IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

               CIVIL APPEAL NO.5680 OF 2008              (Arising out of SLP©No.248 of 2007)

Ajit Singh & Anr.                                            ..Appellants

Versus

Jit Ram & Anr.                                            …Respondents

J U D G M E N T

TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.

1.    Leave granted.  

2.   This  is  an  appeal  by  special  leave  against  the

judgment and final order dated 8th of February, 2006 of

the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in

Civil Revision No. 4231 of 2004, whereby the High Court

in the exercise of its revisional power had interfered with

the findings of fact arrived at by the Appellate Authority

which was the final authority on fact and set aside the

order of the Appellate Authority, Chandigarh dated 5th of

August,  2004  directing  the  eviction  of  the  respondent

only  on  the  ground  of  subletting,  which  affirmed  the

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order  of  eviction  passed  by  the  Rent  Controller  on  a

different ground namely, on the ground of sub-letting.   

3. The appellants are father and son and the appellant

No.1 (son) is the owner of a shop being Shop No. 142,

Village Badheri, U.T. Chandigarh (hereinafter referred to

as  “the  said  shop”)  on  the  basis  of  a  family  partition

dated 26th of August, 1998 and the appellant No.2 is the

landlord  of  the said shop.  Prior  to  the family partition

dated 26th of August, 1998 the father, namely, appellant

No.2  was  the  owner  and  landlord  of  the  said  shop.

Respondent  Nos.1  and 2 are  also  father and son.  The

father,  namely,  respondent  No.1  was  inducted  as  a

tenant in respect of the said shop at a monthly rental of

Rs.500/-  per  month  excluding  the  electricity  charges.

The  appellants  filed  an  eviction  petition  against  the

respondents for evicting them from the said shop inter

alia  on the ground of sub-  letting,  for non payment of

rent and also for bonafide requirement for the personal

use and occupation of the appellant No.1. According to

the appellants, the respondent No.1 had sub-let the said

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shop  to  respondent  No.2,  his  own  son,  who  is  in

possession of the same and has been running the said

shop  under  the  name  of  M/s.  New  Paris  Furniture

without  the  consent  of  the  appellants.  It  was  further

alleged that the respondent No.1 neither paid the rent of

the  said  shop  nor  tendered  the  same  as  such  was in

arrears of payment of rent since 1st of October, 1995 till

the filing of the application for eviction. The appellants

further alleged in the eviction petition that the said shop

was required for the personal use and occupation of the

appellant  No.1.  Accordingly,  the  appellants  were

constrained  to  file  the  eviction  petition  against  the

respondents  in  respect  of  the  said  shop  when  it  was

found that in respect of the notice, the respondents had

failed  to  vacate  and deliver  peaceful  possession  of  the

said shop to the appellants.     

4. The  respondents  entered  appearance  and  filed  a

written statement inter alia contending that the eviction

petition  against  them  was  not  maintainable  and  the

personal  necessity  of  the  said  shop  for  the  use  and

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occupation of the appellant No.1 was also not available

and that the Rent Controller had no jurisdiction to try

and  entertain  the  eviction  petition.  Accordingly,  the

respondents prayed for rejection of the eviction petition.  

5. On  the  basis  of  the  pleadings  of  the  parties,  as

noted  herein  above,  the  Rent  Controller  framed  the

following issues :-      

“  (I)  Whether  the  respondents  were  in  arrears  of  rent

w.e.f.  01-10-95  and  as  such  were  liable  to  be  evicted

from demised premises on the ground of non-payment of

rent?  

(II)  Whether  the  rent  tendered  by  the  respondent  was

short and insufficient?  

(III) Whether the said shop was sublet by the respondent

no.  1  to  respondent  no.2  without   the  consent  of  the

appellants?  

(IV) Whether the appellant No1 for his personal use and

occupation required the said shop?

(V)  Whether  this  court  has  no  jurisdiction  to  try  and

entertain the eviction petition?   

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(VI)  Whether the ground of personal  necessity was not

available  to the appellants as the shop in dispute was

not a commercial property?  

(VII)  Whether  the  respondents  are  entitled  for  counter

claim as prayed for?  

(VIII) Relief.”

The Rent Controller decided issue Nos. 1, 2 and 7

together  and  held  that  the  respondents  were  not

defaulters in payment of rent nor they were entitled to

get refund of any amount from the appellant as the case

made out by them that they have paid the appellant in

excess.  This finding arrived at by the Rent Controller by

holding  that  the  appellant  had  failed  to  produce  any

credible and reliable evidence, accordingly, Issue Nos. 1,

2 and 7 were held against the appellant and, therefore,

no order for ejectment could be passed on the ground of

non-payment of rent.  Issue No.4 and 6 were also taken

up  together.  Issue  No.4  was  decided  against  the

appellants and Issue No.6 was decided in favour of the

respondents. Accordingly, the Rent Controller held that

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the ground for personal necessity was not made out and

therefore, on that issue, the appellants were not entitled

to evict the respondents from the said shop. So far as

Issue No.5 was concerned, before the Rent Controller the

said issue was not pressed.  It  may be mentioned here

that the Rent Controller,  however,  held that there was

relationship of landlord tenant between the parties as the

respondents in their examination-in-chief admitted that

the appellant No.2 was the owner of the said shop who

had  given  the  same  to  the  appellant  No.1  by  way  of

family  settlement  dated  26th of  August,  1998.

Accordingly, the Rent Controller held that the appellants

were entitled to evict the respondents only on the ground

of sub-letting as the said shop was sub-let by respondent

No.1  to  respondent  No.2  without  the  consent  of  the

appellants. Upon the issues being decided in the manner

indicated  above,  the Rent Controller  finally passed  the

order of eviction against the respondents in respect of the

said shop only on the ground of sub-letting.

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6. Feeling aggrieved by the order of eviction passed by

the  Rent  Controller,  the  respondents  filed  an  appeal

before  the  Appellate  Authority  under  the  East  Punjab

Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (in short the ‘Rent Act’).

The Appellate Authority by its judgment and final order

dated 5th of August, 2004 allowed the appeal and also the

cross  objections  of  the  appellants  and  directed  the

eviction of  the  respondents from the said shop on the

ground of personal necessity by the appellants.  

7. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order of

the  Appellate  Authority  directing  eviction  on  a  finding

that the appellants required the said shop for their own

use and occupation, the respondents filed a civil revision

petition in the High Court which, by the impugned order,

was allowed and the High Court, as noted herein earlier,

in the exercise of its revisional power had set aside the

order of eviction passed by the Appellate Authority on the

ground that appellant No.2 was the landlord of the said

shop  but  they  had  failed  to  prove  the  ingredients  as

required under Section 13(3)(a)(ii) of the Rent Act. It was

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held by the High Court that the averments made in the

eviction  petition  would  evidently  show  that  such

averments were made only to the extent of the personal

requirement of the appellant No.1, Ajit Singh, but such

pleadings did not relate to the personal requirement of

the appellant No.2, who was also the landlord of the said

shop and, accordingly, in the absence of any pleading or

averment made in the eviction petition to the extent of

the  personal  requirement  of  the  said  shop  of  the

appellant  No.2,  the  High Court  held  that  the  order  of

eviction passed by the Appellate Authority could not be

sustained in law. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with

the order of the High Court allowing the revision petition,

the  appellants  filed  a  special  leave  petition  which  on

grant  of  leave  was  heard  in  presence  of  the  learned

counsel for the parties.

8. Having  heard  the  learned  counsel  for  the  parties

and  after  examining  the  impugned  order  of  the  High

Court as well as the order of the appellate authority and

the Rent Controller and the materials on record including

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the averments made by the appellants in their  petition

for eviction, we are of the view that the High Court in the

exercise of its revisional power under the Rent Act was

not entitled to interfere with the findings of fact arrived at

by the Appellate  Authority on the question of bonafide

requirement  of  the  said  shop  at  the  instance  of  the

appellants. Since the findings arrived at by the Appellate

Authority on the question of bonafide requirement was

set  aside  by  the  High  Court  in  the  exercise  of  its

revisional power under the Rent Act and the eviction of

the respondents from the said shop therefore rests only

on  the  ground  whether  the  pleadings  made  by  the

appellants  in  their  eviction  petition  would  satisfy  the

requirement  of  Section 13(3)(a)(ii)  of  the  Rent  Act.  The

pleadings made by the appellants in the eviction petition

must therefore be looked into in depth and in detail.  

9. It is an admitted position that the said shop is at

Village Badheri, Chandigarh. Since the eviction granted

by  the  appellate  authority  and  reversed  by  the  High

Court  in  revision  was  on  bonafide  requirement  of  the

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appellants, it will be fit and proper that Section 13(3)(a)

(ii) of the Rent Act should now be referred to, which runs

as under :

“13. Eviction of tenant –

(3)(a) A landlord may apply to the controller for an

order  directing  the  tenant  to  put  the  landlord  in

possession;

(i)…………………………………

(ii) in the case of non-residential building or rented

land, if  

(a) he requires it for his own use;

(b) he  is  not  occupying  in  the  urban  area

concerned for the purpose of his business any

other such building or rented land as the case

may be; and

(c) he has not vacated such a building or rented

land  without  sufficient  cause  after  the

commencement of this Act, in the urban area

concerned;”  

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A plain reading of the aforesaid provision, namely,

Section 13(3)(a)(ii)  of  the  Rent  Act  would  show that  in

order to get an order of eviction on the aforesaid ground,

the  landlord  had  to  aver  and  prove  that  the  landlord

required the said shop for his own use as the said shop

was  a  non-residential  building.   In  Joginder  Pal  vs.

Naval  Kishore  Behal  [(2002)  5  SCC 397],  this  Court

considered  the  aforesaid  provision  in  detail  and

interpreted the words “his own use” in regard to a non-

residential building. In that view of the matter, it would

be  appropriate  for  us  to  refer  to  the  aforesaid

consideration  by  this  Court  in  the  aforesaid  decision

which crystallised the question as under :  

“  (1)  The words “for his own use”  as occurring in

Section 13(3)(a)(ii)  of  the Act must receive  a wide,

liberal and useful meaning rather than a strict or

narrow construction.

(2)The expression – landlord requires for “his own

use”  is  not  confined  in  its  meaning  to  actual

physical  user  by  the  landlord  personally.  The

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requirement not only of the landlord himself but

also of the normal “emanations” of the landlord is

included  therein.  All  the  cases  and

circumstances  in  which  actual  physical

occupation  or  user  by  someone  else,  would

amount  to  occupation  or  user  by  the  landlord

himself,  cannot  be  exhaustively  enumerated.  It

will  depend  on  a  variety  of  factors  such  as

interrelationship  and  interdependence  –

economic or otherwise, between the landlord and

such person in the background of social, socio-

religious and local customs and obligations of the

society or region to which they belong.

(3)The  tests  to  be  applied  are  :  (i)  whether  the

requirement pleaded and proved may properly be

regarded as the landlord’s own requirement; and,

(ii) whether on the facts and in the circumstances

of a given case, actual occupation and user by a

person other than the landlord would be deemed

by the landlord as “his own” occupation or user.

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The answer would, in its turn, depend on (i) the

nature  and  degree  of  relationship  and/or

dependence  between  the  landlord  pleading  the

requirement  as  “his  own”  and  the  person  who

would  actually  use  the  premises;  (ii)  the

circumstances in which the claim arises and is

put forward; and (iii) the intrinsic tenability of the

claim.  The  court  on  being  satisfied  of  the

reasonability  and  genuineness  of  claim,  as

distinguished from a mere ruse to get rid of the

tenant, will uphold the landlord’s claim.  

(4)  While casting its judicial verdict, the court shall

adopt  a  practical  and  meaningful  approach

guided by the realities of life.

(5)In  the  present  case,  the  requirement  of  the

landlord of the suit premises for user as office of

his chartered accountant son is the requirement

of landlord “for his own use” within the meaning

of Section 13(3)(a)(ii).”

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10. This judgment is the answer to the question posed

before us.  Here also, the requirement is made for the

son who is admittedly the owner of the shop room and

also the landlord, after the said shop was, by a family

partition  dated  26th of  August,  1998,  given  to  the  son

who also became the landlord after family partition and

also  he  became  the  owner  of  the  said  shop  by  such

family partition.  

11. From  the  aforesaid  decision  of  this  Court,  it  is

therefore,  clear  that  this  Court  has  laid  down

authoritatively  that  a  non-residential  premises,  if

required  by  a  son  for  user  by  him  would  cover  the

requirement  of  words used  in the Section,  i.e.  “for  his

own use” in reference to a landlord. Therefore, if “his own

use” has been interpreted by this Court in the above-said

manner, then the requirements as laid down in Section

13(3)(a)(ii)(b) and (c) of the Act has to be interpreted in

the same manner to hold that (a) the son of the landlord

has to plead in the eviction petition that, (b)  he is not

occupying in the urban area concerned for the purpose

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of his business any other such building or rented land as

the  case  may  be;  and  (c)  he  has  not  vacated  such  a

building or rented land without sufficient cause after the

commencement  of  the  Rent  Act,  in  the  urban  area

concerned.     

12. In the present case, it was pleaded and proved that

the said shop was required for the use of the son and,

therefore,  the  pleadings  of  the  son  in  regard  to  the

aforesaid requirement, being mandatory, were satisfied,

otherwise  it  would  make  the  requirement  laid  down

under  the  said  provisions  nugatory  in  view  of  the

interpretation  given  by  this  Court  in  the  aforesaid

decision, with which we are in full agreement.

13. Applying  the  principles  as  laid  down  by  the

aforesaid decision namely,  Joginder Pal (Supra)  which

also deals with commercial premises, as in the present

case, we are of the view that a plain reading of Section 13

(3)(a)(ii) (a) to (c) in conjunction with Section 13(3)(a)(iv)(a)

& (b) of the Rent Act, would make it ample clear when

the said shop is being got vacated on the ground of user

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for the son of the landlord, then in the eviction petition,

the  son (appellant  No.  1)  must  plead  that  he  was  not

occupying  any  other  building  and  that  he  had  not

vacated such a building without sufficient cause.  It  is

well  settled  that  while  interpreting  a  provision  of  a

statute,  the  same  has  to  be  interpreted  taking  into

consideration the other provisions of the same statute.

In the aforesaid decision, namely, Joginder Pal (Supra),

this  Court  has  clearly  laid  down  that  a  balanced

interpretation  has  to  be  given  in  regard  to  the  rent

legislation and the provisions itself contemplate a case in

regard  to  user  of  non-residential  building  by  a

professional and the statute itself lays down requirement

in that regard within the same requirements will have to

be read in regard to shop required to be used by the son

of  the  landlord for  business  purpose.   Accordingly,  we

are of the view that the impugned decision of the High

Court  is  in  direct  conflict  with  the  Judgment  of  this

Court in  Joginder Singh’s case  (supra) and therefore,

the said Judgment cannot be sustained.  

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14. There  is  another  aspect  of  this  matter.  While

making an interpretation of  Section 13 of  the  Act,  the

High Court did not deal with Section 13 of the Rent Act

completely but it dealt with only that part of Section 13

which deals with residential  building only and has not

dealt with portion of Section 13, which deals with non-

residential  building.  It  is  true  that  while  reversing  the

order of eviction passed by the Appellate Authority, the

High Court in the impugned order had also taken note of

the decision in Joginder Pal’s case (supra), but in view

of our discussions made herein above,  the ratio of the

aforesaid decision was not applied in the present case.

There is yet another angle in which the High Court was

not  justified  in  interfering  with  the  order  of  eviction

passed  by the Appellate  Authority  which was the final

court  of  fact.  The  Appellate  Authority  while  directing

eviction  to  the  respondents  considered  the  oral  and

documentary evidence on record and also the pleadings

of  the  parties  and  then  came  to  a  finding  that  the

appellants  had  successfully  averred  and  proved  their

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case of personal requirement as made out by them under

Section 13(3)(a)(ii) of the Rent Act. It is true that the High

Court in its revisional jurisdiction could have interfered

with  such  findings  of  fact  arrived  at  by  the  Appellate

Authority, if the High Court had found that the findings

of  the  Appellate  Authority  on the  question  of  bonafide

requirement were either perverse or arbitrary. On a close

examination of the impugned order of the High Court, we

do not find any ground to hold that the findings of fact,

regarding  the  bonafide  requirement  of  the  appellants,

were perverse or arbitrary or the pleadings made by the

appellants in their eviction petition could be said to be

not in conformity with the requirement of Section 13(3)(a)

(ii) of the Rent Act. Therefore, we are also of the view that

the High Court was in error in interfering with the order

of  eviction  passed  by  the  Appellate  Authority  on  the

ground of bonafide requirement.    

15. At this stage, an argument advanced by the learned

counsel  for  the  respondents  may  be  considered.  The

learned counsel for the respondents relied on a decision

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of  this  Court  in  Hasmat Rai & Anr.  Vs.  Raghunath

Prasad [(1981) 3 SCC 103] and contended that a portion

of  the  demised  premises  may  also  be  used  as  a

residential premises, which cannot be considered to be a

commercial  premises  for  the  purpose  of  evicting  the

tenant under Section 13(3)(a)(ii) of the Rent Act. We are

unable to accept this submission of the learned counsel

for  the  respondents,  for  the  simple  reasons,  first,  the

decision  in  Hasmat  Rai’s  case  (supra)  was  based  on

M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 which confers on

the authority to pass order of eviction on the ground of

bonafide  requirement  on  a  different  wording  from the

words used in East Punjab Urban Rent Registration Act,

1949. Furthermore, it may be reiterated that in order to

obtain an order  of  eviction under  Section 13(3)(a)(ii)  of

the Rent Act, the landlord has to prove, as noted herein

earlier, that he required the said shop for his own use

and the said shop was a non-residential building.  In this

case,  admittedly  the  said shop is  used  for  commercial

purposes and therefore there was no question of the said

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shop being used as residential purposes or being used

for a portion of residential purposes for residential use.

That  being  the  position,  the  aforesaid  decision,  in  our

view, is clearly distinguishable.   Accordingly, the above

decision of this court is of no help to the respondents.  

16. For  the  reasons  aforesaid,  the  impugned  order  of

the High Court is hereby set aside and the order of the

Appellate Authority is restored and the eviction petition

filed by the appellants stands allowed.  

17. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case

and considering the facts that the respondents are

using the said shop for commercial  purposes and

have  been  carrying  on  business  in  the  same,  we

grant the respondents 9 months’ time to vacate the

same, subject to filing the usual undertaking in this

Court within two weeks from this date. Accordingly,

the appeal is allowed. There will be no order as to

costs.      

  …………………….J.

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[Tarun Chatterjee]

New Delhi; …………………….J. September 16, 2008.          [Aftab Alam]

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