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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  669 of 2001

PETITIONER: A.M. Ramanna

RESPONDENT: Land Tribunal, Mandya Taluk  & Ors

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 12/07/2007

BENCH: Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT & LOKESHWAR SINGH PANTA

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T

Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.

1.      Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by learned  Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court allowing the  revision petition filed under Section 121-A of the Karnataka  Land Reforms Act, 1961 (in short the ’Act’).  The non-official  respondent No.2 C.L. Thammaiah (since dead and substituted  by his legal heirs) had filed the revision before the High Court  questioning correctness of the order dated 28.2.1990 passed  by the Land Reforms Appellate Authority, Mandya, reversing  the  order passed by the Land Tribunal, Mandya on 21.1.1988.   Stand before the High Court was that the claim for grant of  occupancy, though initially accepted by the Land Tribunal was  erroneously rejected by the Appellate Authority on re- appreciation of the evidence.

2.      Background facts as noticed by the High Court in a  nutshell are as follows:

Thammaiah had two brothers, viz. Linge Gowda and Bore  Gowda. Bore Gowda is no more and his wife and daughter,  Kempamma and Sunandamma are respondents 3 and 4  respectively in this appeal. Admittedly, prior to 1960 there was  a partition amongst the 3 brothers, viz. Thammaiah, Linge  Gowda and Bore Gowda. The land Survey No.86/1 of  Chikkaballi, Mandya Taluk, along with other lands fell to the  share of Bore Gowda. It is not disputed that on 18.11.1960  Bore Gowda mortgaged the land in question in favour of  Thammaiah for a period of 10 years. Though the mortgage  period was upto 1970, on 27.8.1963 the said Bore Gowda  redeemed the mortgage. It is the case of the original tenant  Thammaiah that on 30.8.1963 Bore Gowda executed a lease  deed in his favour in respect of 14 items of land including the  land in question and since then the original tenant and after  his death his legal heirs are in possession and enjoyment of  the land as the tenants. Appellant-Ramanna, claimed to be the  purchaser of the land from Karigowda in the year 1972.  According to him, on 30.9.1963 the land in question was sold  by Bore Gowda in favour of his father-in-law, Karigowda, and  after about 9 years Karigowda sold the land to appellant and  handed over possession also. It is also undisputed that, after  the sale transaction in favour of appellant, as the original  tenant Thammaiah, resisted appellant from cultivating the  land in question on the ground that he is the tenant.  Appellant-Ramanna filed a suit in 0.S. No.26 of 1972 and

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during the pendency of the suit, as the provisions of the Act  came to be amended and Civil Courts were barred from  deciding the question of tenancy, the said suit was not  finalised. As stated earlier, after coming into force the Act as  amended by Karnataka Act No.1 of 1974, the original tenant,  Thammaiah, filed application in Form No.7 claiming  occupancy rights in respect of all the 14 items of lands  including the land in question. Before the Land Tribunal  statements of the parties were recorded and relying upon the  agreement deed and the rent receipts the Tribunal proceeded  to grant occupancy rights in favour of the original tenant  Thammaiah by the order dated 2.8.1975. The said order was  challenged by appellant before the High Court by way of a writ  petition and the High Court remanded the matter to the Land  Tribunal for fresh disposal in accordance with law. After the  remand, once again the parties were given opportunity to  adduce evidence and, after recording of such fresh evidence,  the Tribunal again gave occupancy rights to the said  Thammaiah. Aggrieved by the same, appellant approached the  Appellate Authority. Even before the Appellate Authority  opportunity to lead additional evidence was given to the  parties and, after recording such evidence, the Appellate  Authority doubting the veracity of the lease deed rejected the  claim of the revision petitioners. Hence revision petition was  filed before the High Court.

3.      Stand before the High Court was that the Appellate  Authority should have held that Thammaiah was a deemed  tenant in terms of Section 4.  It was also submitted merely  because the alleged lease deed was not a registered document  as required under law, the same cannot be treated to be a  concocted document. On the basis of the said agreement 14  lands belonging to Boregowda were leased out to the tenant  Thammaiah and except that land in dispute the remaining 13  lands which were given to the wife and daughter under a deed  of settlement had been granted to the original tenant only on  the basis of the said agreement.

4.      Stand of the respondents before the High Court was that  appellate authority dealt with each of the issue elaborately and  in detail and the court exercising its revisional jurisdiction  under Section 121-A of the Act should not interfere with the  findings of fact arrived at by the Appellate Authority. It was  pointed out that Karigowda the predecessor in title was in  possession of the land in question was its owner since  13.9.1960 as was held by the appellate authority.  Therefore  no lease could have been created by Boregowda and after 1972  as there was a sale by Karigowda and as there was no  subsisting relationship of landlord and tenant between himself  and revision petitioner or between Karigowda and the revision  petitioner since 1963.  The Revision petitioner was not entitled  for grant of occupancy right.   

5.      The High Court was of the view that there was no  discussion about the genuineness of the lease deed.  Finally, it  was concluded that Karigowda was not examined either before  the Tribunal or before the Appellate Authority by Ramanna, to  substantiate his case that it was Karigowda who was the  owner of the land from 1963 to 1972 from whom Ramanna  purchased the land in the year 1972. Accordingly the order of  the appellate authority was set aside.

6.      In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the  appellant submitted that the High Court’s order is not  supportable on facts and in law. The High Court has

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erroneously observed that there was no discussion about the  genuineness of the lease deed. The admitted fact is that  possession was taken at the time of redemption. The  possession had given to Karigowda and Karigowda had given it  to the appellant.  Basis of the claim was the lease-deed and  the rent receipts.  In the revenue records name of Thimmayya  was not there.

7.      Learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand  supported the order of the High Court.

8.      Few important dates need to be noted.  In the year 1960  there was a partition and the ownership of disputed property  Survey No.86/1 along with some other plots came to  Boregowda. On 18.11.1960 Boregowda mortgaged the property  with his own brother Thammaiah for a period of ten years.            9.      The said property was redeemed on 27.8.1963. On  30.9.1963 Boregowda sold the property to his father-in-law  Karigowda.            10.     As noted above the admitted position is that possession  was taken at the time of redemption, and the possession was  given to Karigowda, and Karigowda had handed over  possession to the appellant.

11.     On 1.3.1974 the Act was enacted. It was specifically  provided that the lands vest in the Government and tenants  were given right to claim occupancy rights. Thammiah filed the  petition before the land Tribunal and claimed to be the tenant  under Karigowda.  Interestingly Boregowda was not seen after  the sale. The claim of tenancy was initially accepted.  But the  High Court set aside the order and remanded the matter for  fresh consideration. The Land Tribunal again granted claim of  occupancy tenant.   12.     Before the Appellate authority following points were  formulated for determination:

(a)     Whether the disputed land is fit for agriculture? (b)     Whether the disputed land was tenanted as on  1.3.1974 or immediately prior thereto? (c)     As on 1.3.1974 or immediately prior to that,  whether the first respondent was a tenant cultivating the  disputed land lawfully under Boregowda? (d)     Whether the order of the Land Tribunal is valid? (e) What is the proper and suitable order that can be  passed in this appeal?

13.     As noted above basis of the claim was the lease- deed  and the rent receipts.  The Appellate Authority noted that  there was no dispute that Thammiah was in possession of the  disputed land.  Appellant had purchased the land under sale-  deed on 21.7.1972.  In order to prove that he was lawfully  cultivating the land relied Thammiah upon the Gutha  Agreement dated 30.8.1963 and the Gutha receipts dated  2.3.1964, 28.2.1966, 18.1.1965, 6.3.1970, 2.3.1969 and  16.2.1968. The appellate authority noted that Thamaiah  attempted to secure tenancy rights in the land that has gone  to the share of his younger brother. It was, therefore, known to  him that on 13.9.1963 Boregowda had sold the disputed land  under a sale deed to his father in law Karigowda. Karigowda in  his statement before the Land Tribunal made some significant  statements. The Appellate Authority noted that after partition  in the family Boregowda had mortgaged with possession of the

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land that came to his share for a period of 10 years by  receiving a loan from Thammaiah. Before completion of the ten  years period Boregowda repaid the mortgaged amount on  27.8.1963 and obtained back the possession.  Boregowda  discharged the mortgaged loan of Thammaiah on 27.8.1963.   In his cross examination Thammaiah had admitted that after  redeeming the mortgage for about 2 to 3 years he had not  done guthige of the land and gave the same to his younger  brother for a period of three years on concession.  After he left  the village continuing the guthige of the land again he himself  was doing it.  

14.     The Appellate Authority referred to the statement in the  cross examination and came to hold that he was not in  possession of the land on 30.8.1963.  The Pahani documents  of the land were examined and it was noted that the  possession and enjoyment of land by Thammaiah was not  there from 30.9.1963 and the same was not established.  In  the Pahari documents of the land his name was not entered as  tenant.  On 30.9.1963 Boregowda sold the disputed land to  his father in law.  After such sale in the Kandayam Patta Book  and Pahari documents of the disputed land name of the  Karigowda the purchaser was entered. He had even paid the  land tax to the State Government. Thammaiah who was the  village Patel has himself written remarks in the Putta Book by  receiving the land tax in the Kandayam Patta Book. He had  signed for having received the land tax in the Kandayam.  Contrary to what the High Court has observed, the Appellate  Authority in detail has examined the question as to the  genuineness of the lease deed.  In the statement recorded by  the Land Tribunal has been clearly admitted that the disputed  land was being cultivated by the Koregowda and his son in law  Boregowda jointly.  Therefore, the Appellate Authority inferred  that the sale deed was in force. After examining the materials  on record, the Appellate Authority recorded a categorical  finding that the lease deed was not a genuine document and it  was not a believable document.  The Appellate Authority noted  that Thammaiah was Patel of the village and he had full  knowledge of the transaction. High Court erred in holding that  there was no discussion on the factual aspect as to the  genuineness of the document. No evidence was adduced to  substantiate the claim of possession. It was also not shown as  to when possession was taken from Korigowda.   

15.     Above being the position the High Court should not have  interfered with the factual findings recorded by the appellate  authority while exercising jurisdiction under Section 121-A of  the Act.  The order of the High Court is not sustainable and is  set aside.

16.     The appeal succeeds but in the circumstances without  any order as to costs.