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PETITIONER: A.   K. KRAIPAK & ORS.  ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 29/04/1969

BENCH:

ACT: Natural     Justice-Applicability    of    principles     to Administrative proceedings-Violation of principles by  first authority-Effect on ultimate decision.

HEADNOTE: In   pursuance  of  the  Indian  Forest   Service   (Initial Recruitment)  Regulation, 1966, framed under r. 4(1) of  the Indian Forest Service (Recruitment) Rules made under the All India  Services  Act, 1951, a Special  Selection  Board  was constituted  for  selecting officers to  the  Indian  Forest Service  in  the  senior and  junior  scales  from  officers serving  in the forest department of the State of Jammu  and Kashmir.   One  of the members of the Board  was  the  Chief Conservator  of  Forests of the State, as )required  by  the Regulations.   He was a Conservator of forests appointed  as Acting Chief Conservator superseding another Conservator  of Forests  whose  appeal to the State Government  against  his supersession  was pending at the time the selections by  the Board were made.  The Acting Chief Conservator was also  one of  the  candidates  seeking to be selected  to  the  Indian Forest  Service.  The Board made the ’selection of  officers in   the  senior  and  junior  scales.   The  Acting   Chief Conservator’s  name was at the top of the list  of  selected officers, while the names of three conservators,  (including the  officer who was superseded), who were the Acting  Chief Conservator’s  rivals,  were  omitted.   The  Acting   Chief Conservator  did not sit in the Selection Board at the  time his   name   was  considered,  but   participated   in   the deliberations when the names of his rivals were  considered. He  -also  participated in the Board’s  deliberations  while preparing  the  list  of selected  candidates  in  order  of preference.   The  list  and the records were  sent  to  the Ministry  of Home Affairs and the Ministry of  Home  Affairs forwarded the list with its observations to the Union Public Service Commission, as required by the Regulations, and  the U.P.S.C.  examined  the records of the officers  afresh  and made   its   recommendations.   The  Government   of   India thereafter notified the list.  The three conservators, whose names  were  not included in the list, and  other  aggrieved officers  filed a petition in this Court under Art.  32  for quashing the notification. On the questions : (1) Assuming that the proceedings in  the present   case  were  administrative  proceedings,   whether principles  of natural justice applied to them; (2)  Whether there was a violation of such principles of natural  justice in  the present case; (3) Since the recommendations  of  the Board  were  first considered by the Home Ministry  and  the final  recommendations  were made by the  U.P.S.C.,  whether

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there  was  any basis for the petitioners’  grievances;  (4) Whether  there were grounds for setting aside the  selection of all the officers including those in the junior scales, HELD : (1) The rules of natural justice operate in areas not covered  by  any  law validly made, that  is,  they  do  not supplant  the law of the land but supplement it.   They  are not embodied rules and their aim is to secure justice or  to prevent  miscarriage of justice.  If that is their  purpose, there  is  no  reason  why  they  should       not  be  made applicable  to  administrative proceeding  also,  especially when it is not easy to draw the line that 458 demarcates  administrative  enquiries  from   quasi-judicial ones,  and an unjust decision in an  administrative  enquiry may  have  a more far-reaching effect than a decision  in  a quasi-judicial enquiry. [468F-G; 469B-D] Suresh  Koshy George v. The University of Kerala,  [1969]  1 S.C.R.  317,  State of Orissa v. Dr.,  (Miss)  Binapani  Dei [1967]  2 S.C.R. 625 and In re : H. K. (An Infant) [1967]  2 Q.B. 617, 630, referred to. (2)  The  concept of natural justice has undergone  a  great deal  of  change in recent years.  What particular  rule  of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend  to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that  case, the framework of the law under which the enquiry is held and the  constitution  of the Tribunal or the  body  of  persons appointed  for that purpose.  Whenever a complaint  is  made before  a court that some principle of natural  justice  had been  contravened,  the  court has  to  decide  whether  the observance of that rule was necessary for a just decision on the  facts  of that case.  The rule that enquiries  must  be held in good faith and without bias, and not arbitrarily  or unreasonably,  is  now  included  among  the  principles  of natural justice. [468G-H; 469D-L-] In  the  present case. at the time of selection,  the  other members  of  the Board did not know that the appeal  of  the superseded   conservator  was  pending  before   the   State Government  and  hence  there was no occasion  for  them  to distrust the opinion of the Acting Chief Conservator.  There was  a conflict between his interest and duty and he  was  a judge  in  his own cause.  Taking into  consideration  human probabilities  and  the ordinary course  of  human  conduct, there  was reasonable ground for believing that  the  Acting Chief  Conservator was likely to have been biased.   He  did not  participate in some of the deliberations of the  Board, but the facts that he was a member of the Board and that  he participated  in  the deliberations when the claims  of  his rivals  were considered and in the preparation of the  list, must have had its impact on the selection, as the Board,  in making the selection, must necessarily have given weight  to his  opinion.  In judging the suitability of the  candidates the  members of the Board must have had  mutual  discussions and  though the other members filed affidavits stating  that the  Acting Chief Conservator in no manner influenced  their decision,  in  group discussions, each member was  bound  to influence  the others in a subtle manner and  without  their being aware of such influence. [466D-G; 467A-D] In  the  circumstances  of the case, the  selection  by  the Board, could not be considered to have been taken fairly and justly as it was influenced by a member who was biased. [470 C-E] (3)  The  Selection  Board was undoubtedly  a  high  powered body,  and  its recommendations must have  had  considerable weight  with  the U.P.S.C. The recommendation  made  by  the U.P.S.C. could not be dissociated from the selection made by

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the  Selection  Board  which  was  the  foundation  for  the recommendations of the U.P.S.C. Therefore, if the  selection by  the Selection Board was held to be vitiated,  the  final recommendation  by  the U.P.S.C, must also be held  to  have been vitiated. [462 G-H; 469G-H] Regina  v.  Criminal Injuries Compensation Board,  Ex  Parte Lain, [1967] 2 Q.B. 864, 881, applied. Sumer  Chand  Jain v. Union of India W.P. No. 237  of  1966, dated 4-5-1967, distinguished. 459 (4)  The  selections to both senior and junior  scales  were made  from  the  same pool and so, it was  not  possible  to separate  the two sets of Officers.  Therefore, it  was  not sufficient to merely direct the Selection Board to  consider the  cases of the three conservators who were excluded,  but all the selections had to be set aside. [470 G-H; 471A]

JUDGMENT: ORIGINAL  JURISDICTION:  Writ Petitions Nos. 173 to  175  of 1967. Petition  under  Art. 32 of the Constitution  of  India  for enforcement of the fundamental rights. A.   K.  Sen  -and E. C. Agrawala, for the  petitioners  (in W.P. No. 173 of 1967). Frank  Anthony, E. C. Agrawala and A. T. M. Sampat, for  the petitioners (in W.P. No. 174 of 1967). C.   K.  Daphtary,  E. C. Agrawala, A. T. M. Sampat,  S.  R. Agarwala  and Champat Rai, for the petitioners (in W.P.  No. 175 of 1967). Niren De, Attorney-General, N. S. Bindra and R. N. Sachthey, for respondents Nos.  1 to 6 (in all the petitions). H.   R.  Gokhale and Harbans Singh, for respondents  Nos.  7 and 26 (in all the petitions). The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Hegde, J. These petitions are brought by some of the  Gazet- ted  Officers serving in the forest department of the  State of  Jammu  and  Kashmir.   Some  of  them  are  serving   as Conservators of Forests, some as Divisional Forest  Officers and  others  as Assistant Conservators of Forests.   All  of them  feel aggrieved by the selections made from  among  the officers  serving in the forest department of the  State  of Jammu  and Kashmir to the Indian Forest Service,  a  service constituted in 1966 under s. 3(1) of the All India  Services Act, 1951 and the rules framed thereunder.  Hence they  have moved this Court to quash notification No.  3/24/66-A-15(IV) dated the 29th July 1967 issued by the Government of  India, Ministry   of  Home  Affairs,  as  according  to  them   the selections  notified in the said notification are  violative of  Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution and on  the  further ground  that the selections in question are vitiated by  the contravention  of the principles of natural  justice.   They are  also  challenging the vires of s. 3 of  the  All  India Services Act, rule 4 of the rules framed under that Act  and Regulation   5  of  the  Indian  Forest   Service   (Initial Recruitment)    Regulations   1966,   framed    under    the aforementioned rule 4. Section 2(A) of the All India Services Act, 1951  authorises the  Central  Government to constitute three new  All  India Services 460 including  the  Indian Forest Service.  Section  3  provides that  the  Central  Government shall  after  consulting  the Government  of  the States concerned including that  of  the

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State of -Jammu and Kashmir to make rules for the regulation of  recruitment  and the conditions of  service  of  persons appointed  to those All India Services.  Sub-s. (2) of S.  2 prescribes that all rules made under that section "shall  be laid  for not less than fourteen days before  Parliament  as soon as possible after -they are made, and shall be  subject to   such  modifications,  whether  by  way  of  repeal   or amendment,  as Parliament may make on a motion  made  during the session in which they are so laid." In  pursuance of the power given under S. 3, rules  for  the recruitment to the Indian Forest Service were made in  1966- Indian  Forest Service (Recruitment) Rules, 1966.  The  only rule  relevant  for our present purpose is rule  4(1)  which reads :               "As soon as may be, after the commencement  of                             these   rules,  the  Central  Governme nt   ’May               recruit to the service any person from amongst               the  members  of  the  State  Forest   Service               adjudged  suitable  in  accordance  with  such               Regulations as the Central Government may make               in consultation with the State Governments and               the Commission." The  Commission referred to in the above rule is  the  Union Public Service Commission.  The Proviso to that sub-rufe  is not  relevant for our present purpose.  We may next come  to the Regulations  framed under rule 4(1).  Those Regulations  are known  as  the Indian Forest Service  (Initial  Recruitment) Regulations, 1966.  They are deemed to have come into  force on July 1, 1966.  Regulation 2 defines certain  expressions. Regulation  3  provides for the constitution  of  a  special selection  board.   It  says  that  the  purpose  of  making selection  to  State  cadre, the  Central  Government  shall constitute  a  special  selection board  consisting  of  the Chairman  of  the  Union Public Service  Commission  or  his nominee, the Inspector General of Forests of the  Government of  India, ad officer of the Government of India  not  below the  rank  of Joint Secretary, the Chief  Secretary  to  the State   Government  concerned  or  the  Secretary  of   that Government   dealing   with  the  forests  and   the   Chief Conservator  of Forests of the State  Government  concerned. Regulation 4 prescribes the conditions of eligibility.  That Regulation  contemplates the formation of a service  in  the senior scale and a service in the junior scale.   Regulation 5  is important for our present purpose.  It deals with  the -preparation of the list of suitable candidates.  It reads :               "(1) The Board shall prepare, in the order  of               preference, a  list of such officers of  State               Forest Service who                                    461               satisfy the conditions specified in regulation               4  and who are adjudged by the Board  suitable               for  appointment  to posts in the  senior  and               junior scales of the Service.               (2)   The  list  prepared in  accordance  with               sub-regulation  (1) shall then be referred  to               the  Commission  for advice,  by  the  Central               Government along with :-               (a)   the  records  of all officers  of  State               Forest Service               included   in the list;               (b)   the   records  of  all  other   eligible               officers of the               State  Forest  Service who  are  not  adjudged

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             suitable  for inclusion in the list,  together               with the reasons as recorded by the Board  for               their non-inclusion in the list; and               (c)   the   observations,  if  any,   of   the               Ministry    of    Home    Affairs    on    the               recommendations of the Board.               3.    On  receipt of the list, along with  the               other  documents  received  from  the  Central               Government  the Commission shall  forward  its               recommendations to that Government." Regulation 6 stipulates that the officers recommended by the Commission  under  sub-r.  (3)  of  Regulation  5  shall  be appointed  to the service by the Central Government  subject to  the  availability  of  vacancies  in  the  State   cadre concerned. In pursuance of the Regulation mentioned above, the  Central Government constituted a special selection board for select- ing  officers  to the Indian Forest Service  in  the  senior scale  as well as in the junior scale from those serving  in the  forest  department of the State of Jammu  and  Kashmir. The  nominee  of the Chairman of the  Union  Public  Service Commission,  one M. A. Venkataraman was the Chairman of  the board.   The other members of the board were  the  Inspector General  of Forests of the Government of India, one  of  the Joint  Secretaries  in the Government of  India,  the  Chief Secretary  to the State Government of Jammu and Kashmir  and Naqishbund, the Acting Chief Conservator of Forests of Jammu and Kashmir. The  selection  board met at Srinagar in May, 1967  and  se- lected respondents 7 to 31 in Writ Petition No. 173 of 1967. The  cases  of respondents Nos. 32 to 37 were  reserved  for further consideration.  The selections in question are  said to  have  been made solely on the basis of the  records  -of officers.    Their  suitability  was  not  tested   by   any examination,  written or oral., Nor were  they  interviewed. For several years before that selection the adverse  entries made in the character rolls of the officers had not been 462 communicated  to them and their explanation called for.   In doing  so  quite  clearly  the  authorities  concerned   had contravened  the instructions issued by the Chief  Secretary of the State.  Sometime after the afore-mentioned selections were  made, at the instance of the Government of India,  the adverse  remarks made in the course of years  against  those officers who had not been selected were communicated to them and their explanations called for.  Those explanations  were considered  by the State Government and on the basis of  the same,  some of the adverse remarks made against some of  the officers  were  removed.   Thereafter  the  selection  board reviewed  the  cases of officers not selected earlier  as  a result  of  which a few more officers  were  selected.   The selections as finally made by the board were accepted by the Commission.   On  the basis of the  recommendations  of  the Commission, the impugned list was published.  Even after the review  Basu, Baig and Kaul were not selected.  It may  also be noted that Naqishbund’s name is placed at the top of  the -list of selected officers. Naqishbund had been promoted as Chief Conservator of Forests in the year 1964.  He is not yet confirmed in that post.  G. H.  Basu, Conservator of Forests in the Kashmir Forest  Ser- vice who is admittedly senior to Naqishbund had appealed  to the  State  Government  against his  supersession  and  that appeal was pending with the State Government at the time the impugned  selections were made.  M. I. Baig and A.  N.  Kaul Conservators of Forests also claim that they are seniors  to

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Naqishbund but that fact is denied by Naqishbund.  Kaul  had also  appealed  against his alleged supersession but  it  is alleged   that  appeal  had  been  rejected  by  the   State Government. Naqishbund  was  also one of the candidates  seeking  to  be selected to the All India Forest Service.  We were told  and we  take  it  to  be correct that he  did  not  sit  in  the selection  board  at the time his name  was  considered  for selection  but  admittedly  he  did sit  in  the  board  and participate  in  its deliberations when the names  of  Basu, Baig  and Kaul, his rivals, were considered  for  selection. It  is  further  admitted that he  did  participate  in  the deliberations  of  the  board while preparing  the  list  of selected  candidates in order of preference, as required  by Regulation 5. The  selection  board was undoubtedly a high  powered  body. That  much was conceded by the learned Attorney-General  who appeared  for  the  Union Government as well  as  the  State Government.   It  is  true that the  list  prepared  by  the selection  board was not the last word in the matter of  the selection  -in -question.  That list along with the  records of  the officers in the concerned cadre selected as well  as not selected had to be sent to the Minis-                             463 try  of Home Affairs.  We shall assume that as  required  by Regulation  5,  the Ministry of Home Affairs  had  forwarded that  list with its observations to the Commission  and  the Commission  had  examined the records of  all  the  officers afresh before making its recommendation.  But it is  obvious that the recommendations made by the selection board  should have weighed with the Commission.  Undoubtedly the adjudging of  the merits of the candidates by the selection board  was an extremely important step in the process. It  was  contended  before us that s. 3  of  the  All  India Services  Act,  rule 4 of the rules  framed  thereunder  and Regulation   5  of  the  Indian  Forest   Service   (Initial Recruitment)  Regulations 1966 are void as those  provisions confer  unguided, uncontrolled and uncanalised power on  the concerned  delegates.   So far as the vires of s. 3  of  the Indian  Administrative Act is concerned, the question is  no more  res integra.  It is concluded by the decision of  this Court in D. S. Garewal v. The State of Punjab and Anr.(1) We have not thought it necessary to go into the question of the vires  of  rule 4 and Regulation 5, as we have come  to  the conclusion that the impugned selections must be struck  down for the reasons to be presently stated. There  was  considerable  controversy before us  as  to  the nature  of the power conferred on the selection board  under rule 4 read with Regulation 5. It was contended on behalf of the  petitioners that that power was a quasi-judicial  power whereas the case for the contesting respondents was that  it was  a  purely  administrative power.   In  support  of  the contention  that the power in question was a  quasi-judicial power emphasis was laid on the language of rule 4 as well as Regulation  5 which prescribe that the selections should  be made  after  adjudging  the  suitability  of  the   officers belonging to the State service.  The word ’adjudge’ we  were told means "to judge or decide".  It was contended that such a power is essentially a judicial power and the same had  to be  exercised  in accordance with the  well  accepted  rules relating to the exercise of such a power.  Emphasis was also laid on the fact that the power in question was exercised by a  statutory  body  and a wrong exercise of  that  power  is likely  to affect adversely the careers of the officers  not selected.  On the other hand it was contended by the learned

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Attorney-General  that  though  the selection  board  was  a statutory  body, as it was not required to decide about  any right, the proceedings before it cannot be considered quasi- judicial; its duty was merely to select officers who in  its opinion  were  suitable  for being absorbed  in  the  Indian Forest Service.  According to him the word ’adjudge’ in rule 4 as well as Regulation 5 means "found worthy of selection". (1)  [1959] 1 Supp.  S.C.R. 792. 464 The  dividing  line between an administrative  power  and  a quasi-judicial  power is quite thin and is  being  gradually obliterated.   For  determining  whether  a  power   is   an administrative  power or a quasi-judicial power one  has  to look  to  the nature of the power conferred, the  person  or persons  on whom it is conferred, the framework of  the  law conferring  that  power, the consequences ensuing  from  the exercise of that power and the manner in which that power is expected  to be exercised.  Under our Constitution the  rule of  law  pervades over the entire field  of  administration. Every organ of the State under our Constitution is regulated and controlled by the rule of law.  In a welfare State  like ours   it  is  inevitable  that  the  jurisdiction  of   the administrative  bodies is increasing at a rapid  rate.   The concept  of  rule  of law would lose  its  vitality  if  the instrumentalities of the State are not charged with the duty of  discharging their functions in a fair and  just  manner. The  requirement of acting judicially in essence is  nothing but  a  requirement to act justly and fairly and  not  arbi- trarily   or   capriciously.   The  procedures   which   are considered inherent in the exercise of a judicial power  are merely those which facilitate if not ensure a just and  fair decision.   In  recent years the concept  of  quasi-judicial power  has  been  undergoing a  radical  change.   What  was considered as an administrative power some years back is now being  considered as a quasi-judicial power.  ’Me  following observations  of  Lord  Parker C.J. in  Regina  v.  Criminal Injuries   Compensation  Board,  Ex.   Parte   Lain(1)   are instructive.               "With  regard to Mr. Bridge’s second  point  I               cannot  think  that Atkin,  L.J.  intended  to               confine  his principle to cases in  which  the               determination affected rights in the sense  of               enforceable    rights.    Indeed,    in    the               Electricity  Commissioners  case,  the  rights               determined  were at any rate  not  immediately               enforceable rights since the scheme laid  down               by the commissioners had to be approved by the               Minister  of Transport and by  resolutions  of               Parliament.   The  commissioners  nevertheless               were held amenable to the jurisdiction of this               court.  Moreover, as can be seen from Rex.  v.               Postmaster-General,  Ex-parte Carmichael (2  )               and  Rex. v. Boycott Ex parte  Keasley(3)  the               remedy  is available even though the  decision               is merely a step as a result of which  legally               enforceable rights may be affected.               The  position  as I see it is that  the  exact               limits  of  the  ancient  remedy  by  way   of               certiorari have never been and ought not to be               specifically defined.  They have varied               (1) [1967] 2 Q.B. 864, 881.               (2) [1928] 1 K.B.291.               (3)   [1939] 2 K.B. 651.                                    465               from  time  to  time being  extended  to  meet

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             changing  conditions.   At one time  the  writ               only  went  to an inferior court.   Later  its               ambit  was  extended  to  statutory  tribunals               determining a lis inter parties.  Later  again               it extended to cases where there was no lis in               the  strict  sense  of  the  word  but   where               immediate  or subsequent rights of  a  citizen               were  affected.   The  only  constant   limits               throughout  were  that it  was  performing  -a               public  duty.  Private or  domestic  tribunals               have   always  been  outside  the   scope   of               certiorari  since their authority  is  derived               solely from contract, that is, from the agree-               ment of the parties concerned.               Finally, it is to be observed that the  remedy               has now been extended, see Reg. v.  Manchester               Legal  Aid Committee, Ex parte R. A.  Brand  &               Co. Ltd.(1) to cases in which the decision  of               an  administrative officer is only arrived  at               after  an inquiry or process of a judicial  or               quasi-judicial character.  In such a case this               court  has  jurisdiction  to  supervise   that               process.               We have as it seems to me reached the position               when  the ambit of certiorari can be  said  to               cover every case in which a body of persons of               a  public  as opposed to a purely  private  or               domestic  character has to  determine  matters               affecting subjects provided always that it has               a  duty to act judicially.  Looked at in  this               way the board in my judgment comes fairly  and               squarely,  within  the  jurisdiction  of  this               court.   It is as Mr. Bridge said, ’a  servant               of  the Crown charged by the Crown, by  execu-               tive    instruction,   with   the   duty    of                             distributing  the bounty of the Crown. ’  It  is               clearly, therefore, performing public duties." The  Court of Appeal of New Zealand has held that the  power to make a zoning order under Dairy Factory Supply Regulation 1936  has  to be exercised judicially, see New  Zealand  and Dairy Board v. Okita Co-operative Dairy Co. Ltd. (2).   This Court  in  The Purtabpore Co. Ltd. v. Cane  Commissioner  of Bihar  and  Ors.(3) held that the power to  alter  the  area reserved  under  the Sugar Cane (Control) Order  1966  is  a quasi-judicial power.  With the increase of the power of the administrative  bodies  it has become necessary  to  provide guidelines for the just exercise of their power.  To prevent the abuse of that power and to see that it does not become a new despotism, courts are gradually evolving (1)  [1952] 2 Q.B. 413; (2)  [1953] New Zealand Law Reports p. 366. (3)  [1969] 2 S.C.R. 807. 466 the principles to be observed while exercising such  powers. In  matters  like these, public good is not  advanced  by  a rigid  adherence to precedents.  New problems call  for  new solutions.  It is neither possible nor desirable to fix  the limits  of a quasi-judicial power.  But for the  purpose  of the  present case we shall ,assume that the power  exercised by the selection board was an administrative power and  test the validity of the impugned selections on that basis. It  is unfortunate that Naquishbund was appointed as one  of the  members  of  the  selection board.   It  is  true  that ordinarily  the  Chief  Conservator of Forests  in  a  State

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should  be considered as the most -appropriate person to  be in  the  selection board.  He must be expected to  know  his officers  thoroughly,  their  weaknesses as  well  as  their strength.   His  opinion as regards  their  suitability  for selection  to  the All India Service is  entitled  to  great weight.  But then under the circumstances it was improper to have  included  Naquishbund  as a member  of  the  selection board.   He  was  one of the persons to  be  considered  for selection.   It is against all canons of justice to  make  a man  judge  in his own cause.  It is true that  he  did  not participate  in the deliberations of the committee when  his name  was considered.  But then the very fact that he was  a member  of the selection board must have had its own  impact on the decision of the selection board.  Further  admittedly he participated in the deliberations of the selection  board when the claims of his rivals particularly that of Basu  was considered.   He  was also party to the preparation  of  the list  of  selected candidates in order  of  preference.   At every  stage of this participation in the  deliberations  of the  selection  board  there  was  a  conflict  between  his interest   and  duty.   Under  those  circumstances  it   is difficult to believe that he could have been impartial.  The real question is not whether he was biased.  It is difficult to  prove the state of mind of a person.  Therefore what  we have  to  see  is whether there  is  reasonable  ground  for believing that he was likely to have been biased.  We  agree with  the learned Attorney General that a mere suspicion  of bias  is  not  sufficient.   There  must  be  a   reasonable likelihood  of  bias.  In deciding the question of  bias  we have  to  take into consideration  human  probabilities  and ordinary course of human conduct.  It was in the interest of Naqishbund  to  keen out his rivals in order to  secure  his position  from  further challenge.  Naturally  he  was  also interested in safeguarding his position while preparing  the list of selected candidates. The  members of the selection board other  than  Naqishbund, each  one of them separately, have filed affidavits in  this Court swearing that Naqishbund in no manner influenced their decision in making the selections.  In a group  deliberation each member                             467 of  the group is bound to influence the others, more so,  if the member concerned is a person with special knowledge.  Ms bias  is  likely to operate in a subtle manner.   It  is  no wonder  that  the other members of the selection  board  are unaware of the extent to which his opinion influenced  their conclusions.  We are unable to accept the contention that in adjudging  the suitability of the candidates the members  of the board did not have any mutual discussion.  It is not  as if  the  records  spoke of themselves.   We  are  unable  to believe that the members of selection board functioned  like computers.   At this stage it may also be noted that at  the time the selections were made, the members of the  selection board  other than Naqishbund were not likely to  have  known that Basu had appealed against his supersession and that his appeal  was pending before the State Government.   Therefore there  was  no  occasion for them to  distrust  the  opinion expressed  by  Naqishbund.  Hence the board  in  making  the selections must necessarily have given weight to the opinion expressed by Naqishbund. This  takes  us to the question whether  the  principles  of natural justice apply to administrative proceedings  similar to  that  with  which  we  are  concerned  in  these  cases. According  to the learned Attorney General those  principles have no bearing in determining the validity of the  impugned

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selections.   In  support of his contention he  read  to  us several  decisions.   It is not necessary to  examine  those decisions as there is a great deal of fresh thinking on  the subject.   The  horizon  of natural  justice  is  constanlty expanding.   The question how far the principles of  natural justice   govern  administrative  enquiries  came   up   for consideration before the Queens Bench Division in In re : H. K.  (An  Infant) (1).  Therein the validity  of  the  action taken  by an Immigration Officer came up for  consideration. In  the  course of his judgment Lord Parker,  C.J.  observed thus :               "But  at  the same time, I myself  think  that               even  if  an immigration officer is not  in  a               judicial  or quasi-judicial capacity, he  must               at any rate give the immigrant an  opportunity               of  satisfying  him  of  the  matters  in  the               subsection,  and  for  that  purpose  let  the               immigrant  know what his immediate  impression               is  so  that the immigrant can  disabuse  him.               That is not, as I see it, a question of acting               or  being required to act judicially,  but  of               being   required   to   act   fairly.     Good               administration  and  an honest  or  bona  fide               decision must, as it seems to me, require  not               merely impartiality, nor merely bringing one’s               mind  to  bear  on  the  problem,  but  acting               fairly;  and  to the limited extent  that  the               circumstances  of any particular  case  allow,               and within the legislative frame work under               (1)   [1967] 2 Q.B. 617, 630.               468               which  the administrator is working,  only  to               that limited extent do the so-called rules  of               natural justice apply, which in a case such as               this  is  merely  a duty  to  act  fairly.   I               appreciate that in saying that it may be  said               that one is going further than is permitted on               the  decided cases because heretofore  at  any               rate  the decisions of the courts do  seem  to               have  drawn  a strict line  in  these  matters               according to whether there is or is not a duty               to act judicially or quasi-judicially."               In the same case Blain, J. observed thus               "I would only say that an immigration  officer               having  assumed  the jurisdiction  granted  by               those provisions is in a position where it  is               his duty to exercise that assumed jurisdiction               whether  it  be administrative,  executive  or               quasi-judicial,   fairly,  by  which  I   mean               applying  his mind dispassionately to  a  fair               analysis  of  the particular problem  and  the               information available to him in analysing  it.               If  in any hypothetical case, and in any  real               case,   this  court  was  satisfied  that   an               immigration officer was not so doing, then  in               my view mandamus would lie."               In State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani  Dei               and  Ors.(1) Shah, J. speaking for the  Court,               dealing  with an enquiry made as  regards  the               correct age of a government servant,  observed               thus               "We  think that such an enquiry  and  decision               were contrary to the basic concept of  justice               and cannot have any value. It is true that the               order is administrative in character,but  even

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             an   administrative   order   which   involves               civil consequences as already stated, must  be               made  consistently with the rules  of  natural               justice  after informing the first  respondent               of the case of the State The aim of the rules of natural justice is to secure justice or  to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of  justice. These rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly  made.  In other words they do not supplant the  law of  the  land  but supplement  it.-The  concept  of  natural justice  has  undergone  a great deal of  change  in  recent years.  In the past it was thought that it included just two rules  namely  (1) no one shall be a judge in his  own  case (Nemo  debet esse judex propria causa) and (2)  no  decision shall  be  given  against a party without  affording  him  a reasonable hearing (audi alteram partem).  Very soon  there- after  a  third rule was envisaged and that is  that  quasi- judicial enquiries must be held in good faith, without  bias and not arbitrarily (1)  [1967] 2 S.C.R. 625.                             469 or  unreasonably.   But  in the course of  years  many  more subsidiary  rules came to be added to the rules  of  natural justice.   Till  very  recently it was the  opinion  of  the courts  that unless the authority concerned was required  by the  law under which it functioned to act  judicially  there was  no  room for the application of the  rules  of  natural justice.  The validity of that limitation is now questioned. If the purpose of the rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage  of  justice one fails to see  why  those  rules should  be  made inapplicable to  administrative  enquiries. Often times it is not easy to draw the line that  demarcates administrative  enquiries  from  quasi-judicial   enquiries. Enquiries  which were considered administrative at one  time are  now  being considered as  quasijudicial  in  character. Arriving  at  a  just decision is the  aim  of  both  quasi- judicial enquiries as well as administrative enquiries.   An unjust  decision in an administrative enquiry may have  more far  reaching  effect  than a decison  in  a  quasi-judicial enquiry.   As observed by this Court in Suresh Koshy  George v. The University of Kerala and Ors.(1) the rules of natural justice  are  not embodied rules.  What particular  rule  of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend  to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that  case, the framework of the law under which the enquiry is held and the  constitution  of  the  Tribunal  or  body  of   persons appointed  for that purpose.  Whenever a cornplaint is  made before  a court that some principle of natural  justice  had been contravened the court has to decide whether the  obser- vance of that was necessary for a just decision on the facts of that case. It was next urged by the learned Attorney-General that after all the selection board was only a recommendatory body.  Its recommendations  had  first  to be considered  by  the  Home Ministry   and  *.hereafter  by  the  U.P.S.C.   The   final recommendations  were made by the U.P.S.C. Hence  grievances of  the  petitioners have no real basis.  According  to  him while  considering  the validity of  administrative  actions taken,  all  that  we have to see is  whether  the  ultimate decision  is just or not.  We are unable to agree  with  the learned  Attorney-General that the recommendations  made  by the selection board were of little consequence.  Looking  at the  composition of the board and the nature of  the  duties entrusted  to it we have no doubt that  its  recommendations should have carried considerable weight with the U.P.S.C. If

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the  decision  of the selection board is held to  have  been vitiated,   it  is  -clear  to  our  mind  that  the   final recommendation  made by the Commission must also be held  to have  been vitiated.  The recommendations made by the  Union Public  Service Commission cannot be disassociated from  the selections made by the selection board which (1)  [1969] 1 S.C.R. 317. 470 is  the  foundation  for the recommendations  of  the  Union Public Service Commission.  In this connection reference may be  usefully  made  to the decision in  Regina  v.  Criminal Injuries Compensation Board Ex.  Parte Lain(1). It  was next urged by the learned Attorney-General that  the mere  fact that one of the members of the Board  was  biased against  some of the petitioners cannot vitiate  the  entire proceedings.  In this connection he invited our attention to the  decision of this Court in Sumer Chand Jain v. Union  of India  and  another(2).   Therein  the  Court  repelled  the contention that the proceedings of a departmental  promotion committee  were  vitiated  as one of  the  members  of  that committee  was  favourably  disposed  towards  one  of   the selected  candidates.   The question before  the  Court  was whether  the plea of mala fides was established.  The  Court came to the conclusion that on the material on record it was unable  to  uphold  that plea.  In that case  there  was  no question  of any conflict between duty and interest nor  any members of the departmental promotion committee was a  judge in his own case.  The only thing complained of was that  one of  the  members of the promotion committee  was  favourably disposed  towards  one  of the  competitors.   As  mentioned earlier  in this case we are essentially concerned with  the question  whether  the decision taken by the  board  can  be considered as having been taken fairly and justly. One more argument of the learned Attorney-General remains to be  considered.  He urged that even if we are to  hold  that Naqishbund should not have participated in the deliberations of  the selection board while it considered the  suitability of Basu, Baig and Kaul, there is no ground to set aside  the selection  of other officers.  According to him it  will  be sufficient in the interest of justice if we direct that  the cases  of Basu, Baig and Kaul be reconsidered by a Board  of which  Naqishbund  is not a member.  Proceeding  further  he urged  that under any circumstance no case is made  out  for disturbing  the  selection  of the officers  in  the  junior scale.  We are unable to accept either of these contentions. As seen earlier Naqishbund was a party to the preparation of the select list in order of preference and that he is  shown as  No. 1 in the list.  To that extent he was undoubtedly  a judge in his own case, a circumstance which is abhorrent  to our concept of justice.  Now coming to the selection of  the officers  in  the. junior scale service, the  selections  to both  senior scale service as well as junior  scale  service were made from the same pool.  Every officer who had put  in a  service  of 8 years or more, even if he was  holding  the post of an Assistant Conservator of Forests was eligible for being selected for the senior scale service.  In fact some (1)  [1967] 2 Q.B. 864. (2)  Writ Petition No. 237/1966 decided on 4-5-1967.                             471 Assistant  Conservators  have been selected for  the  senior scale  service.  At the same time some of the  officers  who had  put  in  more  than eight years  of  service  had  been selected  for  the junior scale service.  Hence  it  is  not possible to separate the two sets of officers. For the reasons mentioned above these petitions are  allowed

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and the impugned selections set aside.  The Union Government and  the  State  Government  shall  pay  the  costs  of  the petitioners. V.P.S.                  Petitions allowed. 472