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PETITIONER: AMALGAMATED ELECTRICITY CO.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE, AJMER

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 25/07/1968

BENCH: HEGDE, K.S. BENCH: HEGDE, K.S. BACHAWAT, R.S.

CITATION:  1969 AIR  227            1969 SCR  (1) 430  CITATOR INFO :  R          1972 SC2504  (26)  E&F        1974 SC 923  (31,32)

ACT:     Ajmer   Merwara  Municipalities  Regulation,  1925,   s. 223--Municipality  fails to pay surcharge  levied  regarding supply of electricity--Suit to recover--Notice under section if necessary.     Bombay  Electricity Surcharge Act (Bom..Act 19 of  1946) ss.    3,   4  and  6--Power  of   Commissioner   to   issue notifications levying surcharge.     Indian  Electricity  Act  (9  of  1910)  Schedule,   cl. 12--Sections  3 and 4 of Bombay Act if ultra vires,  cl.  12 of Schedule.

HEADNOTE:     The Ajmer Electric Supply Co. Ltd. a licensee under  the Indian  Electricity  Act, 1910, entered into  two  contracts with  the respondent-Municipal Committee, (i) for  supplying electricity for street lighting, and (ii) pumping water from the wells belonging to the respondent at a particular place. The Bombay Electricity Surcharge Act, 1946, was extended  to the   province   of   Ajmer  Metwar   subject   to   certain modifications.  Thereafter,  the Ajmer Electric  Supply  Co. applied  under  s.  3  of  the  Bombay  Act,  to  the  Chief Commissioner,  for imposing the surcharge provided  in  that section, to meet its increased cost.  The Chief Commissioner issued a notification and on the basis of that  notification the Ajmer Electric Supply Co. called upon the respondent  by a notice, to pay the surcharge detailed therein with respect to the two contracts.  As the respondent did not comply with the  demand, the appellant, with which the  Ajme’r  Electric Supply  Company  was  amalgamated,  filed  a  suit  for  the recovery of the surcharge.     The trial Court decree.d the suit but the High Court set aside the decree on the grounds: (1) Before filing the  suit a  notice  as  required  by  s.  233  of  the  Ajmer  Metwar Municipalities  Regulation,  1925, was not  given;  (2)  The Commissioner’s notification imposing the impugned  surcharge was beyond the provisions of the Bombay Act, because of  the omission of certain words from s. 6 of that Act as  extended to  Ajmer  Merwara; and (3) The relevant provisions  of  the

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Bombay  Act. namely, ss. 3 and 4 were ultra vires el. 12  of the Schedule to the Indian Electricity In appeal to this Court,     HELD:  (1)  No notice under s. 233 of the  Ajmer  Merwar Municipalities  Regulation was necessary before  instituting the suit. [438 E]     Under the section a notice is necessary when the suit is filed against the Committee only in respect of any act  done in its official  capacity. The expression ’act’ includes  an illegal omission; but. before an omission can be  considered as  an illegal omission, it must be shown that there was  an omission  to discharge some official duty imposed in  public interest. That is the non-discharge of the duty must  amount to an illegality entailing penal consequences. [436 B, G]     In the present case, the appellant’s contention was that it was entitled to recover from the respondent the amount of surcharge  claimed,  while  the  respondent’s  case   was  a bonafide contention, namely, that the levy of 431 surcharge was invalid.  Under the Regulation it was the duty of  the  respondent to di’scharge all its  liabilities,  but failure  to  do so would not ordinarily make it  an  illegal omission,  because, the respondent or its members or  office hearers  could not be punished for their failure to pay  the amount due to the appellant. [436 D-G] Revati  Mohan  Das  v. Jitendra Mohan Ghosh,  61  I.A.  171, applied. Debendra  Nath  Roy  v.  Official  Receiver,  A.I.R.    1938 Cal.    191 approved. Bhagchand  Dagdusa  Gujrathi  v.  Secretary  of  State   for India,  54 I.A. 338. distinguished.   (2)  The provisions of s. 3 of the Bombay Act empower  the Chief  Commissioner to levy surcharge on the bills  for  the supply  of  electricity  for  street  lighting.   Section  4 empowers  the  licensec  to collect from  the  consumer  the surcharge levied.  Municipal councils are not excluded  from the operation of ss. 3 and 4 of the Act as extended to Ajmer Metwar.Similarly, electrical energy supplied on the basis of a contract is not excluded from the operation of s. 3.   For taking  action on the basis of those sections no  assistance is needed from s. 6, and so, s. 6 as it stood originally  or as modified does not in any manner cut down the operation of as.  3  and 4.  Therefore, the High Court was Wrong  in  its decision   that  the  notification  issued  by   the   Chief Commissioner  levying surcharge on the price  of  electrical energy   supplied  for  street  lighting  was  without   the authority of law. [440 C-E, H; 441 A]   (3)  Since  ’Electricity’  is a  concurrent  subject,  the Bomhay Legislature was competent to provide for the levy  of surcharge so long as the relevant provision did not conflict with  any  provision  in any Central Act.Clause  12  of  the Schedule  to the Indian Electricity Act, which is deemed  to form  part of the licence under s. 3(f) of  the  Electricity Act,  does not conflict with ss. 3 and 4 of the Bomhay  Act. The  clause merely prescribes a procedure for  settling  the price  of  electricity supplied by the licensec  for  street lighting and lays down the machinery for settling the  price if  there is a dispute between the contracting parties.   It o.nly  means that the licensee cannot dictate its  terms  to the authority responsible for street lighting, but does  not fix the price to be paid or even the maximum price  payable. It  imposes  no  fetters on the  powers  of  the  Provincial Legislature  in  the  matter  of  enhancing  the  price   of electricity  supplied by the licensec for  street  lighting. The  High  Court was, therefore, wrong in  holding  that  by

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incorporating   cl.  12  into  the  licenee   the    Central Legislature   intended  that  under  no  circumstances   the liability  of the consumer can be increased heyond what  was agreed during the continuance of  the contract. [441 H;  442 A-D]     (4)  Under  the  notification  imposing  surcharge,  the appellant,  however, was not entitled to get any  additional sum as regards the pumping of water.  Under the notification surcharge  is  levied  on the  price  of  electrical  energy supplied under a contract.  In construing a contract it must be read as a whole.  So read, under the second contract, the appellant  only undertook to pump water from the  wells  and not to supply any electricat energy. [442 E-F, H]

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 706 of 1965. 432       Appeal  from the judgment and decree  dated  September 22,    1964 of the Rajasthan High Court in D.B. First Appeal No. 67 of 1956. Purshottam  Trikamdas and 1. N. Shroff, for  the  appellant. B.D. Sharma, for the respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     Hegde,  J. This is plaintiff’s appeal.  The  Amalgamated Electricity Co. Ltd. is the plaintiff in the suit from which this appeal arises.  It sued the Municipal Committee,  Ajmer through  its Chairman in suit No. 21 of 1951 in the court of Sub  Judge, first class, Ajmer.  In that suit it  claimed  a sum  of  Rs.  93,520/2/1  as  Surcharge  due  under  certain notifications  issued by the Chief Commissioner   of  Ajmer. Out  of  the   said  sum,  a  sum  of  Rs.  28,837/12/5  was claimed as being due as SUrcharge on the bills issued by  it in  respect  of  the  electricity  supplied  by  it  to  the defendant for street lighting.  A sum of Rs. 58,143/12/2 was claimed  as  Surcharge  on  its  bills  in  respect  of  the electricity  utidised for pumping water in pursuance of  one of its contracts with the defendant.  The balance amount was claimed  as interest on the amount claimed.  That  suit  was resisted  by  the defendant on various grounds.   The  trial court  substantially  allowed  the  plaintiff’s  claim   and decreed  the suit in a sam of Rs. 44,461/11/9 with  interest and  proportionate  costs.   The  High  Court  of  Rajasthan accepting  the  appeal  (No. 67 of 1956)  of  the  defendant dismissed   the  plaintiff’s  suit.   After   obtaining    a certificate  under  Art. 133(1) (a) of the Constitution, the plaintiff has filed this appeal.     The  High Court of Rajasthan dismissed  the  plaintiff’s suit on two grounds namely (1 ) that before filing the suit, no  notice  as  required by s. 233  of  the  Ajmer  .Merwara Municipalities  Regulation, 1925 has been given and (2)  the notification  of  the  Commissioner  imposing  the  impugned Surcharge  is either beyond the scope of the  provisions  of Bombay Electricity  Surcharge  Act, 1946 (Bombay Ac’t 19  of 1946)  (to be hereinafter referred to as the Bombay Act)  as extended to Ajmer by the Central Government in pursuance  of the powers conferred on it under the Ajmer Merwar (Extension of Laws) Act, 1947 or in  the  alternative the provisions of the Bombay Act are ultra vires cl. 12  of  the .schedule  to the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 (to be hereinafter referred to as the Electricity Act).     In view of the above findings the other pleas taken   by the  d,efendant were not examined.  We have to  see  whether the decision of the High Court is in accordance with law.

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The material facts of the case are as follows: A  company known as Trustees Corporation (I) Ltd.  took  out license from the Chief Commissioner of Ajmer on 19-1-1928 433 under  the provisions of the Electricity Act authorising  it to geneate and supply electrical energy within the municipal limits of Ajmer and such extensions beyond those limits   as may be permitted by the Chief Commissioner from time to time in  accordance with the conditions mentioned in the  licence (Exh.  1 ).  Someime later the said company transferred  all its  rights and liabilities,    Ajmer Electric  Supply  Co., Ltd.    The  Ajmer  Electric  Supply  Co.  Ltd.  was   later amalgamated with the plaintiff’s company as. ber the  scheme of  transfer  approved by the Bombay High Court.  Fhe  Ajmer Electric  Supply  Co. Ltd. had en’tered  into  an  agreenent (Exh. 20) on 31-3-1932  with the Municipal Committee,  Ajmer for   supplying   electricity  for   street   lighting   and maintaining  the  street lighting  equipments.   By  another agreement  (Exh. 21 ) dated 15-3-1939, it undertook to  pump water  from  the wells belonging to Municipal  Committee  at Bhaonta.     On  September  3,  1948, the  Governmen’t  of  India  in exercise  of  the powers conferred on it by s.  2  of  Ajmer Merwar  (Extension of Laws) Act, 1947, extended  the  Bombay Act  to  the  province of Ajmer Merwar  subject  to  certain modifications.  That notification among other  modifications omitted  the  words "or in  any contract for energy  or  for maintenance   of  street  lighting equipment" found in s.  6 of  the  Bombay Act.  The other modifications made  are  not relevant  for our present purpose.  After the  extension  of the  Bombay  Act to Ajmer Merwar the Ajmer  Electric  SuppLy Co.,  Ltd.,   applied under s. 3 of the Bombay  Act  to  the Chief  Commissioner for imposing Surcharge as  provided   in that  section to meet its increased cost.  On September  19, 1948,  the Chief Commissioner directed that the  Bombay  Act as modified shall apply to two undertakings including  Ajmer Electric   Supply  Co.  Ltd.,  Ajmer.   There  was   another notification on September 19, 1948 but that is not  relevant for  our  present  purpose.  On March 29,  1949,  the  Chief Commissioner issued the notification herein set out below in substitution of the notification issued by him on  September 19, 1948. "CHIEF COMMISSIONER’S OFFICE, AJMER.    No. 6/5/48-LSG.         Dated Ajmer, the 29th                            March, 1949. To  be  substituted for the notification  bearing  the  same number and date. Orders by the Chief Commissioner, Ajmer Merwara.            NOTIFICATION   No. F/8-4-II(CC)-H.       Dated Ajmer, the 19th                             September 1948. 434       In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-sec. (2) of sec. 3  of the Bombay Electricity (Surcharge) Act 1946  (XIX of 1946) as extended to the Ajmer Merwara by the  Government of India, Minis’try of Home Affairs Notification No. 8/9/48- Judicial  dated  the 3rd September 1948, and  in  accordance with  the recommendations made by the  Electricity  Advisory Board  constituted  by  him  under sec.  35  of  the  Indian Electricity Act, 1910, the Chief Commissioner, is pleased to fix  for  a  period  of two years  from  the  date  of  this Notification,  the  following  rates  of  surcharge  on  the charges for energy leviable by the Ajmer and Beawar Electric Supply Companies :--               (1 ) For supplies made under standard tariffs:

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             (i) Ajmer Electric Supply Co. Ltd.,  Ajmer 20%               (ii) Beawar Electric Supply Co., Ltd.,  Beawar               15%                     (2  )  For supplies made  under  special               contracts,   other   than  those   made   with               Municipal Committee for street lighting.                     Ajmer  Electric Supply Co.,  Ltd.  Ajmer               and   Beawar   Electric  Supply   Co.,   Ltd.,               Beawar.--0.007 of an anna per unit (Kw.  hour)               per rupee increase in the price of oil  beyond               the basic price of Rs. 90/- per ton.                     (3  ) For supplies for Municipal  Street               Lighting made under special contracts                     Ajmer  Electrictiy  Co.,  Ltd.,   Ajmer,               Beawar Electric Supply Co., Ltd.,  Beawar.--O.               128  of  an  anna per  month  per  each  rupee               advance in price of fuel oil beyond the  basic               price of Rs. 90/- per ton for each 60  wattage               lamp and prorate for lower and higher  wattage               lamps.                     The surcharge is leviable on the  actual               energy  consumed  and  not  on  the   standing               charges of motors and meters.                             By order                                         Sd/-    A.N.     Lal               Secretary to the Chief Commissioner,               Ajmer Merwara." On the basis of that notification the Ajmer Electric  Supply Co.,  Ltd. called upon the defendant by means of a  lawyers’ notice  dated  16-8-1951  to  pay  the  surcharge   detailed therein.   As the defendant did not comply with  the  demand made,  the  plaintiff  after  the  amalgamation   men.tioned earlier instituted the present suit. 435     It is not necessary to deal with the various pleas taken by  the defendant in resisting the plaintiff’s suit.    Some of  those  pleas  have been given up;  some  have  not  been considered by the High Court.  The plaintiff’s suit has been dismissed by the High Court solely on the grounds  mentioned above.  If the plaintiff succeeds     satisfying this  Court that  the  view taken by the High Court is  wrong  then  the matter  will have to go back to the High Court for  decision on questions left undecided.     We  shall first take up the question of notice under  s. 233   of  Ajmer  Merwar  Municipalities  Regulation.     The contention  of  the defendant is that the notice  issued  is invalid  inasmuch  as the same was issued on behalf  of  the Ajmer  Electric  Supply  Co. Ltd.  after  that  company  was amalgamated with the plaintiff.   The next ground of  attack is  that the said notice is invalid because it does not  set out  the  name  and  the place of  abode  of  the  intending plaintiff.   These contentions have commended themselves  to the  learned Judges of the High Court.  Section 233  of  the Ajmer Merwar Municipality Regulation prescribes:                     "Section   233:Suits  against  Committee               or its officers.  No suit shall be  instituted               against  a Committee, or against  any  member,               officer or servant of a Committee, in  respect               of any act purporting to be done in its or his               official capacity, until the expiration of one               month  next after notice in writing has  been,               in the case of a Committee, delivered or  left               at  its office, and in the case of an  officer               or  servant, delivered to him or left  at  his               office or place of abode, stating the cause of

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             action and the name and place of abode of  the               intending  plaintiff;  and unless  the  plaint               domains a statement  that such notice has been               so delivered or left:                     Provided  that nothing in  this  section               shall  apply  to  any  suit  instituted  under               section  54 of the Specific Relief Act,  1877.               (I of 1877)."               So  far as suits against public officials  are               concerned    this   section   is   an    exact               reproduction of s. 80,  Civil Procedure  Code.               But s. 80, Civil Procedure Code has two  parts               namely:               (1) Suits against Governments and                   (2)  Suits  against  public  officers   in               respect   of  acts purporting to  be  done  by               those   public  officers  in  their   official               capacity. So  far  as suits against Governments  are  concerned,  they cannot  be  validly instituted without giving  a  notice  as required  by s. 80, Civil Procedure Code.  But when we  come to  suits  against public officers, s. 80,  Civil  Procedure Code  applies  only  to  suits  in  respect  of  any   ’act’ purporting to be done by a public officer and 436 that  in his official capacity.  Hence before s. 80  can  be relied  on in any suit against a public officer, it must  be shown that it is a suit in respect of an ’act’ purporting to be  ’done  by  him ’in his dial capacity.  In  view  of  the provisions of ’the General Clauses Act, the expression ’act’ also includes illegal omissions.  Therefore if the suit does not relate to any ’act’ or ’illegal omission’ purporting  to be done by a public officer in his official capacity, s.  80 will  not  have any application.  Similar  is  the  position under s. 233 of the Ajmer Merwar Municipalities Regulation.     The stand taken by the plaintiff is that in the  instant case  no notice under s. 233 of Ajmer Merwar  Municipalities Regulation was necessary; alternatively it was urged that if such a notice is necessary, the notice issued complies  with the  requirements  of  law.  If  the  first  alternative  is accepted there is no need to go into the question as to  the validity of the notice issued.     In the suit, the plaintiff does not complain of any  act done by the defendant nor does it say that the defendant was guilty of any illegal omission.  The plaintiff’s case is  as mentioned earlier that in view of the notification issued by the  Chief Commissioner on March 29, 1949 [Exh.  13(B)],  it was  entitled  to  recover from  the  defendant  the  amount claimed.  The stand taken by the defendant is that the  levy of   surcharge  is  invalid.   Whether  the  contention   is sustainable  or not there is no doubt that it is  bona  fide contention.   That  contention had commended itself  to  the High  Court.   Every omission is not  an  illegal  omission. Before an omission can be considered as an illegal  omission it must be shown that the official concerned had omitted  to discharge  some  official  duty imposed  on  him  in  public interest.   The  omission in question must have  a  positive content in it.  In other  words  the  nondischarging of that duty  must amount to an illegality.  We are told that  under the   provisions   of  the   Ajmer   Metwar   Municipalities Regulation,  it  is  the duty of the  Municipal  Council  to discharge all its liabilities. In that connection  reference was made to certain provisions of the said Regulation.   But the failure on the part of the Municipality to discharge its liabilities will  not  ordinarily become illegal  omissions.

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The  municipality or its members or office bearer cannot  be punished  for  their failure to pay the amount  due  to  the plaintiff.   To put it differently the  omission  complained does  not  entail  any  penal  consequence  for  the  public official   responsible  for  it.   If  every   omission   is considered  as  an  illegal omission and therefore an  ’act’ either within the meaning of s. 80, Civil Procedure Code  or s.  233 of the Ajrner Merwar Municipalities Regulation  then the  distinction  between  the first part of  s.  80,  Civil Procedure  Code and its second part disappears.  If that  is so,  k follows that in every suit against a  public  officer relating  to his public duty, the issuance of a notice is  a condition precedent. That in our opinion would be  rewriting the section. 437     It is true that in  Bhagchand Dagdusa Guirathi and  ors. v.  Secretary of State for India(1) the Privy  Council  laid down  that  s. 80 should be strictly complied  with  and  is applicable  to  all forms of action and all kinds of reliefs claimed against the Government. But here in this case we are not   concerned  with  a  claim  against   the   Government. Therefore  that decision has no application to the facts  of the  present  case.   The case which  is  relevant  for  our present  purpose  is  Revati Mohan  Das  v.  Jatindra  Mohan Ghosh(2).  Therein a manager of an estate appointed under s. 95     the Bengal Tenancy Act, 1885 executed a  mortgage  in favour  of  the predecessor of the plaintiff  therein  after obtaining the sanction of the local court.  The successor of that   manager  failed  to  discharge  the  mortgage   debt. Consequently  the plaintiff brought a suit against  him  for obtaining a mortgage decree.  That suit was resisted on  the ground  that the plaintiff had failed  to  give  the  notice prescribed by s. 80, Civil Procedure Code before instituting the  suit.   That  plea succeeded in the  High  Court.   The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council reversed the  decree of  the High Court holding that the failure on the  part  of the   resportdent  to  discharge  the  mortgage  cannot   be considered  as  an ’act’within the meaning of s.  80,  Civil Procedure Code.  In   the course of the Judgment Sir  George Lowndes speaking  for  the Board observed thus:     "On  the  alternative  contention  their  Lordships  are unable  to hold that non-payment by respondent 1 is an  ’act purporting  to  be  done by’ the manager  ’in  his  official capacity’.    Under the general definitions contained in  s. 3,  General  Clauses  Act, 1897 an ’act’  might  include  an illegal  omission but there clearly was no illegal  omission in  the present case.  It is also difficult to see how  mere omission to pay either interest or principal could be an act purporting  to  be  done by ’the  manager  in  his  official capacity." (emphasis supplied).     At this stage we would like to emphasis the observations of  their  Lordships;  "but clearly  there  was  no  illegal omission in the present case."  This observation shows  that a mere omission to discharge the debt without any thing more is  not an illegal omission.  It is true that in that  case, the court proceeded further and observed:     "The  mortgage  imposed no personal liability  upon  the manager,  but merely provided that if payment was  not  made the mortgagee would be entitled to realize his dues by  sale through  the  Court,  and this was all  that  the  appellant sought by his suit.  The manager for the time being no doubt had  an  option  to  pay  in order to  save  the  sale,  but failure  to exercise an option is not in any sense a  breach of duty.  The appellant made no claim against (1) 54 I.A. 338.                         (2) 61 I.A. 171.

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438 respondent 1 personally.  He was there only as  representing the  estate  of  which  the  sale  was  sought.   In   their Lordships’ opinion, such a suit is not within the gambit  of s. 80 and no notice of suit was required."     It  is possible to read this passage  as merely  setting out  the  facts of that particular case  and  the  equitable considerations arising therefrom and not as the ratio of the decision.   Even if we consider that passage as one  of  the reasons  given in support of the decision, the  strength  of the earlier ratio is not weakened. The interpretation placed by  us  on that decision is the same as that placed  by  the Calcutta  High  Court  in  Debendra  Nath  Roy  v.  Official Receiver(1).  Mr.  Sharma read to us several  decisions   of the  various High Courts wherein it has been laid down  that a  suit brought in respect of breach of contract by a public official  is  an  act  within the meaning  of  s.  80  Civil Procedure Code. Similarly, illegal omissions have been  held to be ’acts’ under that section. In some of the decisions it was held that the second part of s. 80, Civil Procedure Code applies  only  to  actions  on  torts  committed  by  public officials,  in  the discharge of  their   public  functions. There  is conflict of judicial opinion on that  point.   For our  present  purpose it is not necessary  to  resolve  that conflict.   Suffice it to say that in the present case,  the plaint  does  not complain of any ’act’ or even  an  illegal omission  on the part of the defendant. Hence we agree  with Mr. Purshottam Tricumdas that no notice under s. 233 of  the Ajmer Metwar Municipalities Regulation was necessary  before instituting  the suit.  In that view it is not necessary  to consider whether the notice relied on by the plaintiff meets the requirements of the law.     This takes us to the validity of the notification issued by the Chief Commissioner of Ajmer on March 29, 1949 levying certain surcharges on the consumers of electricity  supplied by  the  plaintiff.   Section  6 of the  Bombay  Act  as  it originally stood read:                     "The  provisions of the Act shall  apply               notwithstanding  anything in any other law  or               any  licence  or sanction  granted  under  the               Principal Act or in any contract for energy or               maintaining street light equipments."               The  notification extending this Act to  Ajmer               Metwar modified that section and the  modified               section reads:                      "The provisions of the Act shall  apply               notwithstanding  anything in any other law  or               any  licence  or sanction  granted  under  the               principal Act." The words ’Principal Act’ refer to the Electricity Act.   On the basis of this modification it is urged on behalf of  the respondent   (1) A.I.R. 1938 Cal. 191. 439 that the Chief Commissioner was not competent  to  levy  the impugned surcharge.  From the fact that certain  words  were omitted in s. 6, we are asked to assume that the  Government of India intended that no surcharge should be levied on  the bills  issued to the defendant for the supply of  electrical energy for street lighting.  We do not know why the words in question  were  omitted  from s. 6.  But  to  our  mind  the omission  of those words does not in any manner  affect  the provisions contained in ss. 3 and 4    the Bombay Act.   Now we shall set out ss. 3 and 4 of the Bombay Act.  They read:                     "Section  3  .--(  1 )  Any  license  or

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             sanction-holder  may apply to  the  Provincial                             Government in the prescribed form for fixing  a               rate of surcharge on the charges for energy or               street  lighting  equipment  leviable  by  him               under  the terms of his licenee,  sanction  or               contract,   as   the  case   may   be.    Such               application  shall  be accompanied I  by  such               calculations as may be prescribed.                     (2)  On receipt of an application  under               sub-section  (1)  the  Provincial   Government               may,  if  it  considers that  a  surcharge  is               desirable  in  the case of  such  licensec  or               sanction-holder,  by  order notified   in  the               Official Gazette, fix the rate of surcharge.                      (3)  The rate of surcharge fixed  under               sub-section (2) shall not exceed:                   (a)  331/2 per centuries in the  case   of               undertakings where diesel oil  is used for the               generation of energy,                   (b)  20  per  centuries  in  the  case  of               undertakings  where  steam  is  used  for  the               generation of energy.                     (4)  In  the order fixing  the  rate  of               surcharge    under   sub-section   (2),    the               Provincial   Government   may   specify   such               conditions as it may think fit to be  observed               by the licensee or sanction-holder.                     (5)    Without   prejudice     to    the               generality  of  the power  contained  in  sub-               section  (4),  the Provincial  Government  may               require the execution of an undertaking in the               prescribed    form    by   the   licensec   or               sanction holder that his profits in excess  of               the prescribed limits shah be transferred to a               Rates  Stabilization  Reserve  for  prescribed               purposes.                     (6) The Provincial Government may at any               time  enhance  or reduce by a like  order  the               rate fixed under sub-section (2).               440                     Sec.  4  :--Upon the rate  of  surcharge               being fixed by the Provincial Government  from               time  to time in accordance with this Act,  it               shall  not  be  lawful  for  the  licensec  or               sanction-holder  concerned  except  with   the               previous sanction of the Provincial Government                             to  charge at other than charges surch arged  at               the rate for the time being so fixed;                      Provided  that  no  surcharge  or   any               subsequent   revision  thereof  shall   affect               charges leviable for any period not covered by               the   relevant  order   of   the    Provincial               Government."     The  provisions  contained therein clearly  empower  the Chief  Commissioner   to  levy  surcharge   on   the   bills for    the  supply  of  electricity  for  street   lighting. Section 4 empowers the licensec to collect from the consumer the  surcharge levied. Municipal Councils are  not  excluded from  the  operation  of ss. 3 and 4 of the  Bombay  Act  as extended  to  Ajmer Merwar.    Similarly  electrical  energy supplied on the basis of a contract is not excluded from the operation of s. 3.  That much is clear from the language  of that section. We see no reason to read into that section  an

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exception  in the case of Municipal Councils or  electricity supplied  for street lighting under a contract.   Section  6 does  not in any manner cut down the operation of ss. 3  and 4.  In our opinion that section as it stood originally or as modified  has  no impact on ss. 3 and 4.   Charges  for  the supply of energy for street lighting are ordinarily  payable by  the Municipal Councils.   Generally speaking it  is  the Municipal Councils that provide street lighting. Possibly s. 6  was  included in the Bombay Act as a matter  of  abundant caution.   It is not denied that the Bombay legislature  had competence  to enact that Act.  We shall  presently  examine the  contention  that Act is ultra vires the  provisions  of Electricity  Act  and therefore the provisions of  that  Act should  not be given effect to.  But for the present we  are assuming that Act is valid and proceed to examine the impact of  s. 6 on ss. 3 and 4. We think that s. 6 does not in  any manner control  ss. 3 and 4. The intention of a  legislature or its delegate has to be gathered from the language of  the statutory provisions and not from what it failed to say.  If because of modification of s. 6, the provisions contained in ss.  3  & 4 could not be applied in the case  of  supply  of electrical energy for street lighting under a contract  then it could have been said that the notification issued by  the Chief  Commissioner was without the authority of  law.   But that  cannot be said in this case.  The provisions in ss.  3 and  4 are self contained provisions.  For taking action  on the basis of those sections no assistance is needed from  s. 6.   Therefore we think the High Court was wrong in  opining that the notification issued  by the Chief 441 Commissioner   levying  surcharge  on  the  price   of   the electrical  energy supplied for street lighting was  without the authority of law.     We   shall   now  examine  the  contention   that    the notification  issued by the Chief Commissioner on March  29, 1949  is ultra vires the provisions of the Electricity  Act. On  this  aspect the argument on behalf  of  the  respondent proceeded  thus: Section 3(f) of that Act provides that  the provisions  contained in the Schedule shall be deemed to  be incorporated  with,  and  to form  part  of,  every  licence granted under this Act save in so far as they are  expressly added  to,  varied  or excepted by the  licence,  and  shaH, subject  to  any such additions,  variations  or  exceptions which  the  State Government is hereby  empowered  to  make, apply to the undertaking authorised by the license:      (Proviso  is  not  relevant for  our  present  purpose) Clause  12 of the Schedule as it stood at the relevant  time read:                     "XII.  CHARGE  FOR  SUPPLY  FOR   PUBLIC               LAMPS.--                     The price to be charged by the  licensec               and to be paid to him for energy supplied  for               the public lamps, and ’the mode in which those               charges are to be ascertained shall be settled               by  agreement  between the  licensee  and  the               (State Government) or the local authority,  as               the case may be, and, where any difference  or               dispute arises, the matter shall be determined               by arbitration." The  argument proceeded that the Electricity Act  which   is a central legislation lays down that the price to be charged by  the  licensee and to be paid to him for  the  electrical energy supplied for street lighting shall be settled  either by  agreement between the licensee and the State  Government or the local authority as the case may be or, and, where any

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difference or dispute arises the matter should be determined by arbitration; the price so fixed cannot be altered in  any manner;  levying surcharge is but one mode of enhancing  the price  to be paid; such a course is violative of cl.  12  of the  Schedule in the Electricity Act; hence it must be  held that  the  Chief  Commissioner  had no  power  to  levy  any surcharge which would interfere with the mandate of cl.  12. It was not said before us nor before the High Court that the Bombay  legislature  had  no competence to  enact  the  Act. Electricity   is  a  concurrent  subject  both   under   the Constitution  as well as under the Government of India  Act, 1935.   Therefore quite clearly the Bombay  legislature  had competence  to provide for the levy of surcharge so long  as the  relevant provision did not conflict with any  provision in any central Act.  Hence the question is whether ss. 3 and 4 are in conflict 442 with cl. 12 of the Schedule of the Electricity Act ?  If the two  can  co-exist  then there is no  question  of  conflict between the two.     We see no conflict between cl. 12 of the Schedule in the Electricity  Act and ss. 3 and 4 of the Bombay Act.   Clause 12  prescribes  a  procedure  for  settling  the  price   of electricity  supplied by the licensee for  street  lighting. It merely lays down the machinery for settling the price  if there  is  dispute between the  contracting  parties.   That clause does not fix the price to be paid or even the maximum price  payable.  We fail to see how that clause  takes  away the  power from the State legislature to  impose  additional burden  on the consumer.  All that clause means is that  the licensec   cannot  dictate  his  terms  to   the   authority responsible  for  street lighting.  We are unable  to  agree with   the  learned  Judges  of  the  High  Court  that   in incorporating   cl.   12  of  the  Schedule,   the   central legislature   intended  that  under  no   circumstance   the liability  of the consumer can be increased beyond  what  is asked  during  the  continuance of  the  contract.   In  our opinion  it  imposes  no  fetters  on  the  powers  of   the provincial legislatures in the matter of hanging  the  price  of the  electricity   supplied  by  the licensec for street lighting.     For  the reasons mentioned above we are unable to  agree with  the High Court that either the suit is bad because  of want  of  a valid notice under s. 233 of  the  Ajmer  Merwar Municipalities Regulation or that the notification  imposing surcharge is invalid for any reason.     Under the notification imposing surcharge the  plaintiff is  not  entitled to get any additional sum as  regards  the pumping  of water. Under that notification to the extent  it is  applicable to this case surcharge is levied only on  the price  of  electrical energy supplied under a  contract  for street  lighting  and  not in respect of the  price  of  the electrical energy used for pumping water. Under Exh. 21  the plaintiff  entered  into an agreement to pump  water  for  a fixed  consideration.  For so doing it may have  to  utilise the  electricity produced by it but that does not amount  to supplying  electricity  to the Municipal Council  much  less supplying  electricity for street lighting.  From el.  8  of that agreement it is seen that the parties to that agreement contemplated  the  pumping  of water by  using  Oil  Engines though  ordinarily it was expected that it will be  done  by electrical energy.  It is true that el. 20 of the  agreement provides  that the Municipal Council shall have first  claim over  other consumers for the supply of energy  for  pumping such   quantity  of water as may be required from the  wells

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at  Bhaonta.  In construing the true nature of the  contract entered  into  between the parties. the contract has  to  be read  as  a whole and if so read it is clear that  what  the plaintiff  undertook  was to pump water from  the  wells  in question and not to supply any electrical energy. 443 Hence  we  are in agreement with the learned Judges  of  the High  Court that the plaintiff’s case in this regard  should fail.     Mr.  Sharma urged that the High Court had  not   thought it  necessary  to  decide certain  contentions  advanced  on behalf  of the defendant in view of its conclusions set  out earlier.  He told us that the defendant had pleaded that the plaintiff  failed to prove the quantum of surcharge  payable by the defendant.  It also contended ’that the  notification under   which   the   surcharge  is   levied   cannot   have retrospective  operation and that no surcharge was  leviable under  that  notification  on  the  charges  in  respect  of maintaining  street lighting equipments.  According  to  the learned  Counsel for the plaintiff there is no merit in  any one  of  these contentions.  As mentioned earlier  the  High Court  has not gone into these contentions.  It is for  that court  to  examine those contentions.  This court  does  not ordinarily examine contentions which have not been  examined by  the  appellate court.  It is best that  these  questions should be gone into by the High Court.     In  the  result  we allow this  appeal,  set  aside  the judgment  of the High Court and remand the case back to  the High  Court  for  deciding  the issues  that  remain  to  be decided.   The  costs of this appeal shall be costs  in  the cause. V.P.S.                                       Appeal allowed. 444