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PETITIONER: AFLATOON AND OTHERS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: LT. GOVERNOR OF DELHI & OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT23/08/1974

BENCH: MATHEW, KUTTYIL KURIEN BENCH: MATHEW, KUTTYIL KURIEN RAY, A.N. (CJ) ALAGIRISWAMI, A. GOSWAMI, P.K. SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH

CITATION:  1974 AIR 2077            1975 SCR  (1) 802  1975 SCC  (4) 285  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1974 SC2085  (9)  F          1975 SC1699  (2,11,12)  R          1975 SC2112  (4)  RF         1978 SC 515  (7)  F          1979 SC1713  (11)

ACT: Land  Acquisition  Act,  Section  4,  sab-sections  (1)  and (2)--Initiation  of proceedings under, a valid  notification sine, qua non-- Delay in moving the Court--Effect. Land Acquisition Act, Section 23 and Constitution of  India, 1950,  Articles 19(1)(f) 31(2) and 31(5)--Compensation  with reference  to value of property on the date of  notification under   sec.   4--Adequacy   of   compensation,    challenge of--Challenge  confined  only  to  question  of   procedural reasonableness. Delhi   Development   Act,  sections  12   and   15--Planned development   of  Delhi  to  be  in  accordance   with   the Act--Central  Govt.,  if precluded from acquiring  land  for planned development--Laches and acquiescence on the part  of the petitioners--Effect. Land Acquisition Act, Section 3(a) and Part VII--Acquisition of  land  for planned development of Delhi--Landing  over  a portion  of  the acquired property to  co-operative  housing societies--Provisions  of  Part  VII  of  the  Act,  whether attracted.

HEADNOTE: A notification under sec. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act  was issued  on  Nov. 13, 1959, stating that an  area  of  34,070 acres  of  land was needed for a public  purpose,  viz.  the planned development of Delhi.  Between 1959 and 1961,  about six thousand objections were filed under sec. 5A of the Act. The  objections  were  overruled.  On March  18,  1966,  the declaration under sec. 6 of the Act was published in respect of a portion of the area.  Therefore, in 1970, notices  were issued  under sec. 9(1) of the Act requiring the  appellants to  state  their objections, if any, to  the  assessment  of compensation.   The  appellants  thereupon  challenged   the

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validity  of  proceedings for acquisition  before  the  High Court of Delhi.  The High Court negatived their  contentions and dismissed the writ petitions.  In the writ petitions and civil appeals filed in the Supreme Court it was contended  : (i) The public purpose specified in the notification  issued under  sec. 4, namely, the planned development of Delhi  was vague  as  neither  a Master Plan nor a Zonal  Plan  was  in existence on the date of the notification and as the purpose specified in the notification was vague, the appellants  and the  petitioners were unable to exercise  effectively  their right under sec. 5A of the Act; (ii) As there was inordinate delay  in finalizing the acquisition proceedings, they  were deprived of the benefit of the appreciation in the value  of the  property between the date of notification under sec.  4 and the date of taking possession of the property. (iii) The provisions   of  sec.  23  of  the  Act  laying  down   that compensation  should  be determined with  reference  to  the market  value  of the land as an the  date  of  notification under  sec.  4  was  an  unreasonable  restriction  on   the fundamental  right of the appellants to hold and dispose  of property under Article 19(1) (b); (iv) As the acquisition of the property was for the purpose, of planned development  of Delhi,   the   only  authority  competent   to   issue   the notification  under sec. 4 was the Central Govt. under  see. 15  of Delhi Development Act and since the proceedings  were initiated   by   the  Chief  Commissioner  of   Delhi,   the proceedings were ab initial invalid; and (v) The acquisition was  not  for any public purpose, but for companies  as  the major portion of the land acquired was allotted without  any development  to  co-operative housing societies  which  were companies within the definition of the word "company" in the Act  and as the provisions of part VII of the Act  were  not complied with the proceedings for acquisition were bad. Rejecting the contention and dismissing the appeals and  the petitions, 803 HELD  : (i) A valid notification under sec. 4 is a sine  qua non  for  initiation  of  proceedings  for  acquisition   of property.  It is necessary to specify the particular  public purpose, in the notification for which the land is needed or likely  to be needed as otherwise, the matters specified  in sub-sec. (2) of sec. (4) cannot be carried out. [807C] Munsh  Singh and Others v. Union of India, [1973]  1  S.C.R. 973 (975 and 984)   relied  on. Arnold Rodricks and  Another v.  State  of Maharashtra and others, [1966]  3  S.C.R.  885 referred to. In  the  case  of an acquisition of a  large  area  of  land comprising several plots belonging to different persons, the specification of the purpose can only, be with reference  to the acquisition of the whole area.  Unlike in the case or an acquisition  of  a  small  area,  it  might  be  practically difficult  to specify the particular purpose for which  each and  every  item of land comprised in the area  is-  needed. [807G] The  appellants  did not move in the matter even  after  the declaration  under  sec.  6 was  published  in  1966.   They approached the High Court with their writ petitions only  in 1970 when the notices under sec. 9 were issued, to them That apart, the appellants did not contend before the High  Court that as the particulars of public purpose were not specified in   the-notification  issued  under  sec.  4,   they   were prejudiced in that they could not effectively exercise their right  under  sec. 5A.  As the plea was not raised  by  them before  the High Court, the appellants are not  entitled  to have  the plea considered in these appeals.  To have sat  on

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the fence and allowed the Govt. to complete the  acquisition proceedings  on the basis of the notification under  sec.  4 and  the  declaration under sec. 6 were valid  and  then  to attack  the notification on grounds which were available  to the  writ petitioners at the-time when the notification  was published  would be putting a premium on  dilatory  tactics. The writ petitions are liable to be dismissed on the  ground of laches and delay on the part of the petitioners. [808A-B; D & F-G] Tilok.   Chand  Moti Chand and others v. H.  B.  Munshi  and Another,  [1969]  2  S.C.R. 824 and  Rabindranath  Bose  and Others  v.  Union of India and others [1970]  2  S.C.R.  697 referred to. (ii) About  6,000  objections were filed under  sec.  5A  by persons interested in the property.  Several writ  petitions were also filed in 1966 and 1967 challenging the validity of the  acquisition proceedings.  The Govt. had necessarily  to wait for the disposal of the objections and petitions before proceeding further in the matter.  The High Court was of the view  that there was no inordinate delay on the part of  the Govt.  in  completing  the  acquisition  proceedings.    The conclusion of the High Court is correct. [809B-C] (iii)     The  Land  Acquisition Act is  a  pre-Constitution Act.  its  provisions  are  not,  therefore,  liable  to  be challenged  on  the ground that they are not  in  conformity with  the requirement of Article 31(2) of the  Constitution. What  the appellants and writ petitioners complain  is  that their  properties were acquired by paying them  compensation computed with reference to the. market value of the land  as on  the date of the notification under sec. 4 and that  sec. 23 is, therefore, bad.  This, in substance is nothing but  a challenge to the adequacy of compensation.  Such a challenge is  precluded by reason of Art. 31(5) of  the  Constitution. [809F-G] Although  a  law for acquisition of property must  pass  the test  of  Article  19(5), the challenge  to  the  law  would ordinarily   be  limited  to  the  question  of   procedural unreasonableness. [810B] R.  C. Cooper v. Union of India [1970] 3 S.C.R.  530,  (577) relied on. It  follows  that  although  sec.  23  of  the  Act  can  be challenged  on the, ground that it violates the  fundamental right  of  a citizen to held and dispose of  property  under Article 19(1)(b), the challenge would practically be limited to  the question of procedural reasonableness.  But sec.  23 does  not deal with procedure and cannot, therefore,  suffer from any procedural unreasonableness. [810E-F] 804 (iv) The planned development of Delhi had been decided  upon by  the  Govt.  before 1959, viz.,  even  before  the  Delhi Development  Act  came into force.  It is  true  that  there could  be no planned development of Delhi except in  accord- ance with the provisions of Delhi Development Act after that Act came into force but there was no inhibition in acquiring land  for planned development of Delhi under the Act  before the Master Plan was ready. [812E] Patna  Improvement  Trust v. Sint. Lakshmi Devi  and  others [1963] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 812 referred to. In  other  words,  the  fact  that  actual  development   is permissible  in an area other than a development  area  with the  approval  or sanction of the local  authority  did  not preclude  the  Central  Govt. from acquiring  the  land  for planned development under the Acts.  Section 12 is concerned only  with  the planned development.  It has nothing  to  do with   acquisition  of  property-,   acquisition   generally

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precedes  development.  For planned development in  an  area other  than  a  development area, it is  only  necessary  to obtain  the sanction or approval of the local  authority  as provided in sec. 12(3).  The Central Govt. could acquire any property  under the Act and develop it after  Obtaining  the approval  of  the  local authority.   As  already  held  the appellants  and  the writ petitioners cannot be  allowed  to challenge  the validity of notification under sec. 4 on  the ground of laches and acquiescence.  The plea that the  Chief Commissioner  of  D.-]hi had no authority  to  initiate  the proceedings  for  acquisition by  issuing  the  notification under sec. 4 of the Act as sec. 15 of the Delhi  Development Act  gives  that  power only to the  Central  Govt.  relates primarily  to  the  validity  of  the  notification.    Even assuming that the Chief Commissioner was not so  authorized, since the appellants and the writ petitioners are  precluded by  their  ]aches  and acquiescence  from  questioning  the, notification, the plea must be negatived. [812F-H; 813A-B] (v)  The  plea  that the provisions of Part VII of  the  Act have  not been complied witin has also to be rejected.   The High  Court  was  correct in giving  the  finding  that  the acquisition was not for Company’.  The mere fact that  after the  acquisition  the Govt. proposed to hand  over,  or,  in fact,  handed over, a portion of the property  acquired  for development  to the cooperative housing societies would  not make  the acquisition one for company’ and  therefore,  Part VII of the Act was not attracted, [813C-E]

JUDGMENT: ORIGINAL  JURISDICTION  : Writ Petitions Nos. 362 &  363  of 1972. Petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. Civil Appeals Nos. 107, 968 to 971 and 1185 of 1972. Appeals  by special leave from the judgment and order  dated the  September 24, 1971 of the Delhi High Court  in  L.PsAs. NC3. 172, 177, 151, 170, 171 and 152 of 1971 respectively. Civil Appeal No. 1168 of 1972. Appeal  by Special Leave from the judgment and  Order  dated the  17th April, 1971 of the Delhi High Court in L.P.A.  No. 94 of 1971. A.   K.  Sen, (in W.P. No. 362/72), L. M. Singhvi  (in  W.P. No.  363/72 & C.A. No. 968/72), S. K. Dhingra (in  C.A.  No. 968/72) and   B.    Dutta,  for the petitioners  (in  W.Ps.) and appellants (in C.As.) L.   N. Sinha, Sol.  General of India, S. N. Prasad (in W.P. No.  363/72  and  C.A.  No. 968 of  1972  only)  and  R.  N. Sachthey,  for  the respondents Nos. 1-3 (in C.A.  No.  968, 970, 107/72 and W.P. Nos. 362-363 of 1972 and respondents in other appeals. 805 Sardar  Bahadur  Saharya  and Vishnu  Bahadur  Saharya,  for respondent No. 4 (in C.As. Nos. 107 & 968/72). K.   K.  Sinha, S. K. Sinha and B. B. Sinha, for  respondent Nos. 5, 6, 8 (in C.A. No. 968/72). Vinoo Bhagat, for respondent no. 4 (in C.A. No. 970/72). Ashok Grover, for respondent no. 5 (in C.A. No. 107/72). S.   K. Dholakia, for respondent no. 6 (in C.A. No. 107/72). T.   V. S. Narasimhachari, for respondent no. 7 (in C.A. No. 107/72). L. M. Singhvi and S. K. Dhingra, for the interveners. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by MATHEW,  J.  These writ petitions and  civil  appeals  raise common  questions and they are, therefore, disposed of by  a

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common  judgment.   The  Civil  Appeals  arise  out  of  the decision  of  High  Court  of  Delhi  dismissing  the   writ petitions filed by the appellants challenging-the,  validity of  the proceedings for acquisition of the land in  question for "planned development of Delhi".  In the writ  petitions, the validity of the same proceedings is being challenged  on certain additional grounds also. A  notification  under  s. 4 of  the  Land  Acquisition  Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act’) was issued on November 13,  1950, stating that an area of 34,070 acres of land  was needed  for a public purpose, viz., the planned  development of  Delhi.   Between  1959  and  1961,  about  six  thousand objections  were filed under s. 5A of the Act.   The  objec- tions  were civerruled.  On March 18, 1966, the  declaration under S. 6 of the Act was published in respect of a  portion of the area.  Thereafter, in 1970, notices were issued under s. 9(1) of the, Act requiring the appellants to state  their objections, if any, to the assessment of compensation.   The appellants thereupon challenged the validity of  proceedings for  acquisition  before  the, High Court of  Delhi  on  the following,  grounds : (1) that the acquisition was  not  for public  purpose but for companies and so the  provisions  of Part  VII of the Act ought to have been complied  with,  (2) since  no  part of the compensation payable  came  from  the public  exchequer,  the  acquisition was not  for  a  public purpose  and  (3)  that  the  proceedings  for   acquisition violated  the  fundamental right of  the,  appellants  under Article 19(1)(f) as there was unreasonable delay between the publication of the notification under s. 4 and the issue  of the  notices under s. 9 of the Act with the result that  the appellants were deprived of the benefit of the  appreciation in value of the property after the date of the  notification under  s.  4. The High Court negatived the  contentions  and dismissed the writ petitions. The  main  arguments addressed before us on  behalf  of  the appellants  and  the writ petitioners were that  the  public purpose  specified  in the notification issued under  s.  4, namely,  the  planned  development of Delhi’  was  vague  as neither  a Master Plan nor a Zonal Plan was in existence  on the date of the notification and as the purpose specified 806 in  die, notification was vague, the appellants were  unable to  exercise effectively their right under s. 5A of the  Act and  that  as the notification under s. 4 was  published  in 1959,  the compensation awarded was wholly  inadequate  with reference  to the market value of the property on  the  date when  the appellants are to be deprived of their  possession of the property.  In other words the contention was that  as there  was  inordinate delay in finalizing  the  acquisition proceedings, the appellants were deprived of the benefit  of the  appreciation in the value of the property between  the, date  of the notification under s. 4 and the date of  taking possession of the property.  Linked with this contention was the submission that the previsions of s. 23 of the Act which lay  down  that  compensation  should  be  determined   with reference to the market value of the land as on the date  of the notification under s. 4 was an unreasonable  restriction on  the  fundamental  right of the appellants  to  hold  and dispose of property under Article 19(1) (f).  It was further contended  that as the acquisition of the property  was  for the  purpose  of  planned development  of  Delhi,  the  only authority competent to issue the notification under s. 4 was the Central Government under s. 15 of the Delhi  Development Act  and since the proceedings were initiated by  the  Chief Commissioner  of  Delhi,  the  proceedings  were  ab  initio

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invalid.  The argument was that, as the acquisition was made for  the planned development of Delhi, it could  be  carried out’  only  in accordance with the provisions of  the  Delhi Development  Act, and that, under s. 15 of that Act, it  was only  the  Central Government which could  have  issued  the notification  under  s. 4, after having formed  the  opinion that  the  acquisition  of the land was  necessary  for  the planned development of Delhi and, since the notification was issued by the Chief Commissioner of Delhi, the  notification was  void  ab  initio.  The last  contention  was  that  the acquisition  was  not  for  any  public  purpose,  but   for companies,  as  the major portion of the,land  acquired  was allotted  without  any development  to  cooperative  housing societies which were companies within the definition of  the word  Company’ in the Act and as the provisions of Part  VII of  the  Act  were not complied with,  the  proceedings  for acquisition were bad. The  influx of displaced persons in 1947 from West  Pakistan into  Delhi aggravated the problem of housing  accommodation in  Delhi.  With the extension of industrial and  commercial activities  and  the setting up of  the  foreign  embassies, Delhi  acquired enormous potential as an employment  centre. The   consequent   increase  in  the  population   was   not accompanied by an adequate expansion of lousing  facilities. There  was  haphazard  and unplanned  growth  of  houses  in different  areas; land also was not available at  reasonable price as substantial portion of the available land, suitable for  development,  had  passed into  the  hands  of  private enterprises.   The  Government found it  necessary  to  take effective steps to check the haphazard growth of houses  and to   prevent  substandard  construction.    Therefore,   the Government  framed  a  scheme for  "planned  development  of Delhi".  It was in order to implement the scheme of  planned development of Delhi that the Government decided to  acquire 34,070 acres of land in 1959 and published the  notification under  s.  4 specifying the public purpose as  "the  planned development of Delhi". 807 Section  4 of the Act says that whenever it appears  to  the appropriate  Government that land in any locality is  needed or.  is  likely  to  be needed for  any  public  purpose,  a notification  to  that  effect shall  be  published  in  the official Gazette and the Collector shall cause public notice of  the  substance  of  such notification  to  be  given  at convenient  places in the said locality.  According  to  the section,  therefore,  it is only necessary to state  in  the notification  that the land is needed for a public  purpose. The  wording of s. 5A would make it further clear  that  all that is necessary to be specified in a notification under s. 4  is  that the land is needed for a  public  purpose.   One reason for specification of the particular public purpose in the,  notification  is to enable the person  whose  land  is sought to be acquired to file objection under s. 5A.  Unless a person is told about the specific purpose of the  acquisi- tion  it  may not be possible for him to file  a  meaningful objection  against the acquisition under s. 5A.  This  Court has laid down that it is necessary to specify the particular public  purpose  in the notification for which the  land  is needed  or  likely to be needed as, otherwise,  the  matters specified in sub-section (2) of s. 4 cannot be carried  out. in  Munshi Singh and Others v. Union of India,  etc.(1)  the Court said               "It  is apparent from sub-section (2) of s.  4               that the public purpose which has to be stated               in   sub-section  (1)  of  s.  4  has  to   be

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             particularized  because, unless that is  done,               the  various matters which were  mentioned  in               sub-section  (2) cannot be carried out and  if               the  public  purpose  stated  in  s.  4(1)  is               planned development, without anything more, it               is  extremely difficult to comprehend how  all               the matters set out in sub-section (2) can  be               carried out by the officer concerned." We think that the question whether the purpose specified  in a  notification  under  s.  4 is  sufficient  to  enable  an objection to be filed under s.     5A would depend upon  the facts and circumstances of each case. In  Arnold Rodricks and Another v. State of Maharashtra  and Others(2), this Court held that a notification under s. 4 of the   Act  which  stated  that  the  land  was  needed   for "Development  and  utilization  of  the  said  lands  as  an industrial    and   residential   area"    was    sufficient specification of public purpose. In  the  case  of an acquisition of a  large  area  of  land comprising several plots belonging to different persons, the specification  of the purpose can only be with reference  to the acquisition of the whole area.  Unlike in the case of an acquisition  of  a  small  area,  it  might  be  practically difficult to specify the particular public purpose for which each and every item of land comprised in the area is needed.  Assuming  for  the moment that the public purpose  was  not sufficiently   specified  in  the  notification,   did   the appellants  make a grievance of it at the appropriate  time? If  the  appellants had really been prejudiced by  the  non- specification of the public purpose for which the (1) [1973] 1 SCR 973, at 975 and 984. (2) [1966] 3 S.C.R. 885. 808 plots in which they were interested were needed, they should have  taken steps to have the notification quashed  on  that ground  within a reasonable time.  They did not move in  the matter even after the declaration under r 6 was published in 1966.   They  approached  the High  Court  with  their  writ petitions  only  in 1970 when the notices under  s.  9  were issued  to them.  In the concluding portion of the  judgment in  Munshi Singh & Others v. Union of India (supra), it  was observed :               "In matters of this nature we would have taken               due  notice  of  laches on  the  part  of  the               appellants while granting the above relief but               we  are satisfied that so far as  the  present               appellants  are concerned they have  not  been               guilty  of laches, delay or  acquiescence,  at               any stage." We do not think that the appellants were vigilant. That  apart, the appellants did not contend before the  High Court that as the particulars of the public purpose were not specified  in the notification issued under s. 4, they  were prejudiced in that they could not effectively exercise their right  under  s.  5A.  As the plea was  not  raised  by  the appellants  in  the  writ petitions filed  before  the  High Court,  we do not think that the appellants are entitled  to have the plea considered in these appeals. Nor  do we think that the petitioners in the writ  petitions should  be  allowed  to raise this plea  in  view  of  their conduct in not challenging the validity of the, notification even after the publication of the declaration under s. 6  in 1966.  Of the two writ petitions, one is filed by one of the appellants.   There  was apparently no reason why  the  writ petitioners  should  have waited till 1972 to come  to  this

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Court  for  challenging  the validity  of  the  notification issued  in 1959 on the ground that the particulars  of  the, public  purpose  were not specified.  A  valid  notification under  s. 4 is a sine qua non for initiation of  proceedings for  acquisition of property.  To have sat on the fence  and allowed   the  Government  to  complete   the,   acquisition proceedings  on the basis that the notification under  s.  4 and the declaration under s. 6 were valid and then to attack the notification on grounds which were available to them  at the  time  when  the notification was  published  would  be, putting  a premium on dilatory tactics.  The writ  petitions are liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches and delay on the part of the petitioners (see Tilokchand Motichand and Others v. H. B. Munshi and Another(1); and Rabindranath Bose and Others v. Union of India & Others(2). From   the  counter  affidavit  filed  on  behalf   of   the Government, it is clear that the Government have allotted  a large portion of the land after the acquisition  proceedings were  finalised to Cooperative lousing societies.  To  quash the  notification at this stage would disturb the rights  of third parties who are not before the Court. (1) [1969] 2 S.C.R. 824.            (2) [1970] 2 S.C.R. 697. 809 As regards the second contention that there, was  inordinate delay  in finalizing the acquisition proceedings,  and  that the  appellants  and writ petitioners were deprived  of  the appreciation  in  value  of  the land  in  which  they  were interested,  it  may be, noted that about  6,000  objections were  filed  under  s.  5A  by  persons  interested  in  the property.   Several writ petitions were also filed  in  1966 and  1967  challenging  the  validity  of  the   acquisition proceedings.  The Government had necessarily to wait for the disposal  of the objections and petitions before  proceeding further  in  the matter.  Both the learned Single  Judge  as well  as  the Division Bench of the High Court were  of  the view  that there was no inordinate delay on the part of  the Government  in completing the acquisition  proceedings.   We are not persuaded to come to a different conclusion. Linked  with the above contention was the argument that  the provisions  of  s.  23  of  the  Act  imposes   unreasonable restrictions  upon the fundamental right of  the  appellants and  writ petitioners to hold and dispose of property  under Article  19(1)(f)  of the, Constitution as  compensation  is awardable  only with reference to the value of the  property on the date of notification under s. 4 however long the pro- ceedings for acquisition may drag on and not with  reference to the market value of property when it is taken  possession of.  It was submitted that compensation should be paid  with reference  to the value of the property as on the date  when possession of the, property is taken and the section’, as it lays  down that compensation should be fixed with  reference to the market value as on the date of the notification under s.  4,  abridges the fundamental right of  a  citizen  under Article  19  (1)  (f).  We find- that the  argument  is  not persuasive.  Article 31(5) (a) provides :               "(5) Nothing in clause (2) shall affect--               (a)   the provisions of any existing law other               than  a law to which the provisions of  clause               (6) apply," The,  Land Acquisition Act is a pre-Constitution  Act.   Its provisions  are not, therefore, liable to be  challenged  on the  ground  that  they  are  not  in  conformity  with  the requirement of article 31(2).  What the appellants and  writ petitioners complain is, that their properties were acquired by  paying them compensation computed with reference to  the

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market value of the land as on the date of the  notification under  s.  4 and that s. 23 is, therefore,  bad.   This,  in substance,  is  nothing but a challenge to the  adequacy  of compensation.   Such a challenge is precluded by  reason  of Article 31(5).  In other words, the appellants and the  writ petitioners  cannot challenge the validity of s. 23  on  the ground that compensation payable under its provisions is  in any  way inadequate, because, such a challenge would fly  in the face of Article 31(5). It  is  noteworthy  that s. 4(3)  of  the  Land  Acquisition Amendment  and Validation Act, 1957 provides for payment  of interest at 6 per cent of the market value after the  expiry of  3 years from the date of the notification under s. 4  to the date of payment of compensation.  Section 24 of the  Act provides that any outlay or improvements on, 810 or  disposal  of  the  land  acquired,  commenced,  made  or effected  without  the sanction of the Collector  after  the date  of the publication of the notification under  s.  4(1) shall  not  be  taken into consideration  by  the  Court  in awarding compensation.  This provision means that any outlay or improvement made with the sanction of the Collector after the   date   of  the  notification  will   be   taken   into consideration in awarding compensation. In  R.  C.  Cooper  v. Union of  India(1),  this  Court  has observed  that  although a law for acquisition  of  property must  pass the test of Article 19(5), the challenge  to  the law   would  ordinarily  be  limited  to  the  question   of procedural unreasonableness.  This is what the Court said               ".  . . Where the law provides for  compulsory               acquisition of property for a public  purpose,               it may be presumed that the acquisition or the               law  relating  thereto  imposes  a  reasonable               restriction  in  the interest of  the  general               public.   If  there is no  public  purpose  to               sustain   compulsory  acquisition,   the   law               violates  Art. 31(2).  If the  acquisition  is               for    a    public    purpose,     substantive               reasonableness   of  the   restriction   which               includes  deprivation  may,  unless  otherwise               established,  be  presumed, but  enquiry  into               reasonableness  of the  procedural  provisions               will  not  be excluded.  For  instance,  if  a               tribunal is authorised by an Act to  determine               compensation    for   property    compulsorily               acquired,  without  hearing the owner  of  the               property, the Act would be liable to be struck               down under Art. 19(1)(f)." It follows that although S. 23 of the Act can be  challenged on  the ground that it violates the fundamental right  of  a citizen to hold and dispose of property under Article 19  (1 )  (f),  the challenge would practically be limited  to  the question of procedural reasonableness.  But section 23  does not  deal with procedure and cannot, therefore, suffer  from any procedural unreasonableness.  When it is seen that S. 23 is  not  liable  to be challenged on  the  ground  that  the compensation  provided  by its provisions is  inadequate  in view  of the provisions of Art. 31(5), there is no point  in the  contention  that  it can be challenged  for  that  very reason on the basis that it imposes unreasonable restriction upon a citizen’s right to hold and dispose of- property. It was argued that there could be no planned development  of Delhi  otherwise than in accordance with the  provisions  of the  Delhi Development Act and, therefore, the  notification under S. 4 of the Act should have been issued by the Central

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Government in view of  S.     15 of that Act and not by  the Chief Commissioner of Delhi.               Section 12 of the Delhi  Development Act, 1957               provides :               "12(1)   As   soon  as  may   be   after   the               commencement   of   this  Act,   the   Central               Government may, by notification in the               (1)   [1970] 3 S.C.R. 530, at 577.                811               official Gazette, declare any area in Delhi to               be a development area for the purposes of this               Act               Provided  that  no such declaration  shall  be               made  unless a proposal for  such  declaration               has been referred by the Central Government to               the Authority and the Municipal Corporation of               Delhi  for  expressing  their  views   thereon               within  thirty  days  from  the  date  of  the               receipt  of  the  reference  or  within   such               further  period as the Central Government  may               allow  and the period so specified or  allowed               has expired. (2)  Save  as otherwise provided in this Act, the  Authority shall not undertake or carry out any development of land  in any area which is not a development area. (3)  After  the commencement of this Act no  development  of land  shall be undertaken or carried out in any area by  any person  or  body  (including  a  department  of  Government) unless,-               (i)   where  that area is a development  area,               permission  for  such  development  has   been               obtained  in  writing from  the  Authority  in               accordance with the provisions of this Act;               (ii)  where that area is an area other than  a               development  area,  approval of,  or  sanction               for,  such  development has been  obtained  in               writing from the local authority concerned  or               any officer or authority thereof empowered  or               authorised in this behalf, in accordance  with               the  provisions  made  by  or  under  the  law               governing   such  authority  or   until   such               provisions have been made, in accordance  with               the provisions of the regulations relating  to               the  grant of permission for development  made               under   the   Delhi   (Control   of   Building               Operations)   Act,   1955,   and   in    force               immediately  before the commencement  of  this               Act. Provided  that the local authority concerned may subject  to the  provisions of s. 53A amend those regulations  in  their application to such area. (4)  After the coming into operation of any of the plans  in any  area no development shall be undertaken or carried  out in  that area unless such development is also in  accordance with such plans. (5)  Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sections  (3) and (4)   development of any land begun by any department of Government or any local authority before the commencement of this  Act  may  be completed by  that  department  or  local authority without compliance with the requirements of  those sub-sections.               Section 15 of the Delhi Development Act,  1957               states               "15(1)  If  in  the  opinion  of  the  Central               Government,  any  land  is  required  for  the

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             purpose of development, or for any                812               other  purpose,  under this Act,  the  Central               Government  may  acquire such land  under  the               provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.                (2)  Where any land has been acquired by  the               Central Government, that Government may, after               it has taken possession of the land,  transfer               the  land  to  the  Authority  or  any   local               authority for the, purpose for Which the  land               has been acquired on payment by the  Authority               or  the  local authority of  the  compensation               awarded  under  that Act and  of  the  charges               incurred by the Government in connection  with               the acquisition." Counsel  contended  that on the date when  the  notification under  s. 4 was published, the Government had  not  declared any  area in Delhi is a development area under s.  12(1)  of the Delhi Development Act, nor was there a master plan drawn up  in  accordance  with  s.  7  of  that  Act  and  so  the acquisition of the property for planned development of Delhi was  illegal.  Under s. 12(3) of the Delhi Development  Act, no  development  of land can be undertaken  or  carried  out except  as provided in that clause.  Section 2(d)  states  : "development".  with  its grammatical variations  means  the carrying  out  of  building, engineering,  mining  or  other operations in, on, over or under land or’ the making of  any material  change  in  any  building  or  land  includes  re- development.  Section 2(e) states "development area"’  means any area declared to be a development area under sub-section (1) of s. 12. The  planned development of Delhi had been decided  upon  by the  Government  before 1959, viz., even  before  the  Delhi Development  Act  came into force.  It is  true  that  there could   be  no  planned  development  of  Delhi  except   in accordance  with  the provisions of  Delhi  Development  Act after that Act came into force, but there was no  inhibition in acquiring land for planned development of Delhi under the Act  before the Master Plan was ready (see the  decision  in Patna Improvement Trust v. Smt.  Lakshmi Devi and Others(1). In  other  words,  the  fact  that  actual  development   is permissible  in an area other than a development  area  with the  approval  or sanction of the local  authority  did  not preclude the Central Government from acquiring the land  for planned development under the Act.  Section 12 is  concerned only  with  the planned development.  It has nothing  to  do with acquisition of property; acquisition generally precedes development.  For planned development in an area other  than a  development  area  it is only  necessary  to  obtain  the sanction  or approval of the local authority as provided  in S. 12(3).  The Central Government could acquire any property under the Act and develop it after obtaining the approval of the  local  authority.  We do not think it necessary  to  go into  the  question whether the power to  acquire  the  land under  s. 15 was delegated by the Central Government to  the Chief Commissioner of Delhi.  We have already held that  the appellants  and  the writ petitioners cannot be  allowed  to challenge the validity of the notification under s. 4 on the ground of laches and acquiescence.  The plea that the  Chief Commissioner of Delhi had no authority to initiate the (1)  [1963] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 812. 813 proceeding for acquisition by issuing the notification under s. 4 of the Act as s. 15 of the Delhi Development Act  gives that-power only to the Central Government relates  primarily

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to the validity of the notification.  Even assuming that the Chief  Commissioner  of  Delhi was  not  authorized  by  the Central  Government to issue the notification under s. 4  of the Land Acquisition Act, since the appellants and the  writ petitioners  are precluded by their laches and  acquiescence from  questioning the notification, the contention must,  in any event, be negatived and we do so. It  was  contended by Dr. Singhvi that the  acquisition  was really  for  the  cooperative housing  societies  which  are companies  within the definition of the word company’ in  s. 3(e) of the Act, and, therefore, the provisions of Part  VII of the Act should have been complied with.  Both the learned Single  Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court  were of  the view that the acquisition was not for  company.   We see no reason to differ from their view.  The mere fact that after the acquisition the Government proposed to hand  over, or, in fact, handed over, a portion of the property acquired for  development to the cooperative housing societies  would not  make  the  acquisition one for company’.   Nor  are  we satisfied  that  there is any merit in the  contention  that compensation  to be paid for the acquisition came  from  the consideration  paid  by the cooperative societies.   In  the light of the averments in the counter affidavit filed in the writ  petitions  here, it is difficult to hold that  it  was cooperatives  which provided the fund for  the  acquisition. Merely  because  the  Government  allotted  a  part  of  the property to cooperative societies for development, it  would not   follow  that  the  acquisition  was  for   cooperative societies, and therefore, Part VII of the Act was attracted. It may be noted that the validity of the notification  under s. 4 and the declaration under s. 6 was in issue in Udai Ram Sharma and Others v. Union of India(1) and this Court upheld their validity. We see no merit in the appeals and the writ petitions.  They are, therefore, dismissed with costs.                                   Petitions dismissed. (1) [1968] 3 S.C.R. 41. 814