REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3933 OF 2010 (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 14428 of 2009)

The Administrator,  Union Territory of Dadra & Nagar Haveli                …Appellant

Versus

Gulabhia M. Lad           …Respondent

JUDGEMENT

R.M. Lodha, J.

Leave granted.

2. The  question  that  calls  to  be  determined  in  this  

appeal by special leave is : on consideration of the report of the  

Inquiring Authority wherein misconduct of the respondent has  

been proved and after following the prescribed procedure, the  

Disciplinary Authority ordered his removal from service and the  

departmental appeal against that order has been dismissed by  

the Appellate Authority, whether Central Administrative Tribunal

was justified, on the facts found, in interfering with the order of  

punishment on the ground that  co-delinquents were awarded  

lesser  punishment  in  departmental  appeals  and directing  the  

appellant  to  reconsider  the  whole  matter  and  give  the  

respondent the same treatment which has been meted out to  

the co-delinquents.  

3. Gulabhia M. Lad –  respondent – while functioning  

as Land Reforms Officer—I ,  Dadra and Nagar Haveli for the  

period  October  14,  1997 to  April  27,  1998 allegedly granted  

occupancy  rights  of  the  government  land  situate  at  village  

Athola to five persons with ulterior motive by getting the survey  

conducted from R.K. Kapdi, Surveyor and without following the  

procedure prescribed under the Dadra and Nagar Haveli Land  

Reforms  Regulation,  1971  (for  short,  ‘Regulations’).  A  

disciplinary enquiry was initiated against him under Rule 14 of  

Central  Civil  Services  (Classification,  Control  and  Appeal)  

Rules, 1965.  He was charged for misconduct under Rule 3 of  

Central  Civil  Services  (Conduct)  Rules,  1964.    Two  other  

employees, R.K. Kapdi, Surveyor and P.N. Vinod, Patel Talati  

were also subjected to disciplinary enquiry in connection with  

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illegal grant of occupancy rights of government land to those  

five persons. R.K. Kapdi was charged for having connived with  

the  respondent  and  prepared  a  map  by  not  following  the  

procedure and without verifying the documentary evidence as  

required  under  the  Regulations  and  in  assigning  new  plot  

numbers  without  any  authority  in  flagrant  violation  of  law.  

Insofar  as  P.N.  Vinod  was  concerned,  he  was  charged  for  

having  connived  with  the   respondent  and  prepared  the  

statement  on  oath  of  each  of  the  applicants  in  his  own  

handwriting  in  the  absence  of  the  applicants  and  thereby  

abusing his official position as Patel Talati.

4. A  joint  enquiry  was  conducted  against  the  

respondent and two other delinquents, namely, R.K. Kapdi and  

P.N.  Vinod.  The  three  delinquents  submitted  their  defence  

separately  and  denied  any  misconduct  on  their  part.   The  

Inquiring Authority, on consideration of the written statement of  

defence;  evidence produced in the course of the inquiry and  

after  hearing  the  Presenting  Officer  and  the  delinquents  

recorded its opinion that charges were proved and submitted its  

report to the Disciplinary Authority.  The Disciplinary Authority  

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(Administrator,  Daman  &  Diu  and  Dadra  and  Nagar  Haveli)  

served  enquiry  report  upon  respondent  and  after  calling  for  

explanation,  imposed  a  major  penalty  of  his  removal  from  

service  vide  order  dated  April  23,  2004.  For  the  other  two  

delinquents,  the  Disciplinary  Authority  was  the  

Commissioner/Secretary  (Finance),  Daman & Diu  and Dadra  

and  Nagar  Haveli  and  the  said  Disciplinary  Authority  after  

serving  the  enquiry  report  and  calling  for  their  explanation,  

ordered their removal from service by two separate orders.  

5. The  respondent  filed  the  departmental  appeal  

against the order of punishment dated April 23, 2004 before the  

Appellate  Authority  but  the  said  appeal  was  dismissed  on  

March  8,  2006.   Insofar  as  the  other  two  delinquents  are  

concerned,  their  departmental  appeals  were  partly  allowed.  

The  punishment  of  removal  awarded  to  R.K.  Kapdi  was  

modified to that of compulsory retirement with effect from April  

23,  2004  by  the  Appellate  Authority  while  the  punishment  

awarded to P.N. Vinod was modified to reduction to lower stage  

of pay by five stages with cumulative effect.

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6. The order of punishment dated April 23, 2004 which  

was  confirmed  in  departmental  appeal  by  the  Appellate  

Authority  vide  order  dated  March  8,  2006  came  to  be  

challenged by the  respondent before the Central Administrative  

Tribunal,  Bombay Bench at  Mumbai  (for  short,  ‘Tribunal’)  on  

diverse grounds.  The Tribunal  accepted the argument  of  the  

respondent  that  he  has  been  discriminated  in  the  matter  of  

imposition  of  punishment.   The Tribunal  vide its  order  dated  

June 22,  2007 allowed the original  application and held that  

similarly placed persons have been treated differently and the  

action  of  the  present  appellant  in  awarding  differential  

punishment  to  the  respondent  by  singling  him  out  for  the  

extreme punishment of removal could not be sustained. In this  

regard,  the  Tribunal  relied  upon two decisions  of  this  Court,  

namely, (1)  Tata Engineering & Locomotive Co. Ltd. v. Jitendra  

Pd. Singh and Another1  and (2)  State of U.P. and Others. v.  

Raj Pal Singh2.  

7. The present appellant challenged the order of the  

Tribunal before Bombay High Court by filing a writ petition but  

1 (2001) 10 SCC 530 2 JT 2001 (Suppl. 1) SC 44

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that was dismissed on December 1, 2008. The High Court held  

that as the authorities did not challenge the orders passed by  

the Appellate Authority in respect of co-delinquents, the order of  

the Tribunal did not call for any interference.

8. The scope of judicial review in disciplinary matters  

has come up for consideration before this Court time and again.  

It is worthwhile to refer to some of these decisions.  In the case  

of B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India and Others3 this Court held:

“18.  A  review  of  the  above  legal  position  would  establish that the disciplinary authority,  and on appeal  the  appellate  authority,  being  fact-finding  authorities  have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a  view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the  discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in  view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct.  The  High  Court/Tribunal,  while  exercising  the  power  of  judicial  review,  cannot  normally  substitute  its  own  conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty.  If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority  or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the  High  Court/Tribunal,  it  would  appropriately  mould  the  relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority  to  reconsider  the  penalty  imposed,  or  to  shorten  the  litigation,  it  may itself,  in  exceptional  and rare  cases,  impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in  support thereof”.

9. In  Director  General,  RPF  and  Others  v.  Ch.  Sai   

Babu 4, this Court stated the legal position thus :  3 (1995) 6 SCC 749 4 (2003) 4 SCC 331

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“6.  ….Normally,  the  punishment  imposed  by  a  disciplinary  authority  should  not  be  disturbed  by  the  High Court or a tribunal except in appropriate cases that  too only after reaching a conclusion that the punishment  imposed is grossly or shockingly disproportionate, after  examining all the relevant factors including the nature of  charges  proved  against,  the  past  conduct,  penalty  imposed earlier,  the nature of  duties assigned having  due regard to their sensitiveness, exactness expected  of  and  discipline  required  to  be  maintained,  and  the  department/establishment  in  which  the  delinquent  person concerned works.”

10. In  the  case  of  Chairman  and  Managing  Director,  

United Commercial Bank and Others v. P.C. Kakkar5, this Court  

on review of  long line of  cases and the principles of  judicial  

review of administrative action under English law summarized  

the legal position in the following words :  

“11. The common thread running through in all  these  decisions is that the court should not interfere with the  administrator’s decision unless it was illogical or suffers  from  procedural  impropriety  or  was  shocking  to  the  conscience  of  the  court,  in  the  sense  that  it  was  in  defiance of logic or moral standards. In view of what has  been stated in  Wednesbury case [(1947) 2 All ER 680  (CA)] the court would not go into the correctness of the  choice made by the administrator open to him and the  court  should  not  substitute  its  decision  to  that  of  the  administrator. The scope of judicial review is limited to  the deficiency in decision-making process and not the  decision.

12. To put it differently, unless the punishment imposed  by the disciplinary authority or the Appellate Authority  shocks the conscience of the court/tribunal, there is no  

5 (2003) 4 SCC364

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scope  for  interference.  Further,  to  shorten  litigation  it  may, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate  punishment  by  recording  cogent  reasons  in  support  thereof. In the normal course if the punishment imposed  is shockingly disproportionate it would be appropriate to  direct  the  disciplinary  authority  or  the  Appellate  Authority to reconsider the penalty imposed.

13. In the case at hand the High Court did not record  any reason as to how and why it found the punishment  shockingly disproportionate. Even there is no discussion  on  this  aspect.  The  only  discernible  reason  was  the  punishment  awarded in  M.L.  Keshwani  case.  As  was  observed by this Court in Balbir Chand v. Food Corpn.  of India Ltd. [(1997) 3SCC 371] even if a co-delinquent  is  given lesser  punishment  it  cannot  be a  ground for  interference. Even such a plea was not available to be  given  credence  as  the  allegations  were  contextually  different”.

11. In  Union of  India and Another  v.  S.S.  Ahluwalia6,  

this Court reiterated the legal position as follows :

“8. …….The scope of judicial review in the matter of  imposition  of  penalty  as  a  result  of  disciplinary  proceedings is very limited. The court can interfere  with the punishment only if it finds the same to be  shockingly disproportionate to the charges found to  be proved…..”.  

12. In State of Meghalaya and Others v. Mecken Singh  

N. Marak7 this Court stated :

“14.  In the matter of imposition of sentence, the scope  for  interference  is  very  limited  and  restricted  to  exceptional cases. The jurisdiction of the High Court, to  interfere with the quantum of punishment is limited and  cannot  be  exercised  without  sufficient  reasons.  The  High  Court,  although  has  jurisdiction  in  appropriate  case, to consider the question in regard to the quantum  of punishment, but it has a limited role to play. It is now  well settled that the High Courts, in exercise of powers  under Article 226, do not interfere with the quantum of  

6 (2007) 7 SCC 257 7 (2008) 7 SCC 580

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punishment  unless  there  exist  sufficient  reasons  therefor.  The  punishment  imposed by the  disciplinary  authority or the appellate authority unless shocking to  the  conscience  of  the  court,  cannot  be  subjected  to  judicial review. In the impugned order of the High Court  no reasons whatsoever have been indicated as to why  the  punishment  was  considered  disproportionate.  Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice. The  mere  statement  that  it  is  disproportionate  would  not  suffice.”

13. The  legal  position  is  fairly  well  settled  that  while  

exercising power of judicial review, the High Court or a Tribunal  

cannot interfere with the discretion exercised by the Disciplinary  

Authority, and/or on appeal the Appellate Authority with regard  

to the imposition of punishment unless such discretion suffers  

from illegality or material  procedural  irregularity or that would  

shock the conscience of the Court/Tribunal.   The exercise of  

discretion  in  imposition  of  punishment  by  the  Disciplinary  

Authority or Appellate Authority is dependent on host of factors  

such  as  gravity  of  misconduct,  past  conduct,  the  nature  of  

duties assigned to the delinquent, responsibility of the position  

that  the  delinquent  holds,  previous  penalty,  if  any,  and  the  

discipline  required  to  be  maintained  in  the  department  or  

establishment  he  works.  Ordinarily  the  Court  or  a  Tribunal  

would  not substitute  its  opinion  on reappraisal  of  facts.  In  a  

matter  of  imposition  of  punishment  where  joint  disciplinary  

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enquiry is held against more than one delinquent, the same or  

similarity of charges is not decisive but many factors as noticed  

above may be vital in decision making. A single distinguishing  

feature in the nature of duties or degree of responsibility may  

make difference insofar as award of punishment is concerned.  

To avoid multiplicity of proceedings and overlapping adducing  

of evidence, a joint enquiry may be conducted against all the  

delinquent  officers  but  imposition  of  different  punishment  on  

proved charges may not be impermissible if the responsibilities  

and duties of the co-delinquents differ or where distinguishing  

features exist.  In such a case, there would not be any question  

of selective or invidious discrimination. Does the present case  

make out discrimination in inflicting punishment?  We do not  

think so.  In the first place, the respondent and the two other  

delinquents may have been found guilty in connection with the  

same incident, i.e. illegal grant of occupancy rights in respect of  

government land to five persons but the charges against the  

respondent and the other two delinquents cannot be said to be  

same  or  substantially  similar.  The  substance  of  the  charge  

against the respondent was that as a Land Reforms Officer-I,  

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he granted  occupancy  rights  to  the  government  land  to  five  

persons with  ulterior  motive  by getting the survey conducted  

from co-delinquent R.K. Kapdi, Surveyor and without following  

the procedure prescribed under the Regulations. On the other  

hand, the main charge against R.K. Kapdi was that he prepared  

a map by not following the procedure and without verifying the  

documentary evidence as was required under the Regulations  

and  assigning  new  plot  numbers  without  any  authority  in  

flagrant  violation  of  law.  As  regards,  P.N.  Vinod,  he  was  

principally charged for having prepared the statement on oath  

of each of the applicants in his own handwriting in the absence  

of  the applicants  and thereby abusing his  official  position as  

Patel  Talati.  Thus,  there  was  variation  in  allegations  of  

misconduct and all the three delinquents could not have been  

put  on  par  although  joint  enquiry  was  held  and  there  was  

common evidence.

14. Secondly,  the  Tribunal  failed  to  notice  that  

respondent was holding an important position as Land Reforms  

Officer during the relevant period having been conferred with  

various powers and duties under the Regulations. As a Land  

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Reforms Officer, the respondent possessed the official authority  

for grant of occupancy rights under the Regulations. The co-

delinquents were only his subordinates and they carried out his  

instructions.  In  the  facts  and  circumstances,  therefore,  the  

respondent and the two co-delinquents cannot be said to have  

been similarly placed.

15. Thirdly,  and  more  importantly,  the  Tribunal  

overlooked  a  very  important  aspect  that  even  the  Appellate  

Authority has not treated the case of co-delinquents viz., R.K.  

Kapdi and P.N. Vinod alike inasmuch as in the departmental  

appeal the punishment of removal awarded to R.K. Kapdi was  

modified to that of compulsory retirement while the punishment  

awarded to P.N. Vinod was modified to reduction to lower stage  

of pay by five stages with cumulative effect. There was, thus,  

no  similarity  in  award  of  punishment  to  the  other  two  co-

delinquents as well.  

16. The Tribunal relied upon two decisions of this Court.  

In Tata Engineering & Locomotive Co. Ltd.1, this Court found no  

justification to  interfere  with  the order  of  the High Court  that  

recorded the following finding:

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“Since as many as three workmen on almost identical  charges were found guilty of misconduct in connection  with the same incident, though in separate proceedings,  and  one  was  punished  with  only  one  month’s  suspension, and the other was ultimately reinstated in  view of the findings recorded by the Labour Court and  affirmed by the High Court and the Supreme Court, it  would be denial of justice to the appellant if he alone is  singled  out  for  punishment  by  way  of  dismissal  from  service.”

We are afraid Tata Engineering & Locomotive Co. Ltd.1  has no  

application to the facts of the present case.

17. Similarly,  the  decision  of  this  Court  in  Raj  Pal  

Singh2 has no application  to  the  present  case.  It  was  found  

therein that the charges proved against the delinquents were  

same and identical. No dissimilarity was found and, therefore, it  

was held that it was not open for the Disciplinary Authority to  

impose different  punishments for  different  delinquents.  In the  

case in hand, we have already noticed above that the charges  

against   respondent  and  co-delinquents  were  not  exactly  

identical  or  substantially  similar.  Moreover,  the  respondent  

being  the  Land  Reforms  Officer  was  the  authorized  officer  

under  the  Regulations  for  grant  of  occupancy  rights  and  for  

illegal grant of occupancy rights in respect of government lands,  

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it was he who was squarely responsible. We have no hesitation  

in holding that on the facts found and conclusions recorded in  

the enquiry report, the punishment of removal cannot be said to  

be not commensurate with the misconduct proved against the  

respondent and the High Court ought to have interfered with the  

order of the Tribunal.  

18. The result is that appeal is allowed, the order of the  

High Court dated December 1, 2008 and that of the Tribunal  

dated June 22, 2007 are set aside. The parties shall bear their  

own costs.  

     …….…...…………………J.  (R.V. Raveendran)

                …………..…………………..J     (R. M. Lodha)

New Delhi April 28, 2010.

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