09 February 2010
Supreme Court
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A PRAMEELA REDDY Vs KARNATAKA MANGAMMA

Bench: HARJIT SINGH BEDI,CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, , ,
Case number: C.A. No.-008866-008868 / 2003
Diary number: 19708 / 2003
Advocates: Vs GUNTUR PRABHAKAR


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    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.  8866-8868  OF 2003

 

A PRAMEELA REDDY ..... APPELLANT

VERSUS

KARNATAKA  MANGAMMA ..... RESPONDENT

O R D E R

1. This appeal by way of special leave is against  

the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the trial  

court and by the High Court in first appeal decreeing  

the  suit  filed  by  the  respondent.   The  matter  

originated  from  an  agreement  to  sell  dated  5th  

December, 1970 executed by the appellant, A.P. Reddy  

who  was  the  vendor  in  favour  of  the  respondent  

Karnataka Mangamma. 2. Three suits in all were filed  

interse the parties; two by the appellant herein, one  

OS No. 187/1990 for perpetual injunction, a second OS  

No. 648/1985 filed by the respondent Karnataka Mangamma  

for specific performance of the agreement to sell dated  

5th December, 1970 and the third OS No. 108//88 by the

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appellant for eviction of the respondent.  The  trial  

court framed the following issues:

“OS No. 648/1985

(1) Whether  the  agreement  of  

sale dated 05.12.1970 is true, valid and  

binding on the defendant?

(2) Whether  the  plaintiff  is  

entitled to the specific performance as  

prayed for?

(3) To what relief?

OS No. 187 of 1990

(1) Whether  the  plaintiff  is  

entitled  to  perpetual  injunction  as  

prayed for?

(2) To what relief?

OS No. 108 of 1988:

(1) Whether the defendant is in  

permissive possession of the suit house?

(2) Whether  the  possession  of  

the  defendant in  the suit  house is  in  

part performance of the agreement of sale  

dated 05.12.1970?

(3) Whether  the  suit  claim  is  

barred by adverse possession?

(4) To what relief?”

3. The first two suits were decreed by the trial  

court  whereas  the  third  suit  was  dismissed.   These  

orders have been confirmed by the High Court in appeal.  

The present appeal is the outcome of the orders of the  

High Court.

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4. At the very outset, Mr. M.N.  Rao, the learned  

senior  counsel  for  the  appellant-A.P.  Reddy,  has  

pointed out that one of the issues that ought to have  

been  raised  and  decided  was  the  validity  of  the  

agreement to sell dated 5th December, 1970 in the light  

of the transfer of the property in dispute in violation  

of the lease agreement dated 10th December, 1969 and  

the various documents filed in the suit and it was thus  

appropriate that the matter be remanded to the trial  

court or the High Court for re-decision.   

5. Mr.  Rao  has  also  challenged  the  concurrent  

findings of fact recorded by the courts against the  

appellant herein.

6. Mr.  Vishwanath  Shetty,  the  learned  senior  

counsel for the respondent has, however, pointed out  

that the primary issue raised before the trial court  

and the High Court was with regard to the validity of  

the agreement dated 5th December, 1970 as the appellant  

had  denied  having  executed  it  and  there  was  no  

reference whatsoever in the pleadings with regard to  

the  validity  of  the  aforesaid  agreement  in  the  

background of the lease agreement dated 10th December,  

1969, and to remand the case for decision afresh on  

this limited issue after a gap of forty years could not  

be justified and would amount to a travesty of justice.

7. We  have  heard  the  learned  counsel  for  the

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parties  and  also  have  gone  through  the  records  

carefully.  It would perhaps be true to say that the  

validity  of   the  agreement  dated  5th December,  1970  

could have been the subject matter of a challenge in  

the  background  of  the  lease  agreement  dated  10th  

December,  1969  which  forbade  a  transfer  to  a  third  

party.  We are, however, not called upon to determine  

this fact as admittedly this issue has been raised for  

the first time at the stage of special leave.  We are  

therefore not inclined to grant permission to raise  

this  additional  plea  in  this  Court  at  this  belated  

stage.

8. We  thus  see  no  reason  to  interfere  in  these  

appeals.  

9. The  appeals  are  dismissed  in  the  aforesaid  

terms.  

 

    ..................J      [HARJIT SINGH BEDI]

    ..................J      [C.K. PRASAD]

NEW DELHI FEBRUARY 09, 2010.