IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3478                   OF 2010 (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 17965 of 2008)

Anoop Sharma  ...Appellant  

Versus

Executive Engineer, Public Health Division No.1 Panipat (Haryana) ...Respondent

J  U  D  G  M  E  N  T  

G.S. Singhvi, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. The  only  question  which  requires  consideration  in  this  appeal  is  

whether  the Division Bench of  Punjab and Haryana High Court  erred in  

upsetting award dated 1.8.2002 passed by Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour  

Court,  Panipat  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  “the  Labour  Court”)  for  

reinstatement of the appellant without even recording a finding that the same  

suffered  from any jurisdictional  error  or  violation  of  the  rules  of  natural  

justice or was vitiated by an error of law apparent on the face of the record.

3. The appellant was engaged/employed by the respondent as Mali-cum-

Chowkidar with effect from 11.10.1995.  He was paid monthly wages at the  

rate of Rs.1900/-.  His service was discontinued with effect from 25.4.1998.  

The  dispute  raised  by  the  appellant  was  referred  by  the  Government  of  

Haryana  to  the  Labour  Court  under  Section  10(1)(c)  of  the  Industrial  

Disputes Act, 1947 (for short, “the Act”).  In the statement of claim filed by  

him, the appellant pleaded that he had worked for a period of more than two  

years and six months;  that  his service was discontinued with effect  from  

25.4.1998 without giving him notice or pay in lieu thereof or retrenchment  

compensation and without complying with mandate of Section 25-N of the  

Act.  Another plea taken by the appellant was that no seniority list of the  

workers  had  been  prepared  and  persons  junior  to  him,  namely,  Ramesh,  

Amarjit,  Jagbir  and  Rohtash  were  retained  in  service.   In  the  written  

statement filed by the respondent,  it  was pleaded that the services of the  

appellant and other similarly situated employees were discontinued because  

the State Government had issued instructions to that effect in the wake of  

financial  crisis.   It  was  further  pleaded  that  the  workman  was  offered  

compensation along with the letter of termination, but he refused to accept  

the same and left the station and, therefore, demand draft bearing No.056997  

dated 25.4.1998 for a sum of Rs.5,491/- was sent at his residence.   For the  

sake of convenient reference, the relevant portions of the written statement,

as contained in the paper book of this appeal, are extracted below:-

“PRELIMINARY OBJECTION

1. xxx xxx xxx

2. That as per rules prescribed in section 25-F of Industrial  Dispute  Act,  the  workman  was  offered  the  amount  of  compensation with termination letter but the claimant refused to  take the same and soon after he left the station also.  A demand  draft bearing No.056997 dated 25.4.98 amounting to Rs.5491/-  was sent to the 18.8.1998 workman residence but he refused to  accept it and registered letter received back undelivered.  The  said draft/banker cheque was once again sent to the claimant  home address.  2nd time the same was received/accepted by the  claimant.   Keeping-in-view  the  facts  stated  above  the  respondent is not at fault in any manner so the present claim  statement  filed  by  the  claimant  is  not  maintainable  in  any  manner.

ON MERIT

1. That  in reply to  para  no.1 of  the claim statement it  is  stated that the claimant was engaged as casual labour in 12/95  and his services were dispensed with on 25.498 due to financial  crunch being experienced by the Govt. of Haryana as already  explained in para no.1 of the preliminary objection.

a) That para no.1(a) of the claim statement is wrong  and denied, the notice dated 25.4.98 along with a  demand  draft  bearing  No.056997  dated  25.4.98  amounting  to  Rs.5491/-  was  offered  to  the  claimant on dated 25.4.98 but the claimant refused  to take the same and soon after he left the station  also, later on the said draft was sent to the claimant  residence which was received by him.

b) That  the  para  no.1(b)  of  the  claim  statement  is  wrong and denied as already explained above the  retrenchment compensation as per Section 25-F of  the I.D. Act was offered to the claimant on 25.4.98  but he refused to take the same and soon after left  the station also.  The demand draft was sent to his  home address which was received by him.

c) xxx xxx xxx d) xxx xxx xxx”

4. The  appellant  appeared  as  WW-1  and  reiterated  the  averments  

contained in the statement of claim.  On behalf of the respondent, Shri Ram  

Chander was examined as MW-1.  He stated that the appellant had worked  

as casual labour from December 1995 to 25.4.1998 with breaks and that he  

was given retrenchment compensation with letter Ex. M-1 dated 25.4.1998,  

which  he  refused  to  accept.   Shri  Ram  Chander  further  stated  that  the  

amount of compensation was sent to the appellant at his home address by  

demand draft Ext. M-3 dated 25.4.1998.  According to Shri Ram Chander,  

no person junior to the appellant was retained in the department.  However,  

no  evidence  was  produced  by  the  respondent  to  corroborate  the  oral  

assertion of Shri Ram Chander that the appellant had refused to accept the  

compensation.

5. After  considering  the  pleadings  and  evidence  of  the  parties,  the  

Labour Court recorded the following conclusions:

(1) That the total number of employees in the department was about  

400 and,  therefore,  compliance of Section 25-N of the Act was  

mandatory before terminating the services of the workman.

(2) From Ext. M-4 it is clear that the workman received the amount of  

compensation on 18.8.1998, i.e., after the months and 23 days.

(3) The plea of the management that compensation was refused by the  

workman is not supported by any proof or other evidence.

(4) The workman is entitled to reinstatement with full back wages.

6. The respondent  challenged  the award of  the  Labour  Court  in  Writ  

Petition No. 6849/2004.  By the impugned order, the Division Bench of the  

High Court allowed the writ petition and set aside the award by observing  

that there was no reason for the Labour Court to record a finding that the  

compensation was not offered to the workman at the time of retrenchment.  

The  Division  Bench  also  held  that  the  appellant  cannot  be  reinstated  in  

service because he was not appointed against any sanctioned post and he  

was  initially  employed  without  complying  with  the  statutory  provisions.  

This is evinced from the following extract of the impugned order:

“During the course of arguments, learned counsel appearing for  the petitioner argued that in view of the nature of appointment  of respondent No.1, he cannot be ordered to be reinstated.  The  respondent has not shown before the Labour Court or before  this Court that he had been appointed on a sanctioned post in  consonance with the provisions of Articles  14 and 16 of the  Constitution of India.  It has further not been shown that the  entry in service of the respondent was legal and in accordance  with the statutory provisions and rules framed thereunder.  A  person who has taken entry illegally by the back door cannot be  permitted to be reinstated in view of the law laid down by the  Hon’ble Supreme Court in recent judgments.”

For  arriving  at  the  aforementioned conclusion,  the  Division  Bench  

relied upon the judgments of this Court in Himanshu Kumar Vidyarthi v.  

State of Bihar AIR 1997 SC 3657,  Municipal Council, Samrala v. Raj  

Kumar (2006) 3 SCC 81,  Reserve Bank of India v. Gopinath Sharma  

(2006) 6 SCC 221, Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Uma Devi (2006) 4  

SCC 1,  U.P. Power Corporation Ltd. v. Bijli Mazdoor Sangh (2007) 5  

SCC 755 and Haryana Urban Development Authority v. Om Pal (2007)  

5 SCC 745.

7. Shri Brijender Chahar, learned senior counsel for the appellant argued  

that  the  finding  recorded  by  the  Labour  Court  on  the  issue  of  non-

compliance of Section 25-F of the Act was a pure finding of fact based on  

correct  appreciation of the pleadings and evidence of  the parties  and the  

High Court committed a jurisdictional error by interfering with the award of  

reinstatement.   Learned counsel submitted that even though the respondent  

had pleaded before the Labour Court that compensation was offered to the  

appellant on the date of termination of his service and he refused to accept  

the same but no evidence was produced to substantiate the same.  Learned  

counsel further argued that the alleged violation of the doctrine of equality  

enshrined in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution has no bearing on the

appellant’s  case  because  appointment  of  casual,  daily  wage and monthly  

rated employees do not require advertisement of the post or consideration of  

the competing claims of all eligible persons.  Learned counsel pointed out  

that the respondent had not pleaded either before the Labour Court or the  

High Court that the appellant’s initial engagement/employment was contrary  

to any statute or Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and argued that in the  

absence of a specific plea having been taken in that regard, High Court was  

not at all justified in setting aside the award of reinstatement on the specious  

ground that the appellant’s entry in the service was not legal.

8. Ms. Sukhda Pritam, learned counsel for the respondent argued that the  

High  Court  did  not  commit  any  error  by  setting  aside  the  award  of  the  

Labour Court because the finding recorded by it on the issue of violation of  

Section 25-F of the Act was perverse.  She submitted that before terminating  

the appellant’s service, the respondent had complied with the mandate of  

Section 25-F of the Act by offering him demand draft of Rs.5,491/- but the  

Labour Court ignored this stark fact and passed the award for reinstatement  

of the appellant with back wages.   

9. We have considered the respective submissions.   At the outset,  we  

deem  it  necessary  to  mention  that  action  taken  by  the  respondent  to

terminate the services of other similarly situated employees, namely, Rakesh  

Sharma son of Mulkh Raj Sharma, Tejbir Singh, Ram Mehar Singh, Parveen  

Sharma,  Babu  Ram,  Karan  Singh,  Baldev  Singh,  Jaipal  Singh,  Naresh  

Kumar, Jagbir, Rakesh Sharma son of Chajju Ram, Jai Singh, Balbir Singh  

and Ballu Nandwal without complying with Section 25-F of the Act was  

annulled  by  the  Labour  Court  vide  award  dated  8.9.2000  passed  in  

Reference Nos. 1330 to 1338, 1366, 1270, 1273, 1407 and 1525 of 1999 and  

Civil  Writ  Petition  No.  3970/2001,  LPA No.  8/2002  and  Special  Leave  

Petition (Civil) No. 11475/2002 filed by the State of Haryana against the  

award of the Labour Court were dismissed by the High Court and this Court  

respectively.

10. A reading of the impugned order shows that the Division Bench of the  

High Court set aside the award of the Labour Court without even adverting  

to  the  fact  that  challenge  to  similar  award  passed  in  the  cases  of  other  

employees was negatived by the High Court and this Court.  We have no  

doubt that if the Division Bench had taken the trouble of ascertaining the  

status  of  the  disputes  raised  by  other  employees,  then  it  would  have  

discovered that the award of reinstatement of similarly situated employees  

has been upheld by the High Court and this Court and in that event, it may  

not have passed the impugned order.  That apart, we find that even though

the Division Bench did not come to the conclusion that the finding recorded  

by the Labour Court on the issue of non-compliance of Section 25-F of the  

Act  is  vitiated  by an error  of  law apparent  on the  face  of  the  record,  it  

allowed  the  writ  petition  by  assuming  that  the  appellant’s  initial  

engagement/employment  was  not  legal  and the  respondent  had  complied  

with the conditions of a valid retrenchment.    In our view, the approach  

adopted  by  the  Division  Bench  is  contrary  to  the  judicially  recognised  

limitations of the High Court’s power to issue writ of certiorari under Article  

226 of the Constitution -  Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan (1964) 5  

SCR 64,  Municipal  Board,  Saharanpur v.  Imperial  Tobacco of  India  

Ltd. (1999) 1 SCC 566,  Lakshmi Precision Screws Ltd. v. Ram Bhagat  

(2002) 6 SCC 552,  Mohd. Shahnawaz Akhtar v. Ist ADJ Varanasi JT  

2002 (8) SC 69, Mukand Ltd. v. Mukand Staff and Officers’ Association  

(2004) 10 SCC 460,  Dharamraj and others v. Chhitan and others 2006  

(11)  SCALE 292 and  Assistant Commissioner,  Income Tax,  Rajkot v.  

Saurashtra Kutch Stock Exchange Ltd. 2008 (12) SCALE 582.   

11. In  Syed Yakoob v.  K.S.  Radhakrishnan (supra),  the Constitution  

Bench of this Court considered the scope of the High Court’s jurisdiction to  

issue a writ of certiorari in cases involving challenge to the orders passed by  

the  authorities  entrusted  with  quasi  judicial  functions  under  the  Motor

Vehicles  Act,  1939.    Speaking  for  majority  of  the  Constitution  Bench,  

Gajendragadkar, J. observed as under:

“…………………A  writ  of  certiorari  can  be  issued  for  correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts  or  Tribunals;  these  are  cases  where  orders  are  passed  by  inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or in excess  of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdictions. A writ  can  similarly  be  issued  where  in  exercise  of  jurisdiction  conferred  on  it,  the  Court  or  Tribunal  acts  illegally  or  improperly,  as  for  instance,  it  decides  a  question  without  giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the  order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the  dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is,  however,  no doubt  that  the  jurisdiction  to  issue a  writ  of  certiorari  is  a  supervisory  jurisdiction  and  the  Court  exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This  limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by  the inferior Court or Tribunal as a result of the appreciation  of  evidence  cannot  be  reopened  or  questioned  in  writ  proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face  of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of  fact,  however  grave  it  may  appear  to  be.  In  regard  to  a  finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal a writ of certiorari  can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding,  the  Tribunal  had  erroneously  refused  to  admit  admissible  and  material  evidence,  or  had  erroneously  admitted  inadmissible  evidence which has influenced the impugned  finding.  Similarly,  if  a  finding  of  fact  is  based  on  no  evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which  can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this  category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind  that  a  finding of  fact  recorded by the  Tribunal  cannot  be  challenged  in  proceedings  for  a  writ  of  certiorari  on  the  ground  that  the  relevant  and  material  evidence  adduced  before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain  the  impugned  finding. The  adequacy  or  sufficiency  of  evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn  from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of  the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a  writ  court.  It  is  within  these  limits  that  the  jurisdiction

conferred on the High Courts under Art. 226 to issue a writ  of certiorari can be legitimately exercised.”

(emphasis supplied)

12. Section 25-B, which defines the term `continuous service’ and Section  

25-F(a) and (b) of the Act, which mandates giving of one month’s notice or  

pay in lieu thereof and retrenchment compensation to the workman whose  

service is sought to be terminated otherwise than by way of punishment or in  

accordance with the express terms incorporated in the order of appointment,  

read as under:

25B. Definition of continuous service. –  For the purposes of  this Chapter,--

(1) a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a  period  if  he  is,  for  that  period,  in  uninterrupted  service,  including  service  which  may  be  interrupted  on  account  of  sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike which is  not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due  to any fault on the part of the workman;  

(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the  meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year or six months, he  shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer —

(a) for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of  twelve  calendar  months  preceding the  date  with  reference  to  which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the  employer for not less than—

(i) one  hundred  and  ninety  days  in  the  case  of  a  workman employed below ground in a mine; and

(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case;

(b) for a period of six months, if the workman, during a period  of  six  calendar  months  preceding  the  date  with  reference  to  which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the  employer for not less than –  

(i) ninety-five  days,  in  the  case  of  a  workman  employed below ground in a mine; and

(ii) one hundred and twenty days, in any other case.  

Explanation.--For  the  purposes  of  clause  (2),  the  number  of  days  on  which  a  workman  has  actually  worked  under  an  employer shall include the days on which—

(i) he  has  been  laid-off  under  an  agreement  or  as  permitted  by  standing  orders  made  under  the  Industrial  Employment  (Standing  Orders)  Act,  1946 (20 of 1946), or under this Act or under any  other  law  applicable  to  the  industrial  establishment;  

(ii) he has been on leave with full wages, earned in the  previous years;

(iii) he has been absent due to temporary disablement  caused by accident arising out of and in the course  of his employment; and  

(iv) in the case of a female, she has been on maternity  leave;  so,  however,  that  the  total  period of  such  maternity leave does not exceed twelve weeks.

25F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen. -  No  workman  employed  in  any  industry  who  has  been  in  continuous service for not less than one year under an employer  shall be retrenched by that employer until –  

(a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing  indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice  has  expired,  or  the  workman  has  been  paid  in  lieu  of  such  notice, wages for the period of the notice;  (b) the workman has been paid, at  the time of retrenchment,  compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average  pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part  thereof in excess of six months (c)  xxxx xxxx xxxx

13. An  analysis  of  the  above  reproduced  provisions  shows  that  no  

workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for  

not less than one year under an employer can be retrenched by that employer  

until the conditions enumerated in Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 25-F of the  

Act are satisfied.  In terms of Clause (a), the employer is required to give to  

the  workman  one  month’s  notice  in  writing  indicating  the  reasons  for  

retrenchment or pay him wages in lieu of the notice.  Clause (b) casts a duty  

upon the employer to pay to the workman  at the time of retrenchment,  

compensation equivalent to fifteen days’ average pay for every completed  

year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of six months.   This  

Court  has  repeatedly  held  that  Section  25-F(a)  and  (b)  of  the  Act  is  

mandatory  and  non-compliance  thereof  renders  the  retrenchment  of  an  

employee nullity - State of Bombay v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha AIR 1960  

SC 610, Bombay Union of Journalists v. State of Bombay (1964) 6 SCR  

22, State Bank of India v. N. Sundara Money (1976) 1 SCC 822, Santosh  

Gupta  v.  State  Bank  of  Patiala (1980)  3  SCC  340,  Mohan  Lal  v.  

Management  of  M/s.  Bharat  Electronics  Ltd.  (1981)  3  SCC  225,  L.  

Robert D’Souza v. Executive Engineer, Southern Railway (1982) 1 SCC  

645, Surendra Kumar Verma v. Industrial Tribunal (1980) 4 SCC 443,  

Gammon India Ltd. v. Niranjan Das (1984) 1 SCC 509, Gurmail Singh  

v. State of Punjab (1991) 1 SCC 189 and Pramod Jha v. State of Bihar

(2003) 4 SCC 619.   This Court has used different expressions for describing  

the  consequence  of  terminating  a  workman’s  service/employment/  

engagement by way of retrenchment without complying with the mandate of  

Section 25-F of the Act.  Sometimes it  has been termed as  ab initio void,  

sometimes as illegal per se, sometimes as nullity and sometimes as non est.  

Leaving  aside  the  legal  semantics,  we  have  no  hesitation  to  hold  that  

termination  of  service  of  an  employee  by  way  of  retrenchment  without  

complying with the requirement of giving one month’s notice or pay in lieu  

thereof and compensation in terms of Section 25-F(a) and (b) has the effect  

of  rendering  the  action  of  the  employer  as  nullity  and  the  employee  is  

entitled to continue in employment as if his service was not terminated.

14. The question whether the offer to pay wages in lieu of one month’s  

notice and retrenchment compensation in terms of Clauses (a) and (b) of  

Section 25-F must accompany the letter of termination of service by way of  

retrenchment or it  is  sufficient  that the employer should make a tangible  

offer to pay the amount of wages and compensation to the workman before  

he ask to go was considered in National Iron and Steel Company Ltd. v.  

State of West Bengal (1967) 2 SCR 391.  The facts of that case were that  

the  workman  was  given  notice  dated  15.11.1958  for  termination  of  his  

service with effect from 17.11.1958.  In the notice, it was mentioned that the

workman would get one month’s wages in lieu of notice and he was asked to  

collect his dues from the cash office on 20.11.1958 or thereafter during the  

working hours.  The argument of the Additional Solicitor General that there  

was sufficient  compliance of Section 25-F was rejected by this Court  by  

making the following observations:

“The third point raised by the Additional Solicitor-General  is  also  not  one  of  substance.  According  to  him,  retrenchment  could only be struck down if it was mala fide or if it was shown  that  there  was  victimisation  of  the  workman  etc.  Learned  counsel  further  argued  that  the  Tribunal  had  gone  wrong  in  holding that the retrenchment was illegal as Section 25-F of the  Industrial Disputes Act had not been complied with. Under that  section,  a  workman employed in  any industry  should not  be  retrenched  until  he  had  been  given  one  month’s  notice  in  writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period  of notice had expired, or the workman had been paid in lieu of  such notice, wages for the period of the notice. The notice in  this case bears the date November 15, 1958. It is to the effect  that the addressee’s services were terminated with effect from  17th November and that he would get one month’s wages in  lieu of notice of termination of his service. The workman was  further  asked  to  collect  his  dues  from  the  cash  office  on  November  20,  1958  or  thereafter  during  the  working  hours.  Manifestly,  Section 25-F,  had  not  been complied with  under  which it was incumbent on the employer to pay the workman,  the wages for the period of the notice in lieu of the notice. That  is to say, if he was asked to go forthwith he had to be paid at the  time when he was asked to go and could not be asked to collect  his dues afterwards. As there was no compliance with Section  25-F,  we  need  not  consider  the  other  points  raised  by  the  learned counsel.”

15. In  State  Bank of  India v.  N.  Sundara Money (supra),  the  Court  

emphasised that the workman cannot be retrenched without payment, at the  

time of retrenchment, compensation computed in terms of Section 25-F(b).   

16. The legal position has been beautifully summed up in Pramod Jha v.  

State of Bihar (supra) in the following words:

“The underlying object of Section 25-F is  twofold.  Firstly,  a  retrenched employee must have one month’s time available at  his disposal to search for alternate employment, and so, either  he  should  be  given  one  month’s  notice  of  the  proposed  termination or he should be paid wages for the notice period.  Secondly,  the  workman  must  be  paid  retrenchment  compensation  at  the  time of  retrenchment,  or  before,  so  that  once having been retrenched there should be no need for him to  go to his employer demanding retrenchment compensation and  the compensation so paid is not only a reward earned for his  previous  services  rendered  to  the  employer  but  is  also  a  sustenance to the worker for the period which may be spent in  searching  for  another  employment.  Section  25-F  nowhere  speaks  of  the  retrenchment  compensation  being  paid  or  tendered to the worker  along with one month’s notice; on the  contrary,  clause  (b)  expressly  provides  for  the  payment  of  compensation being made  at the time of retrenchment and by  implication  it  would  be  permissible  to  pay  the  same  before  retrenchment. Payment or tender of compensation after the time  when  the  retrenchment  has  taken  effect  would  vitiate  the  retrenchment  and  non-compliance  with  the  mandatory  provision which has a beneficial purpose and a public policy  behind it would result in nullifying the retrenchment.”

17. If the workman is retrenched by an oral order or communication or he  

is simply asked not to come for duty, the employer will be required to lead  

tangible and substantive evidence to prove compliance of Clauses (a) and (b)  

of Section 25-F of the Act.   

18. The  stage  is  now  set  for  considering  whether  the  respondent  had  

offered  compensation  to  the  appellant  before  discontinuing  his  

engagement/employment,  which  amounts  to  retrenchment  within  the  

meaning  of  Section  2(oo)  of  the  Act.   In  his  statement,  the  appellant  

categorically stated that before discontinuing his service, the respondent did  

not  give  him  notice  pay  and  retrenchment  compensation.    Shri  Ram  

Chander,  who  appeared  as  the  sole  witness  on  behalf  of  the  respondent  

stated  that  the  compensation amounting to  Rs.5,491/-  was  offered to  the  

appellant along with letter Ext. M-1, but he refused to accept the same.  The  

respondent did not examine any other witness to corroborate the testimony  

of Ram Chander and no contemporaneous document was produced to prove  

that the compensation was offered to the appellant on 25.4.1998.  Not only  

this, the respondent did not explain as to why the demand draft was sent to  

the appellant after more than three months of his alleged refusal to accept the  

compensation  on  25.4.1998.   If  there  was  any  grain  of  truth  in  the  

respondent’s assertion that the compensation was offered to the appellant on

25.4.1998 and he refused to accept the same, there could be no justification  

for not sending the demand draft by post immediately after the appellant’s  

refusal  to  accept  the  offer  of  compensation.   The  minimum  which  the  

respondent ought to have done was to produce the letter with which draft  

was sent at the appellant’s residence.  The contents of that letter would have  

shown whether  the  offer  of  compensation  was made  to  the  appellant  on  

25.4.1998 and he  refused to  accept  the  same.   However,  the  fact  of  the  

matter is that no such document was produced.  Therefore, we are convinced  

that  the  finding  recorded  by  the  Labour  Court  on  the  issue  of  non-

compliance of Section 25-F of the Act was based on correct appreciation of  

the pleadings and evidence of the parties  and the High Court  committed  

serious error by setting aside the award of reinstatement.   

19. The  judgment  of  the  Constitution  Bench  in  Secretary,  State  of  

Karnataka vs. Uma Devi (supra) and other decisions in which this Court  

considered the right of casual, daily wage, temporary and ad hoc employees  

to be regularised/continued in service or paid salary in the regular time scale,  

appears to have unduly influenced the High Court’s approach in dealing with  

the appellant’s challenge to the award of the Labour Court.  In our view,  

none of those judgments has any bearing on the interpretation of Section 25-

F  of  the  Act  and  employer’s  obligation  to  comply  with  the  conditions  

enumerated in that section.   

20. At the cost of repetition, we consider it necessary to mention that it  

was not the pleaded case of the respondent before the Labour Court and even  

before  the  High Court  that  the  appellant  was  engaged/employed  without  

following the statutory rules or Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and  

that  was the basis  for discontinuing his engagement.  Therefore,  the High  

Court  was  not  justified  in  relying  upon  the  alleged  illegality  of  the  

engagement/employment  of  the  appellant  for  upsetting  the  award  of  

reinstatement.    

21. In  the  result,  the  appeal  is  allowed.   The  impugned  order  of  the  

Division  Bench of  High Court  is  set  aside  and the award passed  by the  

Labour Court is restored.  If the appellant has not already been reinstated,  

the  respondent  shall  do  so  within  one  month  from  the  date  of  

receipt/production of copy of this order.  The respondent shall also pay the  

back  wages  to  the  appellant  within  a  maximum period  of  three  months,  

failing which the appellant shall be entitled to interest at the rate of 9% per  

annum from the effective date of reinstatement i.e., 21.3.2000.  The parties  

to bear their own costs.  

       .………………………..J. (G.S. Singhvi)

………………………….J.        (Asok Kumar Ganguly)

New Delhi, April 9, 2010.