shop of Choudhary Gun House, Arms and Ammunition Dealer, Malviya

Market, Aligarh, recovery memo is Ext. Ka-38. A written application was

given by the proprietor of the Gun House   Surendra Singh. The gun was

deposited by Ashiq Ali, the recovery memo is Ext.Ka-30.  

After  the  investigation  he  submitted  the  charge  sheet  against  the

accused persons. Since the accused persons abjured guilt they were put on

trial. To establish the accusations prosecution examined 12 witnesses, out of

whom PW-1 is the informant and father of the deceased. PWs 2 and 3 were

stated  to  be  eye-witnesses.   The  two  deceased  persons  are  Favad  and

Shahood and as noted above are described as D1 and D2. Placing reliance

on  the  evidence  of  the  prosecution  witnesses,  the  trial  Court  found  the

accused persons guilty. Out of 6 accused persons, accused Shakir absconded

and he had not faced trial.  The trial Court had found the evidence of eye

witnesses  clear,  cogent  and  trustworthy  and  recorded  the  conviction  as

noted above.  While the accused Aqeel Ahmad was convicted under Section

302 IPC and sentenced to death, the other accused persons Irfan, Chaudhary

Aleem, Ashiq Ali and Shakir were convicted for offence punishable under

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Section  302  read  with  Section  149  IPC  and  sentenced  to  undergo

imprisonment  for  life.  Each  of  the  accused  persons  were  also  convicted

under Section 148 IPC and sentenced to two years imprisonment.  Before

the  High  Court  in  the  appeals  and  the  Reference  for  confirmation  of

sentence,  the  basic  stand  of  the  accused  persons  was  that  there  was

unexplained delay in lodging the FIR. The presence of PW-1 has not been

established. There was no evidence that the special report was sent to the

Magistrate.  Since Shah Alam who was stated to be an injured witness was

not  examined,  the  evidence  of  PWs  2  and  3  cannot  be  believed.  The

investigation was tainted. Appropriate questions were not put under Section

313 of the Code.  There was no evidence to show that death was on account

of appellants’ firing and in any event the ingredients of Section 302 are not

made out and at the most even if the prosecution version is accepted in its

totality, the offence would be under Section 304 Part I IPC.   

The  High  Court  did  not  find  any  substance  in  these  pleas.   The

appeals were dismissed but the death sentence was altered to life sentence in

case of accused Aqueel Ahmad, as noted above.   

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3. In support of appeals by the accused persons, learned counsel for the

appellants re-iterated the various stands taken before the High Court.

4. It is pointed out that there was no evidence that the special report was

sent to the concerned Magistrate with reference to Section 157 of the Code.

It  is  submitted  that  the  requirements  have  not  been  complied  with.  In

response,  learned  counsel  for  the  informant  and  the  State  supported  the

judgment. Additionally, learned counsel for the State submitted that this was

a case where death sentence as awarded by the trial Court should have been

confirmed.   

5. There is no doubt that  forwarding of the report is indispensable and

absolute and it has to be forwarded with earliest dispatch which intention is

implicit with the use of the word ‘forthwith’ occurring in Section 157 of the

Code  which  means  promptly  and  without  any  undue  delay.   The  real

purpose is to avoid possibility of the improvement in the prosecution case

and introduction of distorted version by deliberations and consultation and

to enable the Magistrate concerned to have a watch on the progress of the

investigation.  In Sunil Kumar v. State of Rajasthan (2005 (9)  SCC 283) it

was observed by this Court that as a rule of universal application it cannot

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be laid down that whenever there is some delay in sending the FIR to the

Magistrate,  the  prosecution  version  becomes unreliable.  It  would depend

upon the facts of each case. It was noted in the said case that investigation

was taken up immediately and certain steps in the investigation were taken.

Therefore,  the  plea  that  there  was  delayed FIR and/or  that  the  FIR was

inexistent at the relevant point of time was turned down.  In the instant case

the High Court noted that the same was received on 20.12.2001. The High

Court observed that if there was any lapse on the part of the investigating

officer, that would not affect the credibility of the prosecution version.   

6. Another  factor  which  was  highlighted  by  learned  counsel  for  the

appellants was that the prejudice is caused because the evidence of PWs 9

and 10 show that there were some deliberations and improvements made.

Non examination of Shah Alam who is supposed to be injured witness also

has relevance.  It is pointed out that the medical evidence is contrary to the

oral testimony.  Since the medical report shows two wound and two entries

it was stated that firing took place once.   

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7. Interestingly,  as  rightly  submitted  by respondents  that  no  question

was put to the relevant witnesses on this aspect.  Submissions were made

regarding nature of the wounds.  

8. It was also stated that PW-1 could have used one of the cars which he

possessed and there is no reason as to why he had taken the deceased on

scooter. This has also been explained by the prosecution witnesses.

9. So far as applicability of Section 149 IPC is concerned, it is submitted

that the co-accused included the driver. If they were carrying weapons, there

was  no  question  of  any  exhortation.  It  may  have  been  done  by  the

absconding accused. It is unlikely that the driver would give orders to his

master.   

10. In Sunil Kumar’s case (supra) it was inter alia observed as follows:

7.  The  pivotal  question  is  applicability  of  Section  149  IPC. Said  provision  has  its  foundation  on  constructive  liability which is the sine qua non for its operation. The emphasis is on the  common  object  and  not  on  common  intention.  Mere presence in an unlawful assembly cannot render a person liable unless there was a common object and he was actuated by that common object and that object is one of those set out in Section 141.   Where common object  of  an unlawful  assembly is  not proved, the accused persons cannot be convicted with the help of Section 149. The crucial question to determine is whether

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the assembly consisted of five or more persons and whether the said persons entertained one or more of the common objects, as specified in Section 141. It cannot be laid down as a general proposition of law that unless an overt act is proved against a person, who is alleged to be a member of unlawful assembly, it cannot be said that he is a member of such an assembly.  The only thing required is that he should have understood that the assembly was unlawful  and was likely to  commit any of the acts which fall  within the purview of Section 141. The word ‘object’ means the purpose or design and, in order to make it ‘common’, it must be shared by all.  In other words, the object should be common to the persons, who compose the assembly, that is to say, they should all be aware of it and concur in it.  A common  object  may  be  formed  by  express  agreement  after mutual consultation, but that is by no means necessary.  It may be formed at any stage by all or a few members of the assembly and the other members may just join and adopt it. Once formed, it  need  not  continue  to  be  the  same. It  may be  modified  or altered  or  abandoned  at  any  stage.  The  expression  ‘in prosecution  of  common object’  as  appearing  in  Section  149 have to be strictly construed as equivalent to ‘in order to attain the common object’. It must be immediately connected with the common object by virtue of the nature of the object. There must be community of object and the object may exist only up to a particular stage, and not thereafter.  Members of an unlawful assembly may have  community of  object  up to  certain  point beyond  which  they  may  differ  in  their  objects  and  the knowledge, possessed by each member of what is likely to be committed in prosecution of their common object may vary not only  according  to  the  information  at  his  command,  but  also according to the extent to which he shares the community of object, and as a consequence of this the effect of Section 149, IPC  may  be  different  on  different  members  of  the  same assembly.

8. ‘Common object’ is different from a ‘common intention’ as it does not require a prior concert and a common meeting of minds  before  the  attack.   It  is  enough  if  each  has  the  same object in view and their number is five or more and that they act as an assembly to achieve that object. The ‘common object’

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of an assembly is to be ascertained from the acts and language of the members composing it, and from a consideration of all the  surrounding  circumstances.  It  may be  gathered  from the course of  conduct  adopted  by the members  of  the assembly. What  the  common  object  of  the  unlawful  assembly  is  at  a particular stage of the incident is essentially a question of fact to be determined, keeping in view the nature of the assembly, the  arms  carried  by  the  members,  and  the  behaviour  of  the members at or near the scene of the incident. It is not necessary under  law  that  in  all  cases  of  unlawful  assembly,  with  an unlawful  common  object,  the  same  must  be  translated  into action or be successful. Under the Explanation to Section 141, an assembly which was not unlawful when it was assembled, may subsequently become unlawful. It is not necessary that the intention  or  the  purpose,  which  is  necessary  to  render  an assembly an unlawful one comes into existence at the outset. The  time  of  forming  an  unlawful  intent  is  not  material.  An assembly which, at its commencement or even for some time thereafter,  is  lawful,  may subsequently  become unlawful.  In other words it can develop during the course of incident at the spot eo instante.

9. Section 149, IPC consists of two parts. The first part of the  section  means  that  the  offence  to  be  committed  in prosecution  of  the  common  object  must  be  one  which  is committed with a view to accomplish the common object.  In order that the offence may fall within the first part, the offence must be connected immediately with the common object of the unlawful assembly of which the accused was member. Even if the  offence  committed  is  not  in  direct  prosecution  of  the common object of the assembly, it may yet fall under Section 141, if it can be held that the offence was such as the members knew was likely to be committed and this is what is required in the  second  part  of  the  section.  The  purpose  for  which  the members of the assembly set out or desired to achieve is the object. If the object desired by all the members is the same, the knowledge that is the object which is being pursued is shared by all the members and they are in general agreement as to how it is to be achieved and that is now the common object of the assembly. An object is entertained in the human mind, and it

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being  merely  a  mental  attitude,  no  direct  evidence  can  be available and, like intention, has generally to be gathered from the  act  which  the  person  commits  and  the  result  therefrom. Though  no  hard  and  fast  rule  can  be  laid  down  under  the circumstances  from which  the  common object  can  be  culled out,  it  may  reasonably  be  collected  from  the  nature  of  the assembly, arms it carries and behaviour at the time of or before or after the occurrence. The word ‘knew’ used in the second limb of the section implies something more than a possibility and it cannot be made to bear the sense of ‘might have been known’. Positive knowledge is necessary. When an offence is committed  in  prosecution  of  the  common  object,  it  would generally  be  an  offence  which  the  members  of  the  unlawful assembly knew was likely to be committed in prosecution of the common object. That, however, does not make the converse proposition true; there may be cases which would come within the second  part  but  not  within  the  first  part.  The distinction between  the  two  parts  of  Section  149  cannot  be  ignored  or obliterated. In every case it would be an issue to be determined, whether the offence committed falls within the first part or it was an offence such as the members of the assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of the common object and falls within the second part. However, there may be cases which would be within the first part but offences committed in prosecution of the common object would also be generally, if not always, be within the second part, namely, offences which the parties knew to be likely to be committed in the prosecution of the common object. (See Chikkarange Gowda and others v. State of Mysore  AIR 1956 SC 731).

xx xx xx

12. It  has  been  established  by  the  evidence  of  the  eye witnesses that all  the eight accused persons were armed with weapons, they surrounded the deceased and in fact prevented others from going near the deceased to rescue him.  They had arrived together in the same jeep and left by the jeep after the incident.  One important and relevant  factor, which has been noticed by the trial court and the High Court, is that the jeep was kept in starting position. Significantly the defence in the

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cross examination brought out the fact that the accused persons surrounded the deceased and prevented those who wanted to go to  rescue  the  deceased  by  threatening  them  with  dire consequences.  The  trial  court  and  the  High  Court  have analysed the factual position in great detail and have pointed out  the  aforesaid  relevant  factors.  Therefore,  there  is  no infirmity  in  the  conclusion  of  the  courts  below  about  the applicability of Section 149 IPC.  

xx xx xx

17. Where a group of assailants who were members of the unlawful assembly proceeds to commit the crime in pursuance of the common object of that assembly, it is often not possible for witnesses to describe the actual part played by each one of them and when several persons armed with weapons assault the intended victim, all  of  them may not  take  part  in  the actual assault.  Therefore, it was not necessary for the prosecution to establish  as  to  the  specific  overt  act  was  done  by  each accused.”

11. It was pointed out by learned counsel appearing for the informant and

the State that there was no possibility of any false or delayed FIR and there

has been no prejudice caused. The accused persons accepted that there was

no previous enmity and, therefore, the question of any fabrication does not

arise.   As  regards  the  delayed  dispatch  of  report  of  the  Magistrate  is

concerned, reference can also be made to the decision of this Court in Pala

Singh and Anr. v.  State of Punjab (1972 (2) SCC 640).  In para 8 it  was

observed as follows:   

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“8. Shri Kohli  strongly criticised the fact that the occurrence report  contemplated  by  Section  157  CrPC  was  sent  to  the Magistrate concerned very late. Indeed, this challenge, like the argument of interpolation and belated despatch of the inquest report,  was  developed  for  the  purpose  of  showing  that  the investigation was not just, fair and forthright and, therefore, the prosecution case must be looked at with great suspicion. This argument is also unacceptable. No doubt, the report reached the Magistrate  at  about  6  p.m.  Section  157  CrPC requires  such report to be sent forthwith by the police officer concerned to a Magistrate  empowered  to  take  cognizance  of  such  offence. This is really designed to keep the Magistrate informed of the investigation  of  such  cognizable  offence  so  as  to  be  able  to control  the investigation and if necessary to give appropriate direction under Section 159. But when we find in this case that the  FIR  was  actually  recorded  without  delay  and  the investigation started on the basis of that FIR and there is no other infirmity brought to our notice, then, however improper or  objectionable  the  delayed  receipt  of  the  report  by  the Magistrate concerned it cannot by itself justify the conclusion that  the  investigation  was  tainted  and  the  prosecution insupportable. It is not the appellants’ case that they have been prejudiced by this delay.”

12. So  far  as  the  purported  delayed  registration  or  manipulation  is

concerned it is to be noted that investigation commenced immediately. In

State of Karnataka v. Moin Patel and Ors. (1996 (8) SCC167),  it was noted

as follows:

“16. The matter can be viewed from another angle also. It has already been found by us that the prosecution case that the FIR was  promptly  lodged  at  or  about  1.30  a.m.  and  that  the investigation started on the basis thereof is wholly reliable and

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acceptable. Judged in the context of the above facts the mere delay in dispatch of the FIR — and for that matter in receipt thereof by the Magistrate — would not make the prosecution case  suspect  for  as  has  been  pointed  out  by  a  three-Judge Bench  of  this  Court  in  Pala  Singh v.  State  of  Punjab,  the relevant  provision  contained  in  Section  157  CrPC regarding forthwith dispatch of the report (FIR) is really designed to keep the Magistrate  informed of  the investigation  of  a cognizable offence  so  as  to  be  able  to  control  the  investigation  and  if necessary to give proper direction under Section 159 CrPC and therefore if in a given case it  is found that FIR was recorded without  delay and the  investigation  started  on  that  FIR then however improper or objectionable the delayed receipt of the report  by the Magistrate concerned, it  cannot by itself justify the  conclusion  that  the  investigation  was  tainted  and  the prosecution unsupportable.”

13. In  Rabindra Mahto and Anr. v.  State of Jharkhand (2006 (10) SCC

432), the position was re-iterated in paras 19 and 20.

14. PW-12 has referred to Ext. Ka-21 and Ka-22, (the site plan) and case

number  i.e.  crime  No.570  of  2001  has  been  clearly  mentioned.  The

correctness  of  Exts.  Ka-21  and  Ka-22  has  not  been  challenged.   On

18.12.2001 the proceedings in terms of Sections 82 and 83 of the Code were

initiated and non-bailable warrants were issued. On 20.12.2001 on the basis

of the report attachment of the property was directed. Even if there has been

lapse in the investigation as contended by learned counsel for the appellants

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that cannot affect the credibility of the witnesses.  (See Ram Bali v. State of

U.P. 2004  (10)  SCC  598).  It  was  highlighted  that  in  the  panchanama

prepared under Section 174 of the Code names of accused persons were not

indicated and that adds vulnerability to the prosecution version. This plea is

clearly unsustainable. In Amar Singh v. Balwinder Singh and Ors. (2003 (2)

SCC 518), it was observed as follows:  

“12. The High Court has also held that the details about the occurrence  were  not  mentioned  in  the  inquest  report  which showed that the investigating officer was not sure of the facts when the inquest  report  was prepared and this feature of the case carried weight in favour of the accused. We are unable to accept  this  reasoning  of  the  High  Court.  The  provision  for holding  of  an  inquest  and  preparing  an  inquest  report  is contained in Section 174 CrPC. The heading of the section is “Police to enquire and report on suicide etc.” Sub-section (1) of  this  section provides  that  when the officer  in charge of  a police station or some other police officer specially empowered by the  State  Government  in  that  behalf  receives  information that  a  person  has  committed  suicide,  or  has  been  killed  by another or by an animal or by machinery or by an accident, or has  died  under  circumstances  raising  a  reasonable  suspicion that  some  other  person  has  committed  an  offence,  he  shall immediately  give  information  to  the  nearest  Executive Magistrate and shall  proceed to the place where the body of such deceased person is, and there, in the presence of two or more respectable inhabitants of the neighbourhood, shall make an investigation, and draw up a report of the apparent cause of death  describing  such  wounds,  fractures,  bruises,  and  other marks of injury as may be found on the body and stating in what manner, or by what weapon or instrument (if any), such marks appear  to  have been inflicted.  The requirement  of  the section is that the police officer shall record the apparent cause of death describing the wounds as may be found on the body

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and also  the  weapon  or  instrument  by which  they appear  to have been inflicted and this has to be done in the presence of two or more respectable inhabitants of the neighbourhood. The section  does  not  contemplate  that  the  manner  in  which  the incident  took  place  or  the  names  of  the  accused  should  be mentioned in the inquest report. The basic purpose of holding an inquest is to report regarding the apparent cause of death, namely, whether it is suicidal, homicidal, accidental or by some machinery etc.  The scope and purpose of  Section  174 CrPC was  explained by this  Court  in  Pedda Narayana v.  State  of A.P. (1975 (4) SCC 153)  and it will be useful to reproduce the same: (SCC pp. 157-58, para 11):

‘The proceedings under Section 174 have a very limited  scope.  The  object  of  the  proceedings  is merely  to  ascertain  whether  a  person  has  died under  suspicious  circumstances  or  an  unnatural death and if so what is the apparent cause of the death. The question regarding the details as to how the deceased was assaulted or who assaulted him or under what  circumstances he was assaulted is foreign to the ambit and scope of the proceedings under Section 174. Neither in practice nor in law was it  necessary for  the  police  to  mention  those details in the inquest report.

It  is  therefore  not  necessary  to  enter  all  the details of the overt acts in the inquest report. Their omission  is  not  sufficient  to  put  the  prosecution out of court.’

13. In Khujji v.  State of M.P.(1991 (3) SCC 627)  this Court, after placing reliance upon the abovequoted decision, rejected the contention raised on behalf of the accused that the evidence of eyewitnesses could not be relied upon as their names did not figure  in  the  inquest  report  prepared  at  the  earliest  point  of time.  In  Shakila  Khader v.  Nausheer  Cama (1975  (4)  SCC 122)   it  was held that  an inquest  under Section 174 CrPC is

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concerned with establishing the cause of the death only. The High Court was, therefore, clearly in error in holding that as the facts about the occurrence were not mentioned in the inquest report, it would show that at least by the time the report was prepared the investigating officer was not sure of the facts of the case.”

15. Therefore, the appeals filed by the accused persons are without merit,

deserve dismissal which we direct.  

16. So  far  State’s  appeal  as  regards  sentence  is  concerned,  it  is  to  be

noted that number of deaths in a case would not be the determinative factor

for awarding the death sentence.  Even in  the case of single victim death

sentence can be awarded taking into consideration the circumstances of the

case.  In the instant case looking to the background facts it cannot be said

that  the High Court  by altering the sentence from death to life has acted

inappropriately.  We,  therefore,  dismiss  the  State’s  appeal  also.   All  the

appeals are dismissed.  

……………………….…………..J. (Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT)

……………………………….…..J.

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(Dr. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA) New Delhi December 19, 2008

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