REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4190 OF 2000

Ahmmadsahab Abdul Milla (dead) By proposed Lrs. ....Appellants

Versus

Bibijan and Ors.  ....Respondents

J U D G M E N T

Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.

1. A reference  was  made to  a  three-Judge Bench,  by reference  order

dated  21st April,  2008.  The  relevant  question  is  whether  the  use  of  the

expression “date” used in Article 54 of the Schedule to Limitation Act, 1963

(in short  the ‘Act’) is suggestive of a specific date in the calendar. In  S.

Brahmanand v.  K.R.  Muthugopal (2005  (12)  SCC 764)  a  Bench  of  this

Court did not go into this issue. It decided the appeal on the factual scenario

applicable. It was however noticed that several High Courts have dealt with

the matter  differently.  In  all  these  cases,  for example in  Kashi  Prasad v.

Chhabi  Lal (AIR 1933 All 412),  Alopi  Parshad v.  Court  of  Wards (AIR

1938 Lah  23),   Lala  Ram Sarup v.  Court  of  Wards (AIR 1940 PC 19),

Kruitiventi Mallikharjuna Rao v. Vemuri Pardhasaradhirao (AIR 1944 Mad

218),  R. Muniswami Goundar v.  B.M. Shamanna Gouda (AIR 1950 Mad

820), Hutchegowda v. H.M. Basaviah (AIR 1954 Mys 29), Purshottam Sava

v.  Kunverji  Devji (AIR  1954  Sau  104),  Lakshminarayana  Reddiar v.

Singaravelu Naicker (AIR 1963 Mad 24),  Shrikrishna Keshav Kulkarni v.

Balaji Ganesh Kulkarni ( AIR 1976 Bom 342),  P. Sivan Muthiah v.  John

Sathiavasagam  (1990 (1) MLJ 490), the  High Courts had decided the issue

in the background of  Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1908 (hereinafter

referred to as the ‘Old Act’). Article 113 of the Old Act is in pari materia

with Article 54 of Schedule to the Act. Some of the High Courts took the

view that the force of the word ‘fixed’ implies that the date should be fixed

definitely  and  should  not  be  left  to  be  gathered  from  the  surrounding

circumstances  of  the  case.  Some  other  High  Courts,  however,  took  a

different  view.  There  are  two  decisions  of  this  Court  i.e.  Ramzan v.

Hussaini  (1990 (1) SCC 104) and Tarlok Singh v. Vijay Kumar Sabharwal

(1996 (8) SCC 367).  In Tarlok Singh’s case (supra) the factual scenario was

noticed  and  the  case  was  decided  after  referring  to  Article  54  of  the

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Schedule  to  the  Act.   Ramzan’s  case (supra)  related  to  the  specific

performance of contingent  contract.  It  was held that  the expression ‘date

fixed for performance’ need not be ascertainable in the face of the contract

deed and may be ascertainable  on  the  happening  of  a  certain  contingent

event specified in the contract.  

2. Article 54 of the Schedule to the Act reads as follows:

________________________________________________________________ Description of suit       Period of limitation   Time from which  

Period begins to run

54 For specific performance   three years The date fixed for the Of a contract performance or, if no

Such date is fixed, when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused.”

3. Learned  counsel  for  the  appellants  submitted  that  purposive

interpretation has to be given to the expression “the date fixed”.  

4. The  judgments  in  Ramzan and  Tarlok  Singh cases  (supra)  were

rendered in a different  factual  scenario and the discussions  do not  throw

much light on the controversy at hand.

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5. According  to  Advanced  Law Lexicon  by  P.  Ramanatha  Aiyar,  3rd

Edition 2005, the word ‘date’  means as follows:

“Date.  (As  a  noun)  The  point  of  time  at  which  a transaction or event takes place; time given or specified; time in some way ascertained and fixed;  in a deed,  that part of the deed or writing which expresses the day of the month and year in which it  was made,  (2 Bl.  Commn. 304;  Tomlin).  In  Bement  v.  Trenton  Locomotive,  etc., Mfg.  Co.,  32 NLJ 513 (515),  it  is  said :  `The primary signification of the word date, is not time in the abstract, nor  time taken absolutely but,  as  its  derivation plainly indicates,  time  given  or  specified  time  in  some  way ascertained and fixed; this is the sense in which the word is commonly used. When we speak of the date of a deed, we do not mean the time when it was actually executed but  the time of its  execution,  as given or stated in the deed itself.

"Where a deed bears no date, or an impossible date, and in  the  deed  reference  is  made to  the  `date',  that  word must  be  construed  `delivery';  but  if  the  deed  bears  a sensible  date,  the  word  `date',  occurring  in  the  deed, means the day of the date, and not that of the delivery" (Elph. 123, citing Styles v. Wardle, 4 B&C 908;  

"Date", though sometimes used as the shortened form of "day  of  the  date",  is  not  its  synonym;  but  mean  the particular  time  on  which  an  instrument  is  given, executed, or delivered (Howard's Case, 1 Raym. Ld 480; Armitt v. Breame, 2 Raym Ld 1076; Pewtress v Annan, 9 Dowl 828, at pp. 834, 835).  

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"The word `date' is much more commonly descriptive of a day than of any smaller division of time" (per Simpson v. Marshall, 37 SLR 316).

“Date” means day, so that where a cover note providing for temporary insurance of a motor car expires "15 days after date of commencement" it runs for the full 15 days after the day on which it was to commence (Cartwright v. Mac Cormack; Trafalgar Insurance Co. (Third Party), (1963) 1 WLR 18).”  

6. ‘Fixed’  in  essence  means  having  final  or  crystallized  form  or

character not subject to change or fluctuation.  

7. The inevitable conclusion is that the expression ‘date fixed for the

performance’ is a crystallized notion.  This is clear from the fact that the

second part “time from which period begins to run” refers to a case where

no such date is fixed. To put it differently, when date is fixed it means that

there is a definite date fixed for doing a particular act. Even in the second

part  the  stress  is  on  ‘when  the  plaintiff  has  notice  that  performance  is

refused’. Here again,  there is  a definite  point  of  time,  when the plaintiff

notices the refusal. In that sense both the parts refer to definite dates. So,

there is no question of finding out an intention from other circumstances.

Whether the date was fixed or not the plaintiff had notice that performance

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is  refused  and  the  date  thereof  are  to  be  established  with  reference  to

materials and evidence to be brought on record.  The expression ‘date’ used

in  Article  54  of  the  Schedule  to  the  Act  definitely  is  suggestive  of  a

specified date in the calendar. We answer the reference accordingly. The

matter shall now be placed before the Division Bench for deciding the issue

on merits.  

8. The reference is disposed of accordingly.  

…………………………………J. (Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT)

…………………………………J. (HARJIT SINGH BEDI)

………………………………..J. (ASOK KUMAR GANGULY)

New Delhi, April 01, 2009

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