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PETITIONER: AIR INDIA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT18/07/1995

BENCH: BHARUCHA S.P. (J) BENCH: BHARUCHA S.P. (J) AHMADI A.M. (CJ)

CITATION:  1996 AIR  666            1995 SCC  (4) 734  JT 1995 (5)   578        1995 SCALE  (4)523

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                J U D G M E N T BHARUCHA. J.      Special leave granted.      The appeal  impugns a judgment of the Delhi High Court. The appellant is Air India.      Air India  was established  under the  Air Corporations Act, 1953.  Under the  provisions of Section 45 thereof, the Air India  Employees Service  Regulations 1963,  were framed with  the  consent  of  the  Central  Government.  The  said Regulations governed  the terms and conditions of service of Air India’s  employees. in or about the year 1982 the Deputy Chief  Labour  Commissioner,  Delhi,  initiated  proceedings against Air  India under  the provisions  of the  Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, for certification of Standing Orders.  Air  India  contended  that  the  Standing Orders Act  did not apply to it. The contention was rejected and Standing  Orders were  certified. Air India’s appeal was rejected. Air  India then filed the writ petition upon which the order  under appeal was passed. The High Court held that the Standing Orders Act was a special Act and applied to Air India’s employees.      The  Air   Corporations  (Transfer  of  Undertakings  & Repeal) Act,  1994 came  into force on 29th January 1994. By reason of Section 11 thereof the Air Corporations Act, 1953, stands repealed from that day. Based upon this, Ms. Jaisinh, appearing for Air India’s employees, has raised a contention that goes  to the  root. Air  India’s case had been that its employees’ terms  and conditions of service were governed by the said  Regulations framed  under Section  45 of  the  Air Corporations Act,  1953: that  Act having now been repealed, the said Regulations no longer survived and the sheet-anchor of Air India’s bid to avert certification of Standing Orders under the Standing Orders Act disappeared.      ...  ....   .......  .......  .......  ...  ...  India, submitted that  the said Regulations were saved by Section 8

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of the 1994 Act, which reads thus :      8. Provisions in respect of officers and      other employees  of corporations  -  (1)      Every officer  or other  employee  of  a      corporation (except  a Director  of  the      Board, Chairman,  Managing  Director  or      any other  person entitled to manage the      whole  or  a  substantial  part  of  the      business and affairs of the corporation)      serving in  its  employment  immediately      before the  appointed day  shall, in  so      far as such officer or other employee is      employed   in    connection   with   the      undertaking  which   has  vested   in  a      company by  virtue of  this Act. become.      as from the appointed day, an officer or      other employee,  as the  case may be, of      the company in which the undertaking has      vested and  shall  hold  his  office  or      service therein  by the  same tenure, at      the same  remuneration,  upon  the  same      terms  and  conditions,  with  the  same      obligations and with the same rights and      privileges   as   to   leave,   passage,      insurance,    superannuation     scheme,      provident fund, other funds, retirement,      pension, gratuity  and other benefits as      he   would    have   held   under   that      corporation if  its undertaking  had not      vested in the company and shall continue      to do  so an officer or others employee,      as the  case may  be, of  the company or      until the  expiry of  a  period  of  six      months from  the appointed  day if  such      officer or other employee opts not to be      the officer  or other  employee  of  the      company, within such period.      (2) Where  an officer  or other employee      of a  corporation opts under sub-section      (1) not  to  be  in  the  employment  or      service of  the  company  in  which  the      undertaking  of   that  corporation  has      vested. such  officer or  other employee      shall be deemed to have resigned.      (3) Notwithstanding  anything  contained      in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14      of 1947)  or in  any other  law for  the      time being in force, the transfer of the      services  of   any  officer   or   other      employee of  a corporation  to a company      shall not  entitle such officer or other      employee to  any compensation under this      Act or  under any other law for the time      being in  force and  no such claim shall      be entertained by any court, tribunal or      other authority.      (4) The officers and other employees who      have retired  before the  appointed  day      from the  service of  a corporation  and      are entitled  to any benefits, rights or      privileges shall  be entitled to receive      the same  benefits, rights  or privilegs      from   the    company   in   which   the      undertaking  of   that  corporation  has      vested.

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    (5) The  trusts of the Provident Fund or      Pilots     Group      Insurance      and      Superannuation Scheme of the corporation      and any  other bodies  created  for  the      welfare of  the  officers  or  employees      would  continue   to   discharge   their      function in  the company  as  was  being      done hitherto  in the  corporation.  Tax      exemption granted  to Provident  Fund or      Pilots     Group      Insurance      and      Superannuation Scheme  would continue to      be applied to the company.      (6) Notwithstanding  anything  contained      in this  Act or  in the  companies  Act,      1956 (1 of 1956) or in any other law for      the  time  being  in  force  or  in  the      regulations   of   a   corporation.   no      Director   of   the   Board,   Chairman,      Managing Director  or any  other  person      entitled  to   manage  the  whole  or  a      substantial part  of  the  business  and      affairs of  that  corporation  shall  be      entitled  to  any  compensation  against      that corporation or against the company,      as the  case may  be, for  the  loss  of      office or  for the premature termination      of any  contract of  management  entered      into by him with that corporation.           In Watson  vs. Winch,  (1916)  1  K.B.  688,  Lord Reading, C.J., said :      "It would  follow that  any by-law  made      under a  repealed statute ceases to have      any validity  unless the  repealing  Act      contains some  provisions preserving the      validity of  the by-law  notwithstanding      the repeal." Sankey, J.,concurring, said :      "When a  statute is  repealed any by-law      made thereunder  ceases to  be operative      unless there  is a  saving clause in the      new statute  preserving the  old by-law.      There appear  to be two reasons for this      ........................................      ....................   Secondly, because      the usual  practice is  to insert in the      later  statute   a   section   expressly      preserving previously  made by-law if it      is intended  that they  shall remain  in      force."                           (Emphasis supplied)           Bennion on  Statutory interpretation, 2nd edition, at pages  494 and  495 states  that a "saving is a provision the intention  of which  is to  narrow  the  effect  of  the enactment to which it refers so as to preserve some existing legal rule  or right  from its  operation". Its  adds. "Very often a  saving is  unnecessary, but  is put in ex abundanti cautela  to   quieten  doubts".  The  updated  text  of  the Interpretation Act, 1978, (set out in Bennion’s book at page 897)  puts  into  statutory  form  in  Section  15  what  is otherwise recognised  in law,  namely, that the repeal of an anactment does  not, unless  the contrary intention appears, affects any right or privilege accrued under that enactment.           In our  view, if  subordinate  Iegislation  is  to survive the  repeal of  its parent  statute,  the  repealing statute must  say so  in so many words and by mentioning the

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title of  the subordinate  legislation. We do not think that there is room for implying anything in this behalf.           Section 8  of the  1994 Act  does not  in  express terms save  the said  Regulations, nor does it mention them. Section  8   only  protect   the  remuneration,   terms  and conditions and  rights and  privileges of  those who were in Air India’s  employment when  the 1994  Act came into force. Such saving  is undoubtedly "to quieten doubts" of those Air India employment  who were  then in service. What is enacted in Section  8 does  not cover those employees who joined Air India’s service  after the  1994 Act  came into  force.  The limited saving  enacted  in  Section  8  does  not,  in  our opinion, extend to the said Regulations.           Holding as  we do that the said Regulations ceased to be  effective on  29th January, 1994, the very foundation of Air  India’s case  no longer  exists. No consideration of other arguments is therefore, necessary.           The appeal, accordingly, fails and is dismissed with costs.