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PETITIONER: AMRIT BHIKAJI KALE & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: KASHINATH JANARDHAN TRADE & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT11/05/1983

BENCH: DESAI, D.A. BENCH: DESAI, D.A. MISRA RANGNATH

CITATION:  1983 SCR  (3) 237        1983 SCC  (3) 437  1983 SCALE  (1)632

ACT:      Bombay  Tenancy   and  Agricultural  Lands  Act,  1948, Section 32. scope of-Legal effects of (i) a will executed by the landlord  in his  life time  after the tenant became the "deemed purchaser"  and hence the land-owner on 1.4.1957 and (ii)  the  proceedings  taken  on  The  basis  of  the  will including mutation  of the name of the legatee, postponement of sales  under Sections  32F and  32G, entertainment of the suit by the Tenancy Aval Karkoon filed under Sections 14 and 29 of  the Art,  the dispossession.  Of the deemed purchaser and the further sale by the recorded owner.      Estoppel by  conduct-Whether  a  statement  made  by  a tenant, who  has become  a deemed  purchaser under  The Act, under the  mistake or  ignorance of  such a fact, before the Tenancy Tribunal,  agreeing for  the delivery  of possession amount to estoppel.

HEADNOTE:      Section 32 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, as amended from time to time provided that on the 1st day  of April,  1957 styled  as the "tiller’s day" every tenant  shall  subject  to  other  provisions  of  the  next succeeding sections  be deemed  to have  purchased from  his landlord free  from all  encumbrance subsisting  thereon, on the said  date the  land held  by him  as a  tenant if other conditions of  the section  are satisfied.  By operation  of this law,  one Janardhan,  the  father  of  the  respondent, became the  "deemed purchaser"  effective from April 1,1957, of the land bearing survey No. 1052 and F measuring 16 acres situated within  the revenue  limits of village Sonai Taluka Nawasa, District  Ahmednagar  which  belonged  to  Tarachand Chopra.      Subsequent to  this admitted  fact,  several  incidents took place  which have led to the present appeal raising the question of  the legal  effect of the several steps taken by different persons;  ignorant  of  the  factum  of  Janardhan having become  the deemed  purchaser". They are-(a) Landlord Tarachand died  on August  12,1959, after  two and a quarter years after  Janardhan became  the statutory purchaser; (ii) Tarachand executed a will, before his death, bequeathing the suit land  to Ashoklal  Gugale, a  minor; (iii)  the revenue authorities, who must be aware of the provisions of the Act,

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wrongly mutated  the name of Ashoklal in the revenue records as the  landlord in  terms of the will; (iv) in spite of the mandatory duty imposed upon the Agricultural Lands Tribunal, under Section  32G, to issue notice to all tenants who under section 32  are deemed  to have  purchased  the  lands,  all landlords of  such lands and all other persons interested to appear before 238 it for  the determination  of the price of the land which is the  subject   matter  of   compulsory  purchase,  strangely accepted the  plea for the postponement of the inquiry under section 32F  of  the  Act  and  later  again  commenced  the proceedings in  the year  1967 and concluded the proceedings by its order dated July 13 1967 repeating the jurisdictional errors; (v)  in the  interregnum, Ashoklal  through his next friend commenced  proceedings in  case No. 36 of 1967 in the Court of  Tenancy Aval  Karkoon  for  the  recovery  of  the possession;  (vi)   the  Tenancy   Aval  Karkoon,  not  only entertained  the   petition,  but   also  got  recorded  two statements,  on   5.10.1967,  from  Janardhan,  "the  deemed purchaser" to the effect that he had no objection to handing over the  possession of  the land  to the landlord as he was old and  could not cultivate the land personally and another from the  present respondent  to the same effect even though in the life time of his father Janardhan, he had no title to the land  involved in  the dispute, and, thereafter made the order dated  October 6,  1967 exacting  Janardhan  from  the land; (vii)  this wholly  null and  void order  enabled  the minor landlord  to sell  the land  by a  registered deed  on November 13,  1967 to  one Haribhav  and another, the former later transferred  his interest  in favour  of some  of  the petitioners before  the High  Court; (viii)  On  October  6, 1971, Janardhan  moved the Tribunal under section 32F of the Act to the effect that as the landlord Ashoklal had attained majority he  was entitled  to purchase  the land;  (ix)  the Tribunal started the proceedings under section 32G and after bringing the  present respondent on record due to the demise of Janardhan  on November  29, 1976, went into the matter in depth,  examined   all  previous  orders  and  came  to  the conclusion  that   Janardhan  having   become  the   "deemed purchaser.’ all  subsequent. proceedings were null and void, which  was   affirmed  by   tho  Assistant   Collector,  the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal and the High Court later; (x) a parallel proceeding  initiated by  the  respondent  for  the recovery of  possession was  decided in  his favour  by  all Courts including the High Court      Dismissing the appeals by the special leave, the Court ^      HELD: 1:1  on the tiller’s day, the landlord’s interest in the  land  gets  extinguished  and  simultaneously  by  a statutory sale  without anything  more by  the parties,  the extinguished title  of the landlord is kindled or created in the tenant. That very moment landlord-tenant relationship as understood ill  common law or Transfer of Property Act comes to an  end, the  link and  chain is  broken. The absent non- cultivating landlord  ceases to  have that ownership element on the  land and  the cultivating  tenant, the tiller of the soil becomes  the owner thereof. This is unquestionable, the landlord from the date of statutory sale is only entitled to receive the  purchase price  as determined  by the  Tribunal under section  32G. In  other words,  landlord ceases  to be landlord and  the tenant  becomes the  owner of the land and comes in  direct contact  with the state. Without any act of transfer  inter   vivos  the   title  of   the  landlord  is extinguished and  is created  simultaneously in  the  tenant

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making the  tenant the  deemed purchaser.  It is an admitted position that  on April  1, 1957  Tarachand was the landlord and Janardhan was the tenant Tarachand landlord was under no disability as  envisaged by  Section 32F. Therefore or April 1, 1957 Janardhan became deemed purchaser. [244 C-G] 239      Sri Ram  Ram Narain  Medhi v.  State of  Bombay, [1959] Supp. I S.C.R. 489 @ 518 followed.      1:2. If,  in the  instant case.,  Janardhan became  the deemed  purchaser  on  tillers’  day,  the  relationship  of landlord and  tenant between Tarachand and Janardhan came to be extinguished  and no  right could  be claimed  either  by Tarachand or anyone claiming through him such as Ashoklal or the present  purchasers on  the footing  that they  are  the owners of  the land on or after April 1, 1957. [244 G-H, 245 A]      2:1. Section 32F of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act,  1948, has  no application  to the  facts of  the ease. Section  32F postponed the date of compulsory purchase by the  tenant where the landlord is a minor or a widow or a person subject  to mental  or  physical  disability  on  the tillers’ day.  Section 32F  has an  overriding  effect  over Section 32  as it  opens with  a  non-obstante  clause.  The combined effect  of Section 32F and 32 would show that there the landlord  is under no disability as envisaged by Section 32F the  tenant of  such landlord  by operation of law would become the  deemed purchaser  but where the landlord is of a class or category as set out in section 32F such as a minor, a widow  or a  person subject  to  any  mental  or  physical disability, the  date o,  compulsory sale would be postponed as therein  provided. Now,  if Tarachand  the  landlord  was under no disability and he was alive on April 1, 1957 and he was the  owner,  his  tenant  Janardhan  became  the  deemed purchaser. [245 A-D]      2:2. If  Janardhan became the deemed purchaser on April 1, 1957  all subsequent  proceedings in  which the  Tribunal held that  the date  of purchase  was postponed  because the recorded  owner   Ashoklal  was   a   minor   were   without jurisdiction. The Tribunal had absolutely no jurisdiction to proceed on  the footing  that date of sale was postponed. It is neither  an incorrect order nor an erroneous order as was sought to  be made  out but Tribunal lacked tho jurisdiction to proceed  under section  32F because  when the proceedings under Section  32F were  commenced, Janardhan had long since become  the   deemed  purchaser.  Therefore  all  subsequent proceedings were  ab initio  void and  without jurisdiction. [245 D-F]      2:3. When  a Tribunal  of limited jurisdiction clutches at a  jurisdiction by ignoring a statutory provision and its consequences in  law on  the  status  of  parties  or  by  a decision   wholly    unwarranted   with    regard   to   the jurisdictional fact,  its decision  is a  nullity and can be set up  in collateral proceeding. The Tribunal clutched at a jurisdiction not vested in it and in such a situation it can not be disputed that the Tribunal lacked the jurisdiction to entertain any  proceeding purporting  to be between landlord and tenant on the erroneous assumption that tenant was still a  tenant  though  he  had  long  since  become  the  deemed purchaser, The  tenant has  ceased to be a tenant much prior to the  orders passed  by the Tribunal on April 24, 1961 and July 13,  1967 holding  that the date of compulsory purchase was postponed.  The compulsory  purchase by the operation of law had taken place as early as April 1, 1957 and that legal position cannot be wished away. [245 F-H, 246 A-Bl 240

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    3:1 When several orders passed by different authorities are wholly  null and  void and  hence non  est, such  orders cannot thwart subsequent proceedings.   The nullity  can  be set up  in subsequent  proceedings. The  plea of estoppel by conduct also cannot be allowed to be raised, since a measure of agrarian  reform cannot  be permitted  to be  defeated by such devious means of the landlords trying to take advantage of any  statement made  contrary to  their legally protected interest, in  the absence  of legal  literacy  and  by  such jugglery of  orders of low level revenue officers who hardly knew what they were doing.                                            [246 C-H, 247 G]      3:2. In  the  instant  case,  even  assuming  Janardhan relinquished his  right as  a  tenant,  even  then  Ashoklal cannot recover  possession as  the  land  would  be  at  the disposal of  the Collector  under Section  32P. Further, the posthaste steps taken by Ashoklal and others in transferring the lands  to several  others  speak  of  malafides  of  the landlord. [246E-F]

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil  Appeal No. 174 of 1981.      Appeal by  Special leave  from the  Judgment and  order dated the  4th September,  1980 of  the Bombay High Court in Writ Petition No. 2155 of 1979.      U.R.  Lalit,   C.B.  Singh  and  P.H.  Parekh  for  the Appellants.      Jitendra Sharma for the Respondent.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      DESAI, J.  Land bearing  Survey No. 1052 admeasuring 16 acres situated  within the  revenue limits  of Village Sonai Taluka Nawasa  Distt.  Ahmendnagar,  belonged  to  Tarachand Chopra  Janardhan,   the  father   of  the   respondent  was admittedly the tenant of this land on April 1, 1957. Sec. 32 of the  Bombay Tenancy  and Agricultural  Lands Act, 1948 as amended from  time to  time provided  that on the 1st day of April, 1957  styled as  the tillers’  day every tenant shall subject  to   other  provisions   of  the  section  and  the provisions of the next succeeding sections be deemed to have purchased from  his landlord,  free  from  all  encumbrances subsisting thereon  on the same date the land held by him as a tenant  if other  conditions of the section are satisfied. Thus by  operation of  law, Janardhan, who was the tenant of the land  on the  tillers’ day  became the  deemed purchaser thereof. Landlord  Tarachand died on August 12, 1959. Before his death,  landlord  Tarachand  had  executed  a  will  and bequeathed  the   suit  land  to  Ashoklal  Gugale  who  was petitioner No.  5 before the High Court Acting upon the will of Tarachand, Ashoklal got his 241 name mutated  in the  revenue record in respect of suit land in his  favour as  owner. On  the date of mutation, Ashoklal was a  minor. A  Sec. 32-G  imposes a  statutory duty on the Agricultural l  ands  Tribunal  (’Tribunal’  for  short)  to commence enquiry for determining the price of the land which is the  subject matter  of compulsory purchase. The Tribunal is required  to issue  notice to  (a) all tenants who u/s 32 are deemed  to have purchased the lands (b) all landlords of such lands  and (c)  all other persons interested therein to appear before  it on  the  date  specified  in  the  notice. Pursuant to such notice when the parties appeared before the Tribunal it was claimed on behalf of landlord that Ashoklal,

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the recorded  owner was  a minor  and therefore the sale was postponed  u/s   32-F.  The   Tribunal  failed  to  exercise jurisdiction in  not noticing  the  obvious  fact  that  the relevant date  on which compulsory sale takes place is April 1, 1957  and on  that date Tarachand Chopra the landlord was the recorded  owner  and  he  was  under  no  disability  as envisaged by  sec. 32-F  and therefore  the sale  had become effective and  could not be postponed u/s 32-F. However, the Tribunal failed  to exercise its jurisdiction by mis-stating an obvious  irrelevant fact  that as  recorded owner  was  a minor, compulsory  sale was  postponed as  envisaged by sec. 32-F.  It   appears  that   the  Tribunal   again  commenced proceedings in  the year  1967 u/s  32-G and  concluded  the proceedings by  its order  dated July 13, 1967 repeating the jurisdictional  errors   and  thereby   failed  to  exercise jurisdiction vested  in it.  In the meantime, minor landlord through his next friend commenced proceedings in Case No. 36 of 1967  in  the  court  of  Tenancy  Avail  Karkoon  having jurisdiction in  the area  for recovery  of possession  from tenant Janardhan  who had  become a deemed purchaser, u/s 14 read with  sec. 29  of the  Tenancy Act  Sec. 14 enables the landlord to  recover possession if tenant commits default in payment of  rent for  certain number  of years.  The Tenancy Avail Karkoon  entertained the  petition  which  it  had  no jurisdiction because there was no subsisting relationship of landlord  and  tenant  between  Ashoklal  and  Janardhan  as Janardhan had  already become  deemed purchaser  on April 1, 1957. However,  the Tenancy  Aval Karkoon taking note of the earlier decisions  of the  Tribunal holding that the date of compulsory sale  was postponed  directed  possession  to  be handed over  to the  landlord holding  that the  tenant  had committed default in payment of rent.      Mr. Lalit,  learned counsel  for the  appellant at this stage pointed  out that  in the  proceeding u/s 14 read with sec. 29  of the  Tenancy Act, the tenant Janardan had made a Statement on October 5, 1967 242 that he  had no  objection to handing over possession of the land to  A the  land to the landlord as he was old and could not  cultivate   the  land  personally.  On  the  same  day, surprisingly the  Tenancy Aval  Karkoon  also  recorded  the statement of  present respondent that in the lifetime of his father Janardhan he had no title to the land involved in the dispute. It  appears that  the Tenancy Aval Karkoon made the order dated oct. 6, 1967 evicting Janardhan from the land on the footing  that he was a tenant liable to pay rent and had committed defaults.  This wholly null and void order enabled the minor  landlord to sell the land by a registered deed on Nov. 13,  1967 to  the petitioner No. 1 and one Haribhav and the latter  in turn  transferred his  interest in  favour of other petitioners,      Misled by  the two  orders of the Tribunal holding that the sale  was postponed Janardhan served a notice on oct. 6, 1971 as  envisaged by  sec. 32-F  that as  the landlord  has attained majority  he is  entitled to  purchase the land and that the  price of  land be determined. Presumably, pursuant to this  notice, the  Tribunal commenced  proceedings  under sections 32-G  and 32-F  of the  Tenancy Act for determining the purchase  price. It  was  contended  on  behalf  of  the petitioners transferees  from Ashoklal  before the  Tribunal that as  Janardhan has  already handed  over  possession  to Ashoklal he  had no  subsisting interest  in  the  land  and therefore he  had no right to purchase the land u/s 32-F and that the  proceedings  be  dropped.  This  contention  found favour with the Tribunal which overlooked the legal position

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that Janardhan  had become  the deemed purchaser on April 1, 1957. Janardhan died on November 29, 1976 leaving respondent his son  as the  sole heir.  After the death of Janardhan an enquiry was  commenced to  ascertain whether  Janardhan  the deceased tenant  had already  become the deemed purchaser on April 1,  1957 and  that all the subsequent proceedings were Abington void. There were some proceedings in between u/s 84 which are  hardly relevant The Tribunal went into the matter in depth, examined all proviso orders and finally reached an affirmative conclusion  that on  April 1, 1957 Tarachand was the recorded  landlord and  being under  no  disability  and Janardhan being  tenant of  the land,  by operation  of law, Janardhan become  the deemed  purchaser and  all  subsequent proceedings were  null,  void  and  non  est.  The  Tribunal accordingly  determined  the  purchase  price.  The  present petitioners after  unsuccessfully appealing to the Assistant Collector and the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal u/s 76 of the Tenancy Act, reached the High Court under Article 2 27, 243      A parallel  proceeding was  initiated by the respondent u/s 84  of the  Tenancy Act for recovery of possession which was illegally  taken from  him. The Assistant Collector held that occupation  of the  suit land  by the  petitioners  was contrary to  the provisions  of law as Janardhan had already become the  deemed purchaser  and no title could be acquired by the  petitioners from  the sale by Ashoklal and therefore the  respondent  is  entitled  to  recover  possession.  The direction  was  issued  to  hared  over  possession  to  the respondent. This  order was  confirmed  by  the  Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal  in Revision as per its judgment dated July 16, 1973. Two petitions were moved by transferee-petitioners in the  High Court  of Bombay  against two orders one of the Maharashtra Revenue  Tribunal, in  a proceeding u/s 32-G and another  in   a  proceeding   u/s  84  against  the  present respondent. The  learned Single Judge of the High Court by a common  judgment  dismissed  bottle  the  petitions  of  the petitioners holding  that as Janardhan had become the deemed purchaser on  the tillers’  day i.  e.  April  1,  1957  all subsequent proceedings  u/s 32-F  were ab  initio  void  and without jurisdiction  and nullity  is the  eyes of  law. The High Court  also held that the petitioners acquired no title under the purported sale by Ashoklal because Ashoklal had no title to  the land  have receiving  the purchase  price from Janardhan or his heir as determined u/s 32-G. The High Court accordingly dismissed  both the  petitions with costs. Hence these two appeals by special leave.      Mr. U.R.  Lalit,  learned  counsel  appearing  for  the appellants strenuously  urged that  the orders  made by  the Tribunal u/s  32-F and  by the  Tenancy Aval  Karkoon  in  a proceeding u/s  14 read  with sec. 29 of the Tenancy Act and the statement  of Janardhan and the respondent would clearly show that  these orders  were at best erroneous but not void and cannot be ignored as nullity in subsequent proceedings.      The Tenancy Act was comprehensively amended by Amending Act IS  of 1957.  The amendment  brought in  a revolutionary measure of  agrarian reforms  making tiller  of the soil the owner of  the land.  This was  done to achieve the object of removing all  intermediaries between tillers of the soil and the State.  Sec. 32  provides that by mere operation of law, every tenant  of agricultural  land situated  in the area to which the  Act applies shall become by the operation of law, the owner  thereof. He  is declared to be a deemed purchaser without anything  more on  his part. A Constitution Bench of this 244

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Court in  Sri Ram   Narain  Medhi v.  The State of Bombay(1) held  that:           "the title  of the  landlord to  the  land  passes      immediately to the tenant on the tillers’ day and there      is a  completed purchase or sale thereof as between the      landlord and  the tenant.  The title  of the land which      was vested  originally in  the landlord  passes to  the      tenant on the tillers’ day and this title is defeasible      only in  the event  of the  tenant failing to appear or      making a  statement that  he is not willing to purchase      the land  or commit  default in  payment of  the  price      thereto as determined by the Tribunal." Therefore, it  is unquestionably  established  that  on  the tillers’ day,  the landlord’s  interest  in  the  land  gets extinguished and  simultaneously by a statutory sale without anything more  by the parties, the extinguished title of the landlord is  kindled or  created in  the tenant.  That  very moment landlord-tenant  relationship as understood in common law or  Transfer of  Property Act  comes to an end. The link and chain  is broken.  The absent  non-cultivating  landlord ceases to  have that  ownership element  of the land and the cultivating tenant, the tiller of the soil becomes the owner thereof This  is unquestionable.  The landlord from the date of statutory  sale is  only entitled to receive the purchase price as  determined by  the Tribunal  u/s  32-G.  In  other words, the  landlord ceases  to be  landlord and  the tenant becomes the  owner of  the land  and comes in direct contact with the  State. Without any act of transfer inter vivos the title  of  the  landlord  is  extinguished  and  is  created simultaneously in  the tenant  making the  tenant the deemed purchaser. It  is an admitted position that on April 1, 1957 Tarachand was  the landlord  and Janardhan  was the  tenant. Tarachand landlord  was under  no disability as envisaged by sec. 32-F.  Therefore on  April  1,  1957  Janardhan  became deemed purchaser.  and Mr.  Lalit could  not controvert this position.      If Janardhan  became the  deemed purchaser  on tillers’ day,  the   relationship  of  landlord  and  tenant  between Tarachand and Janardhan came to be extinguished and no right could be  claimed either  by Tarachand  or  anyone  claiming through him  such as  Ashoklal or  the present purchasers on the footing that they are the 245 Owners of  the land  on or  after April  1, 1957. This basic fact is A incontrovertible.      It may  be mentioned  that sec. 32-F has no application to the  facts of  this case. Section 32-F postponed the date of compulsory purchase by the tenant where the landlord is a minor or  a widow  or a person subject to mental or physical disability on  the tillers’ day. Sec. 32-F bas an overriding effect-over s.  32 as  it opens  with a non-obstante clause. The combined  effect of  sec. 32-F  and 32  would show  that where the  landlord is  under no  disability as envisaged by sec. 32-F  the tenant  of such  landlord by operation of law would become  the deemed purchaser but where the landlord is of a  class or  category as  set out  in sec. 32-F such as a minor, a widow or a person subject to any mental or physical disability, the  date of  compulsory sale would be postponed as therein  provided. Now,  if Tarachand,  the landlord  was under no disability and he was alive on April 1, 1957 and he was the  owner,  his  tenant  Janardhan  became  the  deemed purchaser. This conclusion, in our opinion, is unassailable.      If Janardhan  became the  owner on  April 1,  1957  all subsequent proceedings  in which  the Tribunal held that the date of  purchase was  postponed because  the recorded owner

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Ashoklal was a minor were without jurisdiction. The Tribunal had absolutely  no jurisdiction  to proceed  on the  footing that the  date of  sale was  postponed.  It  is  neither  an incorrect order  nor an  erroneous order as was sought to be made out  but Tribunal  lacked the  jurisdiction to  proceed u/s. 32-F  because  when  the  proceedings  u/s.  32-F  were commenced,  Janardhan  had  long  since  become  the  deemed purchaser. Therefore  all sub-  sequent proceedings  were an initio void  and without jurisdiction and the High Court was right in holding that orders passed therein were nullity.      The attempt  to overcome  this position  by urging that the order  was erroneous  was rightly  repelled by  the High Court holding that the orders were null and void, proceeding on an  erroneous assumption  of jurisdictional fact that the recorded owner  was a  minor on  the  tillers  day.  When  a Tribunal of  limited jurisdiction clutches at a jurisdiction by ignoring  a statutory  provision and  its consequences in law on  the status  of  parties  or  by  a  decision  wholly unwarranted, with  regard to  the jurisdictional  fact,  its decision is  a nullity  and can  be  set  up  in  collateral proceeding. The  Tribunal clutched  at  a  jurisdiction  not vested in it and in such a situation it cannot be 246 disputed  that  the  Tribunal  lacked  the  jurisdiction  to entertain any A proceeding purporting to be between landlord and tenant on the erroneous assumption that tenant was still a  tenant  though  he  had  long  since  become  the  deemed purchaser. The  tenant has  ceased to be a tenant much prior to the  orders passed  by the Tribunal on April 24, 1961 and July 13,  1967 holding  that the date of compulsory purchase was postponed.  The compulsory  purchase by the operation of law had taken place as early as April 1, 1957 and that legal position cannot be wished away.      Mr. Lalit,  however, contended  that the  statement  of Janardhan in  the proceeding u/s 14 read with sec. 29 of the Tenancy Act stating that he had become old and was unable to cultivate the land and he is willing to hand over possession would estop  the respondent from contending to the contrary. It was  further urged that respondent himself was present on the date on which Janardhan gave his statement on October S, 1967 and  he concurred  with the  statement of Janardhan. We are  not  unaware  of  the  landed  gentry  exercising  such influence over  the tenants  that in  the absence  of  legal literacy they  may make  any  statement  contrary  to  their legally protected  interest. A  measure of  agrarian  reform cannot be  permitted to be defeated by such devious means of the landlords.  However apart from ignorance of his position assuming that  Janardhan relinquished  his right  as tenant, landlord Ashoklal  was nontheless  not entitled  to  recover possession because,  when Janardhan,  the  deemed  purchaser agreed to  hand over  possession subject to the provision of sec. IS,  the land  would be  at the  disposal of  Collector under sec.  32 P.  Landlord even  in such a situation is not entitled to  be restored  to possession without bringing his case under  sec. 15  which appears  not to  be the  case  of landlord. And  look at  the  bona  fides  of  the  landlord. Ashoklal as  soon as  he managed to obtain wholly void order for  possession,  managed  to  transfer  the  lands  to  the petitioners within  a span  of less  than 2  weeks. It would thus appear  that even  Ashoklal and his next friend must be presumably aware  of the  void character  of the  order  and therefore posthaste  with a  view to  thwarting any  further legal proceeding and confuse Janardhan, Ashoklal through his next friend  managed to transfer the land to the petitioners and let  the  petitioners  fight  the  deemed  purchaser.  A

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measure whereby  tenant was to be made the owner of the land cannot be  permitted to  be defeated  by  such  jugglery  of orders by  low-level revenue  officers who  hardly knew what they were doing. Look at the lack of knowledge of law of the Tribunal. While  overlooking the  relevant date, and it took into account the subsequent date which was wholly irrelevant and impermissible. Though 247 landlord  Tarachand   had  died   much  after   1.4.1957  in proceeding u/s 32-G minor Ashoklal whose name was mutated on death of A Tarachand, the authority declared the sale having been postponed  even though statute had already operated and sale taken  place. Can  a statutory  Tribunal charged with a duty  to  implement  the  law  betray  such  total  lack  of knowledge so  as to be counter-productive ? Same is the case with the  decision of Tenancy Aval Karkoon. A proceeding u/s 14 read  with sec.  29 of  the Tenancy  Act, started  on the footing  that   the  relationship  of  landlord  and  tenant subsisted should  have been  thrown  out  at  the  threshold because a  decade back  the then tenant Janardhan had become the deemed  purchaser. Therefore  these orders  were  wholly null and void and hence non est and cannot thwart subsequent proceedings.  The  nullity  can  be  set  up  in  subsequent proceedings.      Janardhan was  deprived of  his possession  by an order which had  no legal  sanction. He was deprived of possession on the footing that he was a tenant ignoring and overlooking the statutory  event that he had become the owner. Even when the Legislature  passed such  a  revolutionary  measure  its knowledge was  not transmitted  to  the  persons  for  whose benefit the  measure was  enacted and there was no awakening to one’s  right. Undoubtedly,  a communication  gap and  for want of legal literacy Janardhan was taken on a joy ride and was illegally  made to  part with  possession.  Subsequently everyone  realised   the  blunder   committed  by  them  and therefore when  the proceedings  started on the notice given by Janardhan,  the Tribunal  determined the price. Appeal of the petitioners  to  Assistant  Collector  failed,  revision petition to the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal at the instance of the  petitioners failed so also the writ petition u/s 227 of the petitioners failed. All authorities concurrently held that Janardhan  had become  the owner  and the  Tribunal was right in determining the price.      The authority  u/s 84  held that  petitioners were  not entitled  to  retain  possession  as  their  occupation  was contrary to  the provisions  of the Tenancy Act and they had acquired no  title to  the land  by the  purported  sale  by Ashoklal.  The   direction  for   restoring  possession   to Janardhan was  rightly given. A revision petition and a writ petition  to   the  High   Court  at  the  instance  of  the petitioners failed. 248      We find that the High Court was right in rejecting both the A  petitions. These  were all  the contentions  in  this appeal and  as we  find no merit in it, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.      When this Court issued notice, appellants were directed to deposit Rs. 1500 for costs of respondent. Respondent came here in  rags and  urged that  he was  too poor  to engage a counsel. We  therefore direct  that the  amount of  Rs. 1500 deposited in this Court by appellants be paid to respondent.      We record  our appreciation  of assistance to the Court by Mr.  Jitendra Sharma  who appeared  amicus curie  at  the request made  by the  Court while granting special leave. He should withdraw  the amount  and take  all steps  to pay the

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same to the respondent. S.R.                                       Appeal dismissed. 249