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PETITIONER: ACHARYA JAGDISHWARANAND AVADHUTA, ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: COMMISSIONER OF POLICE, CALCUTTA & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT20/10/1983

BENCH: MISRA RANGNATH BENCH: MISRA RANGNATH BHAGWATI, P.N. SEN, AMARENDRA NATH (J)

CITATION:  1984 AIR  512            1984 SCR  (1) 447  1983 SCC  (4) 522        1983 SCALE  (2)565  CITATOR INFO :  HO         1987 SC 748  (23)  RF         1992 SC 377  (10)

ACT:      Constitution  of   India-Arts.  25   and  26-Scope  of. Religious denomination-What  is?   Whether a particular rite or observance  is an essential religious rite of a religion- Court can decide.      Constitution   of   India-Arts.   25   and   26-Whether protection of  Arts. 25  and 26  available to Ananda Marga-A socio-Spiritual organisation.  Ananda Marga  not a  separate religion  but   a  religious  denomination.  Performance  of Tandava  dance  in  procession  in  public  streets  not  an essential religious rite of Ananda Marga.      Code  of   Criminal  Procedure,   1973-S.144-Scope  of. Prohibitory  Order   under  s.144-Meant   to  meet  emergent situation-Order not permanent or semipermanent in character- Making of repetitive orders amounts to abuse of power.      Words and Phrases ’Religious denomination’.

HEADNOTE:      Respondent No.  1  was  alleged  to  have  been  making repetitive orders  under  s.144  of  the  Code  of  Criminal Procedure, 1973 from August 1979 directing that no member of a procession  or assembly  of five  or more  persons  should carry any  fire arms,  explosives, swords,  spears,  knives, tridents, lathis  or any article which may be used as weapon of offence  or any  article likely to cause annoyance to the public, for example skulls. A writ petition was filed in the High Court  for a direction on the respondents not to impose such restraints  on the  followers of Ananda Marga. The High Court dismissed the writ petition. The respondent No. 1 made a similar  order on  March  29,  1982.  An  application  for permission to take out a procession in the public streets by the followers of Ananda Marga accompanied with Tandava dance was rejected.  The petitioner filed writ petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution for a direction to the respondent No. 1 and  the State  to allow  procession to  be carried in the public streets  and meetings  to be held in public places by the  followers  of  the  Ananda  Marga  accompanied  by  the performance of  Tandava  dance  within  the  State  of  West

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Bengal. The  petitioner submitted  that Ananda  Marga was  a socio-spiritual organisation  dedicated to  the  service  of humanity in  different spheres  of life  such  as  physical, mental  and  spiritual,  irrespective  of  caste.  creed  or colour; one  of the  prescriptions of the religious rites to be 448 performed by  an Ananda Margi was Tandava dance which was to be performed  with  a  skull,  a  small  symbolic  knife,  a trishul, and  a damroo;  and at  intervals processions  were intended to be taken out in public places accompanied by the Tandava  Dance  as  a  religious  practice.  The  petitioner contended that  Tandava Dance  was an  essential part of the religious rites of Ananda Margis and that they were entitled to practice  the same  both in  private as  also  in  public places and interference by the respondent was opposed to the fundamental rights  guaranteed under  Arts. 25 and 26 of the Constitution. The  petitioner also contended that repetitive orders under  s.144 of  the Code  of Criminal Procedure were not contemplated  by the Code and, therefore, making of such orders  was   an  abuse   of  the  law  and  should  not  be countenanced.      Dismissing the writ petitions, ^      HELD: The  Ananda Marga  is not  a separate religion by itself.  Therefore,   application  of   Art.   25   of   the Constitution is  not attracted. The petitioner asserted that Ananda Marga was not an institutionalised religion but was a religious denomination.  The writings  of the founder of the Ananda Marga are essentially founded upon the essence of the Hindu philosophy.  The test indicated in (1966) 3 S.C.R. 242 and the  admission in  para 17  of the  writ  petition  that Ananda Margis belong to the Shaivite order lead to the clear conclusion that Ananda Margis belong to the Hindu religion.                                                [455 E.456 C]      Sastri Yagnapurushadji  & Ors.  v.  Muldas  Bhudar  das Vaishya & Anr., [1966] 3 S.C.R. 242, referred to.      The words  ’religious denomination’  in Art.  26 of the Constitution must take their colour from the word ’religion’ and if  this be  so, the  expression religious denomination’ must also satisfy three conditions:      (1)  It must  be a collection of individuals who have a      system of  beliefs or  doctrines which  they regard  as      conducive to  their spiritual  well-being, that  is,  a      common faith;      (2) common organisation; and      (3) designation by a distinctive name.      In the instant case Ananda Marga appears to satisfy all the  three  conditions.  Ananda  Marga,  therefore,  can  be appropriately treated as a religious denomination within the Hindu religion. [456 G-457 C]      The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra  Thirtha Swamiar  or Sri Shirur Mutt, [1954] S.C.R. 1005  at 1021;  The Durgah  Committee Ajmer & Anr. v. Syed Hussain  Ali &  Ors., [1962]  1 S.C.R.  383;  and  S.P. Mittal etc. v. Union of India & Ors., [1983] 1 S.C.R. 729 at 774 referred to. 449      Article 26 of the Constitution provides that subject to public  order,   morality  and   health,   every   religious denomination or  any section thereof shall have the right to manage its  own affairs  in matters of religion. Courts have the  power   to  determine  whether  a  particular  rite  or observance is  regarded as  essential by  the  tenets  of  a particular religion. [457 C-D, 458 H]

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    Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. The State of Bombay & Ors., [1954] S.C.R. 1055; and Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj v. The State  of Rajasthan & Ors., [1964] 1 S.C.R. 561 referred to.      In the  instant case  the Tandva dance was not accepted as an essential religious rite of Ananda Margis when in 1955 the Ananda  Marga order  was first  established. It  is  the specific case  of the  petitioner that  Shri  Ananda  Murti, founder of  Ananda Marga,  introduced Tandva  as a  part  of religious rites of Ananda Margis later in 1966. Ananda Marga as a religious order is of recent origin and Tandva dance as a part  of religious  rites of  that  order  is  still  more recent. It  is doubtful  as to whether in such circumstances Tandva dance  can be taken as an essential religious rite of the Ananda Margis. Even conceding that Tandva dance has been prescribed as  a religious  rite for  every follower  of the Ananda Marga  it does  not follow  as a  necessary corollary that Tandava  dance to  be performed  in  the  public  in  a religious procession is a matter of religious rite. In fact, there is  no justification  in any  of the  writings of Shri Ananda Murti that Tandava dance must be performed in public. Therefore, performance of Tandava dance in procession in the public streets  or in  gatherings in public places is not an essential religious  rite of  the followers  of  the  Ananda Marga. Thus, the Claim that the petitioner has a fundamental right within  the meaning  of Arts.  25  or  26  to  perform Tandava dance  in public streets and public places has to be rejected. [459 E-460 E]      An order  made under  s.144 of  the  Code  of  Criminal Procedure is  intended to  meet an  emergent situation.  The order is  not intended  to  be  either  permanent  or  semi- permanent in character. The order is to remain valid for two months from  the date of its making as provided in sub-s.(4) of s.144.  The proviso to sub-s.(4) of s.144 which gives the State Government  jurisdiction  to  extend  the  prohibitory order for  a maximum period of six months beyond the life of the order  made by  the Magistrate  is clearly indicative of the position  that Parliament never intended the life of the order under  s.144 of the Code to remain in force beyond two months when made by a Magistrate. The scheme of that section does not  contemplate repetitive  orders  and  in  case  the situation so  warrants steps  have to  be taken  under other provisions of  the law  such as  s.107 or  s.145 of the Code when individual  disputes are raised and to meet a situation such as  in this  case, there  are provisions to be found in the Police  Act. If  repetitive orders  are  made  it  would clearly amount  to abuse  of the power conferred by s.144 of the Code. [461 D-462 D]      Gopi Mohun  Mullick v.  Taramoni Chowdhrani, ILR 5 Cal. 7; Bishessur  Chuckerbutty &  Anr. v.  Emperor, A.I.R.  1916 Cal. 47;  Swaminatha Mudaliar v. Gopalakrishna Naidu, A.I.R. 1916 Mad.  1106; Taturam sahu v. The State of Orissa, A.I.R. 1953 Orissa  96;  Ram  Das  Gaur  v.  The  City  Magistrate, Varanasi, 450 A.I.R.  1960  All.  397;  and  Ram  Narain  Sah  &  Anr.  v. Parmeshwar  Prasad   Sah  &  Ors.,  A.I.R.  1942  Pat.  414, approved.      Babulal Parate v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., [1961] 3 S.C.R. 423 at 437; and Gulam Abbas & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors.,[1981] 2 Cr. L.J. 1835 at 1862, referred to.

JUDGMENT:

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    ORIGINAL JURISDICTION:  Writ Petitions  Nos. 6890, 7204 of 1982 and 3491 of 1983.           Under article 32 of the Constitution of India      Ram Jethmalani,  V.M. Tarkunde  and R.  Dwivedi for the Petitioner.      M.K. Ramamurthi, D.P. Mukherjee and G.S. Chatterjee for the Respondents State of West Bengal.      K.K. Venugopal,  M/s. Inderjit  Sen and G.S. Chatterjee for the Respondent.      Danial A.  Latiffi and  R.S. Sodhi  for the Intervener, All India Lawyers Union.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      RANGANATH MISRA, J. The petitioner in Writ Petition No. 6890/82, a  monk of  the Ananda  Marga and currently General Secretary, Public  Relations Department  of the Ananda Marga Pracharak Sangh, has filed this petition under Article 32 of the Constitution  for a  direction to  the  Commissioner  of Police, Calcutta  and the  State of  West  Bengal  to  allow processions to be carried in the public streets and meetings to be  held in  public places by the followers of the Ananda Marga cult  accompanied by  the performance of Tandava dance within the  State of  West Bengal.  There are  two connected writ petitions being Writ Petition Nos. 7204/82 & 3491/83 by the Diocese  Secretary of  West Bengal  Region  and  another follower of  Ananda Marga.  All these  Petitions raise  this common  question   and  have  been  heard  at  a  time.  For convenience the  petition by  the General  Secretary, Public Relations Department of the Ananda Marga Pracharak Sangh has been treated  as the  main petition  and references  in  the judgment have been confined to it. 451      In the  original petition  certain  factual  assertions have been  made and  after  counter  affidavits  were  filed several further affidavits have been placed before the Court on behalf  of the petitioner and counter affidavits too have been filed.  Shorn of  unnecessary details, the averments on behalf of the respective contenders are as follows:      Shri Pravat  Ranjan  Sarkar  otherwise  known  as  Shri Ananda Murti, founded a socio-spiritual organisation claimed to have  been  dedicated  to  the  service  of  humanity  in different spheres  of life  such  as  physical,  mental  and spiritual, irrespective  of caste,  creed or  colour, in the year 1955.  In the  initial period  the Headquarters of this organisation was  located near  Ranchi in the State of Bihar but later  it has been shifted to a place within the City of Calcutta in  West Bengal.  It has  been pleaded  that Ananda Marga contains no dogmatic beliefs and teaches the yogic and spiritual science to every aspirant. In order to realise the Supreme, Ananda  Marga does not believe that it is necessary to abandon  home, profession  or  occupation  and  spiritual sadhana is  possible at  any  place  and  concurrently  with fulfilling all  duties and  responsibilities of family life. It has  been pleaded  that Ananda  Marga shows  the way  and explains the  methods for  spiritual  advancement  and  this helps  man   to  practice   his  dharma.  According  to  the petitioner Lord  Shiva had  performed Tandava  Dance in  108 forms but  Shaivite literature has given details of 64 kinds only. Seven  forms out  of these  64  appear  to  have  been commonly  accepted   and  they  are  called  Kalika,  Gouri, Sandhya, Sambhara, Tripura, Urdhava and Ananda. The first of these forms  elaborates the  main aspects of shiva while the seventh, i.e.  the Ananda  Tandava portrays all the manifold responsibilities of  the Lord.  Ananda Tandava is claimed to have taken  place at Tillai, the ancient name of Chidambaram now  situated  in  the  State  of  Tamil  Nadu.  It  is  the

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petitioner’s stand that the word Tandava is derived from the root Tandu  which means  to jump  about and  Shiva  was  the originator of  Tandava about 6500 years ago. Ananda Murtiji, as the  petitioner maintains,  is the  Supreme Father of the Ananda Margis.  It is customary for every Ananda Margi after being duly  initiated to  describe  Ananda  Murtiji  as  his father. One  of the  prescriptions of  religious rites to be daily performed by an Ananda Margi is Tandava Dance and this is claimed  to have been so introduced from the year 1966 by the preceptor. This dance is to be performed with a skull, a small, symbolic knife and a Trishul. It is also customary to hold a lathi and a damroo. It is explained that the knife or the sword  symbolises  the  force  which  cuts  through  the fetters of the mundane world and 452 allows human  beings to  transcend towards  perfection;  the trishul or  the trident  symbolises the fight against static forces in  the three  different spheres  of human existence- spiritual, mental  and physical;  the lathi which is said to be  a   straight  stick   stands  out   as  the   symbol  of straightforwardness or  simplicity; the damroo is the symbol to bring  out rhythmic  harmony  between  eternal  universal music and  the entitative sound; and the skull is the symbol of death  reminding  every  man  that  life  is  short  and, therefore, every  moment of  life should  be utilised in the service of  mankind and  salvation  should  be  sought.  The petitioner has  further maintained  that Ananda Margis greet their spiritual  preceptor Shri Ananda Murti with a dance of Tandava wherein  one or  two followers use the skull and the symbolic knife  and dance  for  two  or  three  minutes.  At intervals processions are intended to be taken out in public places accompanied  by the  Tandava  dance  as  a  religious practice.      Though in  subsequent affidavits  and in  the course of argument an  attempt was made by Mr. Tarkunde to assert that Ananda Marga is a new religious order, we do not think there is any  justification to  accept such  a contention  when it runs counter  to the pleadings in paragraphs 4 and 17 of the writ petition.  In paragraph  4 it  was specifically pleaded that  "Ananda   Marga  is   more  a   denomination  than  an institutionalised religion",  and in  paragraph  17  it  was pleaded that  "Ananda Margis  are  Shaivites..."  We  shall, therefore, proceed to deal with this petition on the footing that, as  pleaded by  the  petitioner,  Ananda  Marga  is  a religious denomination of the Shaivite order which is a well known segment of Hindu religion.      Though the  petitioner had  pleaded that  Tandava dance has been  practiced and  performed by every Ananda Margi for more than  three decades, it has been conceded in the course of the  hearing that  Tandava Dance  was introduced  for the first time  as a  religious rite  for Ananda  Margis  in  or around 1966.  Therefore, by  the time of institution of this writ petition  the practice  was at best prevalent for about 16 years.      The Commissioner  of Police,  respondent 1 before us is alleged to  have made repetitive orders under section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (’Code’ for short) from August 1979,  directing that  "no member  of a procession or assembly of five or more persons should carry any fire arms, explosives, swords,  spears, knives, tridents, lathis or any article which  may be  used as  weapon  of  offence  or  any article likely to cause annoyance to the 453 public, for  example skulls..."  A petition was filed before the  Calcutta   High  Court   under  Article   226  of   the

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Constitution by  the General Secretary of Ananda Marga for a writ of mandamus against the respondents for a direction not to interfere  with or  place restraints  on the  freedom  of conscience and  free profession, practice and propogation of their religion,  including Tandava  Dance, in matter No. 903 of 1980.  The Calcutta High Court rejected the said petition on September 23, 1980 and observed:           "It is open to any one in this country to practice      any religion  but the  religious practice  must not  be      inconsistent with  the susceptibility or sensibility or      fairness or public order. Tandava dance as such may not      be objectionable.  In the streets of Calcutta all kinds      of demonstrations  and procession  are being held every      day which  may on  many occasions  cause disturbance to      others and interrupt the free flow of traffic. In spite      of the  same, such  demonstrations and  processions are      allowed to  take place  particularly every  day by  the      authority concerned.  If the  petitioners or any member      of their  group want  to hold a procession or reception      or demonstration  accompanied by  any dance  or  music,      that by  itself  may  not  be  objectionable.  However,      brandishing fire  torches or  skulls or  daggers in the      public places  including streets  cannot come under the      same category.  Here other  things  are  involved.  The      interests of  other members of the public are involved,      the sense  of security  of the others is also involved.      The authorities  concerned have  to keep  in  mind  the      question of the feelings of other members of the public      and the  question of  the possibility of any attempt to      retaliate or  counter-act to  the same  are also  to be      considered. Taking into consideration all these factors      I am  of the  opinion that  the petitioners do not have      any legal right and they have not established any legal      right to  carry fire  torches, skulls  and  daggers  in      public places  or public  streets and  do not intend to      pass any  order entitling  the petitioners  to  do  so.      However, the  petitioners shall  be entitled  to go  in      procession or  hold any  demonstration without any such      fire tourches,  daggers or  skulls. However, this would      be subject  to  prevailing  law  of  the  land  in  the      particular  area.  For  example,  in  the  High  Court,      Dalhousie Square and Assembly order under section 144 454      of the Criminal Procedure Code is promulgated from time      to time.  This order  would not entitle the petitioners      to hold any such procession, demonstration in violation      of such promulgation, if any. This order would also not      entitle the  petitioners  to  hold  any  procession  or      demonstration without  the permission  of the authority      concerned when  such permission  is required  for  such      purposes under any existing law." On March  29, 1982,  respondent 1  made a  fresh order under s.144 of  the Code  wherein the same restraints as mentioned in the  earlier  order  were  imposed.  An  application  for permission to  take out  a procession  on the  public street accompanied with  Tandava dance was rejected and that led to the filing of this petition.      The  petitioner   asserts  that  tandava  dance  is  an essential part  of the  religious rites of the Ananda Margis and that  they are  entitled to  practise the  same both  in private as  also in  public places  and interference  by the respondents is  opposed to the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles  25 and  26 of  the Constitution.  The  order under s.144  of the  Code has  been assailed  mainly on  the ground that it does not state the material facts of the case

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though the  statute requires  such statement  as a condition precedent to  the making  of the  order.  Repetitive  orders under s.144  of the  Code, it  has been  contended, are  not contemplated by  the Code  and, therefore,  making  of  such orders  is   an  abuse   of  the   law  and  should  not  be countenanced.      Two separate  returns have  been made to the rule nisi. Respondent 1  has filed  a counter  affidavit alleging  that Ananda Marga  is an  organisation which believes in violence and if  Ananda Margis  are permitted to carry open swords or daggers in  public processions  it is  bound, or  likely, to disturb public  peace and  tranquillity and  is fraught with the likelihood  of breach  of public  order and would affect public morality.  Carrying of  human skulls and indulging in provocative dances  with human  skulls is not only repulsive to public  taste and  morality, but is bound, and is likely, to raise  fears in  the minds  of  the  people  particularly children thereby affecting public order, morality, peace and tranquility.  It   has  been   further  pleaded   that   the petitioner, or  for the  matter of  that, Ananda  Margis can have no fundamental right to carry weapons in the public, in procession or  otherwise, nor have they any right to perform tandava dance  with daggers  and human  skulls. It is stated that Ananda 455 Marga is  a politico-religious  organisation started in 1961 by Shri  Pravat Ranjan Sarkar alias Sri Ananda Murti, who is a self-styled  tantrik yogi.  Reference has  been made to an incident of  1971 which  led to  prosecution of  Sri  Ananda Murti and some of his followers. It is stated that militancy continues to  be the main feature of the organisation. Prior to promulgation  of the  prohibitory  orders,  it  has  been pleaded, Ananda  Margis took out processions carrying lethal weapons like  tridents, lathis  as well  as human skulls and knives from  time to  time and  caused much annoyance to the public in  general and  onlookers in  particular,  and  this tended to  disturb public  peace,  tranquillity  and  public order. In  spite of  the prohibitory  orders in  force  from August 10, 1979, a procession was taken out on the following day within  the city  of  Calcutta  by  Ananda  Margis  with lathis, tridents,  Knives, skulls, and the procession became violent. The  assembly was  declared unlawful and the police force was obliged to intervene. The police personnel on duty including a Deputy Commissioner of Police received injuries. Reference to  several other  incidents has also been made in the counter-affidavit  of the Police Commissioner. The State Government  has   supported  the   stand   of   the   Police Commissioner in its separate affidavit.      We have  already indicated  that the  claim that Ananda Marga is  a separate  religion is  not acceptable in view of the clear  assertion that  is was  not an  institutionalised religion but  was a  religious denomination.  The  principle indicated by  Gajendragadkar, CJ,  while  speaking  for  the Court in  Sastri Yagnapurushadji  & Ors. v. Muldas Bhudardas Vaishya &  Anr., also  supports the  conclusion that  Ananda Marga cannot  be a separate religion by itself. In that case the question  for consideration was whether the followers of Swaminarayan belonged  to a  religion different from that of Hinduism. The learned Chief Justice observed:      "Even a  cursory study of the growth and development of      Hindu religion  through the  ages shows that whenever a      saint or  a religious  reformer attempted  the task  of      reforming Hindu  religion and  fighting  irrational  or      corrupt practices  which had  crept into it, a sect was      born which  was governed  by its  own tenets, but which

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    basically subscribed  to  the  fundamental  notions  of      Hindu religion and Hindu philosophy. ’ 456 The averments  in the writ petition would seem to indicate a situation  of   this  type.   We  have   also   taken   into consideration the  writings of  Shri Ananda  Murti in  books like Carya-Carya,  Namah Shivaya  Shantaya, A Guide to Human Conduct, and  Ananda Vachanamritam.  These writings  by Shri Ananda Murti  are essentially  founded upon  the essence  of Hindu philosophy.  The test  indicated by  the learned Chief Justice in  the case  referred to above and the admission in paragraph 17  of the writ petition that Ananda Margis belong to the  Shaivite order  lead to  the clear  conclusion  that Ananda Margis belong to the Hindu religion. Mr. Tarkunde for the petitioner  had claimed  protection of Article 25 of the Constitution but in view of our finding that Ananda Marga is not a  separate religion,  application of  Article 25 is not attracted.      The next  aspect for  consideration is  whether  Ananda Marga can be accepted to be a religious denomination. In The Commissioner  Hindu  Religious  Endowments,  Madras  v.  Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha  Swamiar of  Sri Shirur Mutt, Mukherjee, J. (as  the learned  Judge then  was), spoke  for the  Court thus:      "As regards  article 26, the first question is, what is      the precise  meaning or  connotation of  the expression      ’religious denomination’  and whether a Math could come      within this  expression. The  word  ’denomination’  has      been defined  in  the  Oxford  Dictionary  to  mean  ’a      collection of  individuals classed  together under  the      same name:  a religious  sect or  body having  a common      faith and  organisation and designated by a distinctive      name’." This test has been followed in The Durgah Committee, Ajmer & Anr. v,  Syed Hussain Ali & Ors. In the majority judgment in S. P.  Mittal etc. v. Union of India & Ors reference to this aspect has also been made and it has been stated:      "The words  ’religious denomination’  in Article  26 of      the Constitution  must take  their colour from the word      ’religion’ and if this be so, the expression ’religious      denomination’ must also satisfy three conditions: 457           (1) It  must be  a collection  of individuals  who           have a  system of  beliefs or doctrines which they           regard as conducive to their spiritual well-being,           that is, a common faith;           (2) common organisation, and           (3) designation by a distinctive name."      Ananda  Marga   appears  to   satisfy  all   the  three conditions, viz., it is a collection of individuals who have a system  of beliefs which they regard as conducive to their spiritual well-being;  they have  a common  organisation and the collection  of these individuals has a distinctive name. Ananda Marga,  therefore, can  be appropriately treated as a religious denomination,  within the  Hindu religion. Article 26 of  the Constitution  provides  that  subject  to  public order, morality  and health, every religious denomination or any section  thereof shall  have the right to manage its own affairs in matters of religion. Mukherjea, J. in Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar’s  case (supra)  adverted to the question as to what were the matters of religion and stated:           "What then  are matters  of religion  !  The  word      ’religion’ has not been defined in the Constitution and      it is  a term  which is hardly susceptible of any rigid      definition. In  an American  case (Davie v. Benson, 133

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    US 333  at 342),  it  has  been  said  "that  the  term      ’religion’ has reference to one’s views of his relation      to his  Creator and  to the  obligations they impose of      reverence for  His Being and Character and of obedience      to His will. It is often confounded with cultus of form      or worship of a particular sect, but is distinguishable      from the  latter". We  do  not  think  that  the  above      definition  can   be  regarded  as  either  precise  or      adequate. Articles  25 and  26 of  our Constitution are      based for  the most  part upon  article  44(2)  of  the      Constitution of  Eire and we have great doubt whether a      definition of ’religion’ as given above could have been      in the  minds  of  our  Constitution-makers  when  they      framed the Constitution. Religion is certainly a matter      of faith  with individuals or communities and it is not      necessarily theistic. There are well known religions in      India like Buddhism and Jainism which do not believe in      God or  in any  Intelligent  First  Cause.  A  religion      undoubtedly 458      has its basis in a system of beliefs or doctrines which      are regarded  by those  who profess  that  religion  as      conducive to  their spiritual  well being, but it would      not be correct to say that religion is nothing else but      a doctrine  or belief. A religion may not only lay down      a code of ethical rules for its followers to accept, it      might prescribe rituals and observances, ceremonies and      modes of  worship which  are regarded as integral parts      of religion,  and these  forms  and  observances  might      extend even to matters of food and dress..."           "Restrictions by  the State  upon free exercise of      religion are permitted both under Articles 25 and 26 on      grounds of  public order,  morality and  health. Clause      (2) (a)  of article  25 reserved the right of the State      to  regulate   or  restrict  any  economic,  financial,      political and  other secular  activities which  may  be      associated with  religious  practice  and  there  is  a      further right  given to  the State  by  sub-clause  (b)      under which  the State can legislate for social welfare      and reform  even though  by so doing it might interfere      with religious practices .."           "The contention  formulated in  such  broad  terms      cannot, we  think, be  supported. In  the first  place,      what constitutes  the essential  part of  a religion is      primarily to  be  ascertained  with  reference  to  the      doctrines of that religion itself. It the tenets of any      religious sect  of the  Hindus prescribe that offerings      of food should be given to the idol at particular hours      of  the  day,  that  periodical  ceremonies  should  be      performed in  a certain  way at  certain periods of the      year or  that there  should be  daily recital of sacred      texts or  oblations to the sacred fire, all these would      be regarded as parts of religion and the mere fact that      they involve  expenditure of  money  or  employment  of      priests  and   servants  or   the  use   of  marketable      commodities would  not  make  them  secular  activities      partaking of a commercial or economic character; all of      them are  religious practices and should be regarded as      matters of  religion  within  the  meaning  of  article      26(b)..."      Courts have the power to determine whether a particular rite or observance is regarded as essential by the tenets of a particular 459 religion. In  Laxshmindra Thirtha Swamiar’s case, Mukherjea,

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J. observed:           "This difference  in judicial  opinion brings  out      forcibly the  difficult  task  which  a  Court  has  to      perform in  cases of  this type  where the  freedom  of      religious convictions genuinely entertained by men come      into conflict  with the proper political attitude which      is expected  from citizens  in  matters  of  unity  and      solidarity of the State organization."      The  same   question  arose  in  the  case  of  Ratilal Panachand Gandhi  v. State of Bombay & Ors.(1) The Court did go into  the question whether certain matters appertained to religion and  concluded by  saying that "these are certainly not matters of religion and the objection raised with regard to the  validity of  these provisions seems to be altogether baseless." In  Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj v. State of Rajasthan & Ors.,(2) this Court went into the question as to whether the  tenets of  the  Vallabh  denomination  and  its religious practices require that the worship by the devotees should be  performed at  the private temples and, therefore, the existence  of public  temples was  inconsistent with the said tenets  and practices,  and on  an examination  of this question, negatived the plea.      The  question  for  consideration  now,  therefore,  is whether performance  of Tandava dance is a religious rite or practice essential  to the  tenets of the religious faith of the Ananda  Margis. We  have already  indicated that tandava dance was  not accepted  as an  essential religious  rite of Ananda Margis  when in 1955 the Ananda Marga order was first established. It  is the specific case of the petitioner that Shri Ananda  Murti introduced tandava as a part of religious rites of  Ananda Margis  later in  1966. Ananda  Marga as  a religious order  is of  recent origin and tandava dance as a part of  religious rites of that order is still more recent. It is  doubtful as  to whether in such circumstances tandava dance can  be taken  as an  essential religious  rite of the Ananda Margis. Even conceding that it is so, it is difficult to accept  Mr. Tarkunde’s argument that taking out religious processions with  tandava dance  is an  essential  religious rite of  Ananda Margis. In paragraph 17 of the writ petition the petitioner  pleaded that  "Tandava Dance lasts for a few minutes where two or 460 three persons  dance by  lifting one leg to the level of the chest,  bringing    it  down  and  lifting  the  other."  In paragraph 18  it has  been pleaded  that  "when  the  Ananda Margis greet their spiritual preceptor at the airport, etc., they arrange  for a  brief welcome  dance of tandava wherein one or  two persons  use the  skull and  symbolic knife  and dance for two or three minutes." In paragraph 26 it has been pleaded that "Tandava is a custom among the sect members and it is  a customary  performance and  its origin is over four thousand years  old, hence  it is  not a  new  invention  of Ananda Margis." On the basis of the literature of the Ananda Marga denomination  it has  been  contended  that  there  is prescription of  the performance  of tandava  dance by every follower of  Ananda Marga. Even conceding that tandava dance has been  prescribed as  a religious rite for every follower of the  Ananda Marg  it  does  not  follow  as  a  necessary corollary that  tandava dance  to be performed in the public is a  matter  of  religious  rite.  In  fact,  there  is  no justification in  any of  the writings  of Shri Ananda Murti that tandava dance must be performed in public. Atleast none could be  shown to  us by Mr. Tarkunde despite an enquiry by us in  that behalf.  We are, therefore, not in a position to accept the  contention of  Mr. Tarkunde  that performance of

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tandava dance  in a  procession or  at public  places is  an essential religious  rite to  be performed  by every  Ananda Margi.      Once we  reach this  conclusion,  the  claim  that  the petitioner has  a fundamental  right within  the meaning  of Articles 25 or 26 to perform tandava dance in public streets and public  places has  to be  rejected.  In  view  of  this finding it  is no  more necessary  to consider  whether  the prohibitory order  was justified  in the  interest of public order as provided in Article 25.      It  is   the  petitioner’s   definite  case   that  the prohibitory orders  under s.  144  of  the  Code  are  being repeated at  regular intervals  from August  1979. Copies of several prohibitory  orders made from time to time have been produced before us and it is not the case of the respondents that such  repetitive prohibitory orders have not been made. The order  under s.  144 of  the Code made in March 1982 has also been  challenged on  the ground that the material facts of the  case have  not been stated. Section 144 of the Code. as far  as relevant,  provides: "(1)  In cases  where in the opinion  of   a  District   Magistrate,   a   Sub-Divisional Magistrate, or  any  other  Executive  Magistrate  specially empowered by  the State  Government in this behalf, there is sufficient ground  for proceeding  under  this  section  and immediate prevention  or speedy  remedy is  desirable,  such Magistrate may, by a 461 written order  stating the  material facts  of the  case and served in  the manner provided by section 134, direct..." It has been  the contention  of Mr.  Tarkunde that the right to make the  order is  conditioned upon  it being a written one and the  material facts  of the case being stated. Some High Courts  have   taken  the  view  that  this  is  a  positive requirement and  the validity  of  the  order  depends  upon compliance of  this provision.  In our  opinion  it  is  not necessary to  go into  this  question  as  counsel  for  the respondents conceded that this is one of the requirements of the provision and if the power has to be exercised it should be exercised  in the manner provided on pain of invalidating for  non-compliance.   There  is   currently  in   force   a prohibitory order  in the  same terms and hence the question cannot be  said to  be academic. The other aspect, viz., the propriety of  repetitive prohibitory  orders is, however, to our mind a serious matter and since long arguments have been advanced, we  propose to  deal with it. In this case as fact from October  1979 till  1982 at  the interval of almost two months orders  under s.  144(1) of  the Code  have been made from time  to time.  It is  not disputed  before us that the power conferred under this section is intended for immediate prevention of  breach of  peace or  speedy remedy.  An order made under  this section  is to  remain valid for two months from the  date of  its making as provided in sub-section (4) of s.  144. The  proviso to  sub-s. (4) authorises the State Government in  case it  considers it  necessary so to do for preventing danger  to human  life, health  or safety, or for preventing a  riot or  any affray, to direct by notification that an order made by a Magistrate may remain in force for a further period  not exceeding  six months  from the  date on which the  order made  by the Magistrate would have, but for such order,  expired. The  effect of the proviso, therefore, is that  the State  Government would be entitled to give the prohibitory order  an additional term of life but that would be limited  to six  months beyond  the two months’ period in terms of sub-s. (4) of s. 144 of the Code. Several decisions of different High Courts have rightly taken the view that it

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is not  legitimate to  go on  making successive orders after earlier orders  have lapsed  by efflux of time. A Full Bench consisting of  the entire  Court of  12 Judges in Gopi Mohun Mullick v.  Taramoni Chowdhrani(1)  examining the provisions of s.  518 of  the Code of 1861 (corresponding to present s. 144) took  the view  that such  an  action  was  beyond  the Magistrate’s  powers.   Making  of   successive  orders  was disapproved by the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court 462 in Bishessur Chuckerbutty & Anr. v. Emperor.(1) Similar view was taken  in Swaminatha Mudaliar v. Gopalakrishna Naidu;(2) Taturam Sahu  v. The State of Orissa;(3) Ram Das Gaur v. The City Magistrate,  Varanasi;(4) and  Ram Narain Sah & Anr. v. Parmeshwar Prasad  Sah &  Ors.(5) We  have no doubt that the ratio of  these decisions  represents a correct statement of the legal  position. The  proviso to  sub-s. (4)  of s.  144 which gives  the State Government jurisdiction to extend the prohibitory order  for a maximum period of six months beyond the life  of the  order made  by the  Magistrate is  clearly indicative of  the position  that Parliament  never intended the life  of an  order under s. 144 of the Code to remain in force beyond  two months  when made  by  a  Magistrate.  The scheme of  that  section  does  not  contemplate  repetitive orders and  in case  the situation so warrants steps have to be taken under other provisions of the law such as s. 107 or s. 145  of the  Code when individual disputes are raised and to meet a situation such as here, there are provisions to be found in  the Police  Act. If  repetitive orders are made it would clearly  amount to  abuse of  the power  conferred  by s.144 of  the Code. It is relevant to advert to the decision of this  Court in  Babulal Parate  v. State of Maharashtra & Ors.,(6)  where  the  vires  of  s.  144  of  the  Code  was challenged. Upholding the provision, this Court observed:           "Public order  has to  be maintained in advance in      order to ensure it and, therefore, it is competent to a      legislature to  pass a  law permitting  an  appropriate      authority  to   take  anticipatory   action  or   place      anticipatory restrictions upon particular kinds of acts      in an  emergency for  the purpose of maintaining public      order...." It was again emphasized:           "But it  is difficult  to say that an anticipatory      action taken by such an authority in an emergency where      danger to  public order  is  genuinely  apprehended  is      anything other  than an action done in the discharge of      the duty to maintain order..." 463 This Court  had, therefore,  appropriately stressed upon the feature that  the provision  of  s.  144  of  the  Code  was intended to  meet an  emergency. This postulates a situation temporary in  character and,  therefore, the  duration of an order under  s. 144  of  the  Code  could  never  have  been intended to be semi-permanent in character.      Similar view was expressed by this Court in Gulam Abbas & Ors.  v. State of U.P. & Ors., where it was said that "the entire basis  of action  under s.  144 is  provided  by  the urgency  of  the  situation  and  the  power  thereunder  is intended  to   be  availed   of  for  preventing  disorders, obstructions and annoyances with a view to secure the public weal by  maintaining public  peace  and  tranquillity  ...." Certain observations in Gulam Abbas’s decision regarding the nature of  the order  under s.  144 of  the Code-judicial or executive-to the  extent they run counter to the decision of the Constitution Bench in Babulal Parate’s case, may require reconsideration but  we agree  that the  nature of the order

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under s.  144 of  the Code  is  intended  to  meet  emergent situation. Thus the clear and definite view of this Court is that an order under s. 144 of the Code is not intended to be either  permanent   or  semi-permanent   in  character.  The concensus of  judicial opinion  in the  High Courts  of  the country is  thus in  accord with  the view expressed by this Court. It  is not  necessary on  that ground  to  quash  the impugned order  of March  1982 as  by efflux  of time it has already ceased to be effective.      It is  appropriate to  take note  of the  fact that the impugned order  under  s.  144  of  the  Code  did  not  ban processions or  gatherings at  public places  even by Ananda Margis. The  prohibition was  with reference to the carrying of daggers, trishuls and skulls. Even performance of tandava dance in  public places,  which  we  have  held  is  not  an essential part  of religious  rites to be observed by Ananda Margis, without these, has not been prohibited.      The writ  petitions have  to fail  on our  finding that performance of  tandava dance  in procession  in the  public streets  or  in  gatherings  in  public  places  is  not  an essential religious  rite of  the followers of Ananda Marga. In the circumstance there will be no order as to costs. H.S.K.                                   Petitions dismissed 464