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PETITIONER: ANANT  PRASAD LAKSHMINIVAS GENERIWAL

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH AND OTHERS(With connected Petition)

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 02/11/1962

BENCH: WANCHOO, K.N. BENCH: WANCHOO, K.N. SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.(CJ) GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. GUPTA, K.C. DAS SHAH, J.C.

CITATION:  1963 AIR  853            1963 SCR  Supl. (1) 844  CITATOR INFO :  R          1964 SC1179  (4)  F          1980 SC   1  (22)

ACT: Religious   Public  Trust-Registration-Notice  on   trustee- Failure  of  trustee to appear-Order of  removal,  if  ultra vires  Constitutional  validity of  enactment-Trust  in  one State  Property in another-Venue  of  registration-Hyderabad Endowments Regulation, 1940, ss. 3, 9.

HEADNOTE: The  appellant,  who  was also the petitioner  in  the  writ petition,  claimed  to be the sole  hereditary  trustee  and mutwalli  of the ancient temple of Shri Sitaram  Maharaj  in Hyderabad.   For  the  maintenance of  that  temple  certain villages  in  Berar  had beed granted  by  the  Nizam.   The appellant’s father had got the temple registered as a public trust under s. 7(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Public Trusts Act, 1951, in June, 1955.  845 On December 31, 1957, the appellant was served with a notice by the Director of Endowments, Hyderabad, to have the temple registered under the Hyderabad Endowments Regulations, 1940. He  objected that the temple having already been  registered under  the  Madhya  Pradesh  Act,  was  not  liable  to   be Registered  under  the Regulations and the State  of  Andhra Pradesh had no jurisdiction over the endowment and its  pro- perty.   He moved the High Court under Art. 226  challenging the notice on various grounds.  The High Court rejected  the petition,  and  upheld  the  validity  of  the  notice.   He appealed.   After  the  High Court had  dismissed  the  writ petition,  the  Director  of Endowments  passed  two  orders directing  that the supervision of the temple be taken  over under r. 179 of the Endowment Rules and that the  management of  the  temple  do  vest in  the  Director  of  Endowments, Hyderabad.   The appellant then filed the writ  petition  in this Court against these two orders challenging the validity of  the Regulations and the various rules framed  thereunder as  being repugnant to Arts. 14 and 19 of the  Constitution.

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His further contention was that the orders could not be made even under the Regulations. Held,  that  the  trust  being  situate  in  Hyderabad,  the Hyderabad  Endowment  Regulations applied not  only  to  the temple  situated  at  Hyderabad but  also  to  its  property situated outside the State of Andhra Pradesh, that the trust had already been registered under the Madhya Pradesh  Public Trusts  Act could make no difference.  Sections 2 (4) and  3 of this Act clearly showed that a public trust  contemplated by it must be situated in the State of Madhya Pradesh. State  of  Bihar  v. Smt.  Charusila Dasi,  [1959]  Supp.  2 S.C.R. 601, applied. State  of  Bihar v. Bhabapritananda  Ojha,  [1959)  Supp.  2 S.C.R. 624, referred to. It was not correct to say that because of the application of the Charitable Endowments Act, 1890, and the Charitable  and Religious  Trusts  Act,- 1920, to Hyderabad, then a  Part  B State,  the Hyderabad Endowment Regulations, 1940,  must  be deemed to have been repealed by operation of s.6 of the Part B  States (Laws) Act, 1951.  The former definitely  excluded public  religious  trusts such as the present  one  and  the latter, by s. 3, was confined to a very limited purpose. Nor could the difference in the two laws relating to  public religious and charitable trusts evailing in he two parts of 846 the Andhra State, one formerly part of the A State of Madras and  the  other  of the B State Hyderabad,  be  said  to  be discriminatory.   Difference such as this occasioned  as  it was  by historical reasons could be no ground  for  striking down the laws under Art. 14 of the Constitution. Bhaiyalal Shukla v. State of Madhya Pradesh, [1962] Supp.  2 S.C.R.  297, applied. State,  of Rajasthan v. Rao Manohar Singhji,  [1954]  S.C.R. 996, held inapplicable. The  provisions  contained in ss.3 to 11  of  the  Hyderabad Regulations,  excepting  those  of  s.  4(b)  which  had  no application, provided for the registration of endowments and were  conceived in public interest and were as such  clearly reasonable restrictions within the meaning of Art. 19 (5) of the Constitution and did not, therefore, contravene Art.  19 (1)  (f)  of  the  Constitution.   The  validity  of   these provisions  and  the rules framed  thereunder,  except  r-25 which  has no relevance to the subject matter of the  appeal and such rules as are consequential thereon, must  therefore be upheld valid. Further,  the two orders, which had the effect  of  removing the  applicant  from trusteeship must be held  to  be  ultra vires.  Neither the Regulations nor the Rules permitted  the removal  of a trustee for failure to appear in answer  to  a notice  for  registration  of an endowment,  nor  could  the orders  be justified under rr. 67 and 68 since there was  no enquiry,  they  were  not made by  the  Government  and  the removal  was for a reason not permissible  thereunder.   The two orders must, therefore, be set aside.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.140162. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated March  18,  1960, of the Andhra Pradesh High Court  in  Writ Petition No. 358 of 1958.                             WITH Petition No. 86 of 1960. Petition  under  Art. 32 of the Constitution  of  India  for

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enforcement of Fundamental Rights.                             847 N.   C.  Chatterjee, Alladi Kuppuswami, T. Rama Chandra  Rao and Ganpat Rai, for the appellant in C. A. No. 140 of 62 and the Petition No. 86 of 1960. P.   Ramachandra  Reddy, D. V. Sastry, T.V.R. Tatachari  and P. D. Menon, for the respondents 1 to 2. 1962.   November 2. The judgment of the Court was  delivered by WANCHOO, J.-The appeal is by special leave from the order of the Andhra Pradesh High Court.  The appellant has also filed a  writ petition and as the two matters are connected,  they will be dealt with together.  The  appellant is Anant Prasad Lakshminivas Generiwal.   He is  also  the  petitioner  in the  writ  petition  and  will hereafter  be  referred  to  as  the  appellant.   The  main respondents,  who  are  also opposite parties  in  the  writ petition,  are the State of Andhra Pradesh and the  Director of   Endowments,  Hyderabad.   They  will  be  referred   to hereinafter as the respondents.  The appellant claims to  be the  sole hereditary trustee and Mutwalli of the  temple  of Shri Sitaram Maharaj Sansthan and the subsidiary deity  Shri Varadarajaswami, situate at Sitaram Bagh, in Hyderabad.   In the  earlier part of the nineteenth century, an ancestor  of the appellant migrated to Hyderabad and carried on  business there.  He obviously prospered and in or about 1833 he built a  temple at a cost of two lakhs of rupees and installed  in it the idols of Shri Rama and other ancillary or subsidiary; deities  and consecrated the temple for public  benefit  and worship.  In 1841, one Maharaja Chandulal, a minister to the then  Nizam  granted a jagir consisting of the  villages  of Akolee and Bordee in Berar for the upkeep and maintenance of the temple.  Later, however, these 848 villages  were resumed by the Nizam and two  other  villages were  granted instead to the temple.  It appears that  these two  other  villages were also resumed, and the  village  of Bulgaon was granted to the temple in 1850.  It also  appears that though village Akolee was resumed, the resumption order was  not  carried  out and that  village  continued  in  the possession of the temple,, so that since 1850 the temple has been  in possession of the two villages for its  upkeep  and maintenance.  In 1853, Berar was transferred to the  British Government  of  India by the Nizam and  these  two  villages therefore came under the administration of the Government of India.   In 1859, some doubts arose about the title  of  the temple  to the villages and there were enquiries  under  the Berar Inam Rules.  Eventually, it was decided that the title of  the temple was good and the villages had  been  assigned with  the  rest  of Berar to the  Government  of  India  for administration and that they had been granted in jagir for a religious  object and their devolution was governed by  Rule IV  of the Berar Inam Rules.  Thereafter  inam  certificates were  issued with respect to these two villages in the  name of Ramlal, son of Hargopal, who was described as the Manager of  the  jagirdar,  Shri Sitaramji  Maharaj  of  Akolee  and Bulgaon.   The  purpose of the jagir was mentioned  as  "for charitable  expenses of the temple of Shri  Sitaram  Maharaj situated  in  the  Sitaram  Bagh,  at  Hyderabad".   In  the twentieth century there was considerable litigation  between the members of the family of the founder as to the right  of management  of  the temple.  Eventually, it was  decided  in 1932  that Lakshminivas Generiwal, father of the  appellant, was to be the manager of the jagirdar, and this decision was finally  confirmed  in 1933 by the Governor of  the  Central

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Provinces.  The Government of Hyderabad was trying all along to  find out how the income of this jagir was  being  spent. But it was decided that it was the Government of the Central Provinces alone which had the right to call for accounts  of the villages and was                             849 responsible  to  see that the conditions of the  grant  were fulfilled,  and  in 1941 this position seems  to  have  been accepted by the Government of Hyderabad. After  the  Constitution came into force  from  January  26, 1950, the State of Madhya Pradesh took the place of the  old Central  Provinces and Berar.  The State of  Madhya  Pradesh enacted a law known as the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of  Pro- prietary Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act,  No. 1  of  1951.  In consequence of this law, the  two  villages were taken over by the State and statutory compensation  was awarded.   In addition, an annual cash grant of Rs.  8,470/- was  sanctioned by the State for the upkeep of  the  temple. Besides this grant, there was a large area of home farm land in  the  two villages, which was in the  possession  of  the trustee for the benefit of the trust, and it is said that an income  of Rs. 1,30,000/- was being realised by the  trustee from this home farm land.  It further appears that there are hereditary  pujaris  and mahants of the  temple,  and  these persons  had  been  complaining to  various  authorities  in Hyderabad  that Lakshminivas Generiwal was  misappropriating temple funds on a large scale and neglecting his duties as a trustee  and  otherwise committing breaches  of  trust.   In 1951,  three  of the hereditary pujaris  filed  a  complaint before the Government of Hyderabad alleging various acts  of mismanagement on the part of the trustee.  This was inquired into  by the Home Minister of the State of Hyderabad and  he directed  that the temple should be managed by the a  commi- ttee  of  five persons and this was said to have  been  done with the consent of Lakshminivas Generiwal.  Later, however, Lakshminivas  contended that he had never consented  to  the appointment  of  the  committee, which  would  curtail his rights as hereditary trustee.  Thereupon, the Home  Minister directed  the  Director  of Endowments to  make  a  thorough inquiry into the matter.  In the meantime, 850 one of the hereditary pujaris filed a petition under s. 3 of the  Charitable  and Religious Trusts Act (No. 14  of  1920) alleging  various  acts of mismanagement an  paying  for  an order directing rendition of accounts, before the City Civil Court,  Hyderabad.   In  March,  1956,  the  court  directed rendition of accounts and appointed an auditor to scrutinise them.  The auditor- went into the accounts and made a report showing  several  gross  irregularities  therein.   In   the meantime Lakshminivas Generiwal applied for the registration of  the  temple under the provisions of the  Madhya  Pradesh Public  Trusts Act (No. 30 of 1951) and in June,  1955,  the Registrar of Public Trusts directed the registration of Shri Sitaram  Maharaj  Sansthan, Sitaram Bagh,  Hyderabad,  as  a public trust under s. 7 (1) of the Madhya Pradesh Act No. 30 of 1951. Hyderabad State also had a law for the purpose of  providing for  the proper  administration of  religious  and  public charities and for the due application of the income for  the purpose  of the trust.  This law was known as the  Hyderabad Endowments  Regulations  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  the Regulations)  and  it came into force in  1940.   Section  2 thereof  gives the definition of ""endowment"  as  including "every  transfer of property which any person may have  made for religious purposes or for purposes of charity or  public

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utility".   It  also provides for a "Book of  Endowment"  in which  "all  the  estates or properties  endowed"  would  be entered.   Section 2 also defines a "trustee" as  meaning  a person appointed by the maker of the endowment for  purposes of management of the property and fulfillment of the objects thereof.  Section 3 to 11 provide for the compilation of the Book  of Endowment; s.12 for the management of  the  endowed property;  s.  13 for the duties of the trustee; s.  14  for possession  over  endowed property ; s. 15  for  expenditure from the 851 income of endowed property ; s. 16 for framing of rules ; s. 17 for appeals and s. 18 for revision.  It may be added that a  large  body of rules as many as 478 in number  have  been framed  under the rule making power conferred by the  Act  ; and the Director of Endowments Hyderabad is given the  power to  enforce the Regulations and the Rules.  In  exercise  of his power under the Regulations and the Rules, the  Director of  Endowments  issued notice to Lakshminivas  Generiwal  on September  12, 1957, to show cause within a  fortnight  from the date of the receipt of the notice, why he should not  be removed.  from the office of trustee of the temple  and  why the unauthorised trusteeship of the appellant should not  be terminated,  and  six charges were leveled in  this  notice. Lakshminivas  Generiwal replied to this notice on  September 17, 1957, and pointed out that he was no longer the  trustee and  that  his son, the appellant, had  been  appointed  the trustee  under  the Madhya Pradesh Act-, No. 30 of  1951  by order of the Deputy Commissioner Amravati in November  1956. He also denied the various charges leveled against him.   On this reply, a notice was issued on December 31, 1957, to the appellant to the effect that the temple had to be registered under  the  Regulations, and he was also warned that  if  he failed  to take steps to get the endowment  registered,  the property  would be taken over under the supervision  of  the Government  and no more objection would be heard  from  him. The  appellant objected to this notice on February 1,  1958, and  his  main  contention was that as the  trust  had  been registered under the Madhya Pradesh Act No. 30 of 1951,  the endowment  was  not  liable  to  be  registered  under   the Regulations  and the Rules framed thereunder, and the  State of Andhra Pradesh had no jurisdiction over the endowment and its property. Soon  after,  the appellant filed a writ.  petition  in  the Andhra Pradesh High Court on February 3, 1958, 852 challenging  the  notice dated December 31,  1957,  and  the following contentions were raised on his behalf :- (1)  That by reason, of the registration of the trust  under s. 7(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Act No. 30 of 1951,  including the  temple, the operation of the Regulations was  excluded, as the registration under the Madhya Pradesh Act had  become final ; (2)  That  in any event, in applying the Regulations to  the trust  in  question,  the courts should  bear  in  mind  the principle of comity of nations and refuse to interfere  with the  jurisdiction  lawfully  exercised  by  another   State, namely,  the State of Madhya Pradesh (now Bombay  after  the States Reorganisation Act, 1956); (3)  That  the  Hyderabad Government had acquiesced  in  the control of the trust by the authorities in Berar and it  was not  open to it to repudiate that jurisdiction and claim  to exercise the powers under the Regulations (4)  That  the  Regulations were invalid  inasmuch  as  they infringed  the  fundamental rights of  the  appellant  under

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Arts. 14 and 19 of the Constitution. The  High Court repelled these contentions and by its  order dated  March  18,  1960, rejected the  writ  petition,  thus upholding  the  validity of the notice  dated  December  31, 1957.   The appeal is from this order of the High  Court  by special 1 leave. After  the  High  Court dismissed  the  writ  petition,  the Director  of  Endowments passed two orders.   The  first  is dated June 13, 1960, and it says that as the trustee had not cared to appear before him, even though the judgment of  the High Court had been                             853 even  about three months before, the Director considered  in the  interests  of  the institution,  that  the  supervision should  be taken over under r. 179 of the  Endowment  Rules. The second order was passed on June 14, 1960, and it  stated that   the  temple  with  its  buildings  etc.  situate   at Hyderabad,  had  been  taken under the  supervision  of  the Government  of  Andhra  Pradesh and the  management  of  the temple would vest in the Director of Endowments,  Hyderabad, from the date of the order, namely, June 14, 1960.  The writ petition in this Court is directed against these two orders, and  by  it  the appellant challenges the  validity  of  the Regulations  and the various rules framed thereunder on  the ground  that  they are repugnant to Arts. 14 and 19  of  the Constitution.  In addition, it has been contended on behalf of  the appellant that these orders are not  justified  even under the Regulations. The State of Andhra Pradesh has opposed the petition, and it submits that the Director of Endowments waited till June 13, 1960, after the dismissal of the writ petition :in the  High Court, for the appellant to appear in compliance with  the notice dated December 31, 1957, so that the endowment  might be  registered  under  the Regulations.   As,  however,  the appellant did not appear in reply to the notice, and in view of  the previous conduct of the trustees of this temple  and the several complaints received against them and the evasion of the trustees even to disclose what the properties of  the temple  were,  immediate action had to be  taken  under  the Regulations  and  the Rules framed  thereunder.   Therefore, with  a  view  to secure and preserve  the  trust  property, immediate action was taken so that the property might not be secreted.   It has also been contended that the  Regulations and  the Rules framed thereunder gave power to the State  to take  possession  of the endowment and that the  two  orders were issued under the powers conferred under s. 4(b) and  s. 12 of the Regulations, 854 It  is  also submitted that the Regulations  and  the  Rules framed thereunder are not ultra vires in view of Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution. Learned   counsel  for  the  appellant  has  submitted   the following points for our consideration               (1)   By  reason of the registration  of  this               trust, including the temple, under s. 7 of the               Madhya  Pradesh  Act  No.  30  of  1951,   the                             operation of the Regulations is excluded;               (2)   The  Regulations  and the  Rules  framed               thereunder are no longer in force as they must               be deemed to have been repealed by the Part  B               States (Laws) Act, No. III of 1951;               (3)   The  Regulations  and the  Rules  framed               thereunder are repugnant to Art. 14;               (4)   The  Regulations  and the  Rules  framed               thereunder are repugnant to Art. 19;

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             (5)   In  any case, the orders passed on  June               13 and 14, 1960, cannot be supported under the               Regulations. It  will be seen that the appeal is concerned only with  the notice  dated  December 31, 1957, while  the  writ  petition attacks  the  two  orders passed on June 13  and  14,  1960. Though the attack on the notice as well as on the two orders is  to a large extent common, we shall first deal  with  the attack  on  the  notice dated December 31,  1957,  which  is contained in the first four- points raised on behalf of  the appellant  before us. The fifth point concerns only the  two orders of June, 1960, and will be dealt with later. Re. (1). The contention of the appellant in this connections  that as the trust has been registered under the  855 Madhya Pradesh Act 30 of 1951, the Regulations cannot now be applied to it, and in any case the Regulations cannot affect property  of the temple situate outside the State of  Andhra Pradesh.   We are of opinion that there is no force in  this contention.   It  is true that the  two  ’villages  (namely, Bulgaon  and  Akolee) are not situate within  the  State  of Andhra Pradesh; but it is not in dispute that the temple  is situate  within  the  State  of  Andhra  Pradesh,  and  some property  of the temple in the shape of shops etc.,  besides the  temple  building  itself, is situate in  the  State  of Andhra Pradesh.  Besides, it is common ground that offerings made by pilgrims to the temple also constitute a part of its income,  and  that is received in Hyderabad.   As  such,  we cannot  see  how  the  Regulations  and  the  Rules   framed thereunder  would  not  apply  to  this  temple,  which   is admittedly  situate  in  an area to  which  the  Regulations apply.   A  similar question came to be considered  by  this Court in The State of Bihar v. Smt.  Charusila Dasi (1).  In that case the temple was situate in Deoghar in the State  of Bihar,  though  the major part of income  yielding  property endowed to the temple was situate in Calcutta.  The question that  arose for decision in that case was whether the  Bihar law would apply to the temple and its properties.  Section 3 of  the  Bihar Act made that Act applicable  to  all  public religious and charitable institutions within the meaning  of the definition clause in s. 2 (1) of the Bihar Act, and  the definition  clause provided that the Act would apply to  all religious  trusts,  whether  created  before  or  after  the commencement  of the Bihar Act, any part of the property  of which was situate in the State of Bihar.  It was held that-               "    where the trust is situate  in  Bihar the               State  has legislative power over it and  also               over its trustees or their servants and agents               who must be in Bihar to administer the  trust,               and as the object               (1)   [1959] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 60               856               of  the  Act  is to  provide  for  the  better               administration  of Hindu Religious  Trusts  in               the  State of Bihar and for the protection  of               properties appertaining thereto, in respect of               the  property belonging to the  trust  outside               the State the aim is sought to be achieved  by               exercising   control  over  the  trustees   in               personam,  and there is really no question  of               the Act having extra-territorial operation."               It was further held that-               "’the circumstance that the temples where  the               deities  were installed are situate  in  Bihar

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             and   that   the   hospital   and   charitable               dispensary are to be established in Bihar  for               the  benefit  of the Hindu  public  in  Bihar,               gives enough territorial connection to  enable               the  legislature of Bihar to make a  law  with               respect to such trust. This decision in our opinion makes it abundantly clear that, where the trust is situate in a particular State, the law of that state, will apply to the trust, even though any part of the  trust  property,  whether large or  small,  is  situate outside the state where the trust is situate. We  may also refer to the State of BihaR v.  Bhabapritananda Ojha(1),  where  a question was raised with respect  to  the application  of  the same Bihar Act to a  trust  situate  in Bihar, but in the case of which a scheme had been framed  by the District judge of Burdwan and confirmed by the  Calcutta High  Court, at a time when the State of Bihar was  part  of Bengal  before the partition of 1911.  In that case, it  was urged  that  the Bihar Act did not apply to  the  temple  by reason  of the fact that the temple and its properties  were administered  under  a  scheme, made by  the  court  of  the District  judge  Burdwan and approved by the  Calcutta  High Court (1)  [1959] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 624. 857 both of which were situate outside the territorial limits of Bihar,  on the ground that the Bihar Act would otherwise  by some   of  its  provisions  seek  to  interfere   with   the jurisdiction of courts which were outside Bihar and  thereby get  extra-territorial operation.  It was held in that  case that it was competent to the Bihar legislature to  legislate in respect of religious trusts situate in Bihar though  some of  the properties belonging to the trust might  be  outside Bihar.   And it was further held that s. 92 of the  Code  of Civil Procedure would no longer apply in view of s. 4 (5) of the  Bihar  Act and consequently there was  no  question  of extra-territorial operation, of the Bihar Act. In  the present case, the temple is situate in Hyderabad  in the State of Andhra Pradesh.  There is some property of  the temple  there, though the major part of the income  yielding endowed  property is situate outside in the State of  Madhya Pradesh.   In  view  therefore  of  the  decision  in   Smt. Charusila Dasi’s the Regulations will apply to this trust as the trust is situate in the State of Andhra Pradesh and  the fact  that some of the endowed properties are not in  Andhra Pradesh would make no difference.  Further the fact that the trust  has been registered under the Madhya Pradesh Act  XXX of  1951 cannot exclude the operation of the Regulations  in tile  case  of  this trust, for  the  trust  is  undoubtedly situate within the area where the Regulations are in  force. A "’Public trust" has been defined in s.2 (4) of the  Madhya Pradesh Act as meaning "an express or constructive trust for a  public,  religious or charitable purpose and  includes  a temple,  a  math, a mosque, a church, a wakf  or  any  other religious or charitable endowment and a society formed for a religious or charitable purpose".  Section 3 of the said Act provides   that  "the  Deputy  Commissioner  shall  be   the Registrar of public trusts in respect of every public  trust the principal office or the principal (1)  [1959] Supp. 2.S.C.R. 601, 858 place  of business of which as declared in  the  application made under sub-s. (3) of s. 4 is situate in his’ district", and he shall maintain a register of public trusts.   Section 4  provides  for the registration of public trusts.   It  is

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obvious  that  public trust as defined in s. 2  (4)  of  the Madhya  Pradesh  Act  XXX of 1951 must  be  a  public  trust situate  in the State of Madhya Pradesh.  Even though  s.  2 (4)  does  not  say  so in terms,  the  definition  must  be confined to public trusts situate in Madhya Pradesh for  the Madhya Pradesh legislature could not, and obviously did  not intend  to, legislate with respect to public trusts  situate outside  Madhya  Pradesh.   Therefore,  s.  2  (4)  must  be interpreted to apply only to public trusts situate in Madhya Pradesh.   This  conclusion  is supported  by  s.  3,  which clearly shows that the Registrar would have jurisdiction  in respect of a public trust within his district.  As to  where a public trust is situate has to be determined in accordance with  the decision of this Court in Smt.   Charusila  Dasi’s Case  (1),  and on that view the public trust in  this  case must be situate in Andhra Pradesh and not in Madhya  Pradesh where only some of the endowed trust properties are.  In the circumstances the registration of the trust under the Madhya Pradesh  Act cannot be a bar against the enforcement of  the relevant  provisions  of the Hyderabad  Regulations  because even if it may be necessary for the purpose of management of the  property in Madhya Pradesh to register this trust  also in  Madhya Pradesh, that would not exclude the  jurisdiction of the State of Andhra Pradesh to legislate with respect  to this  trust which is undoubtedly situate in Andhra  Pradesh, though some property of the trust is in Madhya Pradesh.   We therefore  agree with the High Court that the trust in  this case  being situate in Andhra Pradesh, the Regulations  will apply to it. Re.  (2). The contention in this regard is that the Part B (1)[1959] Supp. 2 S.C.R.601.  859 States (Laws) Act, 1951, applied certain Central Acts to the Part  B  State of Hyderabad, as it then was, from  April  1, 1951,  and s. 6 of this Act lays down that  "if  immediately before  the appointed day, there is in force in any  Part  B State any law corresponding to any of the Acts or Ordinances now  extended  to  that  State,  that  law  shall,  save  as otherwise expressly provided in this Act stand repealed."  A large  number  of Central Acts, were applied to the  Part  B States, and reliance on behalf of the appellant is placed on two  Acts  in this connection to show that  the  Regulations have been repealed in consequence of the extension of  those Acts, to the then Part B State of Hyderabad.  These two Acts are, (i) The Charitable Endowments Act, No. VI of 1890,  and (ii)  The  Charitable and Religious Trusts Act, No.  XIV  of 1920.  It is urged that because of the application of  these two  Acts  to  the  then Part  B  State  of  Hyderabad,  the Regulation  must be deemed to have been repealed in view  of s. 6 of this Act.  We are of opinion that there is no  force in this contention.  Act No. VI of 1890 definitely  excludes religious public trusts from it.  The Regulations deal  with two  kinds  of trusts, namely, public religious  trusts  and trusts  for purposes of charity and public utility.  In  the present case we are concerned with a public religious  trust which is specifically excluded from the purview of Act VI of 1890.   Therefore, whatever may be the effect of Act  VI  of 1890,  on  that  part of the Regulations  which  deals  with public  trusts  other  than religious trusts  (on  which  we express  no  opinion, for we are here  concerned  with  only religious  trusts), there is no doubt that  the  Regulations insofar as they apply to religious trusts, cannot be held to have been repealed by the application of Act No. VI of 1890, to  the then Part B State of Hyderabad, for the  Regulations

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when  they deal, with religious trusts, would not be  a  law corresponding to Act No. VI of 1890. 860 As  to  Act XIV of 1920, it certainly applies  to  religious trusts  as  well  as other trusts  of  a  charitable  nature created for public purposes, but a perusal of s.  3 of  this Act would show that it is confined to a      very    limited purpose  and  that purpose is to give power  to  any  person having  an  interest in any express  or  constructive  trust created or existing for a public purpose of a charitable  or religious  nature  to apply to the Court  within  the  local limits  of  whose jurisdiction any substantial part  of  the subject-matter  of the trust is situate to obtain  an  order directing the trustee to furnish the petitioner through  the court  with particulars as to the nature and objects of  the trust,   and  of  the  value,  condition,   management   and application  of the subject-matter of the trust, and of  the income  belonging  thereto  and  also  directing  that   the accounts  of the trust shall be examined and audited.   This is all that Act XIV of 1920 is concerned with.  The rest  of the  provisions  of  the  Act  are  ancillary  to  the  main provision  contained in s. 3. The Regulations on  the  other hand  are  a much wider enactment and provide,  as  we  have already  indicated,  for  the  compilation  of  a  book   of endowment,  for the management of the endowed property,  for the   duties  of  trustees,  for  possession  over   endowed property, and for the control of expenses from the income of the property.  None of these matters is comprised in Act XIV of  1920.  Therefore, the application of Act XIV of 1920  to the  then Part B State of Hyderabad cannot be said  to  have repealed  the  Regulations by virtue of s. 6 of the  Part  B States (Laws) Act, 1951. Re. (3). The contention under this head is that there arc two laws in force  in  two  parts of the State of  Andhra  Pradesh  with respect  to  religious endowments, and these  two  laws  are different   in  many  matters,  and  therefore   there   is, discrimination’  which  is hit 5 by Art. 14,  The  State  of Andhra Pradesh, as it came 861 into  existence after the States Re-organisation Act,  1956, consists  of two areas one of which came to that State  from the former Part A State of Madras in 1953 and the other from the  former  Part B State of Hyderabad in 1956.   These  two areas naturally had different laws.  We are told that  steps are  being taken to assimilate the laws in the two parts  of the State and bring them under one common pattern.  But that naturally  takes time and complete assimilation of all  laws not yet taken place.  We are further told that the  question of  having  one  law  for  public  trusts  of  religious  or charitable nature, is under the active consideration of  the State  Government.  In these circumstances it would  not  be right to strike down all laws prevailing in the two parts of the State, because of certain difference in them arising out of  historical  reasons because the two areas in  the  State were  formerly in two different States, namely,  the  former Part  A  State  of Madras and the former  Part  B  State  of Hyderabad.  Our attention in this connection has been  drawn to  the  State of Rajasthan v. Rao Manohar  Singhji(1).   In that  case  a law relating to management  of  jagir  estates which applied to only a part of Rajasthan was struck down on the ground that there was, nothing corresponding to that law in  other parts of Rajasthan, and the basis of the  decision was that "there was no real and substantial’ distinction why the  jagirdars  of a particular area should continue  to  be

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treated  with inequality as compared with the  jagirdars  in another’   area   of  Rajasthan."  As  against   this,   the respondents  rely  on Bhaiyalal Shukla v.  State  of  Madhya Pradesh(2).   In that case, the sales-tax laws in  different parts  of the new State of Madhya Pradesh, which  came  into existence  after the States Reorganisation Act,  1956,  were different  in  some respects, because they were  enacted  by different   legislatures.   Under  s.  119  of  the   States Reorganisation  Act, all laws in force are to continue  till repealed or altered by the appropriate legislature.  It  was therefore held that different (1) [1954] S.C.R. 996. (2) [1962] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 257, 862 though  parallel laws in different parts of  Madhya  Pradesh could  be sustained on the ground that  the  differentiation arose   from   historical  reasons,   and   a   geographical classification  based on historical reasons could be  upheld as being not contrary to the equal protection clause in Art. 14.   We  think’ the ratio’ of  Bhaiyalal  Shukla’s  case(1) applies  in  the  present  case and not  the  ratio  of  Rao Manohaar  Singhji’s  case(2).   In  the  latter  case,   the Jagirdars of a particular area became singled out after the creation  of the State of Rajasthan and management of  their properties  was taken away from them while the jagirdars  of the rest of Rajasthan retained the management of their  pro- perties.   It  was in those circumstances when there  was  a preexisting law in one part of Rajasthan to which there  was nothing  corresponding  in the rest of Rajasthan  that  this Court  held that the patent discrimination arising  in  that case was violative of Art. 14. In Bhaiyalal Shukla’s case(1) both parts had the same kind of law relating to  sales-,tax, though there were-some differences in their provisions.   It was  in these circumstances that parallel,  though  somewhat different,  laws in two parts of the same State were  upheld on  the  ground  of "geographical  classification  based  on historical   reasons."  The  present  case  is  similar   to Bhaiyalal  Shukla’s  case(1), for in both  parts  of  Andhra Pradesh  there  are laws with respect to  public  trusts  of religious  nature, though there may be some  differences  in detail  in their provisions.  Therefore, the, attack on  the basis  of  violation  of Art. 14 must  be  repelled  in  the present case on the authority of Bhaiyalal Shukla’s case(1). Re. (4). This  brings us to the question whether the Regulations  are violative  of Art. 19(1)(f) of the Constitution.  We do  not propose  in the present case to examine the  numerous  Rules that  have  been  framed under  the  Regulations  and  shall confine ourselves to (1) [1962] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 257. (2) [1954] S.C.R. 996.  863 the vires of that part of the Regulations which is concerned with  registration of endowments, and some of the  Rules  in that   behalf   as  the  appeal  is  only   concerned   with registration.  We have been told that some of the rules have been  the  target  of attack in the  former  High  Court  of Hyderabad,  and some of them have been struck down  by  that High Court (see Narayan Pershad v. State of Hyderabad  (1)). The sections with respect to registration are s. 3 to s. II. Section  3  lays  down that a book  of  endowments  will  be prepared containing all the endowments which are in force on the  date of the Regulations or which will be  brought  into force in future.  Section 4(a) lays down that it will be the duty  of every trustee or endowed of an endowment to  inform

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in  writing  with  regard to an endowment  the  Director  of Endowments  concerned with respect to movable and  immovable property  of  the  endowment,  and if there  is  a  deed  of endowment,  submit  the same or a  certified  copy  thereof. Section  4(b)  lays down that. if any  trustee  neglects  to discharge  his  duties referred to in s. 4 (a),  he  can  be deprived  of the benefit or consideration of  the  endowment wholly  or  partly which he possesses under  the  endowment. Section 5 lays down that any person may inform the  Director of Endowments with regard to an endowment which has not been entered in the book of endowments.. Section 6 gives power to the   Director  of  Endowments  to  give  notice   for   the registration of endowed property, howsoever he comes to know of  it.   Section 7 provides that if no  objection  is  made within  the time fixed in the notice, the  endowed  property shall  be  registered in case the endowment is found  to  be legal.  Sections 8 and 9 provide for procedure for  decision of  objections  where  objections  are  filed.   Section  10 provides  that  every  per-son whose  objections  have  been disallowed  can  file a suit for declaration  in  the  civil court  within one year of, the dismissal of  his  objections whereby his rights might be decided and entries in the  book of endowments will then be governed by the decision of (1)  A.I.R. [1955] HY. 82. 864 the civil court.  Section 10 further provides that no person who has not filed objections can file a civil suit.  Section 11 provides for a presumption that entries made in the  book of endowments are correct unless otherwise held by the civil court. It  will  be  seen  therefore  that  provisions  as  to  the compilation  of book of endowments contained in ss. 3 to  11 (except  s.  4  (b)) provide  for  registration  of  endowed property  and  for  carrying out the  objects  of  the  Act, namely, that the intention of endower may be carried out and the duties of the trustee may be discharged conveniently and efficiently for the benefit of humanity.  These  Regulations are clearly reasonable restrictions in the interests of  the general  public  within  the meaning of Art.  19(5)  of  the Constitution  and are conceived with the purpose  of  having correct  information  as to the endowments existing  in  the State  so that their management may be carried  out  effici- ently and for the benefit of humanity according to the terms of the endowments.  These provisions therefore (except s.  4 (b)) as to the registration of endowments are not in any way ultra  vires  the  fundamental right enshrined  in  Art.  19 (1)(f).   As  to s. 4(b), we do not think  it  necessary  to express any opinion in this case.  Section 4(b) is a kind of penalty  on  the  trustee for neglecting to  carry  out  the provisions of s. 4(a), and lays down that the trustee can be deprived of the benefit arising to him under the  endowment. In  the  present  case  it is  not  the  contention  of  the appellant that there is any benefit arising to him under the endowment and therefore s. 4. (b) would have no application. In  this connection we may also refer to r. 25,  which  lays down  that  "if any trustee does not derive any  benefit  or return from the endowment in accordance with r. 24, then  in the  event  of non-discharge of duties he may  be  suspended from  the  post  of trustee for a suitable  period  and  the management will be 865 carried  on during this period by Government." This rule  is being  attacked  as  going  beyond  the  rule-making   power conferred  on the Government.  We do not think it  necessary in the present case to decide the vires of this rule, as the

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impugned  action  is  not under this rule.   We  should  not however be taken to have upheld the vires of this rule  when we  uphold  the  validity  of  the  provisions  relating  to registration in the Regulations and the Rules.  We therefore uphold   the   validity  of  the   provisions   elating   to registration  of  endowments  (except s. 4(b)  on  which  we express no opinion) and the Rules framed thereunder  (except r.  25 and rules consequential thereon which we  express  no opinion)  to carry out these provisions under  which  notice was given to the appellant on December 31, 1957.  In view of our conclusions on these four points, the appeal must fail. Be. 5. This  brings  us to the consideration of the  vires  of  the orders dated June 13 and 14, 1960.  The attack on these  two orders is two-fold.  In the first place, it is urged that if these  orders  fall  within  the  powers  conferred  by  the Regulations  and the Rules made thereunder, they  should  be struck  down,  as  the  Regulations  and  the  Rules  framed thereunder by which the trustee is deprived of his right  of management  are  ultra vires Art. 19(1)(f).  In  the  second place  it is urged that these orders which purport  to  have been  passed under r. 179 are bad as r. 179 itself goes  be- yond the powers conferred on the rule-making authority under the  Regulations and in any case are contrary to the  Rules. We do not think it necessary in the present case to consider whether the Regulations and the Rules framed thereunder with respect  to  removing a trustee from the management  of  the trust  are unconstitutional.  We shall confine ourselves  to the second part of the argument in this behalf and  consider whether ’the Regulations give power for the 866 removal  of  the trustee under any circumstances and  if  so whether the removal in this case has taken place as provided under  the Regulations and the Rules framed thereunder.   It cannot be doubted that the two orders taken together  amount to removal of the, appellant from trusteeship. The  only  provision  which deals  with  the  management  of endowed property is to be found in s. 12,which is as follows :--               "With regard to the management of the  endowed                             property, the trustee will be generally  compe -               tent  to exercise the powers which  have  been               conferred  on him by the endower.  But if  any               trustee is not found to be competent, then the               Minister  for Endowments may frame  rules  and               regulations for the realisation of the objects               of the endowment and for the better management               of the, same by which the trustee will be duly               bound or he may appoint a Superintendent under               the rules." Analysis  of  this section shows that it consists  of  three parts.   Under the first part, the trustee is  competent  to exercise the powers which have been conferred on him by  the endower,  thereby  recognising the right of the  trustee  to manage  the  trust property according to the  terms  of  the endowment.   The second part lays down that "if any  trustee is  not found to be competent, then the Minister for  Endow- ments may frame rules and regulations for the realisation of the  objects of the endowment and for the better  management of  the same by which the trustee will be duly bound."  Here again the management clearly remains with the trustee and he is  only  subjected  to  control  by  means  of  rules   and regulations   framed  for  the  better  management  of   the particular trust under the orders of the Minister for Endow-

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ments.  Then comes the third part of the section which gives power in the alternative to the Minister  867 for  Endowments  in case of incompetence of the  trustee  to appoint a Superintendent under the Rules.  A  Superintendent is  defined  in  s.  2 as  meaning  a  person  appointed  by Government  for purposes of management.  Thus the last  part of   s.   12  gives  power  to  Government  to   appoint   a Superintendent for purposes of management.  This necessarily implies  that  on  the appointment of  a  Superintendent  to manage the endowed property under s. 12, the trustee is  de- prived  of the management of the property, and in effect  is removed  from trusteeship.  This interpretation of the  last part  of  s,  12 is supported by rules  found  under  Chaps. XLIII,   XLIV   and   XLV.    Chapter   XLIII   deals   with "Superintendence  by Government", Chap.  XLIV  with  "direct superintendence   of  Government"  and  Chap.   XLV   "’with munthazim (manager)." It may be added that in the definition in  s.  2,  the word "munthazim"  has  been  translated’  as "Superintendent"  while  in Chap.  XLV that  word  has  been translated   as   "manager".   It  is   obvious   that   the Superintendent and the manager are the same thing.  Rule 177 provides  that  if  the Government takes  over  the  endowed buildings under its superintendence, it shall have power  to arrange for direct superintendence, or appoint any munthazim (Superintendent)  or manage through any committee.   Chapter XLIV then provides for direct superintendence by Government. Rule   182   in  that  Chapter  shows  that   where   direct superintendence is taken by Government the power of spending the  recurring amounts as per the budget will be  vested  in the  trustee in accordance with the powers possessed by  him under  these Rules and there is no removal of  the  trustee. It is only when a Superintendent is appointed under  Chapter XLV  that  he has all the powers of a trustee  mentioned  in Chap.  XXXI (see r. 187).  The two orders of June 13 and 14, 1960,  read  together  clearly show that  even  though  they purport  to be passed under r. 179, which refers to  "direct superintendence  by  Government", the  Government  has  gone further than 868 provided  in  the  rule when it decided  to  take  over  the management  of the temple and vest the same in the  Director of  Endowments from June 14, 1960, with the result that  the appellant has been deprived of the management and in  effect removed  from  trusteeship.  We presume that  consequent  on this a Superintendent would be appointed.  The last part  of s. 12 which provides for the appointment of a Superintendent under the rules in effect provides also for the  deprivation of  the trustee of his right of management and thus  results in his removal.  Now r. 67 deals with the removal of trustee and  has  laid down six conditions which would  justify  the removal  of  a trustee.  The last of these  conditions  lays down  that if any trustee is not fit for trusteeship due  to some  reason  other than those contained in the  first  five conditions  he  would be removed from the post  of  trustee. But  this  removal  can only take place  if  the  matter  is inquired   into  by  a  competent  officer.   Thus   r.   67 contemplates   that  no  trustee  shall  be   removed   from trusteeship  unless  an  inquiry  is  held  by  a  competent officer.   This  obviously means that the  trustee  will  be given  an  opportunity to show cause why he  should  not  be removed  from  trusteeship  and it is only  after  a  proper inquiry  that  a trustee can be  removed  from  trusteeship. This provision is in consonance with the language of s.  12, where  the words used are "if a trustee is not found  to  be

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competent".  The use of the word "found" clearly shows  that the  legislature intended that action under the  second  and third part of the section would only be taken after a proper inquiry.  Further, r. 68 provides that the power of  removal of a trustee will lie vested in the Minister for Endowments. Thus after an inquiry has been made by a competent  officer, it is only the Minister for Endowments, which in the present set-up  means the Government, which can remove the  trustee. We  have  already  pointed  out that  we  do  not  think  it necessary  in  the  present case to  consider  the  question whether these provisions as to the removal of the trustee by Government can be                             869 upheld   as   constitutional.   But  assuming   that   these provisions  are constitutional, the question that arises  is whether the two orders passed on June 13 and 14, 1960, which must be read together and in effect amount to removal of the appellant  from  trusteeship  can  be  justified  under  the Regulations  and the Rules.  Clearly these two  orders  have been  passed  by the Member, Board of Revenue  while  r.  68 contemplates  that the trustee would be removed only by  the Minister  for Endowments, which in the present  set-up,  can only  mean the Government.  Further, r. 67 provides  that  a trustee cannot be removed from trusteeship unless an inquiry has  been  made  by a competent officer.   That  means  that notice has to be issued to the trustee to show cause why  he should  not be removed for reasons shown therein and  it  is only  after  an  inquiry has been made and one  of  the  six conditions provided in r. 67 is established that the trustee can  be  removed.  In the present case no  notice  was  ever issued  to the appellant to show cause why he should not  be removed from the trusteeship.  It is true that in the notice dated  December  31, 1957, it was stated that  in  case  the appellant  failed to respond to the notice (which  was  with respect  to registration of the endowed property)  the  case would   be   completed  taking  the   property   under   the Government’s  supervision  and no more  objection  would  be heard thereafter.  The consequence of non-appearance to such a  notice is to be found in s. 7 which provides that  if  no objection is filed the endowment would be registered and  in s.  10(b)  which deprives a person who does  not  appear  to object in response to the notice of any right to file a suit as  provided  in s. 10(a).  But there is nothing  in  r.  67 which  gives  power to the Government to  remove  a  trustee simply  because  he fails to appear in reply  to  a  noticed asking  him  to  register the  endowed  property.   The  six conditions  mentioned  in  r. 67 are :  (i)  insanity,  (ii) contraction of a contagious disease of a certain type, (iii) conviction by a criminal court, (iv) going out of  Hyderabad State without 870 intimation for more than a month, (v) forsaking the religion with  which the endowment is concerned, and  (vi)  unfitness for  trusteeship  due  to some other reason.   There  is  no provision therefore for removal of a trustee, merely because he has not appeared in answer to a notice under s. 6 of  the Regulations  for registration of the endowment.  The  orders therefore  that were passed on June 13 and 14,  1960,  which must be read together, cannot be justified under ’rr. 67 and 68,  for the reasons that (i) no inquiry was held, (ii)  the orders  were not passed by the Minister of Endowments,  i.e. the Government, and (iii) the removal in this case is for  a reason  which  is  not permissible  therein.  All  that  the Director  of Endowments was entitled to do on the  basis  of the  notice  dated  December 31, 1957,  was  to  proceed  to

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register  the  endowment, even if the  appellant  failed  to appear  in reply to that notice after making such  inquiries as he thought proper and take such further action as may  be justified  by the other provisions of the Regulations.   But on  the basis of that notice it was not open to him to  pass the  orders  which  he did on June 13 and  14,  1960,  which amounted  to removal of the appellant from  trusteeship  and taking   over  of  the  management  of  the  trust  by   the Government.   These  orders must therefore be set  aside  as ultra  vires the Regulations and the Rules, assuming in  the present  case that the Regulations and the  Rules  providing for the removal of the trustee, are constitutional. We  therefore  dismiss  the appeal  with  costs.   The  writ petition is allowed with costs and orders dated June 13  and 14, 1960, are hereby set aside. Appeal dismissed. 871