13 November 1980
Supreme Court
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ACCOUNTANT GENERAL & ANR. ETC. ETC. Vs S. DORAISWAMY & ORS. ETC. ETC.

Bench: PATHAK,R.S.
Case number: Appeal Civil 1584-1588 of 1973


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PETITIONER: ACCOUNTANT GENERAL & ANR. ETC. ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: S. DORAISWAMY & ORS. ETC. ETC.

DATE OF JUDGMENT13/11/1980

BENCH: PATHAK, R.S. BENCH: PATHAK, R.S. KRISHNAIYER, V.R. REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J)

CITATION:  1981 AIR  783            1981 SCR  (2) 155  1981 SCC  (4)  93  CITATOR INFO :  C&F        1989 SC1233  (4)

ACT:      Constitution of  India 1950,  Articles 148(5)  and 309- Scope of.      Comptroller and  Auditor-General-Functions  of-Head  of Indian Audit  and Accounts Department-persons serving in the department-Whether holding office  exclusively in connection with  the   affairs  of   the  Union-Regulation   of   their recruitment and  conditions of  service-Whether  within  the domain of the President under Article 309 Proviso      Indian  Audit   &  Accounts   Department   (Subordinate Accounts  Service   &  Subordinate  Railway  Audit  service) Service Rules  1974, Rules  1(2)  and  10-Whether  can  have retrospective operation-Rule  1(2) whether ultra vires-Power conferred on  Comptroller &  Auditor-General under  Rule 10- Whether  violates the doctrine against excessive delegation.      Comptroller  &  Auditor-General’s  Manual  of  Standing Orders para  143-whether    could be amended by departmental instructions.

HEADNOTE:      In 1921 the Auditor-General, as the administrative head of the  Indian Audit Department, inserted Article 1666A by a circular No. 1757-E/1129 dated 18th April 1921 giving weight to the  length of  service as  Upper Division  Clerks in the fixation of  seniority in  the Subordinate Accounts Service. In the  Audit  Code  prepared  subsequently,  Article  1666A appeared  as  Article  52.  Thereafter,  in  the  Manual  of Standing Orders  issued  by  the  Auditor-General  in  1938, Article  52   found  expression   as  paragraph  143.  By  a correction slip  dated 27th  July, 1956, the Comptroller and Auditor-General removed the factor of weightage on the basis of length of service in the determination of seniority.      The respondents in the appeals, who had entered service in the  Office of  the Accountant General, as Upper Division Clerks,  appeared   in  the   Subordinate  Accounts  Service Examination and  passed the  examination  held  in  November 1969, and  were promoted  shortly thereafter.  They  claimed seniority on  the basis  that their length of service in the inferior post should be taken into account, and rested their

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claim on  paragraph 143  of the Manual of Standing Orders as it stood  prior to  its amendment  by the correction slip of 27th July  1956. The  claim was  rejected by the Comptroller and Auditor-General      A writ  petition filed  by them  in the  High Court was allowed by  a Single  Judge and the judgment was affirmed by the Appellate Bench of the High Court.      The Accountant-General and the Comptroller and Auditor- General appealed  to this  Court. During the pendency of the appeals, the President enacted 156 the  Indian   Audit  and  Accounts  Department  (Subordinate Accounts  Service   &  Subordinate  Railway  Audit  Service) Service Rules,  1974. They  were deemed  to have  come  into force on  27th July,  1956. These  rules purported  to  give statutory recognition  to the  amendment of paragraph 143 by the Comptroller  and Auditor-General.  Rule 6  provided  for appointments to the service and Rule 7 dealt with seniority. Rule 9  provided that  in matters  not specifically provided for the  rules, regulations,  orders or  instructions of the Central Civil Services as applicable to the Indian Audit and Accounts Department  would be  applicable. Rule 10 empowered the Comptroller  and Auditor-General  to  issue  general  or special instructions for giving effect to the Rules.      In the  appeals, the  respondents assailed the validity of the  Rules of  1974 and  the amendment  made in paragraph 143, contending  that the Rules are invalid as clause (5) of Article 148  does not  permit the retrospective enactment of rules made thereunder, that the specific rules affecting the seniority  of   the  respondents   are  invalid  because  in entrusting power  to the  Comptroller and Auditor-General to issue orders and instructions in his discretion the doctrine against excessive  delegation of  legislative power has been violated, and  that paragraph  143 possesses the status of a statutory rule  and, therefore,  the amendment  attempted by the correction slip has no legal effect upon it.      In the  connected writ  petitions, the  petitioners who had passed the Subordinate Accounts Service Examination were promoted to the Service after 1956 some before the enactment of the  Rules of  1974 and some thereafter. It was contended on their  behalf that  the fixation of seniority having been made  by   Rule  7(2)  to  depend  on  the  order  in  which appointments to  the service  were made under Rule 6 depends on an  arbitrary power  conferred  on  the  Comptroller  and Auditor-General to pass orders and instructions.      On the question whether the respondents are entitled to claim  fixation   of  their  seniority  in  the  Subordinate Accounts Service  after taking  into account their length of service as Upper Division Clerks.      Allowing the appeals and dismissing the writ petitions, ^      HELD: 1. There is nothing in the language of clause (5) of Article  148, to  indicate that  the rules framed therein were intended  to serve  until Parliamentary legislation was enacted. All  that the  clause says is that the rules framed would be  subject to  the provisions of the Constitution and of any  law made  by Parliament.  Clause (5)  of Article 148 confers power  on the  President to  frame  rules  operating prospectively  only.   The  rules   of  1974   cannot   have retrospective operation.  Sub-rule  (2)  of  rule  1,  which declares that they will be deemed to have come into force on 27th July, 1956 is therefore ultra vires. [163B-C]      B.S. Vadera  v. Union  of India  & Ors. [1968] 3 S.C.R. 575 referred to.      2.  The  Comptroller  and  Auditor-General  is  a  high

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ranking constitutional authority, and can be expected to act according  to   the  needs   of  the   service  and  without arbitrariness. He  is the  constitutional head of one of the most important  departments of the State, and is expected to know what the depart- 157 ment requires and how best to fulfil those requirements. The power conferred  on him under the Rules does not violate the principle against excessive delegation. [165C-D]      3. Paragraph  143 in  the  Manual  of  Standing  Orders remained  throughout   a   departmental   instruction   and, therefore, could  be amended by the departmental instruction contained in  the correction  slip issued by the Comptroller and Auditor-General in 1956. [164F]      4. There is a clear dichotomy in the power conferred by Article 309,  a division  of power between the Parliament or President, as the case may be, on the one side and the State Legislature or Governor on the other. The division is marked by the  circumstance that  under Article  309  services  and posts in  connection with the affairs of the Union are dealt with by  a separate authority from the services and posts in connection with  the affairs  of a  State. That dichotomy is not possible in the power employed for appointing persons in the Indian Audit and Accounts Department and for prescribing their conditions of service. [160H-161A]      5. The authority vested in the Comptroller and Auditor- General ranges over functions associated with the affairs of the States.  It is a single office, and the Indian Audit and Accounts Department, which it heads, is a single department. They cannot  be said to be concerned with the affairs of the Union  exclusively.  Consequently,  the  regulation  of  the recruitment and  conditions of service of persons serving in the Indian  Audit and Accounts Department cannot be regarded as a  matter falling  within the  domain  of  the  President within the terms of the proviso to Article 309. [162 C]      B. Shiva  Rao, "The  Framing of India’s Constitution: A Study" [1968] Chap. 12, pp. 414-417 referred to.      6. It cannot be said that persons serving in the Indian Audit  and   Accounts  Department   are  holding  office  in connection with  the affairs  of the Union exclusively. [161 C]      7. The  power contained in clause (5) of Article 148 is not related  to the  power under the proviso to Article 309. The two powers are separate and distinct from each other and are not  complementary to  one another. The reference to the proviso under Article 309 in the recital of the Notification publishing the  Rules of  1974 is  meaningless and  must  be ignored. [162D-E]      8. Having  regard  to  the  provision  determining  the fixation of  seniority under  the  Rules  of  1974  and  the position obtaining  thereafter, none  of the  petitioners in the writ petitions can claim the benefit of weightage on the basis of length of service. [165A]

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil  Appeal Nos. 1584- 1588 of 1973.      Appeals by  Special Leave  from the  Judgment and Order dated 6th  August, 1973  of the  Madras High  Court in  Writ Appeal Nos. 13 to 17 of 1973.                             AND 158      Writ Petition Nos. 357 of 1979 and 4367 of 1978.

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          (Under Article 32 of the Constitution)      K. Parasaran,  Soli. General,  N. Nettar  and  Miss  A. Subhashini for the Appellants in all appeals.      T.S. Krishnamurthy  Iyer, H. B. Dattar, A. K.Srivastava and T. P. Sunderarajan for the Petitioners in WPs. Nos. 4367 of 1978 & 357 of 1979.      T.S.  Krishnamurthy   Iyer,  Vineet   Kumar  and   A.K. Srivastava for the Respondents.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      PATHAK, J.-These  appeals, by  special leave, raise the question whether  the  respondents  are  entitled  to  claim fixation of  their seniority  in  the  Subordinate  Accounts Service after taking into account their length of service as Upper Division  Clerks. The  respondents entered  service in the Office  of the  Accountant General,  Tamil Nadu as Upper Division Clerks.  They appeared  in the Subordinate Accounts Service Examination  but it  was  only  after  a  number  of attempts that  they succeeded  in passing.  They passed  the examination held in November, 1969 and were promoted shortly thereafter. They  claimed seniority  on the basis that their length of  service in the inferior post should be taken into account, and  rested their  claim on  paragraph 143  of  the Manual of  Standing Orders  issued by  the  Comptroller  and Auditor-General as  it  stood  before  its  amendment  by  a correction slip  of 27th  July, 1956.  The  correction  slip removed the  factor of  weightage on  the basis of length of service in  the determination  of seniority.  The claim  was rejected by  the Comptroller  and  Auditor-General.  A  writ petition filed  by them  in the  High Court  of  Madras  was allowed by  a learned  Single Judge,  and his  judgment  was affirmed by  an appellate  Bench, of the High Court. Against the judgment of the appellate Bench, the Accountant General, Tamil Nadu  and the  Comptroller  and  Auditor-General  have appealed to  this Court,  and those  appeals are  pending as Civil Appeals Nos. 1584 to 1588 of 1973. During the pendency of those  appeals the President enacted the Indian Audit and Accounts  Department   (Subordinate   Accounts   Service   & Subordinate  Railway  Audit  Service)  Service  Rules,  1974 (referred to  hereinafter as "the Rules of 1974"). The Rules of  1974  purport  to  give  statutory  recognition  to  the amendment of  paragraph 143  by the Comptroller and Auditor- General. The validity of the Rules of 1974 and the amendment made in paragraph 143 are assailed by the respondents in the instant appeals. 159      The Rules  of 1974  have been enacted by the President. They are  deemed to have come into force on 27th July, 1956, which has been defined, for the purposes of the Rules as the "appointed  day".  The  Subordinate  Accounts  Service  (the "Service") includes  members  appointed  to  it  before  the appointed day  as well  as persons  recruited to  it  in  or before that  day. Rule  5 provides that recruitment shall be made by direct recruitment in accordance with, the orders or directions issued  by the  Comptroller  and  Auditor-General from time to time and also by promotion. Rule 6 provides:      "6. Appointments:-      Appointments to the Service shall be made from the list      prepared in accordance with the orders and instructions      issued by the Comptroller and Auditor-General from time      to time  and applicable  at the  time of appointment to      the Service." Rule 7 deals with seniority, and declares:      "7. Seniority:-      (1) The  seniority inter-se of the persons appointed to      the service before the appointed day shall be regulated

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    by the orders or instructions issued by the Comptroller      and Auditor-General  as were  in force  at the relevant      time before such day.      (2) The  seniority-inter-se of the persons appointed to      the Service  on or  after the appointed day shall be in      the order  in which  the appointments  are made  to the      service in accordance with rule 6.      Provided that  a direct recruit shall on appointment to      the Service  rank senior  to all officiating persons in      the service (excluding a direct recruit) passing in the      same    departmental    examination    or    subsequent      departmental examinations.      Provided further that the seniority of a person who had      declined the  appointment to  the Service  but  who  is      subsequently  appointed   to  the   Service  shall   be      determined with  reference to  the  date  on  which  he      assumed charge of the post in the cadre."      By virtue  of  Rule  9,  in  matters  not  specifically provided for  in the  Rules, every  person appointed  to the Service is  governed by  the rules,  regulations,  orders or instructions made  or issued in respect of the Central Civil Services as applicable to the Indian Audit and Accounts 160 Department. Rule  10 empowers  the Comptroller  and Auditor- General to issue, from time to time, such general or special instructions or  orders as  he  may  consider  necessary  or expedient for the purpose of giving, effect to the Rules.      The respondents  have raised two contentions. The first is that  the Rules  are invalid as clause (5) of Art. 148 to which alone,  it is  said, they  must be  ascribed, does not permit the retrospective enactment of rules made thereunder. The other  contention is  that the  specific rules affecting the seniority  of the  respondents are  in valid be cause in entrusting power  to the  Comptroller and Auditor-General to issue orders and instructions in his discretion the doctrine against excessive  delegation of  legislative power has been violated      Taking the first contention first, it may be noted that the Rules  of 1974  purport, according to the recital in the Notification dated  4th November,  1974 publishing  them, to have been  made by  the President "in exercise of the powers conferred by  the proviso to Art. 309 and clause (5) of Art. 148 of  the Constitution  and after  consultation  with  the Comptroller and  Auditor-General of  India". The respondents say that  the only provision of the Constitution under which those Rules  could be made is clause (5) of Art. 148, and we should ignore  reference to the proviso to Art. 309. If that is done,  they urge,  there will  be  no  justification  for holding that  the Rules  of 1974  can be given retrospective operation. Unlike  the proviso  to Art.  309, it  is pointed out, clause (5) of Art. 148 does not permit the enactment of retrospectively  operating   rules.  We   think   that   the respondents are right.      Article 309 provides for legislation by the appropriate Legislature to  regulate the  recruitment and  conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and posts in connection with  the affairs  of the  Union or of any State, and the  proviso  to  Art.  309  declares  that  until  such legislation is  enacted by  the appropriate  Legislature the President is  empowered in the case of services and posts in connection with  the affairs  of the Union, and the Governor of a  State in  the case of services and posts in connection with the  affairs of  a State,  to make rules regulating the recruitment  and   the  conditions  of  service  of  persons appointed to  such services  and posts.  There  is  a  clear

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dichotomy in  the power conferred by Art. 309, a division of power between  the Parliament  or President, as the case may be, on the one side and the State Legislature or Governor on the other.  The division  is marked by the circumstance that under Art  309, services  and posts  in connection  with the affairs of  the Union are dealt with by a separate authority from the services and 161 posts in  connection with  the  affairs  of  a  State.  That dichotomy it  seems, is  not possible  in the power employed for appointing  persons in  the Indian  Audit  and  Accounts Department and  for prescribing their conditions of service. The Comptroller  and Auditor-General  of India,  who is  the head of  that department,  is a  constitutional  functionary holding a  special position  under the  Constitution.  Under Art.  149,  he  performs  duties  and  exercises  powers  in relation to  the accounts  of the  Union  and  also  of  the States. Clause  (1) of  Art. 151  requires him  to submit  a report  relating  to  the  accounts  of  the  Union  to  the President, who  causes them  to be laid before each House of Parliament. Likewise, clause (2) of Art. 151 requires him to submit a  report relating  to the accounts of a State to the Governor of the State, who causes them to be laid before the Legislature  of  the  State.  It  cannot  be  said,  in  the circumstances, that  the persons serving in the Indian Audit and Accounts  Department are  holding office  in  connection with the affairs of the Union exclusively. It may be pointed out that  when the Constitutional Adviser prepared the Draft Constitution for  consideration by  the Constituent Assembly the  document   contained  separate   provisions   for   the appointment of  the Auditor-General  of the  Federation  and Auditors-General for  the Provinces. The Auditor-General for the Federation  was to be appointed by the President and his functions extended to the accounts of the Federation as well as of  the Provinces.  But  it  was  open  to  a  Provincial Legislature to  provide by  law for  the appointment  of  an Auditor-General for the Province and the appointment to that office was  to be made by the Governor. The Expert Committee on  the  financial  provisions  of  the  Union  Constitution favoured the continuance of a single Auditor-General for the Government  of   India  as   well  as   for  the  Provincial Governments and  hoped that the Provincial Governments would refrain  from  using  their  power  of  appointing  separate Auditors-General of  their own.  When the matter came before the  Drafting   Committee,  it   decided  that  the  persons performing the  functions of  the Auditor-General in a State should  be   designated   Auditor-in-Chief   in   order   to distinguish him  from the Auditor-General of India, and that the salaries  and allowances  of the staff of these officers should be  fixed by  the Auditor-General  of India  and  the Auditor-in-Chief in  consultation with the President and the Governor respectively.  Thereafter, the  Drafting  Committee reconsidered the  desirability of  permitting a multiplicity of audit  authorities, one  for the  Union and  one for each State. On 1st August, 1949 Shri T.T. Krishnamachari moved an amendment deleting  the draft  articles enabling  the  State Legislatures  to  create  their  own  Auditors-in-Chief.  He pointed out  that since the Constituent Assembly had already adopted articles  whereby the  auditing and accounting would become "one  institution, so  to say, under the authority of the 162 Comptroller and  Auditor-General", it  was not  necessary to have separate  provision for  the  States.  Accordingly,  he proposed the  addition of  a new  article now  clause (2) of

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Art.  151]   about  the   Comptroller  and  Auditor-General, requiring him  to submit  the reports  of the  accounts of a State to  the Governor  for  being  laid  before  the  State Legislature.  These   amendments   were   adopted   by   the Constituent Assembly.  It  is  evident  that  the  authority vested in  the Comptroller  and Auditor  General ranges over functions associated  with the  affairs of the Union as well as over functions associated with the affairs of the States. It is  a single  office, and  the Indian  Audit and Accounts Department, which  it heads,  is a  single department.  They cannot be said to be concerned with the affairs of the Union exclusively. Consequently, the regulation of the recruitment and conditions  of service  of persons serving in the Indian Audit and Accounts Department cannot be regarded as a matter falling with the domain of the President within the terms of the proviso  to Art.  309. A special provision was necessary to entrust the President with that power, and that provision is clause (5) of Art, 148. The power contained in clause (5) of Art. 148 is not related to the power under the proviso to Art. 309. The two powers are separate and distinct from each other and  are not  complementary to  one  another.  In  our opinion, the  reference to the proviso under Art. 309 in the recital of  the Notification publishing the Rules of 1974 is meaningless and must be ignored.      The next  question is  whether clause  (5) of  Art. 148 permits  the   enactment  of   rules  having   retrospective operation.  It   is  settled   law  that  unless  a  statute conferring the  power to  make rules provides for the making of  rules  with  retrospective  operation,  the  rules  made pursuant to  that power can have prospective operation only. An exception,  however, is the proviso to Art. 309. In B. S. Vadera v.  Union of  India &  Ors. this  Court held that the rules  framed   under  the   proviso  to  Art.  309  of  the Constitution  could   have  retrospective   operation.   The conclusion followed  from the  circumstance that  the  power conferred under the porviso to Art. 309 was intended to fill a hiatus  that is  to  say,  until  Parliament  or  a  State Legislature enacted a law on the subject matter of Art. 309. The  rules  framed  under  the  proviso  to  Art.  309  were transient in  character and  were  to  do  duty  only  until legislation was  enacted. As  interim substitutes  for  such legislation it  was clearly  intended that  the rules should have the same range of operation as an Act 163 of Parliament  or of  the State  Legislature. The intent was reinforced by  the declaration  in the  proviso to  Art. 309 that "any  rules so  made shall  have effect  subject to the provisions of  any such  Act". Those  features are absent in clause (5)  of Art. 148. There is nothing in the language of that clause  to indicate  that the rules framed therein were intended  to   serve  until  Parliamentary  legislation  was enacted. All  that the  clause says is that the rules framed would be  subject to  the provisions of the Constitution and of any  law made by Parliament. We are satisfied that clause (5) of  Art. 148  confers power  on the  President to  frame rules operating  prospectively only. Clearly then. the rules of 1974  cannot have  retrospective operation, and therefore sub-rule (2)  of rule  1, which  declares that  they will be deemed to  have come  into force  on 27th July, 1956 must be held ultra vires.      If the  Rules of  1974 do  not cover  the case  of  the respondents then  admittedly the only question which remains in regard  to them  is whether the amendment intended by the Comptroller and  Auditor General in 1956 to paragraph 143 of the Manual  of Standing  Orders  results  in  amending  that

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paragraph. The amendment is in the form of a correction slip which, it  is not  disputed,  possesses  the  status  of  an administrative instruction.  The contention on behalf of the respondents is  that paragraph 143 possesses the status of a statutory rule  and, therefore,  the amendment  attempted by the correction  slip has  no legal  effect on  it. The  High Court held  that paragraph  143 was  a statutory rule and it proceeded to hold so on the basis of affidavits filed before it. But the matter has been more carefully researched since, and the  relevant material  is now  set out  in the  special leave petition,  which has  given rise  to this  appeal.  It appears  that   in  1921   the   Auditor-General,   as   the administrative head of the Indian Audit Department, inserted Art. 1666A  by a  circular No. 1757-E/1129 dated 18th April, 1921 giving  weight to the length of service in the fixation of seniority.  In the Audit Code prepared subsequently, Art, 1666A appeared  as Art.  52. Thereafter,  in the  Manual  of Standing Orders  issued by the Auditor-General in 1938, Art. 52 found  expression as  paragraph 143.  The provision never acquired statutory  force under the Government of India Act, 1919. Learned  counsel for  the respondents  urges  that  it acquired  statutory  force  under  sub-s.  (2)  of  s.  252. Government of India Act, 1935. Sub-ss. (1) and (2) of s. 252 provide:           "252. (1)  All persons  who immediately before the      commencement of  Part III  of this  Act were members of      the staff  of  the  High  Commissioner  for  India,  or      members of  the staff of the Auditor of the accounts of      the Secretary 164      of State  in Council,  shall continue  to be,  or shall      become, members  of the  staff of the High Commissioner      for India  or, as  the case  may be,  of the Auditor of      Indian Home Accounts.           (2) All  such persons  aforesaid shall  hold their      offices or  posts subject to like conditions of service      as  to   remuneration,  pensions   or   otherwise,   as      therefore, or not less favourable conditions, and shall      be entitled  to reckon  for  purposes  of  pension  any      service which  they would have been, entitled to reckon      if this Act had not been passed.      *             *           *             *            *"      Sub-s. (2)  of s.  252 does  not help  the respondents. Firstly, the guarantee conferred by it covered those persons who held offices or posts on the staff of the Auditor of the accounts of  the Secretary  of State  in Council  and on the staff of  the Indian  Home Accounts  immediately before  the commencement of  Part III  of the  Act. The  respondents are clearly not  such persons.  Secondly, even  if it be assumed that the  benefit of  sub-s. (2)  can  be  extended  to  the respondents, sub-s.  (2) merely  protects the  conditions of service enjoyed  by them  as they  existed before.  The sub- section does  not enlarge or improve on the quality of those conditions of  service. If  seniority was  determined  by  a departmental instruction,  sub-s.  (2)  did  not  give  that provision the higher status of a statutory rule. It remained what it always was, a departmental instruction. We were also referred to Art. 313 of the Constitution, but that provision also  does   not  result   in  converting   a   departmental instruction into a statutory rule. Plainly, paragraph 143 in the  Manual   of  Standing   Orders  remained  throughout  a departmental instruction and, therefore, could be amended by the departmental  instruction contained  in  the  correction slip issued  by the Comptroller and Auditor-General in 1956. On  that   conclusion  being   reached,  the  claim  of  the

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respondents must fail. The appeals have to be allowed.      In the  connected writ  petition No.  357 of 1979 there are 15  petitioners. The  first ten  passed the  Subordinate Accounts  Service  Examination  and  were  promoted  to  the service after  1956 and before the enactment of the Rules of 1974. They will be governed by the legal position enunciated in  the   aforesaid  appeals.   The  eleventh,  twelfth  and thirteenth petitioners  passed the  examination  immediately before the  enactment of the Rules of 1974 but were promoted after the  Rules were  enacted.  The  remaining  petitioners appeared at  the examination  and were  promoted  after  the enactment of  the  Rules.  In  the  case  of  the  last  two categories the Rules of 165 1974 will  apply. Having regard to the provision determining the fixation  of seniority  under the  Rules of 1974 and the position obtaining  thereafter, none  of the petitioners can claim the  benefit of  weigtage on  the basis  of length  of service. But these petitioners rely on the second of the two contentions concerning  the validity  of the  Rules of 1974. They assail  specifically the  validity of  Rule 7(2)  which provides for fixation of seniority. The argument is that the fixation of  seniority has  been made by Rule 7(2) to depend on the  order in  which appointments to the service are made under Rule  6, and  that, it  is pointed  out, depends on an arbitrary power  conferred on  the Comptroller  and  Auditor General to  pass orders and instructions. We see no force in the contention.  The Comptroller  and Auditor  General is  a high ranking  constitutional authority,  and can be expected to act  according to  the needs  of the  service and without arbitrariness. He  is the  constitutional head of one of the most important  departments of the State, and is expected to know what  the department  requires and  how best  to fulfil those requirements.  We are  unable to  hold that  the power conferred on  him under  the Rules  violates  the  principle against excessive delegation.      The writ petition No. 4367 of 1978 must also be treated on the  basis that  the petitioners are not, in the fixation of their  seniority, entitled to weightage with reference to their  length   of  service.   Both  writ   petitions  must, therefore, be dismissed.      Civil Appeals  Nos. 1584-1588  of 1973 are allowed, the judgment and order of the Madras High Court is set aside and the writ  petition is  dismissed. Writ  Petition Nos. 357 of 1979 and 4367 of 1978 are also dismissed.      In the circumstances, there is no order as to costs. N.V.K.                                   Appeals allowed and                                         Petitions dismissed. 166