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PETITIONER: ACCOUNTANT AND SECRETARIAL SERVICES PVT.LTD. & ANR.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT20/07/1988

BENCH: MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J) BENCH: MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J) RANGNATHAN, S.

CITATION:  1988 AIR 1708            1988 SCR  Supl. (1) 493  1988 SCC  (4) 324        JT 1988 (3)    78  1988 SCALE  (2)53  CITATOR INFO :  E&D        1991 SC 855  (46,48)

ACT:      Public Premises  (Eviction of  unauthorised  occupants) Act, 1971-Whether the Act to the extent it had been extended to premises  belonging to or taken on lease by a Corporation established  by   or  under  a  Central  Act  and  owned  or controlled by  Central Government  was ultra vires or beyond legislative power  of Parliament to extend the applicability of  the  Act  to  such  premises-Determination  of  question involved.

HEADNOTE:      The first  appellant in  this appeal, a private limited company, occupying  a portion  of the  premises belonging to the United  Commercial Bank, claimed to be the tenant of the Bank, but  this was not admitted by the respondent Bank. The Bank alleged  that the appellant company had been allowed to occupy a  portion of  the Bank’s  premises  as  licensee  in consideration  of   certain  accountancy   and   secretarial services rendered  to the Bank. The Bank had issued a notice of eviction  to the  appellant company under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy  Act, 1956  (’the 1956 Act’). Subsequently, the Bank  issued a notice to the appellants under the Public Premises (Eviction  of  unauthorised  occupants)  Act,  1971 (’the 1971  Act’) which  is an  Act of  the Parliament.  The appellants  filed   a  writ  petition  in  the  High  Court, agitating  the  question  whether  the  impugned  Act  which provides for  eviction of unauthorised occupants from public premises belonging  to or  taken on  lease by  a corporation established  by   or  under  a  Central  Act  and  owned  or controlled by  the Central  Government was ultra vires as it was beyond the legislative power of the Parliament to extend the applicability  of the  said Act  to such  premises.  The appellants were  interested in denying the legislative power of Parliament  in so  far as  it  purported  to  extend  the applicability of  the 1971  Act to the premises belonging to or taken  on lease  by  public  sector  corporations.  Their argument went  to the  extent of  urging that only the State legislatures and  not Parliament were competent to legislate on a  topic of  landlord-tenant relationship  in respect  of

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land and buildings.      According to the appellants, the provisions of 1956 Act were squarely applicable and should have been resorted to by the Bank for evicting them. 494      The appellants contended that a legislation of the type of West  A Bengal  Land (Eviction of unauthorised occupants) Act, 1962  (1962Act), which  was on  the pattern of the 1971 Act, would  fall within  the legislative  field  exclusively open to  the State  Legislatures and  that the  1971 Act was ultra vires  the Parliament  in so  far as  it purported  to affect the appellants’ rights.      Dismissing the appeal, the Court, ^      HELD: Per Sabyasachi Mukharji, J.      His Lordship  agreed  with  Ranganathan,  J.  that  the appeal should  be dismissed. His Lordship preferred the view of the  Madhya Pradesh  High Court in L.S. Nair v. Hindustan Steel Ltd.  Bhilai, A.I.R.  1980 M.P. 106 to the view of the Bombay High  Court in  Miscellaneous  Petition  No.  458/79- Elliot Waud  Hill (P)  Ltd. v.  Life Insurance  Corpn.  This Court had  in this  Case proceeded  on  the  short  question whether the  impugned Act  which provides  for  eviction  of unauthorised occupants from public premises to the extent it had been extended to premises belonging or taken on lease by a corporation  established by  or under  a Central  Act  and owned or  controlled by  the Central  Government, was  ultra vires or  beyond the  legislative power of the Parliament to extend the applicability of the Act to such premises. [498D- G]      There was no dispute, as emphasised by Ranganathan, J., as to whether the premises in question or of this type was a public premises. For the purpose of this appeal, once it was held that  the Public  Premises  (Eviction  of  Unauthorised occupants) Act  was intra  vires the  Parliament, no further issue between  the parties survived. It was not necessary to consider whether  the provisions  of the  1971 Act  even  if intra vires  would pervail  upon the provisions of the State Legislation.  For   the  purpose  of  this  appeal,  it  was unnecessary to  express any  view on the amplitude and scope of Article 254 of the Constitution. [498H; 499A-B]      It had  to be  taken that  the legislation  in question must be  under stood  in its  pith  and  substance,  and  so understood, the  Act in  question in this case is in respect of transfer  of property other than agricultural land and as such falls in Entry 6 of List III of the 7th Schedule to the Constitution. It is clear from the decision of this Court in Indu Bhusan  Bose v.  Rana Sundari  Devi and  Anr., [1970] 1 S.C.R. 443  and  the  subsequent  decision  in  V.  Dhanapal Chettiarv.  YesodaiAmmal,  [1980]  1  S.C.R.  334  that  the subject matter  of housing accommodation and control thereof falls within the purview of concurrent list. In that view 495 of the  matter, it  could not  be convassed  that  the  1971 legislation in  question was  beyond the  competence of  the legislature. [499C-E]      Per S. Ranganathan, J.      The present  agrument of  the appellants might not have been open  to them if the premises of the Bank could be said to be  premises belonging  to the  Union Government  In that case, the legislation to the extent it governs such premises can be said to fall under Entry 32 of List I as one covering the "property  of the  Union". Though,  the  premises  being situated in  Calcutta any  legislation under  that entry  in regard thereto  would be  subject to  State Legislation, the

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state Legislation  can  only  govern  "save  in  so  far  as Parliament by  law otherwise  provides."  Parliament  having provided otherwise  by the  1971 Act,  that Act will prevail over the  11/56  and  1962  Acts.  Though  the  Bank  was  a corporation wholly  owned and  controlled by the Government, it had  a distinct  personality of  its own and its property could not  be said  to be  the property  of the  Union.  The position was  beyond  the  pale  of  controversy  after  the decision of this Court in Bacha F.Guzdar v. C.I.T., [1955] 1 S.C.R. 876;  State trading  Corporation  of  India  Ltd.  v. C.T.O., [1964] 4 S.C.R. 99, and many other cases. lt was not possible for  the respondents to support the legislation qua the premises under Entry 32 of List I. [505A-D]      Entry 32 of List I being out of the way, the appellants contended that the legislation squarely regularly fell under Entry 18  of List II. A question as to the interpretation of Entry 18  (or its  predecessor, Entry  21 of  the Provincial List under  the Government  of India  Act, 1935)  had arisen before the  Federal Court  and Privy  Council, and  also was considered in some decisions of this Court, which, except in the case  of Indu Bhusan Bose v. Rama Sundari Devi, [1970] 1 S.C.R. 443,  were not  helpful in  deciding the issue before the Court.  In respect  of Indu  Bhushan’s case,  while  the respondents contended that the ruling concluded the issue in their favour,  the appellants  urged that  it could  not  be taken as a decision that the house tenancy legislation could not come under Entry 18 of List II. [505E; 506B-C; 513C]      It was  true that  the decision  in Indu Bhushan’s case ultimately turned  on the wider interpretation of Entry 2 of List I  favoured by  this Court,  nevertheless, the judgment contains a  specific discussion  of the  terms of  Entry 21. Indu Bhushan  must be  taken to  have expressed  a view that premises tenancy  legislation in  so far  as it  pertains to houses and buildinYs is referable not to Entry 18 of List II but to entries 6,7 496 and 13 of List III. The decision of the larger Bench of this Court in  V. Dhonpal  Chettier v.  Yesodai Ammal,  [1980]  1 S.C.R. 334,  also reinforced  the same line of thinking. The discussion and  ratio of  Dhanpal Chettier  fall into  place only on  the view  that by that time it was taken as settled law that  State house control legislations were referable to the legislative  powers conferred  by the  Concurrent  List. [513C; 520D-E]      Entry 18  should be  given as  wide a  construction  as possible consistent  with all  the other  entries in all the three legislative  Lists. There  is no  reason why the first topic dealt with by the entry, viz. land, should be narrowly interpreted. lt  should be understood as including all types of land,  rural or  urban, agricultural or non-agricultural, arid, cultivated,  fallow or  vacant, What  is ’land’ can be gathered from  the other  words of the entry which attempt a paraphrase. It  is not  possible to  interpret this entry as encompassing   within   its   terms   legislation   on   the relationship of  landlord and tenant in regard to houses and buildings. All  the legislation  coming up for consideration in  the  present  case  are  referable  to  entries  in  the concurrent  List   and  the  topic  of  legislation  is  not referable to Entry 18 of List II. The provisions of the 1971 Act, in  so far as they were made applicable to the premises of the  respondent Bank, are intra vires and valid. [520F-H; 525E]      Once it  was held  that the 1971 Act is infra vires the Parliament, no  further issue  between the parties survived. There was some discussion r. before this Court as to whether

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the provisions  of the  1971 Act, even if intra vires, would prevail against  the provisions  of the  State legislations. This case is clearly governed by the primary rule in Article 254(1) of the Constitution under which the law of Parliament on a  subject in the concurrent List prevails over the State Law. Article  254(2) of  the Constitution  is not  attracted because no  provision of the State Acts (enacted in 1956 and 1962) were  repugnant to the provisions of an earlier law of Parliament of  existing law.  Even if  the provision  of the main part  of Article  254(2) can  be  said  to  be  somehow applicable, the proviso, read with Article 254(1), reaffirms the supremacy of any subsequent legislation of Parliament on the same matter even though such subsequent legislation does not in  terms amend,  vary or  repeal any  provision of  the State Legislation.  The provisions  of the  1971  Act  will, therefore, prevail  against those of the State Acts and were rightly invoked  in this case by she respondent Bank. [525F; 529C-E]      There was  no substance  in the  appellants’ contention that the  provision in  the 1971  Act appointing  one of the officers of  the respondent  Bank as the Estate officers was violative of Article 14. [529F] 497      The appeal failed.      L.S. Nair  v. Hindustan  Steel Ltd. Bhilai, A.I.R. 1980 M.P. 106;  Elliot Waud  Hill  (P)  Ltd.  v.  Life  Insurance Corporation Miscellaneous  Petiton No.  458/79 before Bombay High Court;  Indu Bhusan Bose v. Rama Sundari Devi and Anr.. [1970] 1  S.C.R. 443;  A.C. Patel  v. Vishwanath Chadda, ILR 1954 Bombay  434; V.  Dhanapal Chettiar  v.  Yasodai  Ammal, [1980] 1  S.C.R. 836;  Bacha P.  Guzdar v.  C.I.T., [1955] 1 S.C.R. 876; State Trading Corporation of India Ltd. v. C.T.O [1964] 4  SCR 99;  A.P. State  Raod Transport Corporation v. I.T.O., [1964]  7 SCR 17; Heavy Engineering Mazdoor Union v. State, [1969]  3  S.C.R.  995;  Vidarbha  Housing  Board  v. I.T.O., [1973]  92 I.T.R.  430; Western  Coalfields Ltd.  v. Special Area  Development  Authority,  [1982]  2  S.C.R.  1; Manohar v.  C.G. Deasi,  AIR 1951  Nag. 33;  Raman  Dass  v. State, AIR  1954 All.  707; Darukhanawala  v. Khemchand, ILR 1954 Bom,  546; M.  Karuna  v.  State,  AIR  1955  Nag  153, Kewalchand v.  Dashrathlal, ILR  1956 Nag 618; Sukumar Dutta v.  Gaurishankar,   [1964]  69  CWN  833;  Raval  &  Co.  v. Ramachandran, AIR  1967 Mad.  57;Mangtulal v.  Radhey Shyam, AIR 1953  Pat. 14;  Milap Chand  v. Dwarakadas, AIR 1964 Raj 252; Rama  Sundari v.  Indu Bhusan, AIR 1967 Cal. 355; Nawal Mal v. Nathu Mal, AIR 1962 Raj. 193; Bapalal & Co. v. Thakur Das, AIR  1982 Mad.  309; Vnited  Province v.  Atiga  Begum, [1940J F.C.R. 110; Megh Raj v. Allan Rakhia, AIR 1947 PC 72; Atma Ram  v. State  of Punjab,  [1959] Supp.  1 S.C.R.  748; Manaklal Chhotalal  v. M.G. Makwana & Ors., [1967] 3 SCR 65; Babu Jagtanand  Sri Satyanarayanji,  ILR 40 Patna 625; Union of India v. Valluri S. Chaudhary, [1979] 3 SCR 802, State v. Peter, [1980] 3 SCR 290, 292; Jaisingh Jairam Tyagi v. Maman Chand, [1980]  3  S.C.R.  224;  Hoechst  Pharmaceuticals  v. State, [1983]  3 S.C.R. 130; Dhillon’s case, [1972] 2 S.C.R. 33; Jain  Ink Manufacturing  Co. v. LIC, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 498 and Zaverbhai  Amaidas v. State, [1955] S.C.R. 799, referred to.

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil  Appeal NO  900 of 1987      From the  Judgment and  order dated  12.2.1987  of  the

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Calcutta High Court in Matter No. 676 of 1978.      Dr.  Y.S.   Chitale,  Anil   Mitra,  P.H.   Parekh,  D. Chandfachud, S.C. Ghosh and R.K. Dhil1on for the Appellants.      K. Parasaran Attorney General for Union of India. 498      K.N. Bhat, A. Subba Rao and Miss Madhu Moolchandani for the Respondents.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      SABYASACHI MUKHARJI,  J. I had the advantage of reading in draft the judgment proposed to be delivered by my learned Brother Ranganathan,  J. It  is, however, necessary to add a few sentences.  I was reluctant to take up this matter as it arises out  of a  decision of the Division Bench of the High Court  of  Calcutta.  That  decision  was  occasioned  by  a reference made  by the Chief Justice of that High Court on a reference made  by me to the Chief Justice sitting singly in that Court.  In the  High Court I had not expressed any view on the  contentions urged.  In those  circumstances both the parties requested  me to take up the matter. It was in these circumstances that  I became  a party  to this  judgment.  I agree with  my learned  Brother that  the appeal  should  be dismissed and the order he proposes to make as to costs.      It  is   not  necessary   in  view  of  the  facts  and circumstances of the case to refer in detail to the reasons. I would,  however, make  it clear  that I prefer the view of the Division  Bench of  the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of  L.S. Nair  v. Hindustan Steel Ltd. Bhilai, AIR 1980 MP 106.  I would  prefer this  view in preference to that of the F.  Iearned Single  Judge of  the Bombay  High Court  in Miscellaneous Petition  No. 458/79 Elliot Waud Hill (P) Ltd. v.  Life  Insurance  Corpn.  Further,  it  is  necessary  to reiterate that  in this  case we have proceeded on the short question canvassed  before the  Division Bench  of the  High Court out  of which  this appeal  arises, i.e.,  whether the impugned Act  which provides  for eviction  of  unauthorised occupants from  public premises  to the  extent it  has been extended to  premises belonging  or  taken  on  lease  by  a corporation established  by or under a Central Act and owned or controlled  by the Central Govt. is ultra vires or beyond the legislative  power  of  the  Parliament  to  extend  the applicability of  the Act  to such premises. It is only this question which was mooted before the High Court and required consideration by  us under Article ,136 of the Constitution. It is,  therefore, not  necessary to express any view on any other aspect of the matter.      Furthermore, as  has  been  emphasised  by  my  learned Brother there  was no  dispute as to whether the premises in the present  appeal is  a public  premises.  Therefore,  the question whether the premises in question or of this type is a public  premises is  not an  aspect  into  which  we  were required to go. 499      For the purpose of this appeal once it is held that the Public Premises  (Eviction. Of  Unauthorised occupants) Act, 1971 is intra vires the Parliament, no further issue between the parties  survive because  no other contention was raised before the Division Bench of the High Court and also in this appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution, no other issue can be  canvassed. It  is, therefore,  not necessary,  in my opinion, to consider whether the provisions of 1971 Act even if intra  vires would  prevail upon  the provisions  of  the State legislation.  Hence, for the purpose of this appeal it is unnecessary  to express  any view  on the  amplitude  and scope of Article 254 of the Constitution.      Indu Bhusan  Bose v. Rama Sundari Devi & Anr., [1970] 1

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SCR 443  is a  decision of five learned Judges of this Court affirming the  Calcutta view which held that the legislation in question  in that  case was to be found in Entries 6, 7 & 13 of  List III  of the 7th Schedule of the Constitution and neither in  Entry 18  of II  Schedule nor  in Entry  3 of II Schedule of  the Constitution.  It rejected  the Bombay view expressed in  ,4. C.  Patel v.  Vishwanath Chadda,  ILR 1954 Bom.  434.  Respectfully,  it  has  to  be  taken  that  the legislation in  question must  be understood in its pith and substance and  so understood  the Act  in  question  in  the instant case,  is in  respect of  transfer of property other than agricultural  land and,  as such,  falls in  Entry 6 of List III  of the  7th Schedule  to the  Constitution. It  is clear from  the said  decision and  the subsequent  decision reaffirming the same view in V. Dhanapal Chettiar v. Yesodai Ammal, [1980]  1 SCR  334 that the subject-matter of housing accommodation and  control thereof  falls within the purview of concurrent list. In that view of the matter, it cannot in my opinion,  be canvassed  that the  197  1  legislation  in question was beyond the competence of the legislature.      With these  observations I  agree with  respect with my learned Brother  that the appeal should be dismissed without any order as to cost      S. RANGANATHAN,  J. The  first appellant  is a  private limited company.  The company  is  occupying  a  portion  of premises No.  18,  Russel  Street,  Calcutta.  The  premises belong  to   the  United   Commercial  Bank,   a   statutory corporation  constituted   under   the   Banking   Companies (Acquisition &  Transfer of  Undertakings)  Act,  1970.  The appellant company  claims to  be the  tenant of the Bank but this is  not admitted  by  the  respondent  Bank.  The  Bank alleges  that   the   appellant   company,   when   somewhat differently  constituted,  had  been  allowed  to  occupy  a portion of  the Bank’s premises as licensee in consideration of 500 certain accountancy  and secretarial  services which  it was required to  render to the Bank. It appears that sometime in 1975 the  respondent Bank issued a notice of eviction to the appellant company  under Section  13(6) of  the West  Bengal Premises Tenancy  Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as ’the 1956 Act’).  Subsequently, however, the Bank issued a notice dated 4.2.1977  to the  appellants under the Public Premises (Eviction of  Unauthorised occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred  to  as  ’the  1971  Act’),  which  is  an  Act  of Parliament. The  appellants thereupon  filed a writ petition in the  Calcutta High  Court being  Matter No.  676 of 1978. Though several contentions appear to have been raised in the writ petition,  the judgment  of the  Division Bench  of the Calcutta High Court dated 12th February, 1987, (which is the one presently  under appeal) records that "the only question which has  been mooted and agitated before us is whether the impugned Act  which provides  for eviction  of  unauthorised occupants from  public premises  to the  extent it  has been extended to  premises belonging  or  taken  on  lease  by  a corporation established  by or under a Central Act and owned or controlled by the Central Government is ultra vires as it was beyond the legislative power of the Parliament to extend the applicability  of the said Act to such premises." Though the  appellants   are  interested   only  in   denying   the legislative power  of Parliament in so far as it purports to extend  the  applicability  of  the  1971  Act  to  premises belonging to  or taken  on lease by what may be described as public sector  corporations,  the  contention  as  urged  is somewhat broader.  The argument goes to the extent of urging

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that only  the State  legislatures, and  not Parliament,  is competent  to  legislate  on  the  topic  of  landlordtenant relationships in  respect of  land and  buildings. This  has been the principal contention addressed to us by Dr. Chitale appearing on behalf of the appellants.      The 1971  Act received  the assent  of the President on 23rd August,  1971 but  it is deemed to have come into force on the  16th day of September, 1958 for certain ’historical’ reasons which  are not  relevant for  our purposes.  The Act provides for  the eviction  of ’unauthorised  occupants from public premises  and for certain incidental matters. S. 2(c) defines premises’  to mean  ’any  land  or  any  part  of  a building  and  to  include  garden,  grounds  and  outhouses appurtenant to  the building  or fittings  affixed thereto’. The expression ’public premises’ has been defined in Section 2(e) of  the Act.  This definition  is in  three parts. Sub- clause ( 1) of clause (e) takes in premises belonging to, or taken on  lease or  requisitioned by,  or on  behalf of, the Central Government,  as well  as  premises  placed  by  that Government under  the control  of either House of Parliament for providing residential 501 accommodation to the members of the staff of the Secretariat of either  House of Parliament. Sub-clause (3) of clause (e) takes in  premises belonging to certain local authorities in the Union  Territory of  Delhi. Sub-clause (2) of clause (e) brings in  premises belonging to or taken on lease by, or on behalf of,  various kinds  of bodies,  such as Universities, Institutes of  Technology, Board  of Trustees  of Major Port Trusts and  the Bhakra  Management Board.  It takes  in  any premises belonging to or taken on lease by, or on behalf of, a Government company or its subsidiary. It also takes in-and this is  what we  are concerned  with here-premises  of "any corporation (not  being a company as defined in section 3 of the Companies Act, 1956 or a local authority) established by or under  a Central  Act and  onwed  or  controlled  by  the Central Government".  There is  no dispute that the premises in question  in the  present  appeal  is  "public  premises" within the meaning of the Act.      The Act  contemplates  the  appointment  of  an  Estate officer who is a high placed officer of the Government or of the  relevant  statutory  authority  in  respect  of  public premises controlled  by that  authority. The Act enables the Estate officer  to call  upon  "unauthorised  occupants"  of public premises  (meaning persons  occupying  such  premises without authority  or continuing  in  occupation  after  the authority to  do so  has expired  or has been determined for any reason) to show cause why they should not be evicted and to proceed  to evict them, if need be, after considering the cause, if any, shown by the persons concerned in response to a notice  served on  them. It also contains powers to remove unauthorised    constructions,     demolish     unauthorised constructions, dispose  of property  left on public premises by  unauthorised  occupants,  require  payment  of  rent  or damages in  respect of  public premises  and so on. An order passed by  the estate  officer, under  the provisions of the Act,  is  appealable,  the  appellate  authority  being  the District Judge  or such  other judicial  officer of not less than 10 year’s experience as a District Judge and subject to the above  right of  appeal, the orders passed by the estate officer are  final. Section  15  bars  the  jurisdiction  of Courts to entertain any suits or  proceedings in respect of, inter  alia,   the  eviction   of  any   person  who  is  in unauthorised occupation  of public  premises. This, broadly, is the  outline of  the 1971  Act. Before proceeding to deal

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with the  contentions urged  before us,  it is  necessary to refer to  two more  enactments, which  have a bearing on the topic of discussion before us.      It has  been mentioned earlier that the Bank had served a notice  on the  appellants under  the 1956  Act. This Act, which received the H 502 assent of  the President  on 30th  March, 1956,  is  on  the pattern of  the lease and rent control legislation prevalent in various  States. It  regulates, inter alia, the matter of eviction of  tenants of  buildings situated  in Calcutta and certain important  cities and  localities of the State where there is  scarcity  of  housing  accommodation.  It  is  not necessary to  set out the provisions of this Act except one. Under the  second proviso  to section 1(3) the Act is not to apply to  (a) any premises belonging to any local authority, (b) any premises belonging to or requisitioned by Government and (c)  any tenancy created by Government in respect of any premises taken  on lease  by Government. The premises in the present case  does not  fall within  any of these categories and, according  to the  appellants before us, the provisions of 1956  Act were  squarely applicable  and should have been resorted to by the Bank for evicting them. This is one.      The other  relevant statute  is the  West Bengal Public Land  (Eviction   of  Unauthorised   occupants)  Act,  1962, (hereinafter  referred   to  as   ’the  1962   Act’).   This legislation is  on the  same pattern  as  the  1971  Act,  a pattern which  appears to  have been in existence in various States,  conferring  special  powers  on  statutorily  named officers to evict unauthorised occupants of public premises. The definitions  of ’land’,  ’public land’ and ’unauthorised occupation’ contained in sections 2(2), 2(7) and 2(8) are so wide as to leave no doubt that the premises belonging to the Bank would  be within  the scope  of the  said Act  and that proceedings for  eviction of  the appellants  could also  be initiated by  the Collector  under that Act. It thus appears that the  procedure for the eviction of the petitioners will be governed by the 1971 Act as well as either or both of the State Acts and the question is, which of these will prevail? The appellants  urge that  a legislation  of this  type will fall within  the legislative  field exclusively  open to the State legislatures  and that  the 1971  Act is  ultra  vires Parliament  in   so  far   as  it  purports  to  affect  the appellants’ rights.      It will  be convenient,  at this  stage, to set out all the  relevant   entries  in  the  Seventh  Schedule  of  the Constitution that  may have  a  bearing  on  the  discussion before us along with the corresponding entries under the 7th Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935. These are:      CONSTITUTION                        1935 ACT      List I-Union  List                  List I-Federal List ENTRY 3                          ENTRY  2 Delimitation of cantonment     Naval, military and air                                force works; 503 areas, local self-government   local self-government in cantonment in such areas, the consti-     areas, the constitution and powers tution and powers within       within such areas of cantonment such areas of cantonment       authorities, the regulation of house authorities and the regula-    accommodation in such areas, and the tion of house accommodation    delimitation of such areas. including the control of rents in such areas.           ENTRY 10 ENTRY 32                       Works, lands and buildings vested Property of the Union and      in, or in the possession of, His

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the revenue therefrom, but     Majesty for the purposes of the as regards property situated   Dominion (not being naval, military in a State* * * subject to     or air force works), but? as regards legislation by the State, save property situate in a Province, in so far as Parliament by law subject always to Provincial otherwise provide.             legislation, save in so far as                                Dominion law otherwise provides,                                and, as regards property in an                                Acceding State held by virtue of                                any lease or agreement with that                                State, subject to the terms of                                that lease or agreement. ENTRY 43:                      ENTRY 33: Incorporation7 regulation      Corporations, that is to say, the and winding up of trading      incorporation, regulation and corporations, including        winding-up of trading corporations, banking, insurance and         including banking, insurance and financial corporations hut     financial corporations, but not not including co-operative     including corporations owned or societies.                     controlled by an Acceding State                                and carrying on business only                                within that State or co-operative                                societies, and of corporations,                                whether trading or not, with                                objects not confined to one unit, ENTRY 44:                      but not including universities. Incorporation, regulation and winding up of corpora- tions, whether trading or not, with objects not confined to one State, but not including universities. 504    LIST II--STATE LIST            LIST II--PROVlNClAL LIST ENTRY 18:                      ENTRY 21: Land, that is to say, rights   Land, that is to say, rights in or over land, land tenun    in or over land, land tenures, including the relation of      including the relation of landlord and tenant, and the   landlord and tenant, and the collection of rents; transfer  collection of rents; transfer, and alienation of agricultural alienation and devolution of land; land improvement a       agricultural land; land agricultural loans;            improvement and agricultural colonization.                  loans; colonization; courts                                of Wards; encumbered and                                attached estates; treasure trove. List 111--CONCURRENT LIST      LIST 111--CONCURRENT LIST ENTRY 5:                       ENTRY 7: Marriage and divorce; infants, Wills, intestacy, and succession, and minors; adoption; wills    save as regards agricultural intestacy and succession;      land. joint family and partition; all matters in respect of which parties in judicial proceedings were immedia- tely before the commencement of this Consti- tution subject to their personal law. ENTRY 6:                       ENTRY 8: Transfer of property other     Transfer of property other than agricultural land;        than agricultural land; regis- registration of deeds and      tration of deeds and documents.                     documents. ENTRY 7:                       ENTRY 10:

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Contracts, including part      Contracts, including partnership, ship, agency, contracts of     agency, contracts of carriage, carriage, and other special    and other special forms of forms of contracts, but not    contracts,but not including including contracts relating   contracts relating to agricultural land.          to agricultural land. 505      One thing  may be made clear at the outset. The present argument may  not have  been open  to the  appellants if the premises of  the bank could be said to be premises belonging to the  Union Government.  In that  case, the legislation to the extent  it governs  such premises  can be  said to  fall under entry  32 of  List I  as one covering the "property of the union". Though, the premises being situated in Calcutta, any legislation  under that entry in regard thereto would be subject to State legislation, the State legislation can only govern "save  in so  far  as  Parliament  by  law  otherwise provides". Parliament  having provided otherwise by the 1971 Act, that  Act will,  it can  be said, prevail over the 1956 and 1962  Acts. It is, however, common ground before us that though the Bank is a corporation wholly owned and controlled by the  Government, it has a distinct personality of its own and its  property cannot  be said  to be the property of the Union.  The   position,  indeed,   is  beyond  the  pale  of controversy after  the decisions  of this  Court  in  Bacha. F.Guzdarv. C.  r. T.,  [1955] 1  S.C.R. 876;  State  Trading Corporation of India Ltd. v. C.T.O.,[1964] 4 S.C.R. 99; A.P. State Road  Transport Corporation  v. I.T.O. [1964] 7 S.C.R. 17; Heavy  Engineering Mazdoor  Union  v.  State,  [1969]  3 S.C.R. 995;  Vidarbha Housing  Board v.  I. T.  O.,[1973] 92 I.T.R. 430  and Western  Coalfields  Ltd.  v.  Special  Area Development Authority,  [1982] 2 S.C.R. 1. It is, therefore, not possible for the respondents to support the legislation, qua the premises in question, under Entry 32 of List I.      Entry 32  of List  I being out of the way, Dr. Chitale, appearing on  behalf of  the appellants,  contends that  the legislation squarely  falls under  Entry- 18  of List II. He points out  that judicial  decisions  have  given  the  word ‘land’ in  Entry 18  a very  wide interpretation  so  as  to comprehend not  only  land  of  all  types-rural  or  urban, agricultural or  non-agricultural, vacant  or  built  up-but also  ‘buildings’   put  up   thereon.   Since   the   entry specifically  includes  the  relationship  of  landlord  and tenant, there  can be  no doubt  that  tenancy  legislations pertaining to land and buildings derive their authority from Entry 18. He referred in this context inter alia, to Manohar v. C.  Desai, AIR  1951 Nag  33; A.  C. Patel  v. Vishwanath Chadda, ILR  1954 Bom  434, Raman Doss v State, AIR 1954 ALL 707; Darukhanawala  v. Khemchand,  ILR  1954  Bom.  546;  M. Karuna  v.   State,  AIR   1955  Nag.   153;  Kevalchand  v. Dashrathlal,  I.L.R.   1956  Nag.   618;  Sukumar  Dutta  v. Gauriskanker,  [1964]   69  CWN   833;  Raval   &   Co.   v. Ramackandran,  AIR   1967  Mad.   57  and   a  detailed  and comprehensive judgment  of Parekh J. in Elliot Waud and Hill P. Ltd.  v. L.I.C.,  [1980]  Bom.  C.R.  590  Which  we  are informed is  pending consideration  on appeal, before a Full Bench of  the Bombay High Court. We do not, however, propose to discuss 506 these cases  at length  firstly, because there is a contrary line of  decisions also  vide Mangtulal  v. Radheshyam,  AIR 1953 Pat.  14; Milap Chand v. Dwarakadas, AIR 1954 Raj. 252; Nawal Mal  v. Nathu  Mal, AIR  1962 Raj 193, Rama Sundari v. Indu Bhushan, AIR 1967 Cal 355; L.S. Nair v. Hindustan Steel Ltd., AIR 1980 M.P. 106 and Bapalal & Co. v. Thakur Das, AIR

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1982 Mad.  309 and  the judgment  presently under appeal and secondly, because  a question  as to  the interpretation  of Entry 18  (or its  predecessor, Entry  21 of  the Provincial List under  the Government  of India Act, 1935, (hereinafter referred to as ’the 1935 Act’) had arisen before the Federal Court and  the Privy Council and some of the above judgments have also  been considered  in certain  earlier decisions of this Court.  It would, therefore, be appropriate to refer to these decisions:      (1) The  earliest of  the decisions  relevant  in  this context is  the decision  of the  Federal  Court  in  United Provinces v.  Atiga Begum,  [1940] F.C.R. 110. That case was concerned with  the interpretation of Entry 21 of List II in the Seventh  Schedule to  the Government of India Act, 1935. It raised  the issue of the validity of the United Provinces Regularisation of Remissions Act (14 of 1938). In view of an unprecedented fall  in the  prices of  agricultural produce, the United  Provinces Government directed a remission in the rents payable  by  tenants  to  their  landlords.  But  this remission was  declared by the High Court to be unauthorised and inoperative  as being in contravention of the provisions of the  Agra Tenancy  Act, 1926. The Provincial Legislature, therefore, passed  the  impugned  Act  which  precluded  any question as to the validity of the orders of remission being raised in  courts. This  Act was  held by  a Full  Bench  of Allahabad High  Court to be ultra vires the Legislature. The Provincial Government  appealed to  the Federal  Court.  The Federal Court held that the legislation was clearly governed by Entry 21. The learned Chief Justice observed:           "The subjects  dealt with in the three legislative           lists are  not  always  set  out  with  scientific           definition. It would be practically impossible for           example to define each item in the Provincial List           in such  a way  as to  make it  exclusive of every           other item  in that  List, and Parliament seems to           have  been   content   to   take   a   number   of           comprehensive categories  and to  describe each of           them by a word of broad and general import. In the           case of  some of  these categories  such as "Local           Government", "Education",  "Water",  "Agriculture"           and "Land",  the general  word  is  amplified  and           explained by a number of example or illustrations,           some of 507           which would probably on any construction have been           held to  fall under  the more  general word, while           the inclusion (of) others might not be so obvious.           Thus "Courts  of Wards" and ’treasure-trove’ might           not ordinarily  have  been  regarded  as  included           under the  head  "Land",  if  they  had  not  been           specifically mentioned  in item  no 21.  I  think,           however, that none of the items is to be read in a           narrow or  restricted sense  and that each general           word should  be held to extend to all ancillary or           subsidiary matters which can fairly and reasonably           be said  to be comprehended in it. I deprecate any           attempt to  enumerate in  advance all  the matters           which are  to be  included under  any of  the more           general descriptions;  it will  be sufficient  and           much wiser  to determine  each case as and when it           comes before this Court. " The Court  then proceeded  to hold  that, if  the Provincial Legislature could  legislate in  respect  of  collection  of rents, it must also have the power to legislate with respect to any  limitation on  the power  of a  landlord to  collect

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rents, that  is to  say, with  respect to  the remission  of rents as well as to their collection.      (2) The  next decision, on certain observation in which Dr. Chitale  placed considerable  reliance is  that  of  the Privy Council  in Megh  Raj v. Allah Rakhia, AIR 1947 PC 72. In that case the question was whether the Punjab Restitution of Mortgaged  Lands Act,  an Act  of the Punjab Legislature, was void as being ultra vires of the Punjab Legislature. The Act applied  to mortgagees  in possession  of certain lands. The expression  ’land’ was  defined as  "land which  is  not occupied as  the site  of any  building in a town or village and is  occupied or  let for  agricultural purposes  or  for purposes subservient  to agriculture  or  for  pasture"  and included, inter  alia, "the  sites of  buildings  and  other structures on  such lands."  The object  of the impugned Act was the  relief of  mortgagors by giving them restitution of the mortgaged  premises on  conditions more  favourable than those under  the  mortgage  deed  and  by  providing  for  a procedure before  the Collector  which was more summary than that before  the ordinary  Courts. The contention before the Privy Council,  on behalf  of the  Punjab Province, was that the provisions of the impugned Act were traceable to item 21 supplemented, it  need be,  by  item  2  of  the  Provincial Legislative List  of the  1935 Act.  The appellants,  on the other hand,  contended that the impugned Act went beyond the limits of  the Legislative powers of the Province under list II and could not be supported by invoking the 508 powers of  the Province under List III (i.e. Entries 4, 7, 8 and 10  corresponding to  Entries 13, 5, 6 and 7 of List III under the  Constitution). It  was pointed  out that  certain provisions  of  the  impugned  Act  were  repugnant  to  the provisions of  the Indian Contract Act and the Code of Civil Procedure. The  Judicial Committee  came to  the  conclusion that the legislation was clearly covered by Entry 21 in List III. In so holding, they observed:           "The key  to item 21 is to be found in the opening           word "land".  That word is sufficient in itself to           include every  form of  land, whether agricultural           or not.  Land indeed  is  primarily  a  matter  of           provincial concern.  The land in each Province may           have its  special characteristics in view of which           it is  necessary to legislate, and there are local           customs and  traditions in  regard to land holding           and particular  problems of  provincial  or  local           concern which require provincial consideration. It           would be strange if the land in a province were to           be broken  up into  separate portions  some within           and some  outside the  legislative powers  of  the           province. Such  a conflict  of jurisdiction is not           to be  expected. Item 21 is part of a constitution           and would on ordinary principles receive the idest           construction, unless  for some  reason, it  is cut           down either  by the  terms of Item 21 itself or by           other parts  of the  constitution which  has to be           read as  a  whole.  As  to  Item  21  "land",  the           governing word  is followed  by the  rest  of  the           item, which  goes on  to say,  "that is  to  say".           These words  introduce the  most general  concept-           "rights in  or over  land." "Rights  in land" must           include general  rights  like  full  ownership  or           leasehold or  all such  rights. "Rights over land"           would  include   easements  or   other  collateral           rights, whatever form they might take. Then follow           words which  are not  words of  limitation but  of

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         explanation  or   illustration,  giving  instances           which may  furnish a  clue for particular matters;           thus there are the words "relation of landlord and           tenant and  collection of  rents." These words are           appropriate to  lands which  are not  agricultural           equally with  agricultural  lands.  Rent  is  that           which issues  from the  land. Then  the  next  two           sentences specifically refer to agricultural land,           and are  to be  read with item 7, 8 and 10 of List           3.  These   deal  with   methods  of  transfer  or           alienation or  devolution which  may be subject to           federal legislation  but do  not concern  the land           itself, a  sphere  in  which  the  provincial  and           federal powers are con- 509           current, subject  to the  express exception of the           specific  head   of  agricultural  land  which  is           expressly reserved to the provinces. The remainder           of Item  21 specifies important matters of special           consequence  in   India  relating   to  land.  The           particular   and    limited    specification    of           agricultural land  proves that  "land" is not used           in  Item   21   with   restricted   reference   to           agricultural land  but relates to land in general.           Item 2 is sufficient to give express powers to the           provinces to  create and  determine the powers and           jurisdiction of  Courts in  respect of  land, as a           matter ancillary to the subject of item 21.                It is next necessary to consider the terms of           the impugned  Act, which it is said is ultra vires           of the  Province, and  compare them with the terms           of the  constitution just  quoted. But before that           is done,  it may  be observed  that  there  is  no           express provision in the constitution referring by           name  to   mortgages,  though   mortgages  are  of           particular importance  in India  as a  subject  of           ordinary business  life and  of litigation  and of           legislation. But a constitution does not generally           deal with  particular  transactions  or  types  of           transactions, and  mortgages  of  land  would,  in           their  Lordships’   judgment,  as   a  matter   of           construction, properly  fall under  Item 21  in so           far as  they are  mortgages  of  land,  though  in           certain aspects  they include elements of transfer           of property  and of contract. But they form a type           of transaction  which may  properly be regarded as           sui  generis,  incidental  to  land  and  included           within Item  21 except  in so  far  as  they  fall           within Items  8 and  10  of  List  3  which  again           contain  an  express  exception  in  the  case  of           agricultural land.  Their Lordships  cannot accept           the view  that so important a subject as mortgages           was left  out of  the Constitution and merely left           to the  Governor General’s  powers under  s.  104,           Constitution Act  as a residual subject. So far as           land at  least is concerned, Item 21 would include           mortgages as an incidental and ancillary subject.           The impugned  Act, as  already explained,  has the           main purpose  of giving  relief to  mortgagors  by           enabling  them   to  obtain   restitution  of  the           mortgaged lands  on terms  less onerous  than  the           mortgage deeds  require. It is limited to existing           mortgages of  land as  defined in  s. 3,  effected           prior to 8.6.1901. That definition restricts it to           land "occupied or

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510           let for  agricultural  purposes  or  for  purposes           subservient to  agriculture or  for pasture".  The           addition of  the word "pasture" has been relied on           as  extending   the  scope   of  the   Act  beyond           agriculture,  but   pasture  is  certainly  "land"           within Item  21  or  Item  3.  It  may  have  been           mentioned ex  abundanti cautela but in any case it           is sufficiently allied to agriculture generally to           be treated as a species of agricultural land or at           least  as   land  occupied  or  let  for  purposes           subservient to  agriculture and as such within the           general scope  of an Act dealing with agricultural           land. Section 3 of the Act goes on, it is true, to           give a  number of specific types of land which are           included,  but   they  are  all  governed  by  the           controlling words  of sub.s.(1)  which limits  the           whole  Act  to  agricultural  land  in  the  sense           already stated.  Thus head  (b) of sub s (1) of s.           3, must  be read  as referring  to  an  estate  or           holding in  the only  class of land with which the           Act deals. The same is true of all the other heads           in the  sub-section,  dues,  rent,  water  rights,           occupancy, trees,  all come within the category of           rights in  or over land within Item 21 List 3, and           all are governed by the same controlling reference           to  agriculture  or  agricultural  purposes.  This           reading  of   the  section  is  supported  by  the           qualification of  trees as  trees standing on such           land, that  is agricultural  land. Section 7 and 8           of the  impugned Act  embody its  main substantive           provisions for  the refief  of mortgagors and need           not be  repeated here.  The rest  of the Act deals           with ancillary  matters like  procedure which fall           within the powers given by Item 2 and also by Item           21.           If, as  their Lordships think, the impugned Act is           limited to  agricultural land,  items, 7, 8 and 10           of List  III do  not affect  the position  at  all           since  agricultural  land  is  excluded  in  these           entries. But,  in any event, the Act does not deal           with wills or transfer of property at all; it does           certainly  deal   with  mortgages  but,  as  their           Lordships have already stated, mortgage though not           expressly  mentioned   in  the  Constitution,  are           properly to  be classed  not  under  the  head  of           contracts, but  as special  transactions ancillary           to the entry of "land"      (3) The  next decision  of  this  court  to  which  our attention is drawn is the decision of this court in Atma Ram v. State  of Punjab, [1959] (Suppl. 1) SCR 748. The poini in controversy in this decision 511 was the  constitutional validity  of the  Punjab Security of Land Tenures  Act (10 of 1953) as amended by Act 11 of 1955, which sought  to provide for the security of land tenure and other incidental  matters. The impugned Act admittedly dealt with holdings as defined in the Punjab Revenue Act, 1887. It limited the area which might be held by a land owner for the purpose of  self cultivation and released surplus area to be utilised  for   resettling  ejected   tenants.  Section   18 conferred upon  tenants the  right to purchase from the land owners the  lands held by them and thus themselves to become the land  owners at  prices which  would be below the market value.  The   land  owners  affected  by  the  impugned  Act

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contended that  under Entry  18 of  List II  of the  Seventh Schedule to  the  Constitution  the  State  Legislature  was incompetent to enact a law limiting the extent of land to be held by a land owner and that the provisions of the impugned Act contravened their fundamental rights. On the question of the legislative  competence the  Court  made  the  following observations:           "At the  outset, it  is necessary to deal with the           question  of  legislative  competence,  which  was           raised on  behalf  of  some  of  the  petitioners,           though not on behalf of all of them. This argument           of want of legislative competence goes to the root           of the impugned Act, and if it is well-founded, no           other question  need be  gone into.  It  has  been           argued that  Entry 18  of List  II of  the Seventh           Schedule to  the Constitution,  should not be read           as authorising  the State  Legislature to  enact a           law limiting  the extent of the land to be held by           a proprietor  or a landowner. Entry 18 is in these           words:"                " 18. Land, that is to say, rights in or over                land, land  tenures including the relation of                landlord and  tenant, and  the collection  of                rents;    transfer    and    alienation    of                agricultural  land;   land  improvement   and                agricultural loans; colonization."           "It will be noticed that the Entry read along with           Art.  246(3)   of  the  Constitution,  has  vested           exclusive power  in the  State to  make laws  with           respect to  "rights in  or over land, land tenures           including the  relation of  landlord and tenant ..           ". The  provisions of  the Act set out above, deal           with the  landlord’s rights in land in relation to           his tenant,  so as to modify the landlord’s rights           in the  land, and  correspondingly, to  expand the           tenant’s rights  therein. Each  of the expressions           "rights in or over land" and "land 512           tenures",  is  comprehensive  enough  to  take  in           measures of  reforms of land tenures, limiting the           extent of  land in  cultivating possession  of the           land-owner, and  thus, releasing  larger areas  of           land to  be  made  available  for  cultivation  by           tenants.           Counsel for some of the petitioners who challenged           the   legislative    competence   of   the   state           Legislature, were  hard put to it to enunciate any           easily appreciable grounds of attack against Entry           18 in  List II  of the  Seventh Schedule.  It  was           baldly argued  that Entry  18  aforesaid  was  not           intended to  authorise legislation  which had  the           effect of  limiting the  areas of land which could           be directly  held by a proprietor or a land-owner.           It is  difficult to  see why  the amplitude of the           words "rights  in or over land" should be cut down           in the way suggested in this argument." In support  of its  conclusion, the  Court referred  to  the decisions United  Provinces v.  Mst. Atiqa Begum, [1940] FCR 110 and Megh Raj v. Allah Rakhia, AIR 1947 PC 72.      4. We  may next  refer  to  the  decision  in  Manaklal Chhotalal v.  M.G. Makwana  & Ors.  [1967]  3  SCR  65.  The question here  arose in  the  context  of  the  Bombay  Town Planning Act.  A scheme  drafted by  the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation after  following the  procedure prescribed under the Act  was sanctioned by the State Government. As a result

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of this  the petitioners were allotted a much smaller extent of land  than they  originally  owned  within  the  city  of Ahmedabad and they were also directed to pay certain sums as their share  of contribution. The petitioners challenged the competence of the State Legislature to enact the legislation in question.  The Court  upheld the legislation by reference to Entry  18 of  List II  as well  as Entry  20 of  List III ("Economic and  Social planning").  Reviewing the provisions of the  Act in  question, the  Court came  to the conclusion that the  legislation in  question could  be said  to  be  a legislation in regard to land. Various aspects dealt with in the Act, according to the Court, could be considered to deal with  land   and  accordingly,   competence  of   the  State Legislature to  enact the measure in question could be found in Entry 18.      5. Indu  Bhusan Bose v. Rama Sundari Devi, [1970] 1 SCR 443 is  a decision  of five  Judges of  this Court  and  was rendered on  an appeal from the Calcutta case cited earlier. The question for consideration 513 was whether the act of a rent controller in fixing fair rent for  certain   premises  within   the  cantonment   area  of Barrackpore was valid. The claim of the respondent-owner was that the  appellant was  not entitled  to the  protection of 1956 Act  since "regulation of house accommodation including the control  of rents"  in cantonment  areas was the subject matter of  Entry 3  of the  federal list under the 1935 Act. The State  legislature, it  was therefore  argued, could not competently extend  the 1956  Act (applicable in other parts of the State) to the cantonment areas. This plea was upheld. However, one  of the  contention raised  on  behalf  of  the appellants was that the power of Parliament under Entry 3 of List I  does  not  extend  to  regulating  the  relationship between landlord and tenant as that power vests in the State Legislature either under Entry 18 of List II or Entries Nos. 6, 7  and 13  of List  III. In  support of  this  contention reliance was  placed on  a decision of the Bombay High Court in A.C.  Patel v.  Vishwanath Chada,  ILR 1954  Bombay  434, referred to earlier. In that case, the Bombay High Court was concerned  with   the  applicability   of  the  Bombay  Rent Restriction Act  (No. 57)  of 1947  to contonment areas. The Court first expressed the opinion that Act was referrable to Entry 21  of the  List II  of the 1935 Act. Relying upon the English Interpretation  Act applicable to interpret the 1935 Act, the Court held that the word ’land’ in that entry would include buildings  also so  as to confer jurisdiction on the Provincial Legislature  to legislate  on  relations  between landords and  tenants of buildings. Then the Court expressed the view  that the  legislation could  not be said to be one dealing with  house accommodation.  The Supreme  Court  was, however, clear  that the  legislation  was  covered  by  the language of  Entry 2  of the Federal List. However, appropos the first  aspect of  the High Court’s decision, the Supreme Court observed:           "We have felt considerable doubt whether the power           of legislating  on relationship  between  landlord           and tenant  in respect  of house  accommodation or           buildings would  appropriately fall in Entry 21 of           List II  of the Seventh Schedule to the Government           of India Act, 1935, or in the corresponding Entry.           18 of  List II  of the  Seventh  Schedule  to  the           Constitution. These  Entries permit legislation in           respect of  land and explain the scope by equating           it with  rights in  or  over  land,  land  tenures           including the relation of landlord and tenant, and

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         the collection  of rents.  It is  to be noted that           the relation  of landlord  and tenant is mentioned           as  being   included  in   land  tenures  and  the           expression  "land   tenures"  would  not,  in  our           opinion, appropriately  cover tenancy of buildings           or of house accommodation. That expression is 514           Only used  with reference  to relationship between           landlord and tenant in respect of vacant lands. In           fact,.  leases  in  respect  of  non  agricultural           property  are   dealt  with  in  the  Transfer  of           Property Act  and would  much  more  appropriately           fall within  the scope  of Entry  8 of List III in           the Seventh  Schedule to  the Government  of India           Act read  with Entry 10 in the same List or within           the scope.  Entry 6  of List  III in  the  Seventh           Schedule to  the Constitution read with Entry 7 in           the same  list leases  and all  rights governed by           leases, including  the termination  of leases  and           eviction from property leased, would be covered by           the field  of transfer  of property  and contracts           relating thereto. However, it is not necessary for           us to express any definite opinion in this case on           this  point   because  of   our  view   that   the           relationship of  landlord and tenant in respect of           house accommodation  situated in  cantonment areas           is clearly  covered by  the Entries  in List I. In           the Constitution,  the effect of Entry 3 of List I           is that  Parliament has  exclusive power  to  make           laws in  respect of  the matters contained in that           Entry, notwithstanding  the fact  that  a  similar           power may also be found in any Entry in List II or           List III.  Article 246 of the Constitution confers           exclusive power  on Parliament  to make  laws with           respect to  any of  the matters enumerated in List           I,  notwithstanding   the  concurrent   power   of           Parliament, and  the  State  Legislature,  or  the           exclusive power  of the State Legislature in Lists           III and  II respectively.  The  general  power  of           legislating in  respect  of  relationship  between           landlord  and  tenant  exercisable  by  the  State           Legislature either  under Entry  18 of  List 11 or           Entries 6  and 7  of List  111 is  subject to  the           overriding  power  of  Parliament  in  respect  of           matters in  List I,  so that the effect of Entry 3           of List  I is that, on the subject of relationship           between landlord  and tenant  insofar as it arises           in respect  of  house  accommodation  situated  in           cantonment areas,  Parliament alone  can legislate           and not  the State  Legislature .. In the view, we           are unable  to affirm  the view of the Bombay High           Court in  A. Patel’s  case, which  is based on the           interpretation that  Entry ’  in  List  I  of  the           Seventh Schedule  to the  Government to  India Act           only permitted  laws to be made for requisitioning           of property,  acquiring of property and allocation           of property only." The  Court  then  proceeded  to  consider  the  decision  in Darukhanawala 515 v Khemchand,  ILR 1954  Bom 544;  Kewalchand v. Dashrathlal, ILR 1956  Nag. 618; Babu Jagtanand Sri Satyanarayanji ILR 40 Patna at 625 and expressed the view that all these cases had placed a narrow interpretation on the expression "regulation of house  accommodation" used  in the  relevant entry of the

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Union List. Having said this, the Court concluded:           "On the  other hand,  the Rajasthan  High Court in           Nawal Mal v. Nathu Lal, ILR II Rajasthan 421; held           that  the   power  of  the  State  Legislature  to           legislate in  respect of  landlord and  tenant  of           buildings is  to be  found in Entries, 6, 7 and 13           of  List  lll  of  the  Seventh  Schedule  to  the           Constitution and  not in  Entry 18 of List ll, and           that power  was  circumscribed  by  the  exclusive           power of  Parliament to  legis- late  on the  same           subject under  Entry 3 of List I. That is also the           view which  the Calcutta  High Court  has taken in           the judgment  in appeal  before us.  We think that           the decision  given by  the Calcutta High Court is           correct and must be upheld."      (6) Dr.  Chitale also  placed considerable  reliance on Union of  India v.  Valluri B.  Chaudhary, [1979]  3 SCR 802 which dealt  with the  validity of the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act,  1976. Counsel for the appellant relied, in particular, upon  the procedure  adopted  by  Parliament  in enacting this  piece of  legislation.  The  legislatures  of eleven States  considered it  desirable to  have  a  uniform legislation enacted  by Parliament  for the  imposition of a ceiling on  urban property  for the country as a whole. They passed resolutions  under Art.  252(1) of  the  Constitution authorising  Parliament   to  legislate   on   this   topic. Parliament, accordingly, enacted the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act,  1976.  In  the  first  instance,  the  Act covered  the  eleven  States  which  had  passed  the  above resolutions. Subsequently, the Act was adopted by resolution passed by  the legislatures  of six more States. The primary object and  purpose of  the Act  was  the  imposition  of  a ceiling  on  vacant  land  in  ’urban  agglomerations’,  the acquisition by  the Government of such land in excess of the prescribed  ceiling,   the  regulation  of  construction  of buildings on  such land and matters connected therewith. All this was  done with  a view  to prevent the concentration of urban land in the hands of a few persons and speculation and profiteering therein,  and with  a view  to bring  about  an equitable distribution  of land  in urban  agglomeration  to subserve the  common good  in furtherance  of the  Directive Principles  enunciated   in  Art.   39(b)  and  (c)  of  the Constitution. The controversy before the Court 516 turned mainly on the construction of Articles 251 and 252 of the Constitution  and certain allied questions. Dr. Chitale, however, laid  em phasis  on three important aspects of this legislation and  decision. The first was the language of the resolutions passed  by the  States in  this  context,  which appear to  have been  on the  same lines and one of which is set out  in  the  judgment.  They  contained  the  following paragraphs:           "Whereas this Assembly considers that there should           be a ceiling on Urban Immovable Property           And whereas  the imposition  of such a ceiling and           acquisition of  urban immovable property in excess           of that  ceiling are matters With respect to which           Parliament has  no power to make law for the State           except as  provided in Articles 249 and 250 of the           Constitution of India"                                     (underlining added) The second  was the preamble to the legislation in question. After setting  out the  long title to the Act and the object and purpose  of the  legislation in terms already described, the preamble to the Act contains the following para:

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         "And whereas  Parliament has no power to make laws           for  the   State  with   respect  to  the  matters           aforesaid except  as provided  in Articles 249 and           250 of the Constitution." The third was the following passage from the judgment:           "We are afraid this contention cannot be accepted.           It is  not disputed  that the  subject  matter  of           Entry 18 List II of the Seventh Schedule i.e. land           covers ’land  and buildings’ and would, therefore,           necessarily include  vacant land.  The  expression           ’urban immovable  property’  may  mean  ’land  and           buildings’ or  ’buildings or  land’. It would take           in lands  of every  description i.e.  agricultural           land,  urban   land  or  any  other  kind  and  it           necessarily includes vacant lands."                                     (underlining added)      Stopping  here   for  a   brief  review  of  the  above decisions, it  will be  seen that  except for Indu Bhushan’s case which  will be  discussed later,  the other rulings are not helpful in deciding the issue before us. Atiqa Begum and Atma Ram concerned a legislation that clearly pertained to 517 land-in fact,  land  governed  by  systems  of  land  tenure prevalent in  the States  of Uttar  Pradesh and  Punjab.  In Allah Rakhia,  the impugned  Act was limited to agricultural land and,  since the  items in  the concurrent list excluded such land,  was  covered  by  Entry  21.  In  Maneklal,  the legislation   primarily    concerned   land,    though   not agricultural land,  for, as  observed  in  State  v.  Peter, [1980] 3  SCR 290  at p.  292, "land  is at  the base of all development". It is not quite certain that the provisions of the Act also affected buildings, but if indeed any buildings were affected,  that was  only incidental. As pointed out by the Court,  the primary  target of  the legislation was only urban land,  the ways  and means of developing it and proper utilisation of  land situate  within the  municipal  limits. These decisions  no doubt  establish two  propositions: ( 1) The opening  word ’land’  in entry  18 is  not restricted to agricultural land as are the latter portions of it. It would cover all types of land-rural or urban, agricultural or non- agricultural, vacant  fallows or  pastures.  (2)  The  words which follow  ’land’ only make it clear that the legislative entry takes  in not  merely the  tangible immovable property one normally  describes  as  land  but  also  all  kinds  of intangible rights  or interests,  in or  over, land  in  the broad sense  explained above.  The phrases  which follow the words "rights in or over land" in the entry are illustrative and are  not restrictive.  They only  make it clear that the legislative entry takes in not merely the tangible immovable property one  describes  as  land  but  also  all  kinds  of intangible rights  or interests,  in or  over, land  in  the broad sense  explained above.  But  none  of  the  decisions contain any  support for  the further  proposition that  the legislative entry  should be  so  interpreted  as  to  cover houses and buildings as well as the relationship of landlord and tenant  in regard  thereto or  the collection  of  rents therefrom. We are unable to agree with Dr. Chitale that this further proposition  emerges from  the decision  in Union of India v.  Valluri B.  Chaudhary, [1979] 3 SCR 802. The Urban Land Ceiling  Act also  was a legislation primarily intended to deal  with vacant  lands. If  one scans the provisions of the Act  it is  clear that  the theme of the Act was only to place a  ceiling on  vacant lands  in cities or what we call urban agglomerations and to ensure equitable distribution of such urban  vacant lands.  The pith  and  substance  of  the

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legislation was with regard to urban land and its provisions in  respect   of  buildings  were  incidental  to  the  main objective of  the urban land ceiling. In this context, it is perhaps  not   without  significance  that  as  against  the proposal of  the States  for a  ceiling on ’urban immovable. property’ Parliament  restricted the  legislation to  vacant land. In the light of these circumstances the declaration in the preamble  to the  Act is basically correct that the pith and substance  of the  legislation was  ’land’ and  this  is exclusively within the State’s legislative domain by 518 virtue of Entry 18 of List II. We do not also agree with the counsel  that   the  passage  extracted  from  the  judgment reflects a  decision of  the Court that land includes ’lands and buildings’.  It proceeds on a concession to that effect. That apart,  the context  of the  above observation  is also interesting. The  Court was  dealing with  a contention that the resolution  of the  States had  authorised Parliament to impose a  ceiling on  urban immovable  property and that the legislation imposing  a ceiling  on  urban  land  was  on  a different subject  and thus  contrary to the resolution. The Court, rejecting  this  argument,  pointed  out  that  since ’urban immovable property’ was a wider expression which also included ’land’,  there was  no  contradiction  between  the resolution and the legislation. It is in this context that a reference, on  admission, regarding  the scope  of Entry  18 finds a  place in  the passage. Neither was the scope of the entry in issue in the case nor can the isolated sentence, on admission, be treated as a decision by the court.      We now  come to  Indu Bhushan’s case. While the counsel for the  respondents would  have it  that  this  ruling  has concluded the  present issue  in their  favour, Dr.  Chitale contends that  this is  not so. He points out that the court has been careful to say that "it is not expressing any final opinion" regarding  Entry 21.  It  has,  at  another  place, referred to the framing of house tenancy legislation "either under Entry  18 of  List II  or Entries  6, 7 and 13 of List III" which also indicates that the Court had not made up its mind as  to whether this type of legislation will fall under List II  or List  III. It is submitted also that an analysis of the Calcutta and Rajasthan decisions approved by it would show that  they had not at all been considering any conflict between entries  in Lists II and III and were concerned only with the interpretation of Entry 2 in List I and Entry 21 of List II.  Dr. Chitale,  therefore, urges  that Indu  Bhushan cannot be taken as a decision that house tenancy legislation cannot come under Entry 18 of List II.      We are not, however, persuaded that Indu Bhushan’s case is capable  of being  brushed aside  so easily.  It is  true that, ultimately,  the decision  in that  case turned on the wider interpretation  of Entry  2 of  List I favoured by the Supreme Court in preference to the narrower one preferred by Bombay.  Nevertheless   the  judgment  contains  a  specific discussion of  the terms  of Entry  21. This  is because the Bombay High  Court had  first discussed  the terms  of  this entry and  expressed an  opinion thereon.  The Supreme Court considered the  High Court’s interpretation of the entry and disagreed therewith.  The view  of the  Supreme Court on the entry has been set out in some detail and cannot be ignored. Not only  this, in  the last  para of its judgment the Court has 519 reaffirmed the  earlier discussion  and  interpretation.  We have extracted earlier this concluding para of the judgment. In our view the effect of this para cannot be explained away

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by trying to analyse the Calcutta and Rajasthan decisions to see what  they had  actually decided. The important thing is how the  Supreme Court  understood what  the two High Courts had decided.  This is  set out  in the  two sentences of the last paragraph  of the  judgment, which have been underlined in the  extract set  out earlier.  The  Supreme  Court  then specifically affirmed  this to be the correct ratio. We are, therefore, of the opinion that Indu Bhushan must be taken to have expressed  a view  that premises tenancy legislation in so far  as it  pertains to houses and buildings is referable not to  entry 18  of List  II but  to entries 6, 7 and 13 of List III.      As pointed  out by  the learned  Attorney General, Indu Bhushun has  been understood,  as above,  in the  subsequent decision of  the Supreme  Court in  Jaisingh Jairam Tyagi v. Maman Chand, [1980] 3 S.C.R. 224. The decision of the larger Bench of the Supreme Court in V. Dhanpal Chettiar v. Yesodai Ammal, [1980]  1 S.C.R.  334, also re-inforces the same line of thinking. The question for consideration in this case was whether, in  respect of  a tenancy  governed by  Tamil  Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, it was necessary for the landlord  to issue  a notice  under section  106 of  the Transfer of  Property Act  terminating the tenancy before he could obtain  an order  of eviction against the tenant. This question was  answered in the negative. In the course of its discussion the Supreme Court observed as follows:           "Under the Transfer of Property Act the subject of           "leases of  Immovable Property"  is dealt  with in           Chapter, V.  Section 105  defines the  lease,  the           lessor, the  lessee and  the  rent.  Purely  as  a           matter of  contract, a  lease comes into existence           under the  Transfer of  Property Act.  But in  all           social legislations  meant for  the protection  of           the needy,  not necessarily  the so-called  weaker           section  of   the  society   as  is  commonly  and           popularly called,  there is  appreciable inroad on           the freedom  of contract  and a  person becomes  a           tenant of  a landlord  even against  his wishes on           the allotment  of a  particular premises to him by           the authority  concerned. Under section 107 of the           Transfer of  Property Act  a  lease  of  immovable           property from  year  to  year,  or  for  any  term           exceeding one  year, or  reserving a  yearly rent,           can be  made only by a registered instrument. None           of the  State Rent  Acts has abrogated or affected           this provision. Section 520           108 deals  with  the  rights  and  liabilities  of           lessors and  lessees. Many  State Rent  Acts  have           brought about  consider able changes in the rights           and liabilities of a lessor and lessee, largely in           favour of  the latter,  although not  wholly.  The           topic  of   Transfer  of   Property   other   than           agricultural land  is covered  by Entry  6 of List           III in  the Seventh  Schedule to the Constitution.           The subject  being in  the Con  current List, many           State Rent  Acts have by necessary implication and           many of  them by  starting certain provisions with           non-obstante clause  have done  away with  the law           engrafted  in  section  108  of  the  Transfer  of           Property Act  except in regard to any matter which           is not  provided  for  in  the  State  Act  either           expressly or by necessary implication."      The above passage clearly proceeds on the view that the subject matter  of housing  accommodation falls  within  the

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purview of  the Concurrent  List. It would have strengthened the landlord’s contention in Dhanpal Chettiar’s case to urge that the  terms  of  the  house  control  legislation  being traceable to  List II and not to List III, the provisions of the Transfer  of Property  Act could  not affect the same at all. If  Indu Bhushan had been understood as having left the question open,  it is  difficult to imagine that, before the larger Bench of the Court, counsel would not have raised the issue again.  The discussion  and ratio  of Dhanpal Chettiar fall into  place only  on the  view that by that time it was taken as  settled law  that State House control legislations were referable  to the  legislative powers  conferred by the Concurrent List.      So  much   in  regard   to  precedents.   But,  leaving precedents aside,  let us  proceed to  consider the terms of the legislative  entry itself,  treating the observations in Indu Bhushan  as merely  of persuasive  value. We agree that entry 18  should be given as wide a constriction as possible consistent with  all the  other entries  in  all  the  three legislative lists.  The entry  deals with  four main topics: land, transfer  and alienation  of agricultural  land,  land improvement and  agricultural loans  and  colonisation.  The second and  third of  these clearly  pertain to agricultural land. Perhaps  the last  also  does,  because,  usually,  by colonisation  we   mean  conversion   into   buildings   and industrial sites  of what  was previously  agricultural land but, may be, it is wider and includes colonisation of vacant non-agricultural land  as well.  Any way,  as the  decisions have unanimously held there is no reason why the first topic viz. land  should be  narrowly  interpreted.  It  should  be understood as  including all  types of  land rural or urban, agricultural or  non-agricultural, arid,  cultivated, fallow or vacant. But, what is ’land’? This can 521 be gathered  from the other words of the entry which attempt a paraphrase.  They say in effect that legislation in regard to ’land’  will comprise  of legislation  in regard to three things, that is to say,      (i)  rights in or over land;      (ii)  land   tenures,  including  the  relationship  of           landlord and tenant; and      (iii)collection of rents.      In our  opinion, the true import of the word ’land’ can be gathered if we try to ascertain the proper interpretation and ambit  of these  three phrases,  particularly, the first two among them, in the context of other entries in the Union List. Doing  so, is  it possible  to interpret this entry as encompassing   within   its   terms   legislation   on   the relationship of  landlord and tenant in regard to houses and buildings?   That    is   the    question.   After   careful consideration, we  have  reached  the  conclusion  that  the answer to  this question  has to  be in  the negative  for a number of reasons:      1. As  pointed out  in Megh  Raj, there was good reason for placing  land’ in  the Provincial  List. Land  indeed is primarily a  matter for provincial concern. It is well known that land  in each Province had its special characteristics. There  were  local  customs  and  traditions  in  regard  to landholding and  particular problems  of local concern which required provincial consideration. There are no such special features that  require placing  buildings also  in the State list. The  problem of  scarcity of  house accommodation is a general feature all over the country thanks to India’s post- independent industrial  development involving large influxes of population  into towns, big and small, from the villages.

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Urban housing  problems are  almost the  same throughout the country despite minor differences here and there and uniform nationwide legislation  in regard  thereto, atleast  on same common aspects,  is also  a necessary  desideratum. In other words, the  subject is  appropriate  for  an  entry  in  the Concurrent List.  Such a  need for  a uniform legislation by the Centre  was felt  even in  respect of vacant urban land, (where  unlike  agricultural  land,  there  are  no  special features which  need varying  provincial treatment)  despite its being  on the  State List. It is all the more imperative in respect  of public premises, i.e., buildings belonging to the Union  or to  public sector corporations which have all- India operations.  It is,  therefore, only  appropriate that ’buildings’ should  be an item in the Concurrent Legislative List. 522      2. A  scrutiny of the Legislative lists would show that the Constitution  uses different  expressions  in  different places,  appropriate   to  the  context  and  these  entries indicate an awareness on the part of the Constitution of the distinction between  various kinds  of property. Entries 32, 87 and  88 of  List I  and Entry  6 of List III use the word ’property’, a word of the widest connotation, which takes in not merely  land, buildings  and other  immovable properties but also  all kinds  of rights and interests in tangible and intangible properties.  There are  Entries 35 and 49 of List II which  make specific  reference to ’lands and buildings’. The expression  ’land’ is  used, therefore,  obviously where reference to  land only  is intended. Even the width of this expression is  cut down  and reference  is confined  only to ’agricultural land’  as in  Entries 47  and 48 of List II, 6 and 7  of List III and even 18 of List II. In this scheme of the entries, it would be inappropriate to interpret the word ’land’ in Entry 18 as including buildings also.      3. The  Bombay case,  in interpreting  Entry 21  of the 1935 Act,  was bound  to take into account the terms of s. 3 of the (English) Interpretation Act, 1889 which specifically defined  ’land’   in  the  widest  sense  as  including  all ’messages,  tenements   and   hereditaments,   houses,   and buildings  of   any   tenure".   The   assistance   of   the Interpretation  Act  cannot  be  invoked  to  interpret  the entries in the Constitution.      4. The  entry in  question specifically  refers to  the relationship of  landlord and tenant but this is in the part of the  entry  which  reads:  "land  tenures  including  the relationship  of  landlord  and  tenant".  The  words  "land tenures", are  not followed  by  a  comma  in  some  of  the editions though  the 1935 Act and some of the other editions and text  books on the Constitution have a comma in between. But  this  makes  no  difference.  The  words  "tenant"  and "tenure"  have   a  common  derivation  and  the  expression ’tenure’ no  doubt comprehends within it the relationship of landlord and  tenant. But  this  had  to  be  specified  and clarified because  in India,  the expression "land tenures", as pointed  out in  Indu Bhushan,  has  acquired  a  special significance. It connotes various types of holdings of land, involving the  King or  the Government,  the  zamindar,  the inamdar and  various other  types of  holders, lessors, sub- lessors, lessees  and sub-lessees  under or through them and evolved at  various stages  of  Indian  history  by  various rulers, nawabs  and chieftains  Hindu, Muslim  and  British- differently in  different parts  of the  country. Sir  Baden Powell has  written a  vast treatise  on  such  law  systems prevalent in  India. The  Constitution in  S. 31A contains a clue that expression like "estate" and "land tenures" have a

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special  meaning   in  relation   to  land,   connoting  the relationship among 523 its owner, holder and other intermediary for the time being, be it  on tenancy  or otherwise  and the collection of rents therefrom.  Section   31A  also   describes  some  of  these relationships.   The    system   had   developed   so   many complications and  nuances that  a determined liquidation of all these  special types of relationships had to be achieved by special  provisions in the chapter on fundamental rights. Viewed  in  this  background,  the  words  "relationship  of landlord and  tenant and  the collection  of  rents"  cannot impart a wider meaning to the words "land" and "land tenure" used in the entry.      5. While,  on the  one the  hand, the words in Entry 18 have to  be given  the widest meaning possible, it has to be borne in  mind that the entries in the various lists have to be read together and construed in such a manner as to give a meaning and  content to all of them. We need hardly say that the Constitution  should be  so interpreted  as to reconcile all   concerned   and   relevant   entries   (See:   Hoechst Pharmaceuticals v.  State,  [1983]  3  S.C.R.  130  and  the Dhillon case: 1972 2 S.C.R. 33. If we give the word "land" a meaning so  as to  include buildings and also give the words "rights in  or over  land" a  wide interpretation as we have to, in view of the discussion and ratio in Megh Raj v. Allah Rakhia, AIR  1947 P.C.  72 this  entry will be seen to cover almost all  kinds of  not only  transfer but also alienation and  devolution   of,  or  even  succession  to,  lands  and buildings. The  interpretation thus  placed will  affect not merely leases  and, therefore,  a small part of the contents of the  item regarding ’transfer of property’; it will apply equally to  sales, mortgages, charges and all other forms of transfer of all kinds of interests in land and buildings and this make  such a substantial inroad into the scope of Entry 6 in  the concurrent list as to denude it of all application except to  property other  than land and buildings. The word "property" used  in Entry  6 will  thus lose even its normal meaning not  to speak  of its being given the widest meaning possible appropriate  to a  legislative entry.  It will mean that though  transfer of  property-other  than  agricultural land-is  in   the  Concurrent  List,  the  State  will  have exclusive power  to legislate  in respect of transfer of all property in  the nature  of land  and  buildings;  in  other words, for  the  words  "transfer  of  property  other  than agricultural land",  we will  be substituting  "transfer  of property other  than lands and buildings". It will mean that though wills,  intestacy and succession are in item 5 of the Concurrent List,  the State  can  legislate  exclusively  in respect  of   devolution  of   land  and  buildings  of  all description. It will render Entry 35 of List 11 a surplusage in so  far as  it refers to "lands and buildings". We do not think that  such an  interpretation should  be favoured. The more harmonious interpretation would be that any sub- 524 ject  matter  that  involves  the  element  of  transfer  or alienation of any property (other than agricultural land) or of devolution  (on testamentary  or intestate succession) of any property  or contract  (other than  one in  relation  to agricultural land)  will fall in the Concurrent List and not in the  State List  even though  it may  relate to  land  or buildings.      6. Another  feature of  the entries  in the  Lists also lends support  to our view. Reference has been made to Entry 3 of  List I by which, inter alia, Parliament has been given

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exclusive power  to enact lease and rent control legislation in cantonment areas. Entry 5 of List II is the corresponding entry regarding  local self  government in  areas of  States excluding cantonment  areas. Had  it been  the intention  to confer legislative  power on the State Legislature in regard to housing and rent control accommodation in the States, one would have  expected a  repetition in Entry 5 of List Il or, at least,  in entry 18 of List II of the words of entry 3 of List I.  We do  not think that the omission of those crucial words  in   Entry  S   or  18  can  be  attributed  to  more inadvertance.      7. We  have earlier referred to Dr. Chitale’s reference to the  Urban Land Ceiling Act, 1971 and pointed out how the preamble   to   the   Act   does   not   support   counsel’s interpretation of  Entry 18.  We may point out, on the other hand, that  quite a  few (though not all) State Legislations on house and rent control (including the 1956 Act) have been enacted  after   obtaining  the   President’s  assent.  This indicates a  legislative recognition  that such  legislation stems from the Concurrent List and not the State List.      8. The  learned Attorney  General sought to derive some support for his contention also from the wording of Entry 32 of List  I which  deals with the ’property of the Union’, an expression wide  enough to comprehend all kinds of property, essentially lands and buildings. It does three things at the same time:      (a) it enables Parliament to legislate exclusively with      respect to all property belonging to the Union;      (b) it,  however, subjects  such power,  in so  far  as      property situated  within the territory of any State is      concerned, to  any legislation  of the  State in regard      thereto;      (c) it  nevertheless authorises  Parliament to  provide      otherwise by law. 525 This language  is somewhat  analogous  to  that  of  article 254(2) and  is consistent  with a  special provision  for an item, which,  otherwise, would  primarily be  covered by the Concurrent  List   on  which   both  Parliament   and  State Legislature can  legislate. It  may be  usefully  contrasted with Entries  like Nos.  23 and  24 of  List  ll  where  the language  of   the   entry   clearly   grants   primacy   to Parliamentary legislation  in regard  to a part of the field occupied by  an entry in the State List. There is some force in this  contention which,  effectively, is that if land and buildings were  so clearly  covered by  Entry 18 of List II, either the  wording of entry 32 would have been made subject to List  Il of Entry 18, in this regard, like nos. 23 and 24 would have been made subject to List 1.      9. It  is also a relevant consideration that, while the interpretation suggested  by  appellants  completely  denies power to Parliament to legislate on the subject matter under consideration, the  interpretation preferred  by us does not exclude the  States’ power  to legislate with respect to the topic. It  recognises a  concurrent power  in Parliament and State Legislatures.      For the reasons discussed above, we are of opinion that all the  legislations coming  up for  consideration  in  the present case are referable to entries in the Concurrent List and the  topic of  legislation is  not referable to Entry 18 List II.  The provisions  of the 1971 Act, in so far as they are made  applicable to  the premises of the respondent bank are, therefore, intra vires and valid.      Once it  is held  that the  1971  Act  is  intra  vires Parliament, no  further issue between the parties would seem

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to survive for consideration for, as we have already pointed out, no  other contention  was raised  before  the  Division Bench of  the High Court. However, there was some discussion before us as to whether the provisions of the 1971 Act, even if intra  vires, would prevail against the provisions of the State legislations. In this context, Dr. Chitale invited our attention to Jain Ink Manufacturing Co. v. LIC, [1981] 1 SCR 498 where  this Court  held that  the provisions of the 1971 Act will  prevail against  the provisions  of the Delhi Rent Control Act,  1956 and  the Delhi  Slum Areas (Improvement & Clearance) Act, 1956 on the grounds that it was both a later Act and a special Act. He submitted that the decision in the case is  the subject  matter of  reference to a larger Bench and that  we should,  therefore, defer  our decision  in the present case to await the result of the reference. We do not think this  is called for. In our opinion, that decision has no reference to the issues before us. In that 526 case,  all   the  three   legislations  were   Parliamentary legislations  (Delhi   being  a  Union  Territory)  and  the question was  regarding the inter-se overlap among the three Acts touching  upon the same subject matter viz. eviction of a tenant by a landlord. Here the legislations which are said to occupy this, same field are one of Parliament of 1971 and two of the State of West Bengal of 1956 and 1962, all passed in exercise  of the powers conferred with respect to matters contained in  the  Concurrent  List.  The  resolution  of  a conflict, if  any, between  the two will have to be in terms of Article 254 of the Constitution. This article reads:           Inconsistency between  laws made by Parliament and           laws made by the Legislatures of States-           (1)  If  any  provision  of  a  law  made  by  the           Legislature  of   a  State  is  repugnant  to  any           provision  of  a  law  made  by  Parliament  which           Parliament  is  competent  to  enact,  or  to  any           provision of  an existing  law with respect to one           of the  matters enumerated in the Concurrent List,           then, subject to the provisions of clause (2), the           law made  by Parliament,  whether passed before or           after the  law made  by the  Legislature  of  such           State, or,  as the  case may be, the existing law,           shall prevail  and the law made by the Legislature           of  the   State  shall,   to  the  extent  of  the           repugnancy, be void.           (2) Where a law made by the Legislature of a State           with respect  to one  of the matters enumerated in           the  Concurrent   List  contains   any  provisions           repugnant to the provisions of an earlier law made           by Parliament  or an  existing law with respect to           that  matter,   then,  the  law  so  made  by  the           Legislature of  such State  shall, if  it has been           reserved for  the consideration  of the  President           and has  received his  assent,.  prevail  in  that           State:           Provided that nothing in this clause shall prevent           Parliament from  enacting at any time any law with           respect to  the same matter including a law adding           to, amending, varying or repealing the law so made           by the Legislature of the State.      It will  be convenient,  before applying the provisions of the article to the facts of the present case, to refer to the elucidation  of the scope of its provisions by decisions of this Court. In Zaverbhai Amaidas v. State, [1955] SCR 799 the question whether a provision in Central Act 527

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XXIV if 1946 as amended by the Act LII of 1950 would prevail against a  provision in  Bombay  Act  XXXVI  of  1947.  Both legislations were  referable to  the Concurrent List and the State law  had been passed after obtaining the assent of the Governor General. Referring to Art. 254(2), the Court said:           "This is,  in substance, a reproduction of section           107(2)  of   the  Government  of  India  Act,  the           concluding portion thereof being incorporated in a           proviso with  further  additions.  Discussing  the           nature of  the power  of the Dominion Legislature,           Canada, in  relation to  that  of  the  Provincial           Legislature, in  a situation similar to that under           section 107(2)  of the Government of India Act, it           was observed  by Lord  Watson in  Attorney General           for Outario  v. Attorney General for the Dominion,           (1896) A.C.  348. that though a law enacted by the           Parliament of  Canada and  within competence would           over ride Provincial legislation covering the same           field, the  Dominion Parliament  had no  authority           conferred upon  it under the Constitution to enact           a  statute   repealing  directly   any  Provincial           statute.  That  would  appear  to  have  been  the           position under section 107(2) of the Government of           India Act with reference to the subjects mentioned           in the  Concurrent List.  Now by  the  proviso  to           Article 254  (2) the Constitution has enlarged the           powers of  Parliament.  and  under  that  proviso,           Parliament can  do what  the  Central  Legislature           could not  under section  107(2) of the Government           of India  Act and enact a law adding to, amending,           varying or  repealing a  law of the State, when it           relates to  a matter  mentioned in  the Concurrent           List.  The   position  then   is  that  under  the           Constitution  Parliament  can,  acting  under  the           proviso to article 254(2), repeal a State law. But           where it  does not expressly do so, even then, the           State law  will be  void under the provision if it           conflicts with  a later  "law with  respect to the           same matter" that may be enacted by Parliament." Later, the Court observed:           "It is  true, as  already pointed  out, that  on a           question under  article 254(  1) whether an Act of           Parliament prevails against a law of the State, no           question of  repeal arises;  but the  principle on           which the  rule of  implied repeal  rests, namely,           that  if   the   subject-matter   of   the   later           legislation is identical 528           with that of the earlier, so that they cannot both           stand together,  then the  earlier is  repealed by           the later enactment, will be equally applicable to           a  question   under  Article  254(2)  whether  the           further legislation by Parliament is in respect of           the same  matter as that of the State law. We must           accordingly hold  that section 2 of Bombay Act No.           XXXVI of  1947 cannot prevail as against Section 7           of the  Essential Supplies  (Temporary Powers) Act           No. XXIV  of 1946 as amended by the Act no. LII of           1950." It is  sufficient to cite certain observations from one more judgment on  this aspect:  Hoechst Pharmaceuticals v. State, [1983] 3  SCR 130  which had to consider an alleged conflict between a provision of a State sales tax law and a provision of an  order made  under the  Essential Commodities  Act  of Parliament. The case dealt with several points with which we

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are not  here concerned. Expatiating on the scope of Article 254, the Court observed:           "Art. 254  of  the  Constitution  makes  provision           first, as  to what  would happen  in the  case  of           conflict between  a Central  and  State  law  with           regard  to   the  subjects   enumerated   in   the           Concurrent List  and secondly,  for resolving such           conflict. Art.  254(1) enunciates  the normal rule           that in  the event  of a  conflict between a Union           and a  State law  in  the  concurrent  field,  the           former prevails over the latter. Cl. (1) lays down           that if  a State  law  relating  to  a  concurrent           subject is  ’repugnant’ to a Union law relating to           that subject,  whether the  Union law  is prior or           later in  time, the Union law will prevail and the           State law shall, to the extent of such repugnancy,           be void. To the general rule laid down in cl. (1),           cl. (2)  engrafts an  exception, viz.  that if the           President assents  to a  State law  which has been           reserved for  his consideration,  it will  prevail           notwithstanding its  repugnancy to  an earlier law           of the Union, both laws dealing with a con current           subject. In such a case, the Central Act will give           way to  the  State  Act  only  to  the  extent  of           inconsistency between  the two,  and no  more.  In           short, the  result of  obtaining the assent of the           President to  a State  Act which  is  inconsistent           with a  previous Union  law relating  to a  concur           rent subject  would be  that the  State  Act  will           prevail in  that State and override the provisions           of the  Central Act  in their applicability to the           State only.  The predominance of the State law may           however be taken away if Parliament legis- 529           lates under the Proviso to cl. (2). The proviso to           Art.  254(2)  empowers  the  Union  Parliament  to           repeal or  amend a  repugnant  State  law,  either           directly, or by itself enacting a law repugnant to           the State  law with  respect to the ’same matter’.           Even though  the subsequent law made by Parliament           does not  expressly repeal a State law, even then,           the State  law ill  become void  as  soon  as  the           subsequent law  of Parliament  creating repugnancy           is made.  A State  law would  be repugnant  to the           Union law  when there  is direct  conflict between           the two laws. Such repugnancy may also arise where           both laws  operate in  the same  field and the two           cannot possibly stand together."      The present  case is  clearly governed  by the  primary rule in  Article 254(1) under which the law of Parliament on a subject  in the  Concurrent List  prevails over  the State law. Art.  254(2) is  not attracted  because no provision of the State  Acts (which  were enacted  in 1956 and 1962) were repugnant to  the provisions of an earlier law of Parliament or existing  law. The  fact that  the 1956  Act was enacted, after  being   reserved  for   the  President’s  assent  is, therefore, immaterial.  Even if  the provisions  of the main part of Article 254(2) can be said to be somehow applicable, the  proviso,   read  with   Article  254(1)  reaffirms  the supermacy of any subsequent legislation of Parliament on the same matter even though such subsequent legislation does not in terms  amend, vary  or repeal  any provision of the State Legislation. The provisions of the 1971 Act will, therefore, prevail against  those of  the State  Acts and  were rightly invoked in the present case by the respondent Rank.

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    Dr.   Chitale,    while   initially   formulating   his contentions, outlined  an argument that the provision in the 1971 Act  appointing one  of the  officers of the respondent bank as  the Estate  officers is violative of Article 14. We do not  see any  substance in  this contention.  In the very nature of  things, only  an  officer  or  appointee  of  the Government,  statutory   authority  or  Corporation  can  be thought of  for implementing the provisions of the Act. That apart, personal  bias cannot  necessarily be  attributed  to such officer  either in  favour of  the bank  or against any occupant who  is being  proceeded against, merely because he happens  to  be  such  officer.  Moreover,  as  pointed  out earlier, the  Act provides  for an  appeal to an independent judicial  officer   against  orders  passed  by  the  Estate officer. These provisions do not, therefore, suffer from any infirmity.  In   fact,  Dr.  Chitale  did  not  pursue  this objection seriously. 530      No other  contention was  urged. The appeal, therefore, fails and  is dismissed. We would, however, make no order as to costs  as it  is  the  existence  of  a  multiplicity  of statutory provisions  that enabled  the appellant to come to Court. S.L.                                Appeal dismissed. 531