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PETITIONER: AJIT SINGH

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 02/12/1966

BENCH: SIKRI, S.M. BENCH: SIKRI, S.M. RAO, K. SUBBA (CJ) HIDAYATULLAH, M. BACHAWAT, R.S. SHELAT, J.M.

CITATION:  1967 AIR  856            1967 SCR  (2) 143  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1967 SC 927  (1,2)  F          1967 SC1568  (6)  RF         1972 SC 486  (17)  R          1978 SC 803  (37)  D          1980 SC1682  (67,68)  RF         1989 SC1629  (23)

ACT: Retrospectivity-Public Officer-Retrospective appointment  by Notification-Acts  done  before  date  of  Notification,  if valid. Constitution  of India, 1950, Art. 31A(1),  Second  proviso- "Acquisition by State", meaning of. East  Punjab  Holdings  (Consolidation  and  Prevention   of Fragmentation)  Act (50 of 1948)-Scheme under-Small  portion of  land taken from proprietor holding land  within  ceiling limit-Proprietor, if entitled to compensation.

HEADNOTE: Between  May 1961, and May 1962,  consolidation  proceedings were taken under the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention  of  Fragmentation) Act, 1948, in  an  estate  in which  the  appellant was a small  proprietor  holding  land within  the  ceiling limit.  The  scheme  for  consolidation provided for taking of a fraction of each proprietor’s  land and throwing into a common pool which was added to the  land already  in  the possession of the Gram Panchayat.   But  no portion of the common pool apart from what was already owned by  the Panchayat, was reserved for providing income to  the Panchayat.  The ownership of the common pool was to vest  in the proprietary body consisting of the several  proprietors, and  the  Gram Panchayat was to manage and use  it  for  the common needs and benefits of the estate, under r. 16(ii)  of the   Punjab  Holdings  (Consolidation  and  Prevention   of Fragmentation)  Rules,  1949, so that, the  proprietors  and non-proprietors would share in the benefits.  The  appellant filed  a  writ petition in 1965, contending that :  (1)  The Consolidation  Officer  was  not appointed  till  after  the repartition  was concluded, that he could not  be  appointed

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retrospectively,  that  he had no legal  authority  when  he commenced  the  proceedings, and therefore, the  scheme  was invalid; and-(2) the scheme amounted to "acquisition by  the State"  within  the meaning of the second  proviso  to  Art. 31A(1)   of   the  Constitution,  with   the   result   that compensation  to  the  proprietor at  the  market  rate  was payable.  The High Court dismissed the petition. On appeal, HELD:     (Per Subba Rao, C. J., Sikri and Bachawat JJ.) (1) The  Consolidation Officer had no authority to act  as  such before  he was appointed and what he did, purporting to  act as  such  officer,  had no binding  effect  on  the  owners. Further,  the  State Government could not  appoint  him  and clothe  him  with authority retrospectively.   But,  as  the appellant was guilty of laches and no manifest injustice was done  to  him,  the High Court was right  in  rejecting  the contention. [147 B-D] (Per  Hidayatullah  and Shelat, JJ.) : As the  petition  was filed  more  than three years after the  completion  of  the repartition  of  holdings.  the  contention  should  not  be entertained  in  the face of the presumption under  s.  114, Indian Evidence Act, namely, that the Officer must have been appointed  to  act is such, as Without Such  appointment  he would not have acted. [154 B] 144 (2)  (Per  Subba  Rao, C. J. Sikri and Bachawat,  JJ.).  The words  acquisition  by the State" in the second  proviso  to Art.  31A(1)  do  not have any technical  meaning.   In  the context  of  Art.  31A the expression  must  have  the  same meaning  as  it  has in Art. 3  1A(1)  (a).   The  essential difference  between  "acquisition by the State" on  the  one hand  and "Modification or extinguishment of rights" on  the other,  is  that in the first case the  beneficiary  is  the State while in the second the beneficiary is not the  State. Therefore,  if the State has in substance acquired  all  the rights  in the land for its own purposes, even if the  title -remains  with the owner, it cannot be said that it  is  not acquisition within the proviso. [149 B-D; 150 G] State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose [1954] S.C.R. 587, Dwarkadas Shriniwas v. The Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd.,  11954]  S.C.R.  674, Saghir Ahmad V.  State  of  U.P. [1955] 1 S.C.R. 707 and Bombay Dyeing and Mfg.  CO.  Ltd. v. State of Bombay, [1958] S.C.R. 1122, followed. But  on  the  facts of this case,  the  beneficiary  of  the modification  of  rights  was  neither  the  State  nor  the Panchayat;  and therefore, there was no acquisition  by  the State within the second proviso.  As a result of the  scheme the title to the small fraction of land which was taken away for forming the common pool remained in the proprietary body of the holders in the estate and in the revenue records, the land  would  be  shown as belonging to  all  the  owners  in proportion to their areas.  The Gram Panchayat would  manage it  on behalf of the proprietary body and use it for  common purposes,and the proprietors would enjoy the benefits.  Even the satisfaction and advancement of the non-proprietors  who derived  benefits  from the common pool would enure  to  the advantage of the proprieters who would from a more efficient agricultural community. [152 E-G] Altar  Singh  v. State of U.P. [1959] Supp.  1  S.C.R.  928, followed. Per Hidayatullah and Shelat, JJ. (dissenting) : Article  31A deals  with  the  special  subject  of  "estates"  and   its intention  is  to give protection to  State  action  against Arts.  14,  19 and 31 so long as the acquisition is  by  the State  of  any  estate,  or of any  rights  therein  or  the

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extinguishment or modification of any -such rights.  To this protection  there  is  an  exception,  namely,  the   second proviso, under which land under the personal cultivation  of any  estate-holder of any kind, which is within the  ceiling limit  applicable to him, shall not be acquired  unless  the market value of the land is given as compensation.  The word "acquisition" used in the proviso must take its colour  from the same word used earlier in the same Article, and not from the word as used in an earlier article in juxtaposition with the word "requisition".  It denotes not only the acquisition of ownership, that is, the entire bundle of rights, but also acquisition of some rights which leaves the owner, an  owner in name only [162 E-163 Al In the present case the ’result of the scheme would be  that (i) the proprietor was deprived of his property though  only of a small portion; (ii) though the ownership was vested  in the proprietary body ill rights with    ’regard    to    the management and income therefrom were vested in the Gram Panchayat established under Punjab Gram Panchayat Act, 1953; (iii) the ownership  was  therefore transferred to another  body,  the Gram  Panchayat,  which  is an  entity  different  from  the Proprietor.   It  is a local authority included  within  the definition  of "State" in Art. 12, and (iv) the  benefit  of the  income of such lands goes not to the  proprietor  only, but to all proprietors and non-proprietors in the  Panchayat area.   Therefore,  although the property  is  not  actually vested  in  the  State  Government  or  the  Panchayat,  the Panchayat acquires almost the entire bundle 145 of  rights.  Hence, it is "acquisition" by the State  within the meaning of the second proviso and compensation at market value must be given. [163 D-H; 164 A] Moreover,  the fact that what was acquired was a  small  bit has no significance.  What is small is vague and  uncertain, and  the  safer  rule is, that, if the land  of  the  tenant cultivating  it is below the ceiling fixed by law, and if  a portion  of it is acquired, no matter for what  purpose  the acquisition takes place, compensation at -a ’rate not  lower than  the  market  value  must be paid  to  him.   When  the Constitution  speaks of market value, it is not possible  to find   compensation   in  advantages  which   might   accrue indirectly. [164 B-C]

JUDGMENT: CIVIL  APPELLATE  JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal  No.  1018  of 1966. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated October  5, 1965 of the Punjab High Court in Civil Writ  No. 663 of 1965. B.   R.  L.  Iyengar, S. K. Mehta and K. L. Mehta,  for  the appellant. K.   L. Gossain, O. P. Malhotra and R. N. Sachthey, for  the respondents. The  Judgment Of SUBBA RAO C.J. and SIKRI and  BACHAWAT  JJ. was delivered by SIKRI, J. The dissenting Opinion of HIDAYA- TULLAH and SHELAT, JJ. was delivered by HIDAYATULLAH, J. Sikri,  J. This appeal by special leave is directed  against the judgment of the Punjab High Court dismissing a  petition filed  by the appellant under art. 226 of the  Constitution, praying that the scheme of consolidation of village Ropalon, Tahsil  Samrola, District Ludhiana, be quashed.  The  scheme which was sought to be quashed was made under the provisions of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of

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Fragmentation Act, 1948, hereinafter referred to as the Act. On May 2, 1961, a notification ",as issued under s. 14(1) of the  Act, which provided for a declaration of the  intention of  the  State  Government to make a  scheme  for  the  con- solidation of holdings in the estates.  Section 14(2) of the Act provides for the appointment of a Consolidation  Officer and  the  preparation  of a scheme by  him.   One  Gurkirpal Singh,  purporting  to  act as  the  Consolidation  Officer, prepared  a  draft scheme and published it  on  November  8, 1961,  under  s. 19(1) of the Act.  On January 6,  1962,  or January 16, 1962, the scheme was confirmed by the Settlement Officer under S. 20(3) of the Act.  After the  confirmation, the Consolidation Officer after obtaining the advice of  the landowners  of the estate carried out repartition  under  s. 21(1) and the boundaries of the holdings as demarcated  were published in the prescribed manner in the estate on February 21,  1962.  It appears that the Punjab High Court granted  a stay order and no further proceedings under the Act could be taken.  No possession has been 146 transferred pursuant to the re-partition.  On May 11,  1962, a  notification was published in the Gazette, purporting  to appoint  Shri  Gurkirpal Singh as Consolidation  Officer  in respect  of the estate Ropalon with effect from November  4, 1961.   On March 10, 1965, Ajit Singh, appellant before  us, filed  the petition under art. 226 of the Constitution.   In the High Court, as before us, it was urged on behalf of  the appellant that :               (1)   there   could   be   no    retrospective               appointment of a Consolidation Officer; and               (2)   Compensation  must  be I-),,lid  to  the               appellant for the land reserved in the  scheme               for  various purposes in accordance  with  the               second  proviso to art. 3 1 A(1)  inserted  by               the Seventeenth Amendment. We need not mention the other grounds raised before the High Court as they have not been raised before us. The  High  Court  held  that  although  there  could  be  no retrospective  appointment of a Consolidation  Officer,  the objection  could not be sustained because of laches  of  the appellant.   On the second point, the High Court  held  that the second proviso to art. 3 1 A(1) was prospective and  not retrospective  and did not affect the scheme in question  as the  rights  under the scheme became vested as soon  as  the scheme  was sanctioned by the Settlement Officer.  The  High Court  also expressed a tentative view that the  reservation of  lands for common purposes in accordance with the  scheme and  the  Act  did not amount to  "acquisition"  within  the contemplation  of  the second proviso to art.  31A(1).   The High Court accordingly dismissed the petition.               Mr.  B.R.L. Iyengar, the learned  counsel  for               the appellant, has urged the following  points               before us;               (1)   Gurkirpal   Singh,  when  he   commenced               consolidation  proceedings  and  prepared  and               published  the draft scheme  of  consolidation               did  not  have legal authority to do  so.  The               scheme  being invalid could not be made  valid               by being enforced by the Settlement Officer.               (2)   The  notification  appointing  Gurkirpal               Singh  Consolidation  Officer  retrospectively               with   effect  from  November  4,  1961,   was               invalid,.  as neither the Government  nor  its               delegate, Harcharan Singh, P.C.S., Officer  on               Special  Duty, could appoint  a  Consolidation

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             Officer retrospectively.               (3)   In the second proviso to art. 31 (A)(1),               the expression "acquisition" means substantial               taking  over  the  benefits  of  property  and               conferring it on the State.                             147 (4)  Acquisition  means the entire process terminating  with possession and extinction of the title of the individual. There  seems  to be substance in the first two  points.   It seems to us clear that before a person can start acting as a Consolidation  Officer  lie  must  be  appointed  a,,  such. Before  he is appointed he has no authority to exercise  any of  the functions of a Consolidation Officer.  What he  does purporting to act as a Consolidation Officer has no  binding force  on  the  owners and other  persons  affected  in  the estate.    The   Government   cannot   by   appointing   him retrospectively  clothe him with authority  retrospectively. This  can  be done only by the Legislature  Subject  to  the provisions of the Constitution. But  the appellant cannot succeed on these  grounds  because the  High  Court,  in  its discretion,  has  held  that  the appellant  is  not  entitled to  rely  on  these  objections because  of laches.  We cannot say that the  discretion  has been   exercised  wrongly.   After  the   notification   was published  on  May  11,  1962,  appointing  Gurkirpal  Singh retrospectively  with effect from November 4, 1961, it  must have  been clear to the appellant that Gurkirpal  Singh  had not been appointed Consolidation Officer before lie  started preparing    consolidation   proceedings.     No    adequate explanation  has been given for the delay.  Further  it  has not been shown that there has been any manifest injustice. Coming now to the third point raised by Mr. Iyenger  we  may first mention that it was held by this Court in Ranjit Singh v.  State  of  Punjab(1) that the  Act  was  protected  from challenge  by  art.  3 IA. It is necessary to  set  out  the relevant  constitutional provisions The relevant portion  of art. 3 1 A reads as under :               "31A.  (1) Notwithstanding anything  contained               in article 13, no law providing for-               (a)   the  acquisition  by the  State  of  any               estate  or  of  any  rights  therein  or   the               extinguishment  or  modification of  any  such               rights..........               shall be deemed to be void on the ground  that               it  is  inconsistent with, or  takes  away  or               abridges  any  of  the  rights  conferred   by               article 14, article 19 or article 31  Provided               that....................               Provided further that where any law makes  any               provision for the acquisition by the State  of               any  estate  and  where  any  land   comprised               therein is held by a person under his personal               cultivation,  it shall not be lawful  for  the               State  to acquire any portion of such land  as               is within the ceiling limit applicable to  him               under  any law for the time being in force  or               any building or structure standing thereon 148               or   appurtenant  thereto,  unless   the   law               relating  to  the acquisition  of  such  land,               building or structure, provides for payment of               compensation at a rate which shall not be less               than the market value thereof.               (2)(b) the expression ’rights’ in relation  to               an estate shall include any rights vesting  in

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             a    proprietor,    sub-proprietor,     under-               proprietor,   tenure-holder,  raiyat,   under-               raiyat or other intermediary and any rights or               privileges in respect of land revenue." Relevant portions of articles 19 and 31 may also be set  out because the learned counsel have laid stress on the language employed therein.               "19. (1) All citizens shall have the right--               (f)   to   acquire,   hold  and   dispose   of               property.               31.   (1)  No person shall be deprived of  his               property save by authority of law.               (2)   No   property  shall   be   compulsorily               acquired  or requisitioned save for  a  public               purpose  and save by authority of a law  which               provides for compensation for the property  so               acquired or requisitioned and either fixes the               amount  of the compensation or  specifies  the               principles on which, and the manner in  which,               the  compensation  is  to  be  determined  and               given;  and  no such law shall  be  called  in               question  in any court on the ground that  the               compensation  provided  by  that  law  is  not               adequate.               (2A)  Where  a law does not  provide  for  the               transfer   of  the  ownership  or   right   to               possession of any property to the State or  to               a  corporation  owned  or  controlled  by  the               State,  it shall not be deemed to provide  for               the  compulsory acquisition or  requisitioning               of property, notwithstanding that it  deprives               any person of his property." It  would  be  noticed that art. 31  A(1)(a)  mentions  four categories;  first  acquisition by the State of  an  estate; second,  acquisition  by the State of rights in  an  estate; third,  the  extinguishment  of rights in  an  estate,  and, fourthly,  the modification of rights in an  estate.   These four categories are mentioned separately and are  different. In  the first two categories the State "acquires" either  an estate  or rights in an estate.  In other words, there is  a transference of an estate or the rights in an estate to  the State.   When  there is a transference of an estate  to  the State, it could be said that all the rights of the holder of the estate have been extinguished.  But if the result in the case  of the extinguishment is the transference of  all  the rights  in an estate ,to the State, it would  properly  fall within the expression "acquisition 149 by  the State of an estate".  Similarly, in the case  of  an acquisition  by the State of a right in an estate  it  could also be said that the rights of the owner have been modified since one of the rights of the owner has been acquired. It  seems  to  us that there is  this  essential  difference between  "acquisition  by  the State" on the  one  hand  and "modification or extinguishment of rights" on the other that in the first case the beneficiary is the State while in  the latter  case  the  beneficiary of the  modification  or  the extinguishment  is not the State.  For example, suppose  the State  is the landlord of an estate and there is a lease  of that property, and a law provides for the extinguishment  of leases  held  in  an estate.  In one sense it  would  be  an extinguishment  of  the  rights of a lessee,  but  it  would properly fall under the category of acquisition by the State because  the beneficiary of the extinguishment would be  the State.

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Coming  now to the second proviso to art. 31A, it  would  be noticed that only one category is mentioned in the  proviso, the category being "acquisition by the State of an  estate." It  means  that  the  law must  make  a  provision  for  the acquisition by the State of an estate.  But what is the true meaning  of the expression " acquisition by the State of  an estate".   In  the  context  of  art.  31A,  the  expression "acquisition  by  the  State of an  estate"  in  the  second proviso to art. 31A(1) must have the same meaning as it  has in  cl. (1)(a) to art. 3 1 A. It is urged on behalf  of  the respondents  before us that the expression  "acquisition  by the  State  of any estate" in art. 31A(1)(a)  has  the  same meaning  as  it has in art. 31(2A).  In other words,  it  is urged  that the expression "acquisition by the State of  any estate"  means  transfer  of  the  ownership  or  right   to possession  of  an estate to the State Mr.  Iyengar  on  the other  hand  urges that the expression "acquisition  by  the State"  has a very wide meaning and it would bear  the  same meaning  as  was given by this Court in The  State  of  West Bengal  v.  Subodh  Gopal Bose,(1)  Dwarkadas  Shrinivas  of Bombay v. The Sholapur Spinning & Weaving Co. Ltd.(2) Saghir Ahmad  v.  State  of U.P.(3) and  Bombay  Dyeing  and  Manu- facturing  Co.  Ltd. v. The State of  Bombay(4).   In  these cases  this  Court  had given a wide  meaning  to  the  word "acquisition".   In  Dwarkadas Shrinivas of  Bombay  v.  The Sholapur  Spinning  &  Weaving  Co.  Ltd.(2)  Mahajan,   J., observed at page 704 as follows :               "The  word  ’acquisition’ has  quite  a  -wide               concept, meaning the procuring of property  or               the  taking of it permanently or  temporarily.               It does not necessarily imply the  acquisition               of  legal title by the State in  the  property               taken possession of." (1) [1964]S.C.R. 587. (3)  [1955] 1 S.C.R. 7 7. (2)  [1954] S.C.R. 674. (4)  [1958] S.C.R. 1122.. 150               He further observed at p. 705 :               "I  prefer to follow the view of the  majority               of  the Court, because it seems to me that  it               is more in consonance with juridical principle               that  possession after all is  nine-tenths  of               ownership, and once possession is taken  away,               practically everything is taken away, and that               in  construing  the  Constitution  it  is  the               substance and the practical result of the  act               of the State that should be considered  rather               than its purely legal aspect."               Bose J., observed at p. 734 as follows:               "In my opinion, the possession and acquisition               referred  to  in clause (2) mean the  sort  of               ’possession’  and ’ acquisition’ that  amounts               to ’deprivation’ within the meaning of  clause               (1).  No hard and fast rule can be laid  down.               Each  case must depend on its own facts.   But               if  there  is  substantial  deprivation,  then               clause (2) is, in my judgment, attracted.   By               substantial  deprivation  I mean the  sort  of               deprivation  that substantially robs a man  of               those  attributes of enjoyment which  normally               accompany  rights  to,  or  an  interest   in,               property.  The form is unessential.  It is the               the substance that we must seek." Let us now see whether the other part of the second  proviso

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throws any light on this question.  It would be noticed that it  refers to ceiling limits.  It is well-known  that  under various laws dealing with land reforms, no person apart from certain  exceptions  can hold land beyond  a  ceiling  fixed under the law.  Secondly, the proviso says that not only the land exempted from acquisition should be within the  ceiling limit  but it also must be under personal cultivation.   The underlying  idea of this proviso seems to be that  a  person who  is cultivating land personally, which is his source  of livelihood,  should not be deprived of that land  under  any law  protected by art. 31A unless at least  compensation  at the  market  rate is given.  In various States most  of  the persons  have  already  been deprived  of  land  beyond  the ceiling limit on compensation which was less than the market value.   It  seems  to  us that in  the  light  of  all  the considerations mentioned above the words "acquisition by the State"  in  the  second  proviso do  not  have  a  technical meaning,  as  contended  by  the  learned  counsel  for  the respondent.  If the State has in substance acquired all  the rights  in the land for its own purposes, even if the  title remains  with  the owner, it cannot be said that it  is  not acquisition within the second proviso to art. 31A. But  the  question  still remains whether even  if  a  wider meaning  is  given to the word "acquisition" what  has  been done  by  the  scheme and the.  Act is  acquisition  or  not within the meaning of the second proviso,.  In other  words, does the scheme only modify rights                             151 or does it amount to acquisition of land?  The scheme is not part  of  the  record, but it appears that 89B-  18B-  11  B (Pukhta)  of land was owned by the Gram Panchayat  prior  to consolidation,  which  was used for common  purposes.   Some further  area  was reserved for common  purposes  as  khals, paths,  khurrahs, Panchayat ghars and schools,  etc.,  after applying  cut upon the rightholders on pro-rata  basis.   It does  not appear that any land, apart from what was  already owned by the Panchayat, was reserved for providing income to the Panchayat.  Therefore, in this case we are not concerned with the validity of acquisition for such a purpose. Rule  16(ii)  of  the  Punjab  Holdings  (Consolidation  and Prevention of Fragmentation) Rules, 1949, provides :               "In   an  estate  or  estates   where   during               consolidation proceedings there is no  shamlat               Deh   land   or  such   land   is   considered               inadequate,  land  shall be reserved  for  the               village   Panchayat  and  for   other   common               purposes, under section 18(c) of the Act,  out               of  the common pool of the village at a  scale               prescribed  by Government from time  to  time.               Proprietary  rights  in  respect  of  land  so               reserved  (except  the area reserved  for  the               extension  of  abadi of proprietors  and  non-               proprietors)  shall  vest in  the  proprietary               body  of  estate or estates concerned  and  it               shall be entered in the column of ownership of               record  of  rights as (Jumla Malkan  wa  Digar               Haqdaran   Arazi  Hasab  Rasad  Raqba).    The               management  of such land shall be done by  the               Panchayat  of the estate or estates  concerned               on behalf of the village proprietary body  and               the panchayat shall have the right to  utilise               the  income derived from the land so  reserved               for  the  common  needs and  benefits  of  the               estate or estates concerned." It will be noticed that the title still vest in the property

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body,  the management of the land is done on behalf  of  the proprietary body, and the land is used for the common  needs and  benefits of the estate or estates concerned.  In  other words  a  fraction of each proprietor’s land  is  taken  and formed into a common pool so that the whole may be used  for the  common  needs  and benefits of  the  estate,  mentioned above.   The proprietors naturally would also share  in  the benefits along with others. In Attar Singh v. The State of U.P.(1) Wanchoo J.,  speaking for the Court, said this of the similar proviso in a similar Act,  -namely the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings  Act  (U.P. Act V of 1954) as amended by the U.P. Act XVI of 1957 :               "Thus the land which is taken over is a  small               bit,  which sold by itself would hardly  fetch               anything.  These               (1)   [1959]supp.  S.C.R. 928 at p.938.               152               small bits of land are collected from  various               tenureholders  and consolidated in  one  place               and  added  to the land which might  be  lying               vacant so that it may be used for the purposes               of  s.  14(1)(ee).   A compact  area  is  thus               created and it is used for the purposes of the               tenure-holders themselves and other villagers.               Form  CH-21  framed under r. 41(a)  shows  the               purposes to which this land would be  applied,               namely,  (1) plantation of trees, (2)  pasture               land,               (3)   manure  pits, (4) threshing  floor,  (5)               cremation ground,               (6)   graveyards, (7) primary or other school,               (8) playground, (9)  Panchayatghar,  and  (10)               such other objects.  These small bits of  land               thus   acquired   from   tenure-holders    are               consolidated  and  used  for  these  purposes,               which  are  directly for the  benefit  of  the               tenure-holders.  They are deprived of a  small               bit  and  in place of it they  are  given  ad-               vantages in a much larger area of land made up               of these small bits and also of vacant land." In other words, a proprietor gets advantages which he  could never  have got apart from the scheme.  For example,  if  he wanted  a threshing floor, a manure pit, land  for  pasture, khal, etc., he would not have been able to have them on  the fraction of his land reserved for common purposes. Does such taking away of property then amount to acquisition by the State of any land ? Who is the real beneficiary ?  Is it the Panchayat ? It is clear that the title remains in the proprietary  body and in the revenue records the land  would be  shown  as belonging to "all the owners and  other  right holders  in proportion to their areas." The  Panchayat  will manage it on behalf of the proprietors and use it for common purposes;  it  cannot  use it for any  other  purpose.   The proprietors enjoy the benefits derived from the use of  land for  common purposes.  It is true that  the  non-proprietors also  derive benefit but their satisfaction and  advancement inures in the end to the advantage of the proprietors in the form  of  a  more  efficient  agricultural  community.   The Panchayat as such does not enjoy any benefit.  On the  facts of  this  case it seems to us that the  beneficiary  of  the modification of rights is not the State, and therefore there is no acquisition by the State within the second proviso. In  the  context  of the 2nd proviso,  which  is  trying  to preserve  the  rights  of A person holding  land  under  his personal cultivation, it is impossible to conceive that such

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adjustment of the rights of persons holding land under their personal cultivation in the interest of village economy  was regarded as something to be compensated for in cash. In this view of the matter it is not necessary to deal  with the  fourth  point  raised by the learned  counsel  for  the appellant because                             153 it  does not matter whether the acquisition is  complete  or not, as even if we hold that the acquisition is not complete and  it has yet to be completed, the second proviso to  art. 31A(1) would not prevent the State from proceeding with  the acquisition. in  the result the appeal fails and is dismissed, but  there would be no order as to costs. Hidayatullah, J. This is an appeal against the judgment  and order  of  the  High  Court  of  Punjab,  October  5,  1965, dismissing  a  petition  under  Arts. 226  and  227  or  the Constitution   filed   by  the  appellant   to   quash   the consolidation of village Ropalon, Tehsil Sarmrala,  District Ludhiana.   He  challenged the consolidation mainly  on  two grounds  which alone were pressed before us in this  appeal. The  first  was that the  Consolidation  Officer  (Gurkirpal Singh)  was not appointed under the Fast Punjab  Holdings  ( Consolidation  and Prevention of Fragmentation)  Act,  1948, till after the repartition was concluded.  The consolidation work  done  by  him  was, accordingly  said  to  be  without jurisdiction  and  a nullity.  The second  ground  was  that there  were 89 bighas, 18 biswas and 18 biswanis  of  pukhta lands  with  the Gram Panchayat prior to  the  consolidation proceedings  but under the consolidation an  additional  123 kanals  and  14 marlas were taken from the common  pool  and were given to the Panchayat and a pro rat a cut was applied to the land of all the landholders.  The appellant contended that,  as  he was a small landholder and his land  had  also been taken without the payment of compensation, as  required under Art. 31-A(l), 2nd proviso, the acquisition was illegal and confiscato1ry.  The opposite party joined issue on  both the points and also submitted that on fresh measurements 123 kanals and 14 marlas land was found to be in excess. The  High Court rejected the first contention on the  ground of  laches on the part of the appellant and also on  merits. We  see  no reason to differ.  The State  Government  acting under s. 41 delegated its powers under ss. 14(1) and (2)  of the Consolidation Act to one Harcharan Singh.  Section 14(2) gives powers to appoint a Consolidation Officer.   Harcharan Singh  was, there it is fairly fore, competent to appoint  a Consolidation  Officer. obvious that Gurkirpal  Singh  would not act as Consolidation Officer unless appointed to act  as such  by Harcharan Singh.  The affidavit of the  State  does not  state  that  an  order was passed  and  relies  on  the notification.   No  doubt  a  notification  was  issued   by Harcharan Singh as late as May 3, 1962, appointing Gurkirpal Singh as Consolidation Officer with effect from November  4, 1961,  but  s.  14(2)  only  speaks  of  appointment  of   a Consolidation Officer and does not lay down that it shall be by notification.  In this respect it differs from some other sections such as s. 20 of the Act M19 Sup.CI/66-10 154 under  which Settlement Officers (Consolidation) are  to  be appointed  by  notification.  It is true that  the  original order appointing Gurkirpal Singh was not produced but  there is a presumption that he must have been so appointed because he  would  not  act  without  a  proper  appointment.    The notification which is produced would itself be redundant  if

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an  order appointing Gurkirpal Singh before he began to  act as  Consolidation  Officer had, in fact, been  passed.   The only defect is that the original order is not available  but as  the petition was filed more than three years  after  the completion of the consolidation the objection can hardly  be entertained  in the face of the presumption under s. 114  of the Indian Evidence Act.  We would, therefore, not entertain the  objection.   It  is  a  moot  point,  however,  whether Harcharan  Singh  could  make up his lapse  (if  any)  by  a subsequent  and a retrospective notification.  As we do  not entertain the objection we do not consider that question. As regards the second point it may be pointed out that on an earlier  occasion  the Consolidation Act was  challenged  as ultra  vires  the  Constitution inasmuch  as  it  sought  to deprive  the landholders of their property and Art.  31  was invoked.   Before  the  judgment  of  this  Court  could  be delivered the Seventeenth Amendment of the Constitution came into force.  Counsel in that case were invited to reopen the argument   if  they  desired  but  declined.    The   Court, therefore, considered the validity of the Consolidation  Act and  upheld  it  on  the ground that it  was  a  measure  of agrarian reform and was protected even before Art. 31-A  was amended  by the Seventeenth Amendment Act.  The judgment  of this  Court is reported in Ranjit Singh and others v.  State of  Punjab  and  others() and it  expressly  refrained  from making  any allusion to the Seventeenth Amendment.   At  the hearing  of this appeal no attempt was made to question  the Consolidation  Act and it must, therefore, be assumed to  be validly enacted and to be constitutional. The question that remains is whether the appellant, who is a small  landholder  holding land within the ceiling  and  has lost some of it, is entitled to compensation at market  rate as  required  by  the second proviso to  Art.  31-A  as  now incorporated  in  the Constitution.  To understand  this  we shall   refer  first  to  what  is  being  done  under   the Consolidation  Act  and  then consider whether  the  Act  is unsupportable  in view of the second proviso to Article  31- A(1)  as  contended.   The Consolidation Act  is  passed  to provide  for  the compulsory consolidation  of  agricultural holdings and to prevent their fragmentation.  Section 18  of the Act provides that notwithstanding anything contained  in any  law for the time being in force it shall be lawful  for any Consolidation Officer to direct inter alia: (1)  [1965] 1 S.C.R. 82.                             155               (a)   that any land specifically assigned  for               any  common  purpose  shall  cease  to  be  so               assigned  and to assign any other land in  its               place;               (b)               (c)   that if in any area under  consolidation               no  land  is reserved for any  common  purpose               including  extension of the village abadi,  or               if  the  land so reserved  is  inadequate,  to               assign other land for such purpose. Section  46  of  the Consolidation Act  empowers  the  State Government  to make rules for carrying out the  purposes  of the Act and in particular to provide for               "(e)  the  manner in which the area is  to  be               reserved  under section 18 and the  manner  in               which  it  is to be dealt with  and  also  the               manner  in  which the village abadi is  to  be               given   to  proprietors  and   non-proprietors               (including  scheduled  castes,  Sikh  backward               classes, artisans and labourers) on payment of

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             compensation or otherwise;" In  furtherance  of this power two rules  have  been  framed which  are numbered 16(i) and 16(ii).  These  rules  provide for the reservation of the abadi for the proprietors as well as  the non-proprietors and for reservation of land for  the Gram  Panchayat.  On the present occasion we  are  concerned with sub-rule (ii), which was added on April 9, 1957 by  the Punjab  Government  to the rules framed under the  Act.   It reads :               "16(ii)  In an estate or estates where  during               consolidation proceedings there is no  shamlat               deh   land   or  such   land   is   considered               inadequate,  land  shall be reserved  for  the               village  Panchayat, under section18(c) of  the               out  of  the common pool of the village  at  a               scale  prescribed by Government from  time  to               time.  Proprietary rights in respect of  land,               so reserved (except the area reserved for  the               extension  of abadi of proprietors  and   non-               proprietors)  shall  vest in  the  proprietary               body  of the estate or estates concerned,  and               it shall be entered in the column of ownership               of record of rights as (jumla malikan wa digar               haqdaran   arazi  basab  rasad  raqba).    The               management  of such land shall be done by  the               Panchayat  of the estate or estates  concerned               on behalf of the village proprietary body  and               the Panchayat shall have the right to  utilize               the income derived from the land so,  reserved               for  the  common  needs and  benefits  of  the               estate or estates concerned." 156 The  rule was declared ultra vires by the Punjab High  Court in  Munsha  Singh v. State of Punjab.(1) The  sub-rule  was, however, saved by the second amending Act (27 of 1960) which gave  legal cover to the sub-rule by including a  definition of "common purpose" to the following effect               "2(bb)  ’Common purpose’ means any purpose  in               relation  to any common need,  convenience  or               benefit  of  the  village  and  includes   the               following purposes               (i)   extension of the village abadi;               (ii)  provide income for the Panchayat of  the               village  concerned  for  the  benefit  of  the               village community;               (iii) village roads and paths; village drains;               village wells, ponds or tanks; village  water-               courses or water channels; village bus  stands               and  waiting places; manure pits;  hada  rori;               public latrines; cremation and burial grounds;               Panchayat  Ghar; Janj Ghar;  grazing  grounds;               tanning  places; mela grounds; public  places,               of religious or charitable nature; and               (iv)  schools  and playgrounds,  dispensaries,               hospitals  and  institutions of  like  nature,               water   works  or  tube-wells,  whether   such               schools, play grounds,    dispensaries,               hospitals, institutions, waterworks or   tube-               wells may be managed and controlled by     the               State Government or not." Simultaneously  a new section (s. 23-A) was inserted in  the Consolidation Act to the following effect :-               "23-A.   As soon as a scheme comes into  force               the  management  and  control  of  all   lands               assigned  or reserved for common  purposes  of

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             the village under section 18 -               (a)   in the case of common purposes specified               in sub-clause (iv) of clause (bb) of section 2               in respect of which the management and control               are to be exercised by the State Government  ,               shall vest in the State Government; and               (b)   in the case of any other common purpose,               shall vest in the panchayat of that village;               and the State Government or the Panchayat,  as               the case may be, shall be entitled to appro- (1)  I.L.R. [1960] 1 Punjab 589. 157               priate  the income accruing therefrom for  the               benefit  of  the village  community,  and  the               rights  and  interests of the owners  of  such               lands  shall stand modified  and  extinguished               accordingly :               Provided that in the case of land assigned  or               reserved for the extension of village abadi or               manure  pits for the proprietors and  non-pro-               prietors of the village, such land shall  vest               in the proprietors and non-proprietors to whom               it    is   given   under   the    scheme    of               consolidation." The  preamble  of  the Consolidation Act  was  also  amended suitably  All  these  amendments  were  with   retrospective effect. The  Punjab  Gram Panchayat Act, 1953 (4 of 1953)  has  been passed  to  provide for better administration in  the  rural areas  of  the  Punjab  by Panchayats.   By  s.  19  of  the Panchayat Act various administrative duties are assigned  to the   panchayat  which  is  to  look  after   matters   like sanitation, drainage, supply of water, burial and  cremation grounds,  public health, schools and hospitals etc.  and  in particular it provides :               "(f) pounds for animals;               (n)   the   development  of  agriculture   and               village industries,  and  the  destruction  of               weeds and pests;               (o)   starting  and maintaining a  grain  fund               for the cultivators and lending them seed  for               sowing purposes on such conditions as the Gram               Panchayat may approve;               (q)   allotment of places for preparation  and               conservation of manure;               (t)   framing and carrying out schemes for the               improved methods of cultivation and management               of land to increase production." The Punjab Legislature also passed the Punjab Village Common Lands  (Regulation)  Act  (I of 1954)  with  the  object  of regulating  the  rights in shamlat deh and abadi  deh.   The Regulation  Act  vests  all rights  of  management  in.  the shamlat deh in the village Panchayat and in the land in  the abadi deh under a house owned by a non-proprietor.   Section 4  lays down how the Panchayat is to deal with  the  matters and provides as follows 158               "All lands vested in a panchayat by virtue  of               the  provisions of this Act shall be  utilised               or  disposed  of  by  the  panchayat  for  the               benefit  of  the inhabitants  of  the               village concerned, in the manner prescribed."               Section 6 provides:               "Any income accruing from the use and  occupa-               tion of the lands vested in a panchayat  shall

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             be credited to the panchayat fund and shall be               utilised in the manner prescribed."               Section 7 finally provides as follows               "No   person   shall  be   entitled   to   any               compensation for any loss suffered or  alleged               to  have been suffered as a result  of  coming               into force of this Act." There  is,  however, on the statute book in the  Punjab  yet another  Act  which  is intituled Punjab  Security  of  Land Tenures  Act, (10 of 1953) as amended by Act 57 of 1953  and Act  I  I of 1955.  By that Act security  of  land  tenures, fixing of areas for ’self-cultivation’ is provided and there is  conferment of rights on tenants to purchase lands  under their cultivation from landholders. These   Acts  between  them,  therefore,  provide  for   the establishment  of Gram Panchayat which is to deal  with  the shamlat deh and to look after the social needs of a village, yet  giving  security  to  the  tenants  and  allowing   for consolidation  of  holdings,  with  a  view  to   preventing fragmentation.   The operation of these Acts is  visible  in the  facts of this case, because the shamlat deh is  altered and more land is granted in the consolidation to the village Panchayat  ostensibly  for the purpose  of  construction  of Panchayat  Ghar  and a school and for various  other  common purposes.  No compensation is paid for the lands which  have been taken away from the landholders even though they  claim that  their  case is taken out of Arts. 31 and  31A  and  is covered  by  the  second  proviso to  Art.  31-A(1)  of  the Constitution as framed by the Seventeenth Amendment. These articles were amended by the First, the Fourth and the Seventeenth  Amendments, but reference is made here  to  the articles (omitting portions not relevant to our purpose)  as they stand after the Seventeenth Amendment :               "31.  (1) No person shall be deprived  of  his               property save by authority of law.               (2)   No   property  shall   be   compulsorily               acquired  or requisitioned save for  a  public               purpose  and  save by authority of  law  which               provides for compensation for the property  so               acquired or requisitioned and either fixed the               amount               159               of   the   compensation   or   specifies   the               principles on which, and the manner in  which,               the  compensation  is  to  be  determined  and               given;  and  no such law shall  be  called  in               question  in any court on the ground that  the               compensation  provided  by  that  law  is  not               adequate.               (2A)  Where  a law does not  provide  for  the               transfer   of  the  ownership  or   right   to               possession of any property to the State or  to               a  corporation  owned  or  controlled  by  the               State,  it shall not be deemed to provide  for               the  compulsory acquisition or  requisitioning               of property, notwithstanding that it  deprives               any person of his property.               31A.  Saving of laws providing for acquisition               of estates, etc.               (1)   Notwithstanding  anything  contained  in               article 13, no law providing for---               (a)   the  acquisition  by the  State  of  any               estate  or  of  any  rights  therein  or   the               extinguishment  or  modification of  any  such               rights, or

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             shall be deemed to be void on the ground  that               it  is  inconsistent with, or  takes  away  or               abridges  any  of  the  rights  conferred   by               article 14, article 19 or article 31               Provided further that where any law makes  any               provision for the acquisition by the State  of               any  estate  and  where  any  land   comprised               therein is held by a person under his personal               cultivation,  it shall not be lawful  for  the               State  to acquire any portion of such land  as               is within the ceiling limit applicable to  him               under  any law for the time being in force  or               any building or structure standing thereon  or               appurtenant  thereto, unless the law  relating               to  the acquisition of such land, building  or               structure,  provides for payment of  compensa-               tion  at a rate which shall not be  less  than               the market value thereof.               160               (2)   In this article,-               (a)   the   expression  "estate"   shall,   in               relation  to  any local area,  have  the  same               meaning  as  that  expression  or  its   local               equivalent has in the existing law relating to               land  tenures in force in that area and  shall               also include-               (i)   any  jagir,  inam  or  muafi  or   other               similar grant and in the States of Madras  and               Kerala, any janmam right;               (ii)  any land held under ryotwari settlement;               (iii) any  ].and held or let for  purposes  of               agriculture or for purposes ancillary thereto,               including  waste land, forest land,  land  for               pasture  or  sites  of  buildings  and   other               structures  occupied by cultivators  of  land,               agricultural labourers and village artisans;               (b)   the expression ’rights’, in relation  to               any  estate, shall include any rights  vesting               in a proprietor, tenure-holder, raiyat, under-               raiyat or other intermediary and any rights or               privileges in respect of land revenue." The  case of the appellant is that under the 2nd proviso  to Art.  31-A(1), he is entitled to compensation  because  land under his personal cultivation is an estate, and land within the  ceiling  limit cannot be acquired  without  payment  of compensation  which  is less than the market  value  of  his land,  notwithstanding any law enabling acquisition of  land for the Panchayat.  The State contends that no land has been acquired  because all lands continue to be recorded  in  the names  of  the owners in proportion to the  area  originally held by them as provided by rule 16(ii) and the lands are to be  used for the benefit of the proprietors.  The  appellant contends that this is acquisition all the same.  A  question thus  arises  :  what  is meant  by  ’acquisition’  and  ’to acquire’ in the second proviso? To  determine  the correct meaning it is necessary  to  view Articles 31 and 31-A together.  The State seeks to establish a contrast between acquisition and requisition and  contends that "acquisition" means a total deprivation of the property for  all  time  and "requisition"  means  either  a  partial deprivation  or deprivation for a time.  It submits that  by the former there is a change of ownership and by the  latter a  change  in possession or enjoyment without  a  change  in ownership.  This contrast the State seeks to establish                             161

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from   the  way  in  which  the  words   "acquisition"   and "requisition" and "acquired" and "requisitioned" are used in juxtaposition  in the two Articles.  We have, therefore,  to examine the scheme of the two Articles to see if they  throw any light upon the matter. Before this is done it may be admitted that the  distinction between  "acquisition" and "requisition" is a real  one  and legislative  practice  in  the  past  has  clearly  provided separately  for  acquisition and requisition in  Acts  which were  even  named  acquisition and  requisition  Acts.   The distinction  was also made by the Government of  India  Act, 1935.  Legislative practice, however, uniform is not  always conclusive.  We must discover from the Constitution  itself, how  the  words  are to be understood.  What  then  are  the indications in the Constitution? The  first indication is in the legislative entry No. 42  in List   3   (Seventh  Schedule)  which  was  added   by   the Constitution  Seventh Amendment.  Before the  Amendment  the entry read :               "42.   Principles  on which  compensation  for               property  acquired  or requisitioned  for  the               purposes of the Union or of a State or for any               other public purpose is to be determined,  and               the   form  and  the  manner  in  which   such               compensation is to be given." The  entry  now  reads "Acquisition  and  requisitioning  of property".   These  entries  give  an  indication  that  the Constitution continues to make a distinction between the two terms.   Next  Art. 31 begins by laying down in  clause  (1) that  no  person shall be deprived of his property  save  by authority  of  law  and goes on to say in cl.  (2)  that  no property  shall  be compulsorily acquired  or  requisitioned save  for public purpose and save by authority of law  which provides  for compensation for the property so  acquired  or requisitioned and either fixes the amount of compensation or specifies  the principles on which and the manner in  which, the  compensation is to be determined and given.  The  words of  the  article  refer to acquisition  and  requisition  of property.   Clause  2(A),  which was  added  by  the  Fourth Amendment,  uses  different phraseology.  This  clause  says that  where  a  law does not provide  for  the  transfer  of ownership  or  right to possession of any  property  to  the State or to a corporation owned or controlled by the  State, it  shall  not  be  deemed to  provide  for  the  compulsory acquisition  or requisitioning of property,  notwithstanding that  it  deprives any person of his property.   This  means that  property  shall not be considered to  be  compulsorily acquired  or requisitioned unless the law provides  for  the transfer  of  the ownership or right to  possession  to  the State or to a corporation owned or controlled by the  State. The Gram Panchayat is a local authority and by virtue of the definition  of  "State" in Art. 12 stands included  in  that term.   Therefore,  a  law providing  for  the  transfer  of ownership or right to possession to 162 the  Gram Panchayat is for the purposes of Art. 31-A(1)  and (2),  a  law  providing for the  compulsory  acquisition  or requisitioning of the property. The  contention of the State is that in Art. 31(2A)  we  get the  :clue  to the meanings of the words  "acquisition"  and "requisition" and that the former indicates the transfer  of ownership  and  the  latter the transfer  of  the  right  to possession.   It is, therefore, submitted that the  transfer of the use of the land to Gram Panchayat with the  ownership still in the cultivators (as is shown by the entry of  their

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names  as  owners of shamlat deh) and use of  the  land  for their  benefit indicate a requisitioning of the lands,  that is to ’Say, a transfer of the right to possession merely and not acquisition, that is to say, transfer of ownership.  The conclusion is thus drawn that inasmuch as the second proviso speaks  of acquisition and not requisition, it cannot  apply to  the case of the appellant and persons like him  who  are still  regarded as owners of the lands although they may  be deprived of the immediate right to possession by the handing ,over of land to the Panchayat for management.  It is  urged that  such persons are not entitled to the advantage of  the second   proviso  since  their  land  is  not  acquired   as contemplated therein.  We ,cannot accept this argument. Article  31-A  deals  with a special  subject,  namely,  the saving of laws providing for acquisition of ’estates’.  This article saves any law from an attack under Arts. 14, 19  and 31  provided  it is for the acquisition by the State  of  an estate  or  of any rights therein or the  extinguishment  or modification  of any such rights.  It will be  noticed  that here  the  article does not refer to property as  such,  but speaks  of an estate as defined in the Article and  also  of rights  in the estate.  Estate is defined to include,  among other  things,     " any land held  or  let  for purposes of agriculture  or  for purposes ancillary  thereto,  including waste  land,  forest  land, land for  pasture  or  sites  of buildings  and other structures occupied by  cultivators  of land,   agricultural   labourers  and   village   artisans". Applying the definition, the lands under cultivation must be regarded  as ’estates’.  Now the intention  underlying  Art. 31-A is to give protection to State action against Arts. 14, 19 and 31 so long as the acquisition is by the State of  any estate  or  of any rights therein or the  extinguishment  or modification  of any such rights.  To this protection  there is only one exception and that is to be found in the  second proviso.  It is that land under the personal cultivation  of any  estate holder of any kind which is within  the  ceiling limit  applicable  to such person, shall  not  be  acquired, unless  at  least  market  value of the  land  is  given  as compensation.   Such  land  can  be  acquired  but  only  on compensation  which is not less than the market value.   The word "acquisition" used in the proviso must take its  colour from  the  same word used earlier and not from the  word  as used in the earlier article in juxtaposition with the 1 6 3 word  requisition.   The  word  must  denote  not  only  the acquisition of ownership, that is to say, the entire  bundle of rights, but also acquisition of some rights  particularly an  acquisition  which leaves the person an  owner  in  name only. Article  31-A, it is submitted by the State, introduces  two further   concepts,  viz.,  extinguishment  of  rights   and modification  of rights.  In the case of extinguishment,  if all the rights in the property are extinguished, the  result would  be nothing else than acquisition.  For,  no  property can  remain  in suspense without the  rights  therein  being vested  in someone or the other.  In this case the  property goes to the Panchayat which is included in ’State’.  In  the case  of modification of rights all the rights of  ownership remain    in  the  owner  except  that  they  would  be modified by some statutory    provisions.  In  such   a case the conception either of acquisition orrequisition may not apply. In the present case bits of properties are being  taken from the lands belonging to the appellants  and others  and  are thrown in a common lot.  The  ownership  is supposed  to be vested in a proprietary body  consisting  of

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several proprietors.  The  statute  provides  that  though ownership  is  vested  in  the  said  proprietary  body  the management of the land would be with the Panchayat. The only obligation  thrown  on  the Panchayat  is  that  the  income arising  from  such land should be utilized for  the  common benefit  not  only  of  the proprietors  but  also  of  non- proprietors  in  the  Panchayat area. The  result  of  these provisions is (1) that a proprietor is undoubtedly  deprived of  his  property  howsoever small a proportion  it  may  be thereof; (2) the ownership in such a property is transferred to  another  body  which  under the  statute  is  an  entity different  from  the  proprietor himself;  (3)  though   the ownership  is vested in such a proprietary body  all  rights withregard to the management and income thereof are  vested in aPanchayat; and (4) the benefit of the income from  such lands goes not   to  the  proprietor  but  to  all   the proprietors  as  well as non-proprietors  in  the  Panchayat area. Although the property is not actually vested either in the State Government or the Panchayat a  device  is  being made in the Act to escape the concept or     ,acquisition’ to avoid the payment of compensation required under    the second proviso to Art. 31A. In substance and in effect  this is nothing but a colourable use of the provisions of  Art. 31-A bymaking  out a case of modification of rights  when there is in realityan  acquisition, mainly for the sake  of avoiding compensation.      Therefore,  when  the State  acquires  almost  the entire bundle of rights, it is acquisition within the second proviso  and compensation at market rates must be given.  It is not at all difficult to determine this compensation.  The total  land of the holder must be assessed at  market  value and  the  value  of the dimunition of  the  area  determined proportionately.   The   appellant  is  thus   entitled   to compensation and he cannot be deprived of land within 164 his  ceiling without payment of compensation  calculated  in the manner indicated.  It is admitted that his land has been reduced  to  something less than the ceiling  applicable  to him. It  is contended that what is acquired is a small  bit  from each landholder and that is not of much significance.  We do not  know  what rule is in contemplation.  If it is  the  de minimis  rule,  we  can only say that it  would  be  a  most unsatisfactory  mode  of  avoidance  of  the  constitutional provision.   What  is  a  small bit  is  a  very  vague  and uncertain   expression.    The  safe  rule   is   that   the Constitution  means what it says, that is, land  within  the ceiling  is not to be touched unless compensation at  market rate is given.  We would, therefore, reject the plea that we should  ignore these small bits of land especially  as  they will  be  used  for the general good and  will  confer  some benefit also upon those who will lose them. We would accordingly allow the appeal with costs.                            ORDER In accordance with the Opinion of the majority Civil  Appeal No. 1018 of 1966 is dismissed without costs. V. P. S. 165